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Abstract
I
n contemporary debates, the concept of Europe is most often dis-
cussed and defined in terms of a geographical, cultural-historical, 
political, or even as an economic entity. This dissertation aims at 
reinstituting the philosophical relevance of this concept by articula-
ting a new understanding of one of its guiding intellectual motives: 
the idea of universalism. Against the typically modern understanding of 
this idea – most evident in the violent and unilateral history of European 
expansionism – this work provides a new articulation of this idea as a ne-
cessarily pluralistic and self-critical category of historical and intercultural 
reflection.
  This work has its methodological and conceptual background in the 
philosophical work of Edmund Husserl (1859–1938). Late in his career, 
Husserl – the founder of modern phenomenology – composed a series of 
essays and lectures discussing the topic of Europe, its philosophical idea 
and teleological-spiritual history. These texts, which had their imminent 
background in the devastating experience of the First World War (1914–
1918) and the consequent political turmoil of the Weimar Republic, took 
their point of departure from the overall cultural “crisis” of European 
humanity, which seemed to lose its confidence in the founding ideas of 
modernity, most importantly, in the idea of universal reason within the 
domains of scientific and political activity. 
  The argument of this work is based on a conviction according to which 
Husserl’s late reflections on Europe should not be treated as mere analyses 
of contemporary criticism, but as serious phenomenological reflections 
on the particular topics of generativity and historicity, that is, those forms 
of meaning-creation that take place in interpersonal, intergenerational 
and geo-historical processes of co-operation. Through his reflections on 
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Europe, it is argued, Husserl presented the most compelling and radical 
interpretation on the intersubjective, communal and historical dimen-
sions of phenomenology, announcing itself in the novel understanding of 
philosophy as an essentially normative undertaking.
  The dissertation is divided into four parts. The first part of the work 
deals with the idea of crisis as the point of departure for Husserl’s reflec-
tions. By discussing the intellectual history of this concept and its connec-
tions to the basic presuppositions of the historical and political thought 
of modernity, it shows how Husserl’s own reflections aimed at a radical 
reinterpretation of the idea of crisis in terms of a necessary category of 
historical development. The second part focuses on the general metho-
dological and conceptual approach of Husserl’s late phenomenology of 
generativity. It argues that Husserlian phenomenology – often considered 
as a mere instantiation of modern transcendental philosophy – should not 
be restricted to the domain of individual consciousness but rather pro-
vides a rich and indispensable conceptual framework for understanding 
social, cultural, and political phenomena. The third part of the work dis-
cusses Husserl’s analysis of Greek philosophy as the teleological origin of 
Europe. By focusing on a series of manuscripts, this part delineates a new 
articulation of philosophy as a specifically generative phenomenon that 
unfolds in the new understanding of rational life, communal co-operation 
and political universalism. Finally, on the basis of the aforementioned in-
sights, the fourth part of the work goes on to articulate a new constructive 
account of philosophical universalism, necessarily accompanied by a rene-
wed understanding of historical teleology and political idealism. Along-
side with Husserl’s strong emphasis on Greek philosophy for a renewed 
understanding of universalism, this work shows the necessity of establis-
hing a dialogue with another central variation of this idea, that of Christian 
experience articulated by St. Paul.
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F
or one reason or another, Europe seems to be the sole conti-
nent that has serious difficulties in defining its own borders. 
Historically speaking, Europe has defined itself with regard to 
numerous sets of frontiers, beginning from Anaximander’s (c. 
610–546 BC) and Hecataeus’ (c. 550 BC–c. 476 BC) identifi-
cation of the rivers Nile and Phasis as separating Europe from the conti-
nents of Libya and Asia. As a territorial entity, however, Europe has never 
been unequivocal; its history is that of an ambiguous, even chameleonic 
figure. We are familiar with the story of princess Europa being abducted 
by Zeus from Phoenicia to Crete, referring to the ideas of transgression 
and unfamiliarity as the basic characteristics of this figure. Although we 
are accustomed to consider mainland Attica of the Classical period as the 
heart of Europe, Aristotle, for one, situated the Greeks between the peo-
ples of Asia and Europe, the first being slavish by nature while the latter 
“full of spirit but somewhat deficient in intelligence and skill […] lack-
ing in political organization and capacity to rule their neighbors”.1 All in 
all, it is an inherent characteristic of European history that it is constant 
transgression and reorganization of national, ethnic, and cultural limits. 
In terms of political agenda, the rapid expansion of the European Union 
since the mid-1990s has raised new questions about the extent of Europe 
– for instance, are countries such as Turkey or Ukraine really a part of Eu-
rope? – entailing a new geo-political relevance of the territorial definition 
of Europe.2 On different cultural, historical and even economic grounds, 
many critics have given up on the idea of Europe as a fixed territorial area 
and tried to define it in terms of “fuzzy borders” or “concentric circles,” 
describing the fluctuating and overlapping character of its boundaries.3 
1 Aristotle, Pol. VII.1327b23–26.
2 So far, Morocco has been the only country that has been denied membership in the EU 
on geographical grounds.
3 See Mertes & Prill 1990; Zielonka 2003.
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  In the contemporary debates, we are of course familiar with this spe-
cific transitivity of limits under the title of “globalization”. From the Great 
Commission of Early Christianity to the different forms of European-
Western imperialism and colonialism, as well as the more contemporary 
forms of economic cross-border exchange, it seems that the history of 
European nations has not unfolded as one of “sacred limits” but, on the 
contrary, of “barriers” to be overcome.4 In this regard, the history of Eu-
rope is inseparable from the motive of universalism – articulating itself in 
the philosophical, social, juridical, and geo-political developments of the 
past two and a half millennia. And as we know, this development, despite 
some undeniably positive consequences, has also been quite harmful: the 
modern and pre-modern ventures to overcome borders have not real-
ized themselves through reciprocal dialogue but too often by means of 
the unilateral politics of force. Universal values have not been negotiated 
but exported; moreover, they have been accompanied by culturally spe-
cific practices such as centralized political institutions, Christian religious 
practices, the capitalist market-economy, and so on. Not all borders have 
vanished, however, but new kinds of borders have been and are in the 
making. Instead of the threefold division between the domains of capi-
talist market-economy, state-socialism, and the non-aligned countries of 
the Third World, we are now dividing the cultural and geo-political space 
according to the “old but new” polarities of Europe vs. the Islamic World, 
Europe vs. the rising economies and so on. Despite the successful proj-
ect of European political integration since the beginning of the 1950s, 
we have also witnessed growing disparities within Europe itself – result-
ing from the never-ending series of financial crises, the status of national 
economies and the level of education – which, instead of the old division 
between East and West, announce themselves in the novel dictum of South 
and North.
  As a consequence of this development, I believe, the idea of universal-
ism has fallen between two competing strains of interpretation. On the 
one hand, universalism is acknowledged ever more firmly as the necessary 
point of departure for a genuine democratic culture – both national as 
well as global. A welfare state, it is argued, cannot exist without universal 
healthcare and social security; a global democratic order must be found-
4 Marx 1993: 408.
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ed on universal human rights. In the discussions concerning the status of 
minorities, principles of universalism are often promulgated as the best 
way to enhance the voices of the less heard: a revealing example of the 
indisputability of universalism can be found in the UN’s Vienna declara-
tion of 1993, which firmly states that “the universal nature of these rights 
and freedoms is beyond question.”5 On the other hand, during the last few 
decades universalism has also been disparaged to the point that, at least in 
academic discourse, it has found little unconditional support. Following 
the works of theoreticians such as Edward Said and Immanuel Wallerstein, 
universalism – as a typically European or Western phenomenon – has been 
associated with colonialism, imperialism and even totalitarianism; further, 
it has become common to treat this idea as a product of the Euro-centric 
and “instrumental” rationality of the Enlightenment period.6 Thus, it is 
often stressed that, for instance, the discourse on new European identity 
should take its point of departure from concepts and categories that are 
explicitly non-universalistic, or, as Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000) has put it: 
simply provincial.7 For our contemporary theoretical framework, cultural 
particularism seems to be the only serious alternative to universalism.
5 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, World Conference on Human Rights on 25 
June 1993.
6 In his thoughtful work European Universalism: The Rhetoric of Power (2006), Immanuel 
Wallerstein offers a rather sketchy but provoking history of European universalism begin-
ning from the colonialism of the 15th century to the present moment. Rather than equating 
it with imperialism as such, Wallerstein – one of the great thinkers of the modern global 
system – sees universalism as a “rhetorical device” inherent in the European-Occidental 
tradition, as something that “has been put forward by pan-European leaders and intellectu-
als in their quest to pursue the interests of the dominant strata of the modern world-sys-
tem” (Wallerstein 2006: xiv). From the Spanish conquistadores to the Bush administration, 
this rhetoric has been used to justify the suppression of “barbaric” peoples, the ending of 
alien practices and the destructive leveling of unique cultural features. Rather than serving 
as a means for true unification, universalism has been employed as a means of exclusion, of 
segregation. What makes Wallerstein’s approach particularly compelling is his inclination 
(as manifested in the third part of the book, “Scientific universalism”) to read the history 
of universalism, not merely in standard practical-political terms, but also as resulting from 
the inner contradictions of the modern scientific worldview, more precisely, from the split 
between the “two cultures” of techno-scientist and cultural-humanistic enterprise. The 
domination of Naturwissenschaften over Geisteswissenschaften, the hegemony of the objectivist 
and value-free investigation, has contributed to the propagation of seemingly neutral ideal 
of knowledge and the loss of cultural sensitivity, which, as Wallerstein argues, has resulted 
in a complete neglecting of the systemic inequalities of what he considers to be the preva-
lent form of modern universalism, namely, global capitalism (Wallerstein 1999; 2001).




  In the preface to his work Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcenden-
tal Phenomenology (Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzen-
dentale Phänomenologie, 1936), Edmund Husserl posed the question on the 
nature of this universalizing development with the expression “spectacle 
of Europeanization” (Schauspiel der Europäisierung).8 Leaving aside its pre-
cise historical character, Husserl asked whether this process could be un-
derstood according to an “absolute sense”, as distinct from what he called 
its “historical nonsense”. What this distinction seemed to imply was that 
for Husserl, despite the unjust history of the European-Occidental univer-
salism – founded on the “naive and (if carefully thought through) even ab-
surd rationalism [of the eighteenth century]”9 – the dissolution of cultural 
limits hid within itself a more profound sense, one that perhaps resisted 
the inextricably unilateral and violent realization of this idea. The reader, 
however, finds no further evidence for this claim in the Crisis: in the pub-
lished Biemel-edition (orig. publ. 1954) of the work, Husserl never really 
explicitly returned to the question on the absolute or proper sense of Eu-
ropeanization. Instead, the vagueness of Husserl’s remarks has enhanced 
his reputation as an uncritically Euro-centric philosopher.
* * *
This dissertation discusses the ideas of Europe and European universalism 
within the framework of Husserlian phenomenology. It is the key argu-
ment of this work that Husserl’s late reflections on Europe should not be 
read either as departures from his early transcendental phenomenology 
or as simple exercises of cultural criticism, but as systematic phenom-
enological reflections on the particular topics of generativity and historicity. 
Through his reflections on Europe, I argue, Husserl presented the most 
compelling and radical interpretation on the intersubjective, communal 
and historical dimensions of phenomenology, announcing itself in a novel 
understanding of philosophy as an essentially normative undertaking. 
  The theoretical aim of this work is twofold. First, I aim at articulating 





late transcendental phenomenology. It is my conviction that Husserl’s late 
reflections provide us with an idea of philosophy that based its claim of 
theoretical universality not on a Cartesian-Kantian idea of self-reflecting 
subjectivity but on a plurality of historical traditions and possible stand-
points. This entailed that philosophy, in its pretension to universality, was 
to be conceived in terms of a geo-social-historical movement that articu-
lates itself always from within a particular tradition, but also in a critical rela-
tion towards this tradition. Instead of a final and absolute standpoint, the 
universal could only be thought in terms of an infinite task, i.e., as con-
stant reflexivity and perpetual renewal that has its infinitely open horizon 
over the course of generations. Secondly, by discussing the idea of teleo-
logical-historical reflection on the basis of Husserl’s work, I aim at articu-
lating a novel understanding of the ideas of historical teleology and progress. 
These ideas – usually interpreted as the watershed between the project of 
modern philosophy and its critical renditions in the postmodern tradition – 
were mainly discussed by Husserl only in his unpublished works; however, 
I believe that his somewhat heterogeneous and scattershot remarks pro-
vide a new understanding of these ideas as phenomenological concepts. 
For Husserlian phenomenology, I argue, teleology and progress are to be 
understood as categories of historical reflection that are guided by the idea 
of phenomenological epoché (i.e. “rendering inoperative”) and thus they 
are to be conceived (i) critical towards all particular accounts of historical 
development, and (ii) something which emerge in the present moment. 
Instead of a Kantian-Hegelian concept of historical teleology as a narrative 
of inevitable progress, or its renditions in the Nietzschean-Spenglerian 
formulations of inevitable decline, the historical thinking of phenomenol-
ogy ought to be understood in terms of the “bracketing” of all particular 
accounts or narratives of historical development.10 Instead of a pre-given 
theodicy, the phenomenological idea of teleology is best understood as 
a post-theological or post-metaphysical – but not post-modern – concept, 
10 With the concepts of narrative and narrativity I am basically referring to the discourse 
inaugurated by Paul Ricoeur, who discusses these concepts in relation to the phenomeno-
logical theory of subjectivity. Instead of denoting any kind of “mythical” or “fictive” account 
of the constitution of subjectivity, Ricoeur uses these notions in order to illuminate the 
fundamental element of “story-telling” that is essential to the constitution of (temporal) 
identities: my self-understanding is inextricably tied to the question of how I “narrate” my 
life from the perspective of the present moment. On the idea of narrativity in relation to 
Husserlian phenomenology, see Carr 1986.
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which takes its point of departure from the peculiar “questioning-back” of 
the inherited validities and meanings. By doing so, this idea of teleology 
provides us with a notion of progress not as a category of being but of 
practical reason: progress is not something we must simply believe in, but 
it can and must be willed on the basis of the present moment. 
  On the basis of these reflections, I will show that Husserl’s idea of 
Europe was not to be understood either as the herald of progress or the 
end of history but as the latent possibility of a universal idea of commu-
nality and reciprocal critique, announcing itself in the different forms of 
cultural, territorial and historical universality. For Husserl, this idea of 
Europe was as much a promise as it was an existing history, unfolding 
only in the partial and perhaps even fundamentally skewed forms of this 
universality. As a normative ideal of culture and generative development, 
however, this idea was to remain fundamentally inexhaustible, calling for 
its constant rearticulation in the horizon of the infinite task of philosophi-
cal undertaking.
Generativity and historicity as phenomenological notions
This dissertation approaches the subject of Europe from the viewpoint of 
two specific topics: generativity and historicity. With the topic of genera-
tivity (Generativität) Husserl basically referred to the “unity of historical 
development in its widest sense”11, that is, to all those forms of meaning-
constitution that take place in the intersubjective and intergenerational 
processes of co-operation, expressing themselves in the form of lasting 
cultural accomplishments. We are of course familiar with a wide variety 
of these forms, beginning with simple cultural practices (e.g., eating, 
handicraft) to the development of political and social institutions, reli-
gious practices, and the scientific enterprise. Although these forms differ 




tionality – they are all something “passed forward” (Lat. tradere) down the 
generations – and thus have their origin or future horizon beyond the finite 
life of the individual subject. In this regard, Husserl’s analyses on gen-
erativity significantly broadened the scope of phenomenology to include 
those forms of meaning and validity that are appropriated not through 
simple acts of institution performed by an individual (e.g. perception and 
its correlates) but on the basis of an inherited tradition – its assimilation, 
imitation, or critical refutation. In this regard, the topic of generativity 
opened up a novel dimension in what Husserl called the “paradox of sub-
jectivity” – the idea according to which we are beings who both constitute 
the world as well as belong to this world as constituted – that of cultural 
subjectivity and objectivity (facticity). Culture and tradition are indeed 
something created and transformed by a particular community; however, 
it is exactly by appropriating these structures (e.g. by learning a language) 
that we become members a community in the first place.
  The topic of generativity was anticipated, first of all, in Husserl’s 
growing interest towards the topic of intersubjectivity since the first 
decade of the 1900s. Beginning with his analyses on “alien experience” 
(Fremderfahrung) and “empathy” (Einfühlung) in the experience of the first 
person, Husserl gradually broadened his analyses of interpersonal associa-
tions in order to clarify the constitution of objectivity and the spiritual 
world (i.e., the world of cultural meanings). What Husserl now argued 
was that all objective meanings, as they unfold in the experience of the 
conscious subject, can never be explained simply on the basis of an indi-
vidual subjectivity, but the subject’s experience must necessarily entail an 
element of otherness. Without the constitutive support of other subjects, 
there simply would be no idea of an objective world, which transcends 
my subjective perspective. Actually, the objectivity and reality of things 
is constantly confirmed or refuted by other subjects, or even negotiated 
with them: whether things or entities such as Northern Lights, the com-
mon spirit of a time, or the state of Finland actually exist depends on a 
wide variety of reciprocal “social acts” through which the objectivity and 
sense of the aforementioned phenomena is validated. Thus, the phenom-
enological “social ontology”, as Husserl understood it, did not demarcate 
only a particular region of human activity, but it permeated the very foun-
dations of the constituting capacities of transcendental subjectivity. 
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  The idea of generativity had its background not just in topical inqui-
ries but also in Husserl’s novel genetic method of phenomenology. Devel-
oped and employed from the late 1910s onwards, the genetic method 
was introduced as a complementary approach to the so-called static phe-
nomenology. Whereas the static investigations, as they were entertained 
in Husserl’s earlier works such as the Logical Investigations (1900–01) and 
the first volume of Ideas (1911), had considered the different modes of in-
tentionality as something ready-made, the genetic method broadened the 
scope of phenomenological analyses by opening up the questions concern-
ing the dynamic relations of these modes. The different modes of inten-
tionality could be seen and analyzed on the basis of their type and content 
– there are, for instance, acts of perceiving, valuing, and doing, of kines-
thesia – but they could also be examined on the basis of their relations of 
temporal foundation. Moreover, different acts were not to be conceived 
as mere fleeting experiences, but as temporal forms which constitute last-
ing convictions, tendencies, and orientations. There forms were not to be 
understood as mere empirical characters, but as transcendental features 
that come to define the constituting activity of the ego. Thus through the 
genetic method, Husserl was able to account for the temporally evolving 
character of conscious life as well as its correlates, analyzed through the 
notions of habituality and sedimentation.
  In his published works, Husserl employed the genetic method pri-
marily in order to account for those forms of intentionality and meaning-
constitution that take place within the conscious life of the individual. 
However, through his growing interest towards the problems of cultural 
and historical processes of meaning-constitution – especially those relat-
ing to scientific rationality – he also began to discuss communities and 
interpersonal relations as specific forms of habituation and sedimentation. 
The development of science and scientific rationality, for instance, was not 
to be understood merely in terms of a specific individual attitude (e.g. the 
natural scientific attitude), but as a specific mode of co-operation and pro-
duction of a community of scientists. As in the case of an orchestra and its 
common accomplishments (musical pieces), the end product of scientific 
community could not be explicated in terms of individual scientists: it was 
to be understood as a result of the genuinely shared activity of a personal 
community. These developments led Husserl to his often disputed account 
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of “we-subjectivities” or “personalities of a higher order”, the idea of com-
munities as personal wholes that pertain within themselves a constitutive 
dimension of their own that is irreducible to individual subjects.
  This transition encroached also upon the very core of Husserl’s own 
philosophical methodology. Especially in his last works, Husserl began to 
discuss the phenomenological enterprise in terms of separate “ways” to 
the core of his methodology, the transcendental-phenomenological reduc-
tion. Beginning with the 1907 lecture course The Idea of Phenomenology, 
Husserl introduced the notion of reduction as the point of departure for 
the establishment of a phenomenological “critique of reason”, constituting 
the idea of a genuine and rigorous science. This reduction, argued Hus-
serl, was to be conceived of as a specific activity of the philosophizing 
individual, and it was based on a specific “bracketing” of the prejudices 
(Voraussetzungen) and judgments (Urteile) of the so-called natural attitude.12 
This step, the phenomenological epoché, was supposed to lead him to what 
he conceived as the most fundamental and concrete foundation of mean-
ing-constitution: the domain of “pure ego” or “absolute consciousness”. 
This domain was disclosed for the purpose of describing the fundamental 
relations of dependency that define the constitution of all objectivity – na-
ture and culture, science and religion. However, this idea of fundamental 
inquiries sparked off a wide variety of criticisms concerning the ideal-
istic or even solipsistic character of Husserl’s phenomenology. Theodor 
Adorno, for one, understood Husserl’s reduction in the Kantian sense of 
a return to the absolute and atemporal structures of consciousness. As 
Adorno claimed, behind Husserl’s principle of principles – i.e., the idea 
according to which all cognition must derived its legitimacy from the in-
tuitive givenness for an ego – was “nothing but the old idealist principle that 
the subjective data of our consciousness are the ultimate source of knowl-
edge, and that therefore any fundamental philosophical analysis must be 
an analysis of consciousness.”13 Therefore the sole domain of Husserl’s in-
vestigations was to be located in “subjectivity in its abstractness, [which 
is] the pure function of thinking, the “I think” in the sense of the Kantian 
unity of consciousness.”14
12 HuaII: 43ff.




  Husserl never gave up on the idea of reduction as the fundamental and 
necessary point of departure; however, his later works pointed towards a 
radical reformulation of this idea. In addition to the idea of phenomeno-
logical reduction through “Cartesian” reflections – reflections on the con-
stituting subjectivity as the ground of all meaning – Husserl presented the 
reduction as proceeding through a critical “questioning-back” (rückfragen) 
to the historical presuppositions of the common horizon of communal 
interaction: the lifeworld.15 Although traditional Husserl-scholarship has 
considered the different ways mainly as complementary, the manuscripts 
of the Crisis-period actually reveal the primacy of the historical-communal 
approach, i.e. the way through generativity.16 This entailed that Husserl 
could no longer simply separate between the domains of systematic and 
historical investigation meaning that philosophy could only be understood 
as a specific “intertwining” (Verflechtung) of the two.17 
  As I will argue in this work, it was only through the reflections on 
historicity that Husserl could account for the unique teleological character 
of scientific rationality, which finds its genuine realization only in the form 
of the infinite task of philosophy. Philosophy, understood as the total ho-
rizon of ideal and universal truths, could only be captured through partial 
descriptions that – due to the signitive or symbolic character of human 
language – were constantly prone to the loss of their intuitive foundation. 
This entailed that the peculiar universality of phenomenology could only 
be accounted for as an essentially temporal and intergenerational idea of 
striving. Instead of protecting itself against the loss of meaning, phenom-
enology was to understand its claim for universality on the basis of this 
constant possibility of crisis. In this regard, history was not the obstacle, 
but the condition of a genuinely universal position.
  Even more importantly, the generative and historical dimensions 
articulated a novel understanding of phenomenology as a normative un-
dertaking. Already in his earliest works, Husserl had introduced the phe-
15 The most extensive analyses of the concept of lifeworld can be found in Husserl’s later 
texts, especially in the Crisis-work, even though he introduced the term already as a part 
of Ideen II (dated at 1917). In this early discussion the term “lifeworld” is closely con-
nected to what Husserl calls the “natural world-concept” (natürliche  Weltbegriff), the world 
of personal and cultural accomplishments as distinguished from the world of the natural 
sciences. See Carr 1977; Steinbock 1995: 86ff.




nomenological method in order to provide a universal theory of intuitive 
evidence that could have laid the foundation for all types of givenness: of 
sensuous and categorical, or theoretical, practical, and axiological (i.e. 
acts of perceiving, willing, and valuing). Despite his dominating interest 
in the problematic of scientific evidence, phenomenology was supposed to 
lay the foundation for a novel approach to the problematic of ethical and 
moral cognition (discussed especially in the series of lectures on ethics 
from the early 1900s). In his later works, however, phenomenology was 
now related to a novel understanding of philosophy as a specific form of 
praxis, which does not simply leave behind all commitments to the natural 
world, but which formulates its claim for universality in relation to these 
commitments. Phenomenological reflection, in this regard, was under-
stood in relation to a renewed understanding on the relationship between 
the domains of theory and praxis, united by the idea of self-responsibility 
through perpetual renewal. This idea of historical-generative universality, 
I argue, provides us with a novel possibility of articulating the political 
dimension of Husserlian phenomenology on the basis of a dynamic and 
generative concept of political idealism.
Europe as a philosophical topic
It is by no means an unproblematic fact that we should take Europe as 
denoting an idea. Europe is, first and foremost, a name (or a proper noun) 
and as such, it denotes a particular being and not a general idea or con-
cept. According to our common use of the word, “Europe” stands for a 
particular geographical, historical, cultural, or a political-economic entity 
that can be defined in relation to other respective entities.18 In the Clas-
sical world, the territorial entity of Europe was most often distinguished 
from Africa and Asia, whereas modern geography treats it as one of the 
seven major continents. From the period of Charlemagne (c. 742–814) 
to the 17th century, Europe was employed rather synonymously with the 
18 For an excellent overview of the development of the idea of Europe, see Mikkeli 1998. 
On Europe as a “variable notion”, see Brague 2002: 17.
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cultural and political sphere of Western Christendom, followed by the 
territorial matrix of European states in the Peace of Westphalia (1648). 
Although the idea of a politically unified Europe was already within sight 
of the Catholic Church, this idea gained a novel weight against the back-
drop of the rise of the Ottoman Empire from the 14th century onwards. 
Through the long series of conflicts such as the Ottoman–Hungarian wars 
(14th century onwards), the Fall of Constantinople in 1453 and the Great 
Turkish War (1667–1683), Europe gained a novel sense of its identity as 
being against the Islamic world. Ironically, the thinkers and writers of the 
Islamic world conceived of themselves as the inheritors of the Graeco-Ro-
man philosophy and science, and had preserved some of its most impor-
tant sources during the European Middle Ages. Due to the rapid growth 
of industrial competition from the 19th and early 20th century onwards, 
Europe, despite its significant internal tensions, was defined more and 
more in relation to the new global superpowers such as the USA, Japan 
and Russia. During the Cold War, the definition of Europe remained es-
sentially ambiguous – defined by the perspectives of competing ideologi-
cal standpoints – although in general this notion was more affiliated with 
the West-leaning countries of the continent. Especially in the post-1989 
academic literature, as a result of the loss of geo-political otherness, some 
theorists have entertained the idea of Europe’s own past as its new peculiar 
other. According to this understanding, it has become one of the constitu-
tive features of Europe’s self-understanding that it has moved from the 
idea of territorial otherness to “temporal othering” (a somewhat clumsy 
expression of Thomas Diez19) – denoting the insistence that the events of 
1914–1919, 1939–1945, or the Balkan Wars of 1991–2001 “shall never 
happen again” – which is supposed to open up new possibilities of political 
identity based on cosmopolitanism. It has been asked, for instance, wheth-
er the European Union should include all those countries that are willing 
to accept those values we consider as “European” such as universal human 
rights, democratic constitution, the rule of law, social market-economy, 
freedom of the press, and so on.
  It was perhaps Hegel who was the first to treat Europe not only as a 
geo-historical or geo-political entity but also as a philosophical concept. 




threefold division of Africa, Asia and Europe as a complementary descrip-
tion to the unfolding of world-historical spirit (Geist) through Oriental, 
Greek, Roman, and the Germanic worlds. What Hegel discovered in Eu-
rope was not a mere historical culture among others but a general “spir-
itual unity” manifesting itself in a specific understanding of reason and 
rational life. For Hegel, Europe stood for nothing less than the triumph 
of spirit and its raison d’être – the progress of human freedom – in the “re-
treat from this boundless freedom [of Asian and African peoples] into the 
particular, of control of the immoderate and elevation of the particular to 
the universal, and of the descent of the spirit into itself.”20 Thus Europe, 
as Hegel understood it, stood for a certain ideal of rational life finding its 
genuine platform in the reconciliation of individual freedom with its nec-
essary social constraints, of spontaneity with stable political institutions. 
As we may learn from Hegel’s earlier works – beginning with the Phenom-
enology of Spirit – this universality could only be attained through a process 
of reciprocal recognition (Anerkennen) of human individuals, which brings 
the relations of domination (i.e., the dialectics of Master and Slave) to 
their completion. According to the key thesis of his Philosophy of Right, this 
process found its most concrete realization in the modern nation-states 
founded on Christian principles, dividing the sphere of communality into 
social (family, marriage) and political (the civil society) domains. But it 
was exactly for this reason that Europe could “go beyond” its geographical 
bounds and to announce itself, for instance, in the historical traditions of 
America, the Slavic peoples, or even in Haiti (whose revolutionary move-
ment of the 1790s was interpreted by Hegel as the universal triumph of 
spirit21). Whether their social and political institutions (for instance mar-
riage, mass communication, civil society) would follow the path treaded 
by Europe was debatable – what was important was that they followed the 
same principle of spiritual development as the European nations.
  Hegel’s ideas were highly disputed already in his time. Soon after his 
death in 1831 the philosophical legacy of Hegel – especially that relating 
to his account of European modernity – was basically divided into two 
opposing groups. Against the conservative interpretation of the Old (or 
Right) Hegelians who basically argued for the completeness of post-1789 
20 Hegel 1975: 173.
21 See Buck-Morss 2009: 64.
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political institutions, there emerged a group of Young (i.e. Leftist) Hege-
lians who demanded for a more radical reform of the Prussian state. Marx 
– who became affiliated with the Young Hegelians due to his relations with 
some of its most influential members such as Arnold Ruge and Ludwig 
Feuerbach – shared this conviction of the necessity of reform; however, 
unlike the bourgeoisie revolution envisioned by Ruge, the Marxist revolu-
tion was to be performed by the class of proletariats. More importantly, 
against the national revolution of 1789, the socialist revolution was to be 
executed on an international level. Especially for the Marx of the Com-
munist Manifesto – written in the “year of revolutions” of 1848 – the name 
for this level was nothing less than Europe, haunted by the “specter of 
Communism”. What the year of 1848 had introduced was a novel stage in 
the intellectual consciousness of the European political body, articulating 
itself in the sublation of the opposition between republic and monarchy. 
Thus instead of a pre-given utopia of social and political institutions, Marx 
introduced the reformatory potential of communism that was to be found 
in the “real movement that abolishes the present state of things.”22
  It was perhaps Nietzsche who was the first to locate and criticize the 
inherent presupposition of the historical consciousness of modernity, its 
unwavering faith in Europe as the torchbearer of human freedom. In his 
Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future (1886), Nietzsche 
spoke of Europe as the “protruding peninsula” of Asia, which, in contrast 
to this continent of age-old wisdom and spirituality, “would like to rep-
resent the ‘progress of man’.”23 Instead of the triumph of spirit, Europe 
was the name for the specific feeling of melancholy in regard to its lost 
origin, against which the contemporary European appeared as nothing 
but “a herd animal, something obliging, sickly, and mediocre.”24 In his late 
fragments assembled together under the title The Will to Power (written in 
1883–1888), Nietzsche articulated this analysis on the development of the 
European modernity in terms of a “radical nihilism”. This nihilism showed 
itself in what he called the “devaluation” of all higher values – values of 
“humanity” and “morality”, of “good” and “educated” – a development that 
was inscribed in the very structure of these values due to their life-deny-
22 Marx and Engels 1970: 57.





ing character. In the paragraph 395 of this work, Nietzsche spoke of this 
tendency in terms of a specific European sickness:
“Illness makes men better”: this well-known assertion that runs 
through the centuries, and in the mouth of the wise quite as often 
as in the mouth and jaw of the people, really makes one think. In 
view of discovering whether there is any truth in it, one might be 
allowed to ask whether there is not perhaps a fundamental rela-
tionship between morality and illness? Regarded as a whole, could 
not the “improvement of mankind” – […] the unquestionable soft-
ening, humanizing, and taming which the European has undergone 
within the last two centuries – be regarded as the result of a long 
course of secret and uncanny suffering, failure, abstinence, and 
grief? Has “illness” made the European better?25
As is well known, Nietzsche’s answer to the last question was negative. For 
him, the “illness” of Europe, synonymous to the idea of morality, was codi-
fied into the very structures of its historical development: by restraining 
(i.e., by “softening, humanizing, and taming”) the physiological drives and 
instincts of the healthy individual, the European morality had suppressed 
its natural sense of life. This condition, argued Nietzsche, could only be 
overcome by what he called the free-spirited “good European” – the one 
who overcomes the rationalistic, Christian and nationalistic tendencies for 
the sake of a new artistic, post-Christian and cosmopolitan way of life.26
  Although Husserl’s reflections on Europe followed the Hegelian dic-
tum of spirituality – Husserl spoke of the spiritual “geography”, “form”, 
“culture”, and “unity” of Europe – his reflections followed the approach of 
Nietzsche at least in one crucial respect. Instead of taking his point of de-
25 “„Die Krankheit macht den Menschen besser“: diese berühmte Behauptung, der man 
durch alle Jahrhunderte begegnet, und zwar im Munde der Weisen ebenso als im Mund 
und Maule des Volks, gibt zu denken. Man möchte sich, auf ihre Gültigkeit hin, einmal 
erlauben zu fragen: gibt es vielleicht ein ursächliches Band zwischen Moral und Krankheit 
überhaupt? Die „Verbesserung des Menschen“, im Großen betrachtet, zum Beispiel die 
unleugbare Milderung Vermenschlichung Vergutmüthigung des Europäers innerhalb des 
letzten Jahrtausends — ist sie vielleicht die Folge eines langen heimlich-unheimlichen 
Leidens und Mißrathens, Entbehrens, Verkümmerns? Hat „die Krankheit“ den Europäer 
„besser gemacht“?“ KSA 12.180. Cf. KSA 12.241–242: “erst aus der ganzen Krankheit der 
Zeit heraus müssen sie [Europa] zu ihrer Gesundheit kommen.”
26 Cf. especially the aphorisms in the “Nachgelassene Fragmente” of 1884: “gegen die 
Gleichheit / gegen die moralische Tartüfferie / gegen das Christenthum und Gott / gegen 




parture from the “triumph” of spirit or human freedom, Husserl founded 
his approach on a particular cultural illness that was also articulated in the 
title of his last major work: the “crisis” of Europe. Husserl understood 
this notion according to its classical medical connotations referring to the 
turning point of disease27 – a crisis presents us with a choice: death or 
renewal – but unlike for Nietzsche, this disease did not result from the 
suppression or forgetfulness of original human instincts. What Nietzsche 
had considered as the modern devaluation of the higher values of mankind 
(of aim and unity, of the good and the beautiful) had been inscribed to 
the very structure of the modern scientific rationality since the 16th and 
17th centuries. Through the triumph of modern natural sciences – which 
were founded on the Galilean discovery of exact mathematical ideality as 
the sole language of the universe – the ideas of teleology and normativity, 
sense and purpose, could no longer be acknowledged within the context 
of scientific rationality. As a result, Husserl claimed, although through a 
period of historical struggles concerning the character of the sciences of 
the spirit (Geisteswissenschaften), the purpose and value of human existence, 
of right and wrong, were gradually rendered into subjective phenomena 
that lack an objective grounding. Moreover, due to the radical conclusions 
of modern physicalist rationality drawn by Hobbes and his followers – 
their ideas concerning the mechanist and individualistic concept of hu-
man being – the very idea of human sociality seemed to lose its imminent 
naturality that had been the central credo of the Ancient social and politi-
cal thought. The modern political body was, if not completely unnatural, 
constantly prone to disintegration. 
  Indeed, this was the general cultural condition articulated by Hus-
serl in his writings of the post-WWI period. Already in the first texts of 
the 1920s, Husserl analyzed the contemporary situation of Europe as that 
of inner “vacuity”, “mendacity” and “senselessness”, referring to the novel 
loss of foundations in regard to the guiding ideas of individual and social 
reason.28 Whereas the European humanity of the 19th century could still 
hold on to the ideas of scientific progress, technology, and the nation-state 
as the necessary foundations of a rational humanity, for the philosophers 
27 HuaVI: 315, 317, 550.
28 HuaXXVII: 1. Cf. Husserl’s statement on the “inner emptiness of the whole of Euro-
pean culture” (innere Hohlheit die gesamte europäischen Kultur) in HuaDokIV: 408.
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of the early 20th century this faith could no longer be defended. What the 
Great War had shown was just how easily scientific innovations can be 
turned into means of destruction; how easily national solidarity can be 
agitated in order to serve the purpose of political terrorism. With the rise 
of Fascism during the 1920s and 1930s, Husserl could not but witness the 
growing “hostility towards the spirit”29 that manifested itself not only in 
the horrendous militarily and political events of his time but in the denial 
of a genuine science of spirit and humanity.
  Thus Husserl’s concept of crisis, besides signifying a particular histori-
cal trait, seemed to denote also a general category of historical reflection. 
As Husserl put it in Crisis, what the “breakdown-situation” of his time had 
revealed was nothing less than the need of a genuine self-reflection, which 
would lead to the rearticulation of the ideals of rational humanity.30 Here, 
Husserl’s reflections were founded on his ethical writings dealing with 
the problematic of renewal (Erneuerung), a topic that was conceived from 
the viewpoint of communality already at the beginning of the 1920s. As 
Husserl had argued in his essays written for the Japanese journal Kaizo 
(“Renewal”), a phenomenological account of an ethical life could not be 
understood in terms of substantial imperatives but only as “dynamic-ge-
netically”, that is, through constant self-critique and self-reflexivity that 
motivate the regeneration of one’s ideals and modes of action.31 Already 
in these texts, Husserl argued for the indispensability of social ethics as 
the “full and genuine sense of ethics”, suggesting that the genuine sense of 
renewal could only be attained and articulated as a communal process.
  In the existing Husserl-scholarship, it has become somewhat common 
to acknowledge the idea of crisis as something that goes beyond the mere 
theoretical-scientific enterprise (e.g. the problems of psychologism) and 
touches upon the problematic of practical and ethical ideals. However, 
it is only a few commentators who have explicitly interpreted the con-
cept of crisis as a category of generative phenomenology, referring to the 
idea of a necessary loss of intuitive evidence characteristic to the passing 








Philip Buckley’s Husserl, Heidegger, and the Crisis of Philosophical Responsibil-
ity (1992), which treats Husserl’s idea of crisis as a specific “forgetfulness” 
characteristic to the development of all ideal meanings – but also a more 
specific possibility of a “permanent defeat” characteristic to the modern 
physicalist rationality. In this work I will take my point of departure from 
this distinction; however, I will argue that it is necessary to broaden the 
scope of Husserl’s considerations to encompass also the social and political 
connotations of this “permanent defeat”, the dissolution of the body politic 
through the egoistic and solitary subject of modern political philosophy.33 
  All in all, Husserl’s late reflections on the idea of Europe have inspired 
a great number of philosophers. However, due to the rather controversial 
remarks of Husserl’s in his later texts – remarks relating to the revolution-
ary status of Greek philosophy in regard to the whole of humanity as well 
as those relating to the spiritual geography of Europe excluding a number 
of ethnic-cultural peoples – these reflections have often been met with 
the accusation of an explicit or implicit Euro-centrism. In his early work 
on the concept of genesis in Husserl’s work, Jacques Derrida posed the 
question on the certain naivety of Husserl’s interpretations in regard to 
the division between the “spiritual geography” of Europe and the merely 
empirical unities of India and Asia (cf. Ch. 4.1) – questions that were 
later replaced with accusations of a “racist logic” in Husserl’s later works.34 
Although Derrida credited Husserl for his insistence on articulating a 
transcendental account of temporality and the development of sense, his 
analyses on Europe failed to distinguish between a transcendental and an 
empirical notion of genesis, thus resulting in an unfounded idealization of 
this particular cultural form. By arguing for the inherent ideality and uni-
versality of the philosophical attitude, and at the same time, by locating its 
origin on the Greek peninsula 700–500 BC, Husserl contradicted himself, 
Derrida argues, by “reducing the idea of philosophy into a fact”35. How 
could something empirical serve as the platform for a universal idea?
33 Due to the late publication of Husserl’s lectures on ethics – especially those dealing with 
the problematic of person and state, accompanied by the historical introduction of modern 
moral philosophy from Hobbes onwards –, the crisis has not either been linked to the 
general categories of modern social or political philosophy. I am referring here especially 
to the 1920/24 lecture course on Einleitung in die Ethik. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1920 und 
1924 published as the volume XXXVII of Husserliana.
34 See Derrida 1987: 112ff.
35 Derrida 2003: 156.
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  In his later work The Other Heading (1992), Derrida raised this ques-
tion once more by linking it to the broader question on the historical 
narratives of modernity. Here, he once again expressed doubt concerning 
the ambiguous character of Husserl’s late philosophy as guided by the idea 
of transcendental community, for which “Europe would be at once the 
name and the exemplary figure.”36 By criticizing the general tendency of 
modern historical thinking to treat Europe as the telos of all historical de-
velopment – a criticism already articulated by Nietzsche – Derrida aimed 
at illuminating the destructive tendency of what he called arche-teleological 
model of history. “From Hegel to Valéry, from Husserl to Heidegger”, 
Derrida writes, 
[…] this traditional discourse [on Europe] is already a discourse 
of the modern Western world. […] It dates from a moment when 
Europe sees itself on the horizon, that is to say, from its end (the 
horizon, in Greek, is the limit), from the imminence of its end. This 
old discourse about Europe, a discourse at once exemplary and 
exemplarist, is already a traditional discourse of modernity.37 
Thus following Hegel, Derrida concludes that it is an inherent feature of 
our modern view of history that it has considered all historical develop-
ments as arche-teleological (or variations of such developments), that is, 
as guided by ideas of origin and goal, of arche and telos. In this regard, 
Derrida is quite right to situate Husserl within this modernist framework 
of historical development, searching for what Jean-Francois Lyotard later 
called the “grand narratives” of history. Husserl’s teleological-historical 
reflections did indeed aim at the broadest possible outlook on historical 
development – a universal history – however, this teleology could only be 
articulated on the basis of the present moment, implying the need for its 
constant rearranging. This is why Husserl argues that instead of a Kantian-
Hegelian “novel” (Roman), historical teleology could only be understood 
in terms of an interpretation or even “poetic fiction” (Dichtung).38 It is 
exactly here that Derrida’s interpretation turns out to be unsound: Hus-
serl did not view historical teleology as equivalent to the idea of universal 
history guided by any form of historical determinism, nor did he consider 
36 Derrida 1992: 33.
37 Derrida 1992: 28.
38 HuaXXVII: 47. Cf. Ch. 4.1.
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it necessary to define it in terms of an empirical end (what Derrida names 
as the “imminence of end”). As I will argue in this work, the teleological 
analysis can according to Husserl only be understood on the basis of the 
inextricable openness and inexhaustibility of historical development. As 
a concept of historical thought, teleology can only be articulated as pro-
ceeding backwards from the present situation, and it ought to serve the 
purpose of self-responsibility: it is critical reflection of our own origin 
and genesis.
  Husserl’s interpretations on the idea of Europe have also been ap-
proached from a more approving perspective. Especially several articles 
by Klaus Held (1980, 1989a, 1989b, 2002) – which still can be considered 
as the best introduction to the topic of Europe in Husserl’s work – have 
emphasized the essentially universalistic and non-Eurocentric undertone 
of Husserl’s interpretations. According to one of Held’s central theses, 
Husserl’s reflections on the Greek inception of philosophy aimed at a radi-
cal interpretation on the “Heraclitean” discovery of the “one world” on the 
basis of a universal concept of reason.39 Instead of restricting themselves 
to the scope of scientific evidence, these reflections pointed towards 
an essentially equal and pluralistic idea of human rationality, nurturing 
what Held calls the spirit of democracy. By doing so, Husserl’s “return” 
to Greece was to be understood in terms of an insistence on creating a 
counter-discourse to the violent and unilateral history of European mod-
ernization. While I find Held’s interpretation appealing, I also insist that 
Husserl’s own ideal of a self-responsible community cannot be fully ap-
preciated in the context of Greek political philosophy. Instead, we need 
to read it in relation to the more dynamic concept of intersubjectivity 
characteristic to the Christian experience delineated by St. Paul.
  Besides Held, Husserl’s manifold analyses on generativity have been 
acknowledged particularly in the works of Anthony Steinbock and Bern-
hard Waldenfels. In my own analysis on the generative dimensions of Hus-
serl’s Europe-thinking, I have benefitted especially from Steinbock’s rich 
and detailed account on this problematic in the context of Husserl’s phe-
nomenology. In his work Home and Beyond – Generative Phenomenology after 
Husserl (1995), Steinbock argues for the necessity of articulating a novel 
approach to Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology of the social world 
39 See e.g. Held 2002.
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– an approach or “method” he names as generative phenomenology. Stein-
bock calls this approach “non-foundational” in the sense that it “describes 
and participates in geologically and historically developing structures of 
existence and coexistence, as well as their respective modes of constitu-
tion, without reducing those modes of constitution […] to an egological 
subjectivity as the foundational account does.”40 Especially in this early 
work, Steinbock read the dimension of generativity as an essentially di-
vergent approach in relation to the individual-oriented approach to the 
problem of ownness and otherness in Husserl’s published work (especially 
the analysis of empathy in the fifth section of the Cartesian Meditations), 
resulting in a suggestive analysis on the “axiological asymmetry” of the 
categories of home and alien. In this regard, both Steinbock and Walden-
fels formulate the phenomenological idea of interculturality in terms of a 
Levinasian idea of responsiveness towards the alien: instead of doing away 
with the liminal structure of home and alien, phenomenology ought to 
acknowledge it as a permanent structure of all lifeworlds, as something 
which serves as the point of departure for all genuinely ethical relations. 
In this work I acknowledge this asymmetry as the basic point of departure 
for Husserl’s reflections on generativity and interculturality. However, it 
is my argument that in order to understand and appreciate Husserl’s in-
sistence on the “genuine” sense of universality, we need to go beyond the 
mere idea of responsiveness, and work towards a critical position that 
could point towards the common foundation of all cultural objectivities 
in the shared lifeworld.
  Despite my insistence on defending Husserl’s approach against his 
critics such as Derrida, I am by no means suggesting an un-critical or 
fundamentalist reading of his texts. From the perspective of the contem-
porary situation, we ought to criticize both Husserl’s historical inter-
pretation on the pivotal role the Classical period of Greek thinking as 
well as his remarks on Eskimos, Indians, or Papuans. The evident Euro-
40 Steinbock 1995: 4. In his later article “Temporality and Point: The Origins and Crisis 
of Continental Philosophy”, Steinbock no longer calls this approach non-foundational (but 
co-foundational), since he wishes to distance the Husserlian idea of origin-dependency 
from the non-foundational accounts of post-structuralism and post-modernism (See 
1998c: 166). As I will argue in part 4, this division is well justified: Husserl’s position ought 
to be understood as belonging to the modern tradition of philosophy of history. However, 
through the peculiar epoché of historical narrativity, the idea of historical teleology was to 
be divested of its empirical commitments that delineate the course of history.  
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centrism of his works, I believe, can partially be understood in terms of 
self-reflexivity – Husserl was a philosopher within the European tradi-
tion, which constituted his basic point of departure – though not perhaps 
completely: his insistence that we, the Europeans, “would never Indianize 
ourselves”41 seems both arrogant as well as untrue. Current economic-
cultural globalization, which I believe can best be understood in terms of 
a particular instantiation of universalism – perhaps what Hegel called the 
“formal universality” of the market-place – merely provides a universal 
medium of interaction for the exchange of goods and the accumulation of 
the capital, but it provides no means for the universal mediation between 
different homeworlds. Instead, we are indeed constantly “exotizing” our-
selves in order to create new forms of experience that can be capitalized 
on through globalization. For this reason, my approach to the problematic 
of Europe grows out of a general philosophical conviction concerning the 
indispensability of the universalistic standpoint accompanied by a teleo-
logical idea of historical development.  
The objectives, methods and structure of this work
This dissertation operates within the framework of Husserlian phenom-
enology. It provides a systematic philosophical interpretation of the idea of 
Europe in Husserl’s phenomenology from the perspective of two partic-
ular topics: generativity and historicity. By doing so, the work employs 
specific methods that are characteristic of philosophical analysis: argu-
mentative and conceptual clarification, textual criticism and hermeneutic 
interpretation. Although the work includes a substantial amount of ex-
egetical study of primary and secondary sources, it goes beyond this type 
of study by articulating an argument of its own concerning the historical 
and political implications of phenomenology – implications that have usu-
ally fallen out of the scope of Husserlian phenomenology. 
  At times, but especially in chapters 1.1 and 1.2 dealing with the idea 




tory – however, these historical insights are entertained primarily from 
the overall systematic perspective of my work. Especially in the third part 
of the work, I employ the methods of hermeneutical and philological 
critique of Ancient sources in order to supplement Husserl’s somewhat 
undefined and inadvertent remarks on Greek philosophy. Besides a few 
exceptions – most importantly, the 1919/20 lecture course Einleitung in 
die Philosophie (the manuscript F I 40–) and the 1923 manuscript “Wert 
des Lebens, Wert der Welt, Sittlichkeit (Tugend) und Glückseligkeit” – I 
remain within the standard edition of Husserl’s collected works (Husser-
liana, published by Martinus Nijhoff/Kluwer/Springer). (On secondary 
literature, see above). In regards to Ancient texts, I have employed the 
sixth edition of Diels & Kranz’s Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker: Griechisch und 
Deutsch (for pre-Socratics); and for the translations of Plato and Aristotle, I 
have consulted the bilingual Cambridge-Harvard editions of Plato in Twelve 
Volumes and the Oxford edition of Aristotle’s writings. At certain occasions 
I have diverged from these translations. In chapter 4.3, a similar critique 
is employed in relation to the Pauline letters – for the original Greek, I 
have employed the Nestle–Aland edition of the Novum Testamentum Graece, 
and instead of the King James edition, I have employed the more literal 
translation of The Holy Bible: International Standard Version by the ISV Com-
mittee. 
  The work is divided into four parts. In the first part of the work, 
I begin by illuminating the idea of crisis as the fundamental point of de-
parture for Husserl’s reflections on Europe. I will show that the crisis was 
by no means an original topic of the time, but it was linked to a series 
of presuppositions concerning the political and historical implications of 
modern philosophy. Husserl did not invent this notion, but he aimed at 
articulating some of its most fundamental presuppositions anew. I will 
argue that in order to understand the generative and historical implica-
tions of Husserl’s Europe-thinking, we need to understand it against the 
background of the modern ideas of political community (i.e. the body 
politic) and historical teleology. Moreover, it is necessary to situate Hus-
serl’s thought in the context of early twentieth-century crisis-thinking, 
which endowed this notion with a novel sense of apocalyptic inevitability. 
I will show that Husserl’s reflections on this notion extended well beyond 
the domain of scientific rationality (e.g. the problems of psychologism and 
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historicism). The crisis announced itself, for instance, in the cultural rela-
tivism of his time. However, by showing how the possibility of crisis was 
actually embedded in the very structure of rationality itself, I will locate 
the possibility of articulating this notion as a transcendental-phenome-
nological category. This transition enables us to account for the seeming 
inconsistency in Husserl’s crisis-thinking, the fact that he treats the idea of 
crisis as something necessary and inevitable, yet something that needs to 
be overcome “once and for all”.
  The second part of the work discusses the basic ideas and con-
cepts of generativity and communality in Husserl’s work. By focusing on 
the idea of Husserl’s methodological transition from static to genetic phe-
nomenology, I will show how Husserl was able to open up the domains of 
temporality and historicity as transcendental-phenomenological catego-
ries. By doing so, I elucidate the fundamental transition in Husserl’s ac-
count of the transcendental subjectivity in contrast to Kantian concept of 
transcendentality, a transition which provides us with a notion of the tran-
scendental ego as necessarily temporal and singular. Through the (Leibniz-
ian) concept of monad, I argue, Husserl was able to account for both of 
these aspects, but also for the inherent intersubjectivity of the transcen-
dental ego. This provides us with the basic approach to the Husserlian 
“social ontology”, which should not be understood as a mere theory of 
social interaction or co-operation nor as a hermeneutic approach to the 
structures and discourses of the political community. Instead, Husserl’s 
understanding of sociality penetrated into the very core of the constitu-
tion of objective world and its specific normative (e.g. cultural, historical) 
demarcations through reciprocal social acts. Husserl’s somewhat ambigu-
ous concept of the lifeworld – the lifeworld as a universal correlate of 
intersubjectivity as well as its historical and cultural specifications in the 
plural – ought to be understood on the basis of this normative demarca-
tion: lifeworld is the fundamental transcendental correlate of experience, 
but it is constantly specified and singularized through cultural and spiri-
tual accomplishments. Husserl’s account of the homeworld, I show, ought 
to be likewise understood on the basis of this specification not as an alter-
native domain of purely spiritual geography but as the territorial demarca-
tion of the limits of familiarity. Lastly, I will discuss Husserl’s conceptual 
distinction between community and culture. It is my argument that this 
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distinction is crucial not only for the uniqueness of Husserl’s position to 
the Hegelian idea of objective spirit, but in regard to the specific modes 
of temporality characteristic to these domains. Through his idea of “we-
subjectivity” or the “personalities of a higher order”, Husserl was able to 
account for the specific modes of co-operation and temporal habituation 
that are characteristic to intersubjective associations – most importantly, 
to that specific idea of association which received its inception through 
Greek philosophy.
  This idea of a specific interpersonal co-operation characteristic to the 
philosophical community forms the key theme of the third part of this 
work. In this part, I will provide a reading of Husserl’s account on Greek 
philosophy from the viewpoints of generativity and historicity. It is my 
argument that this account is best understood as the emergence of a spe-
cific idea of universalism, articulating itself in the novel understanding 
of communal and political co-operation as well as a unique horizon of 
production. Philosophy, besides evolving in a novel attitude of the indi-
vidual – the theoretical – was itself founded on a specific generative trans-
formation, which had its foundation in the specific relativization of the 
Greek city-states. Instead of accepting the relativities of different mythical 
world-views (as in the case of skepticism), philosophy aimed at discover-
ing their common foundation in the idea of a shared world. Thus philoso-
phy, I argue, appeared as a twofold deconstruction of limits: it aimed at 
overcoming the seemingly natural territoriality of particular homeworlds, 
but it was also willing to transcend the teleological limits of the pre-phil-
osophical attitude. This is what Husserl implied with his notion of “infinite 
task”: philosophy articulates itself in relation to cultural accomplishments 
that are only partially attainable in concrete action. Philosophy has its ho-
rizon in infinity. Lastly, I will discuss this transition from the viewpoint of 
the best-known instantiation of this universal attitude: political universal-
ism. On the basis of Husserl’s reflections, I will show how the theoretical 
motive of epoché was transferred into the sphere of political community, 
and what implications did this transfer have from the perspective of politi-
cal institutions. While the motive of cosmopolitanism is often regarded as 
a later theme of Hellenistic or Christian political philosophy, I will argue 
for its latent signification in the political idealism of the Classical period, 
especially that of Plato. However, by showing how this idealism was con-
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strained by the specific modes of governance characteristic to Greek po-
litical thought, I argue that Husserl’s idea of perpetual renewal cannot be 
ultimately acknowledged within this framework.
  For this reason, in the fourth part of the work, I will turn my 
attention to the generative conditions of this perpetual renewal in the 
ideas of historical teleology and communality. By offering a reading on 
the absolute and relative ideals within the framework of Husserl’s ethics, I 
will articulate the possibility of a phenomenological account of historical 
teleology and progress. These notions, I argue, ought to be understood as 
critical devices of phenomenological reflection that are founded on the 
specific historical epoché that concerns all particular historical narratives. 
In other words, what we mean by “progress in history” can only be un-
derstood as a category of practical reason or will that developed on the 
basis of the present moment, in relation to the infinitely open horizon of 
generative development. This idea has crucial implications in regard to 
the Husserlian account of philosophy. It is my conviction that if we take 
Husserl’s generative reflections to their utmost limits, we are able to ar-
ticulate a concept of philosophical reflection, which – though it involves 
a necessary relation to the philosophizing individual and her capacities of 
self-reflection – uncovers its genuine sense only as a communal and historical 
undertaking. In other words, if we accept the necessary relation of phi-
losophy and generativity, we are able to arrive at a notion of philosophical 
reflection that carries within itself a relation to the preceding and sub-
sequent community of philosophers: science can only be thought of as a 
communal and intergenerational activity. On the basis of these reflections, 
I will articulate what I consider to be the latent “political phenomenol-
ogy” of Husserl’s body of work. By taking my point of departure from his 
idea of social ethics as a dynamic-genetic notion, I hope to show that the 
political potential of phenomenology resides in a novel understanding of 
political idealism as a form of dynamic utopianism, the twofold creation 
and renewal of the normative ideals of humanity on the basis of historical 
teleology. Lastly, I will discuss this idea in connection to the specific mode 
of subjectivity and communality implied within it. By taking my point of 
departure from one of Husserl’s most ambiguous notions – the commu-
nity of love (Liebesgemeinschaft) – I argue that it was exactly with the help of 
the notion of love that Husserl articulated the most radical solution to the 
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problematic of ethical communality and universalism. By discussing this 
topic on the basis of a specific idea of apolitical communality – articulated 
in the letters of St. Paul – I argue in which sense the universalistic stance 
necessary involves a specific critique of the category of identity, which 
is fundamentally tied to the constitution of home and alien. This read-
ing of the Pauline heritage, motivated especially from the interpretations 
of Jacob Taubes and Alan Badiou, provides us with a novel understanding 
of the phenomenological subject as originally “intertwined” with others; 
moreover, it shows how the constitution of cultural identities necessarily 
entails the concealment of this intertwining.
Secondary literature
As I already pointed out, the topic of Europe does not really constitute a 
unified discussion in the existing Husserl-scholarship. Besides the critical 
approaches of Derrida, Paul de Man, and Enrique Dussel – to name but a 
few – Husserl’s reflections on Europe have been considered in a more pos-
itive light in the works of Held, Buckley, Karl Schuhmann and Elisabeth 
Ströker. Of the more recent publications, Rodolphe Gasché’s Europe, or 
the Infinite Task: a Study of a Philosophical Concept (2009) provides a detailed 
reading of Husserl’s idea of philosophical universality, although this analy-
sis remains for the most part on the level of scientific rationality, and does 
not touch upon the cultural or generative aspects of this phenomenon.42
  All in all, since most of the Husserl-scholarship has concentrated on 
the problems of individual consciousness, subjectivity and scientific evi-
dence, the topics of sociality, generativity and historicity have remained 
somewhat secondary topics. Moreover, the absence of these topics in Hus-
serl’s published works have spurred a wide variety of criticisms concern-
42 As regards to the general problematic of Europe within the phenomenological tradition, 
my interpretation has benefitted from the works of such philosophers as Étienne Balibar, 
Remi Brague, Fred Dallmayr, Françoise Dastur, Dennis Guénoun, Jean-Luc Nancy and Jan 
Patočka. Most importantly, the arguments presented in this work have been motivated by 
the highly original and suggestive interpretations of Husserl’s genetic phenomenology and 
the problematic of Europe by Jacques Derrida. Despite the originality of these interpreta-
tions, I believe Derrida’s critical reactions towards Husserl are often based on careless 
readings of his texts, resulting in what I consider as partially unfounded accusations on 
Husserl’s Euro-centrism (cf. Ch. 4.1).
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ing the negligence of phenomenology in regard to the social and politi-
cal sphere – criticisms that have significantly shaped the development of 
post-Husserlian phenomenology and Continental philosophy in general. 
Following Adorno’s analysis on the fundamental idealistic undertone of 
Husserl, philosophers such as Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, Michel Fou-
cault and Jürgen Habermas have all at some point situated their projects 
in a critical relation towards Husserlian phenomenology, expressing their 
discontent towards the asocial, apolitical, and even atemporal aspects of 
this undertaking. 
  However, it was already some of Husserl’s best known students – 
Edith Stein, Gerda Walther, Alfred Schütz and Leo Strauss – who em-
ployed the phenomenological method in order to discuss and define the 
phenomena of the social and political sphere. From Stein’s reflections on 
the problematic of state and civil society to Schütz’s various analyses in the 
constitution of the social world (what he called “descriptive sociology”), 
phenomenology was seen as a fruitful method for the understanding of 
different social phenomena. However, even these approaches were often 
defined in a critical relation to Husserl’s individualistic approach – Schütz, 
for instance, saw it necessary to accompany Husserl’s analyses with what 
he called the “constitutive analysis of the natural attitude”43, that is, a study 
of social relations as they appear within the natural attitude. Since the 
publication of Husserl’s vast manuscripts on the topic of intersubjectivity 
– especially those complementing the analysis of empathy in the Cartesian 
Meditations – many commentators have acknowledged the novel poten-
tiality of Husserlian phenomenology with regard to the topic of social-
ity. Commentators such as Dan Zahavi, Bernhard Waldenfels, James G. 
Hart, Natalie Depraz, Michael Theunissen, and Janet Donahoe and have 
provided detailed accounts on the problematic of intersubjectivity and so-
cial ontology in the framework of Husserl’s phenomenology. Following 
Waldenfels’ analyses on cultural alienness as well as the idea of “cultural 
phenomenology” (Kulturphänomenologie) in the writings of Ernst Wolfgang 
Orth, several commentators have approached the topics of intercultural-
ity from the perspective of Husserl’s phenomenology.44 
43 Schütz 1967: 44.
44 With regard to these topics, I have benefitted especially from the openings articulated 
by Hart’s The Person and the Common Life: Studies in a Husserlian Social Ethics (1992), Zahavi’s 
works on intersubjectivity (2001) as well as the diligent readings of Ichiro Yamaguchi in 
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  In regards to the topic of historicity, Husserl’s later works have 
spurred a wide variety of analyses dealing with the relation between phe-
nomenology and historical reflection. Already in the works of Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, the historical-critical approach of Husserl’s late philoso-
phy was acknowledged as a novel articulation on the general character 
of the phenomenological method.45 Despite the immensely pivotal role 
of corporeality, perceptual awareness and subjectivity in Merlau-Ponty’s 
own works, I believe his insights on the historical and political aspects of 
phenomenology are still of high relevance – insights that were articulated, 
for instance, in his attempts to reconcile phenomenology with the Marx-
ist tradition.46 This approach was also entertained by Tran Duc Thao in 
his Phenomenology and Dialectical Materialism (Phénoménologie et matérialisme 
dialectique, 1951) whose second part (“The Dialectic of Real Movement”) 
was one of the first instantiations of the teleological-historical method 
outside Husserl’s own body of work. In the early Husserl-reception, the 
problematic of history was likewise discussed by Paul Ricoeur in his 1949 
article “Husserl et le sens de l’histoire” (“Husserl and the Sense of His-
tory”), which approached this topic also in regard to the problematic of 
Europe. Although Ricoeur’s approach was highly original and insightful, 
some of his imprecise translations gave way to a series of misinterpre-
tations concerning Husserl’s definition of Europe (see Ch. 4.1). In this 
work, I have benefitted especially from David Carr’s insightful interpreta-
tions concerning the historical dimensions of phenomenology – especially 
those concerning the narrative character of historicity and its relation to 
Hegelian dialectics – in Phenomenology and the Problem of History (1974) and 
Time, Narrative and History (1991).47 
  As regards to the explicitly political approaches to Husserl’s phenom-
enology, this work employs especially the insights of Karl Schuhmann’s 
Husserls Staatsphilosophie (1988). Besides engaging in a discussion with 
Schumann’s reading of the problematic of state in Husserl, I have also 
capitalized on his interpretation of Husserl’s idea of “community of love” 
his Passive Synthesis und Intersubjektivität bei Edmund Husserl (1982). On the problematic of 
interculturality, see Mohanty 2001; Carr & Zhang 2004; Welton 2000: 306ff.
45 Merleau-Ponty 2002: xx.
46 Merleau-Ponty 1973. 
47 In his collection of essays Interpreting Husserl: Critical and Comparative Studies (1987), Carr 
provides also a suggestive reading on the problematic of intersubjectivity, especially the 
idea of “personalities of a higher order”.
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(Liebesgemeinschaft). Other central contributions in this topic have been 
articulated by Hart (1992a), Held (2007), Natalie Depraz (1995), John 
Drummond (2000), and Andrzej Gniazdowski (2004).
  Regarding the problematic of crisis, or the more specific “European 
crisis”, I have relied on two sets of sources. First of all, I have articulated 
my own position in regard to a variety of authors discussing the idea of 
crisis in Husserl’s own works. Besides the interpretations given by authors 
such as Carr, Tom Rockmore and Dermot Moran, perhaps the most help-
ful work in this regard has been Philip J. Buckley’s Husserl, Heidegger, and 
the Crisis of Philosophical Responsibility (1992).48 Secondly, in my interpreta-
tion concerning the philosophical and intellectual background of Husserl’s 
crisis-thinking, I have taken advantage of a substantial amount of literature 
relating to this thematic. Besides my readings of the original authors – 
Hobbes, Rousseau, Hegel, Schmitt, Spengler – one of the most important 
sources in this regard has been the work of the German philosopher and 
conceptual historian Reinhart Koselleck, whose 1959 work Critique and 
Crisis: Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modern Society (Kritik und Krise: 
Eine Studie zur Pathogenese der bürgerlichen Welt) served as one of the key 
points of departure for my approach to the topic of modernity and its 
crisis. In the first part of the work, I have also benefitted of Koselleck’s nu-
merous articles concerning the conceptual history of the notion of crisis as 
well as the birth of modern philosophical history in general.49
* * *
48 In his work, Buckley provides a detailed reading of Husserl’s concept of crisis especially 
in regard to the problematic of scientific rationality and the loss of intuitive evidence im-
plied within it; at the same time, he manages to touch upon some of the most intriguing 
topics concerning the communal and cultural dimensions of Husserl’s phenomenology.
49 Other important sources in this regard have been Nelly Tsouyopoulos’ entry (1971) 
on the concept of crisis in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie as well as Gerhard Ma-
sur’s “Crisis in History” in Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Selected Study of Pivotal Ideas. 
In my attempt to provide the notion of crisis with a phenomenological interpretation, I 
have benefitted from a number of philosophers dealing with the problematic of modernity 
within the Continental tradition: Hannah Arendt, Charles Bambach, Hans Blumenberg, 
Ágnes Heller, Frederic Jameson, Claude Lefort and Leo Strauss, to name a few. Especially 
Strauss’ work on the genesis of natural law in early modernity in Natural Right and His-
tory (1953) as well as Lefort’s collections The Political Forms of Modern Society: Bureaucracy, 
Democracy, Totalitarianism (1986) and Democracy and Political Theory (1989) have provided 
important insights on the legitimacy-crisis of modern political philosophy.
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On a more general level, this work aims at reinstituting the philosophical 
sense of the concept of Europe not in order to repeat the modern convic-
tion of its unwavering universality but for the purpose of responding to 
the general demise of universalism that we are witnessing through the 
growing crisis of intercultural co-operation, transnational agreements, 
and other global political institutions. This is not to say, however, that we 
ought to conceive Europe as the sole framework for the realization of 
the universal reason, nor should we consider it as the indispensable title 
for future forms of universalism. We should, I believe, treat the history 
of European universalism primarily as a lesson to be learned – a lesson, 
which points towards the idea of a radical responsiveness towards the alien 
but which also accounts for the unjust and unilateral history of European 
expansionism.
  This lesson entails that we approach Europe, once again, not as a tradi-
tion to be defended but as a question to be asked.
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P P. An absolute drive toward per-
fection and completeness is an illness, as soon as it shows 
itself to be destructive and averse toward the imperfect, 
the incomplete. – Novalis: Das allegemeine Brouillon, (1993 
[1798], fr. 32) 
I
n his elusive essay “What is Enlightenment?” Michel Foucault puts 
forward a series of questions concerning the character of the mod-
ern age. Taking his point of departure from a critical encounter with 
Kant’s 1784 essay bearing the same name, Foucault asks whether 
instead of the traditional understanding of modernity as a historical 
epoch – defined through a set of cultural accomplishments, values, or a 
historical style – we ought to characterize it in terms of an attitude. “By 
attitude”, Foucault writes,
I mean a mode of relating to contemporary reality; a voluntary 
choice made by certain people; in the end, a way of thinking and 
feeling; a way, too, of acting and behaving that at one and the same 
time marks a relation of belonging and presents itself as a task. 
A bit, no doubt, like what the Greeks called an ethos. And conse-
quently, rather than seeking to distinguish the “modern era” from 
the “premodern” or “postmodern”, I think it would be more use-
ful to try to find out how the attitude of modernity, ever since its 
formation, has found itself struggling with attitudes of “counter-
modernity”.1 
Thus, what Foucault recalls here is the old Hegelian thought according 
to which modernity is that epoch which is not destroyed by its nega-
tive character but which can sustain this negativity as a fundamental 
1 Foucault 1984: 39.
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constituent of its essence.2 Why is this? Because as the Latin modernus al-
ready suggest, this period implies a special relation to the “just now” (Lat. 
modo).3 Modernity is an epoch that resists the overarching authority of the 
past for the sake of the present moment; it understands that one is free not 
in spontaneity but in relation to one’s historical and cultural presupposi-
tions. Fixing modernity into a particular historical “heritage” would mean 
that we lose sight of what is most essential to this notion: the opposition 
to traditionality as such. As Foucault continues:
Modernity is often characterized in terms of consciousness of the 
discontinuity of time: a break with tradition, a feeling of novelty, 
of vertigo in the face of the passing moment […] Modernity is dis-
tinct from fashion, which does no more than call into question the 
course of time; modernity is the attitude that makes it possible to 
grasp the ‘heroic’ aspect of the present moment. Modernity is not 
a phenomenon of sensitivity to the fleeting present; it is the will to 
“heroize” the present.4 
As a result of this tendency, it is one of the fundamental traits of the mod-
ern age to see the present moment as revolutionary, as something which 
represents the very climax of history. For the modern age, every histori-
cal event is a crucial turning-point; every presence is a time of upheaval 
in which the future course of history is being decided once and for all. 
Here, it is of course easy to agree with Foucault that this logic of constant 
culmination – the “heroization of the present” – cannot obviously be any-
thing but unjustified: genuine historical revolutions are rare and can their 
significance can be acknowledged only in retrospect. Depending on the 
development of the global system, the year 2001 may well turn out to be 
more important for the future history writing than, for instance, the col-
2 I am referring here especially to the characterization in the Philosophy of Right (§358) of 
German nations as “the extreme of absolute negativity” (erfaßt der in sich zurückgedrängte 
Geist in dem Extreme seiner absoluten Negativität), in which “spirit finds the infinite and yet 
positive nature of its own inner being, the principle of unity of the divine and the human” 
(die unendliche Positivität dieses seines Innern, das Prinzip der Einheit der göttlichen und men-
schlichen Natur) GW 14.1: 280–281.
3 The term “modern” itself dates back to the well-known quarrel between the Ancients 
and the Moderns that erupted in the context of Académie française in the late 17th century. 
Here, the fundamental question was whether we should understand the past primarily 
as a source of inspiration and the target of imitation – or, whether the past represents 
something that suppresses us, something that hinders us from reacting to the demands of 
the present moment.
4 Foucault 1984: 39.
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lapse of the iron curtain in the late 1980s – or they both may be surpassed 
by the year of the Maastricht Treaty (1992). This is something that we 
cannot judge. As we have observed with the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system and the succeeding implementation of neo-liberal policies in the 
1980s – which served as a catalyst for the unending series of financial cri-
ses since the beginning of 1990s – some of the most significant revolutions 
of our time take place rather unobserved, as the result of seemingly minor 
or irrelevant occurrences. Thus, as Foucault has put it elsewhere, this logic 
of constant crisis is something whose tempting spell we should resist. What 
we need is a more modest view of ourselves and of our time, humbleness 
in front of history.5
  Still, in order to resist this tendency of overemphasizing the present, 
we should perhaps come to grips with it. For if the crisis-consciousness 
truly is a modern phenomenon, we must ask whether there is something 
in the very nature of modernity itself that allows crises to come about, 
something that constantly produces crises rather than just serves as their 
stage. For if modernity truly is, as Marx put it in connection to the after-
math of French Revolution, an age of “permanent revolution”6, then what 
kind of concepts of permanence and identity must we anticipate? What 
kind of ideas of temporality and change does this idea presuppose in order 
to come about?
  Husserl, too, was a philosopher for whom the present moment car-
ried a particularly important significance. Already in his early works Hus-
serl defined phenomenology as a philosophical attitude, which seeks to 
examine all constitution of meaning with regard to its appearance in the 
present moment (Gegenwart), more precisely, in its “bodily” (leibhaft) or 
“living” (lebendig) clarity.7 This was not to say that our entire experience 
5 Foucault 1989: 251. On Foucault’s use of “crisis”, see Sluga 1993: 74. In his Crossroads in 
the Labyrinth, Cornelius Castoriadis sees crises not just as transitional phases or historical 
stages in the development of the modern science, but as its “permanent state” (1984: xiv). 
See also Bambach 1995: 44–45.
6 This idea of “permanent revolution” originates from Marx’s essay The Holy Family (1844) 
where he discusses Napoleon’s “twofold” struggle with and against the bourgeoisie society. 
This notion became a highly important concept for both the German revisionists as well as 
the Russian communists. See Voegelin 1999: 15.
7 On “bodily” presence, see HuaXXIX: 434. The term “living presence” (lebendige Ge-
genwart) appears mostly in Husserl’s manuscripts, where it is linked to the temporal or 
“flowing” (strömend) character of presense. See HuaI: 161; HuaXI: 278; HuaMatVIII: 113, 
passim.
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would be characterized by the full givenness of things; rather, we ought to 
acknowledge this presence as the demarcation of the limits of legitimate 
knowledge. The objects we perceive or the things we contemplate are of 
course more than those aspects that are intuited at a given moment (what 
Husserl sometimes calls Präsenz or Urpräsenz, “primal presence”). As Hus-
serl later clarified in his lectures on time-consciousness, the present itself 
was to be understood in terms of width and density: it reaches out to 
the horizons of past and future through “retentional” and “protentional” 
awareness. However, it is only this intuitive givenness in the present which 
functions as the ultimate point of reference for all meaning and validity. 
  In Husserl’s later writings, however, this presence seemed to entail 
even a greater magnitude. Especially in his last major work The Crisis of 
the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, the present moment 
was now introduced as the necessary point of departure for the novel way 
of arriving at the fundamental problems of phenomenology, that of “tele-
ological-historical reflection”.8 Whereas most of Husserl’s earlier works 
were dominated by the narration of the first person singular (“Philosophy 
[…] is the philosophizer’s quite personal affair”9, as Husserl put it in the 
Cartesian Meditations) it seems that especially in the context of Crisis-work, 
the subject of philosophical reflection was to be conceived now in terms 
of the first person plural – “we, humans of the present” (Wir Menschen 
der Gegenwart), “we, philosophers of the present” (wir Philosophen dieser Ge-
genwart), or “contemporary philosophers” (heutige Philosophen).10 Respec-
tively, the foundation of philosophical questioning was now defined with 
terms such as “the actual state of the present” (die faktische Gegenwartslage) 
and “our present situation” (unsere Gegenwartssituation)11 referring to the 
inextricably cultural and communal aspects of this presence. Here, the 
present was no longer understood in terms of immediate presence for 
consciousness, but in terms of a broader horizon of interests, including 
the various historical “presuppositions” (Voraussetzungen) belonging to the 
given situation.
8 On the use of this term, see the editor’s comments in HuaVI: xiii; Cf. HuaVI: 435.
9 HuaI: 44.
10 HuaVI: 12, 15, 72. 
11 HuaVI: 8, 16, 196.
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  This focus on the present moment was of course implied by the very 
topic of the work itself, the “crisis” (Krisis) of the European sciences. By 
the year 1934, as Husserl began to prepare his first texts that carried this 
notion in their title, the German intellectual scene had witnessed a quick 
emergence of crisis-literature whose topics extended from the particular 
cultural, political and economic crises to the overarching degradation of 
the whole of Western world. The “crisis” was by no means an originary 
topic: since the early 1920s, the economic crisis of the post-war Ger-
many had paved the way for political extremists who aimed at capitalizing 
the political sense of the crisis by introducing exceptional measures of 
action. The Weimar Republic itself reached its end through the so-called 
Gleichschaltung (“coordination”) of the early 1933, which basically institu-
tionalized the crisis by introducing a permanent state of exception over 
the constitutional law. Thus, it seems that there was no shortage of crisis-
consciousness, which called for a transformation on the present state of 
affairs: for politicians as well as for philosophers, it was an imperative to 
act. What was perhaps lacking was a more thorough consideration con-
cerning the origins of these crises. Although Husserl, too, maintained that 
the “task of self-reflection grows out of the breakdown-situation of our 
time”12, this insight did not prevent him from warning against the “spell” 
(Bann) of the present times.13 Despite its compelling character, the very 
discourse on crisis as the focusing of attention to the present moment was as 
much a hindrance as it was the path to a genuine philosophical reflection.
  There are still good reasons, I believe, to designate Husserl’s later re-
flections in terms of a philosophy of presence. This presence, however, was 
no longer the affair of a singular subject and her givenness, but it was 
understood as the essentially intersubjective and historical framework of 
meaning and sense. A serious analysis of this domain was already antici-
pated with the emerging analyses on the concept of lifeworld (Lebenswelt) 
since the late 1910s – however, it was only in his later works that Husserl 
fully appreciated the generative dimensions of this concept, i.e. the cul-
tural, historical and social processes of meaning-sedimentation implied in 
it. In order to accomplish this, Husserl introduced a novel idea of histori-
12 “[…] diejenige Aufgabe der Selbstbesinnung auf uns nehmen, welche aus der Zusam-
menbruchs-Situation unserer Zeit [...] erwachsen ist.” HuaVI: 59.
13 HuaVI: 58.
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cal critique (the “teleological-historical reflection”), proceeding through a 
“questioning-back” (rückfragen), which unfolds the essential dependency of 
the present moment from the past. 
  Thus Europe, as it constituted the basic historical, social, and also the 
political framework for this questioning, was to be conceived not only as 
a geographical or geopolitical region but as a historically sedimented tradition 
of meaning. Its crisis could not be overcome by putting the present on ped-
estal; instead, this crisis could only be understood in terms of a historical 
movement, consisting in a series of ill-founded ideas, meanings, values, 
and practices. The crisis was, to use the expression of Husserl’s Vienna 
Lecture, to be “uprooted” (entwurzeln) in its essential core.14
  But what really are crises? The frequent use of the word “crisis” in 
the contemporary debate may often lead us to forget that its modern use 
results actually from a shift of meaning. The word crisis derives from the 
Greek verb krinō which in the context of classical period meant the mak-
ing of a separation, distinction, decision or choice. (Correspondingly, the 
medial form krinomai denoted judging or disputing, though not in a par-
ticularly violent sense). One of the most common contexts of use was the 
tribunal that aimed at making a krisis concerning the subject matter: the 
court sessions were pre-pared by a preliminary hearing (anakrisis) con-
ducted by a public officer, finally leading to a voting between the options 
of favorable (prokrisis) and unfavorable (konkrisis) decision.15 The sense of 
decision was also present in Herodotus’ Histories, in which the word “cri-
sis” was attached to the four pivotal battles of the Persian wars.16 All in 
all, the classical use of the word referred to a certain idea of active choice 
– something that one is forced to make. Crises do not merely happen, 
but they are conducted or performed in one way or another. In Politics, 
for instance, Aristotle linked this sense intimately to the establishing of a 
political order: “Justice belongs to the polis; for justice, which is the deter-
mination or decision (krisis) of what is just, is an ordering of the political 
association”.17 Here the “crisis” was the decision that creates order and 
establishes the possibility of good life in general.
14 HuaVI: 317.
15 Sealey 1994: 109.
16 See esp. Herodotus, Hist. VIII.87.
17 Aristotle, Pol.I.2 1253a.
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  However, already in the fifth century BC the word krisis took up an-
other direction that was somewhat opposite to the aforementioned sense. 
Especially in the medical writings gathered in the Corpus Hippocraticum, 
“crisis” came to dnote a “decision” on a medical condition, that is, both 
the turning-point of a disease as well as the doctor’s judgment about it.18 
Galen’s (129–200) systematization of Hippocratean crisis-theory and its 
differentiation between acute and chronic crises was highly influential un-
til the late Middle Ages; to Latin, the word crisis was adopted primarily in 
this medical sense and it is still an important part of medical terminology 
(“epicrisis”, “hemolytic crisis” etc.). According to this account, the crisis 
was linked to the critical days which either trigger off the process of re-
covery in the patient, or, in turn, result in the deepening of the medical 
condition. In its ultimate form, the crisis was a decision between life and 
death, which must lead either to the renewal of the organism or to its ex-
tinction. This crisis, however, was not primarily a matter of active choice. 
On the contrary, the subject of the crisis was now projected as essentially 
powerless and passive. (It is particularly this sense that forms the basis for 
the modern understanding of the word, for we usually speak of the sub-
jects of crises as passive entities – the global economy, for instance, does 
not actively drive itself into crisis, but is drifted or descended into it.)
  Alongside with the active and passive conceptions of crisis, we might 
still list one important meaning of the word. This is the context of Chris-
tian theology and its idea of Last Judgment (krisis) or the Day of Judgment. 
Even though this idea of crisis as an “act of justice” dates from the legal 
context of theGreeks and can be found in all Abrahamic religions, it is not 
primarily an act that would have taken place in worldly time. It is rather a 
“cosmic” event that guides history as a whole, guaranteeing the possibility 
of salvation as well as the rightness of the world (“But I say unto you that 
every idle word that men shall speak, they shall give account thereof in the 
Day of Judgment (en hēmera kriseōs)”19). Being a Christian means to live in 
the waiting of this judgment which makes it actually an already ongoing 
process: the crisis takes place constantly at the level of one’s conscience. 
As Reinhart Koselleck has pointed out, until the sixteenth century the his-
tory of Christianity was indeed the waiting of the End of the World – and 
18 Koselleck 2006: 360.
19 Matt. 12:36
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the continual deferment of this End.20 This teleology, while it guaranteed 
the essentially just character of world history, could not really point to-
wards a genuine resolution within historical time. There was no choice 
between death and renewal; both of them coalesced at the ultimate bound 
of time, the eschaton of history. 
  This eschatological sense of the crisis is particularly important from 
a philosophical-historical point of view, for it links the notion of crisis to 
a specific temporal structure. For the late 18th and early 19th century phi-
losophers of history, crisis was not taken as a simple descriptive category, 
but it implied a deeper prophetical connotation pointing towards the fulfill-
ment of history. At the same time, crisis was divested of its sense as the 
ultimate end of history, and was not conceived in relation to significant 
historical transitions, for instance, the French Revolution. This tendency, 
which begins with Rousseau, reached its peak in Hegel, Marx and Comte 
who all emphasized the pivotal role of radical breaks as the driving forces 
of history.21 Crises were not mere sporadic diseases, but they were inter-
preted in connection to wider historical narratives – for instance, as in 
the case of Marxist tradition proclaiming the self-destructive character of 
capitalism due to its increasingly vigorous crises. 
  As a result of this development, the notion of crisis itself was endowed 
with its multifaceted contemporary sense during the 18th and 19th centu-
ries. The “crisis” was used to describe a vast variety of ideas, all of which 
are not easily reconciled with each other. During this period the notion 
of crisis gained strong foothold in the frameworks of political and social 
theory, economy and theology; correspondingly, it became a dominant 
theme in different disciplines such as anthropology, ethnology and psy-
chology.22 From the 18th century onwards, the philosophical-historical 
prognoses employed the notion of crisis in order to describe as much the 
moments of deepest desperation and pessimism as well as the boldness 
that is involved in the attempts of establishing a new order. In the frame-
work of German philosophy, the notion of crisis employed a central posi-
tion especially between the years of 1890 and 1933, during which it may 
be said to have transformed from a mere diagnostic concept into a perma-
20 Koselleck 1983: 11.
21 Löwith 1949: 2. See Ch. 1.2.
22 Koselleck 2006: 358.
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nent military-political condition. More importantly, instead of denoting 
a mere point of transition in the course of history, crisis seemed to refer 
to a more devastating break in the European-Occidental tradition – one 
that implicated the possibility of a permanent defeat or even complete 
decline.
  In this section I want to argue that not only does this conceptual back-
ground carry a lot of weight in relation to the modern theories of cri-
ses, but that it is particularly crucial for Husserl’s reflections on Europe. 
It will be the guiding presupposition of this work that these reflections 
took their starting-point from a recognition of crisis – from the discovery 
of a historical breakdown-situation, which seemed to drill down to the 
very fundaments of cultural self-understanding. Husserl, however, did not 
entertain this popular discourse merely in order to argue for the immi-
nent demise of Europe. Instead, these reflections enabled him to articulate 
phenomenology with respect to a wholly new domain – the domain of 
culture, social and political ontology, and historical teleology. As Anthony 
Steinbock argues, the problematic of generative phenomenology – i.e. the 
investigation of intergenerational forms of co-existence and sedimenta-
tion of meaning – “did not arise willy-nilly, as just one phenomenological 
matter among others. It grew as an historical response to a cultural crisis 
in a broad sense, not merely a crisis of reason and science, but ultimately 
of an ethical community.”23 As a result of this confrontation, Husserl found 
himself struggling with the fundamental problems and presuppositions of 
modern thought: questions of the direction and progress of history, the 
possibility of philosophical thinking to direct the course of humanity at 
large and perhaps most importantly, the possibility of rational culture. 
Thus, in order to appreciate the uniqueness of the cultural-critical aspect 
of Husserl’s phenomenology, I believe it is crucial that we acknowledge 
this background.
  Within the framework of this dissertation, it is not necessary to pro-
vide a detailed idea- or conceptual-historical discussion on the genesis of 
the European crisis. What I would like to do in this chapter, however, is 
to capture some of its essential features that I see as crucial with regard 
to Husserl’s reflections on Europe. The notion of crisis attached to several 
23 Steinbock 1995: 260.
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presuppositions and conceptual frameworks, which I will discuss in the 
following part.
  First, I will discuss the question concerning the personification of cul-
tures and communities in chapter 1.1. Even though Husserl’s phenomenol-
ogy was defined by its first-person orientation, it was not limited merely 
to the problems of individual consciousness or life. Especially from the 
1920s onwards, Husserl saw that phenomenology should be able to con-
front questions concerning the social realm: the problems of intersub-
jectivity and interpersonal communication, science as a specific form of 
communal co-operation, and the ethical ideal of community. Instead of 
mere derivative phenomena of the individual (consciousness), Husserl be-
gun to discuss communities with such concepts as Bewusstsein, Personalität, 
and Subjekt, which all referred to the distinct, though not completely in-
dependent character of communities. It is my conviction that in order to 
understand the implications of Husserl’s crisis-thinking, it is necessary to 
situate it not only in regard to the tradition of German idealism promot-
ing the idea of communities as “spiritual” notions, but even the longer tra-
dition of “body politic” (Lat. corpus politicus): the definition of communities 
(particularly political communities) as analogical to individual persons. As 
I will argue, Husserl’s discourse on the crisis of modern Europe was not 
restricted merely to the sphere of scientific rationality, but this discourse 
was entertained in order to tackle its wider connotations in the political 
thinking of modernity, most importantly, the loss of natural human sociality 
implied by modern physicalist rationality. 
  Secondly, I will focus on the background of the crisis in the idea of 
history as a teleological process in chapter 1.2. Since the eighteenth century 
the notion of crisis has closely linked to the idea of historical decision or 
break: a crisis is an event that marks a radical turning-point in the course 
of history. Especially since Kant and Hegel, we have been accustomed to 
speak of this general form of historical development in terms of a teleologi-
cal structure – i.e. determined by the categories of origin and end – which 
finds its ultimate completion in a particular ideal form. As I will show, al-
though Hegel’s relation to the “end of history” was fundamentally am-
biguous, he nevertheless maintained that the development of spirit must 
correspond to a particular empirical form, which brings the dialectics of 
history to its end. It is my argument that Husserl’s reflections on crisis 
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capitalized on this idea in the sense that he aimed at interpreting the crisis 
on the basis of a teleological concept of historical development, which can 
be discovered by the phenomenological “questioning-back”. By insisting 
on the inextricably ideal character of this teleology, Husserl radically chal-
lenged the progressive and deterministic implications of the modern te-
leological view of history – an idea which serves as the point of departure 
for my thesis on the peculiar “historical epoché” of Husserl (cf. Ch. 4.1).
  In chapter 1.3 I will focus on the more imminent influences of Hus-
serl’s crisis-thinking, the philosophical and intellectual situation of the ear-
ly twentieth century. As I will show, it was especially the novel emphasis 
on the organic connotations of crisis that served as the point of departure 
for Husserl’s broadened critiques of naturalism and historicism in regard 
to the mere individual-oriented and scientific interpretations of these no-
tions. Through the post-WWI debate, Husserl was inclined to react to a 
growing debate concerning the crisis of the “European” rationality that 
manifested itself in the novel idea of cultural relativism and the critique 
of progress. Instead of a historical transition, the crisis pointed towards a 
new idea of historical decline – expressed in the works of Nietzsche and 
Spengler – that could no longer hold on to the essentially voluntarist and 
open character of historical development. Instead, the crisis was now used 
to denote the beginning of an irreversible end. It is my argument that in 
order to understand the essentially active and voluntarist connotations of 
Husserl’s crisis-thinking, it is necessary to attach it to the idea of political 
decisionism that played a part in the crisis-debate of the early twentieth-
century. Instead of pointing towards a political state of exception, Hus-
serl aimed at articulating this decisionism in the context of generative and 
historical reflection.
  Lastly, in chapter 1.4 I will start the discussion on the emergence 
and character of the topic of crisis in Husserl’s phenomenology. Although 
Husserl expressed the need to formulate the project of phenomenology 
in regard to the domain of culture already at the beginning of the 1910s, 
it was not until the 1920s that Husserl begun to understand this need as 
depending on a novel articulation of the division between theoretical and 
practical reason. As I will show, Husserl no longer treated the philosophi-
cal problems of naturalism and historicism as merely something which 
concern the rational capacities of the individual subject; instead, their 
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scope had now broadened to include also the domains of culture and in-
tersubjective co-operation. As I will show, Husserl’s “crisis” was to be con-
ceived, not only as a historical-empirical phenomenon of his time, but as a 
category of reason denoting the “loss of intuitive evidence” characteristic 
of both theoretical as well as practical commitments – a category that also 
unfolded in the generative development of communities. By discussing 
the idea of personal self-responsibility in regard to his novel understand-
ing of the temporal dynamism of human subjectivity, Husserl was able to 
account for a positive sense of the crisis as the active responsiveness to the 
loss of meaning. 
1.1. On the Crisis of the Modern Body Politic
In Kulturgeschichte der Neuzeit (A Cultural History of the Modern Times, pub-
lished 1927–1931), Egon Friedell writes:
In the life of state and society, in the history of art, science and 
religion we can observe that the loss of balance should not be 
conceived merely as a harmful phenomena; on the contrary, ev-
ery fruitful renewal can only be attained through a “revolution” 
[…] From the old perspective, this condition must always look as 
morbid […] The idea that the phenomenon of sickness has closely 
linked to the secret of becoming, has been widespread in all times 
of humanity.24
Indeed, Friedell’s three-volume work seems like an intricate medical casebook. Drawing back to Spengler’s popular morphology of culture as well as to Herder’s poetic historiography, Friedell wanted to of-
fer a full-fledged and comprehensive history of the modern age through 
the manifold dynamism of different forces, most importantly, through the 
concepts of sickness and health, disease and cure. In the heart of the mod-
ern history, Friedell located a specific spiritual condition – the “crisis of 
European soul” – which was not to be conceived as a univocally harmful 
event but also as a productive one.25 According to this diagnosis, the crisis 
24 Friedell 2007: 65.
25 Friedell 2007: 236ff.
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dated back to 1348 and the painful experience of the Black Death, which 
first released the medieval human being from the belief in the rational 
course of things.26 “So many died that all believed it was the end of the 
world,” wrote Agnolo di Tura, a Sienese witness of the Black Death – and 
indeed, as Friedell put it, it was the beginning of the end of the medieval 
world. Followed by what Friedell called the “incubation period” of the late 
fourteenth and the early fifteenth century, the crisis became all more ap-
parent: through the crisis of the Western Christianity, the discovery of the 
New World, and the emergence of the new monetary economy, the world 
of “God-inspired mystery” was gradually replaced by “man-made rational-
ity”. Lastly, the “materialistically oriented” Italian Renaissance produced a 
kind of anarchy within the European soul with its disbelief in everything. 
  Thus modernity, Friedell argued, was to be understood as a constant 
striving to overcome this crisis – as an effort to heal the disease through a 
new ontological foundation of culture.
  Although Friedell may be right in emphasizing the pivotal role of met-
aphors of sickness and health for all historical periods, we should perhaps 
be careful in applying the notion of crisis too hastily in connection to pre-
modern thinking. With the discovery of the New World, the rise of new 
scientific discoveries and the rapid expansion of monetary economy, the 
period of early modernity may be defined in terms of regeneration; how-
ever, it is another thing to agree with Friedell that the Italian Renaissance, 
for instance, would have defined itself in terms of a crisis. For the people 
of fourteenth century, the Black Death was obviously a devastating expe-
rience, and it exterminated a third of the European population; however, 
the contemporary historians or intellectuals did not address it in terms of 
a social or a historical crisis. As for Agnolo di Tura, the “crisis” was a sign of 
the end of the world and not an open historical choice between death and 
renewal. The astronomy of Copernicus naturally transformed our modern 
view of the world radically – still, it was not experienced as a “scientific 
crisis” by his contemporaries. Most of the European economies suffered 
a recession at the turn of fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, but for the 
economists of the time, this was not a situation of crisis. (Actually, it was 
only through Marx that the concept of crisis established its position in the 
mainstream economics.)
26 Friedell 2007: 63ff.
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  Of course, Friedell’s poetic description is a product of its times. But 
this applies also to the notion of crisis: as a category of social, cultural or 
a political reflection it is a uniquely modern concept that is made possible 
by ways of thinking that are characteristic of this period of time. Moder-
nity interprets historical events as breaks, transitions, or stops, and it does 
so against the background of the teleological horizon of historical con-
sciousness, which projects history itself as a self-sufficient, transcendent 
flow of time. At the same time, modernity unfolds as a specific struggle on 
the genuine agency or driving force of this process: who, or what, is the 
subject of history that constantly descends into crises?
  Perhaps this point can be illuminated by considering the conceptual 
background of the modern crisis-thinking. Up to the seventeenth century, 
the Latin word “crisis” was restricted mainly to medical usage. The early 
English, French and German translations (or adaptations) of this concept 
that appeared in the course of sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were 
dominated by the medical sense, and it was only after the French Revolu-
tion that the German lexicons, for instance, began to acknowledge its so-
cial and political connotations. According to Reinhart Koselleck, the first 
instances of the metaphorical use of the word can be found in the contexts 
of French and English politics in which the crisis was used to describe a 
certain imbalance in the political order; for instance, the insecure pros-
pects of the Parliament or the instability of economy.27 The idea of general 
cultural crises is a relatively late idea that first appeared in the course of 
nineteenth century, but really came into fruitition only in the beginning of 
the twentieth century.
  One of the central reasons behind the early adaptation of crisis-meta-
phor was that both the English and the French political cultures had been 
heavily influenced by the tradition of “body politic” (corpus politicus), that 
is, the analogy between the human body and the state (or society). This 
analogy was deployed throughout the medieval times, for instance, in the 
Policraticus (1159) by John of Salisbury, often considered the antecedent of 
modern political science. Salisbury employed the physiological model in 
his political ontology primarily in order to describe the natural order of 
power within the state: whereas the prince equated with the head of state, 
the senate represented its heart, the soldiers and officials functioned as 
27 Koselleck 2006: 362.
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its hands and the peasants as its legs. Tyranny, for instance, was to be con-
ceived as an imbalance of the political system, a “political disease” that can 
only be battled by acknowledging the compelling necessity of the natural 
order.28 
  Within the tradition of Western philosophy, the metaphor of body 
politic derives already from the political writings of the Greeks. In their 
descriptions of the character of the state (polis), both Plato and Aristotle 
rely on the image of the body (sōma), and they do so in two respects. As 
especially Aristotle emphasizes, polis is not an artificial construction of 
human beings (although he acknowledges a certain active element in its 
establishment) but rather something that necessarily belongs to human 
life. “Every polis exists by nature (fysei), inasmuch as the first communi-
ties (koinoniai) so exist,” writes Aristotle, “for the polis is the end (telos) of 
the other communities for nature is an end.”29 For Greek philosophy in 
general, it was a shared presupposition that the being of man can reach its 
fulfillment only in the shared world of the polis; without a membership in 
a state, man is essentially incomplete. Thus without the whole “body” of 
the state, Aristotle maintained, there would not be a living “foot” (an indi-
vidual) or a “hand” (a family) – polis is the common organism that vivifies 
all forms of human sociality and provides them with a teleological sense.30 
Alongside with this descriptive use of the analogy, the body was employed 
also as a normative category defining the righteous form of the state.31 
Plato articulated his societal revolution on the basis of a well-functioning 
body, and argued how the ideal state is arranged according to the virtues 
of temperance, wisdom and courage that all have their bodily counter-
parts.32 In Timaeus we discover the analogy between health and justice – an 
28 John of Salisbury 1990: 67. On different interpretations of the body politic in John, see 
Nedermann 1987.
29 Aristotle, Pol. I.2 1252b32–35.
30 Aristotle, Pol. I.2 1252b27–30.
31 These analogies could be applied also in opposite direction. The 5th century medical 
philosopher Alcmaeon discussed the idea of healthy body in terms of “political equality” 
(isonomia) – a concept that was most often linked to the idea of democracy – and sickness 
in terms of monarchy (monarkhia) in which one element exercises superior power in rela-
tion to other parts. See DK 24 B4, Longrigg 1993. In Republic, Plato discussed the polis as a 
heuristic model determining what makes a righteous individual: a human being can be said 
to be “wise” or “courageous” in the same manner as the state is (Plato, Rep. 441c–d).
32 However, in order to realize his vision of rational somatics, he needed to warn off basi-
cally all foreign impulses (dance, music, and inappropriate poetry) from the political body. 
Plato, Rep. 442b
— 66 —
. P   C  E M
analogy which is called forth again in the Republic as Socrates characterizes 
the city of polarized wealth as “feverish”.33 
  Following the thesis of Ernst Kantorowicz’s book The King’s Two Bodies 
(1957), the medieval idea of political sovereignty was born out of the con-
juncture of the two ideas of the political body: the natural and the political. 
In line with the Christian idea of Christ’s two bodies – the corpus naturale 
as the flesh-and-blood body of Christ, and the corpus mysticum, the collec-
tive, enduring body of the congregation – the sovereign was conceived as 
the embodiment of not only his own persona, but also of the collective, 
societal body of people. This distinction had important consequences for 
our modern view of sovereignty: by conflating the natural body of the 
King with the political body of people, the political community could be 
described as having a single interest, a single authority and a clear territo-
rial outline. As in the case of Christ, the death of King’s natural body could 
be reconciled through the remaining societal collective: through the idea 
of corpus republicae mysticum, the political body could be thought as pertain-
ing within itself an infinite future horizon.34 
  The metaphysical-theological conflation of sovereignty and the body 
politic was challenged by several of the early modern philosophers. Es-
pecially for the representatives of the early modern liberal tradition, the 
state was now conceived as a result of an imagined pact – the social con-
tract – that was established in order to argue for the necessity of politi-
cal sovereignty. Instead of the compelling necessity of a natural body or 
a metaphysical conflation, political institutions derived their legitimacy 
through a voluntary covenant, though hypothetical, through which the 
individuals gave up on the absolute character of their will and submitted 
themselves to the will of political sovereignty. These thinkers – for in-
stance, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke – did not completely abandon the 
metaphor of the body politic. Alongside with the notion of corpus politicus 
there emerged a wide variety of other personal metaphors – such as magni 
homines and personae moralis – that referred to the idea of a social body. De-
spite Hobbes’ “atomistic” view of the human individual, even he referred 
to communities as persons (“civitas est persona una”) and political bodies, al-
though they were given an explicitly “fictious” character (persona ficta, “le-
33 Plato, Tim. 42b; Rep. 372e.
34 Kantorowicz 1957: 193ff.
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gal person”).35 This shift was reflected also in the new legalist framework 
of the seventeenth and eighteenth century political theorists for whom the 
analogy of state and person was central above all for juridical reasons. It 
was crucial to ensure the state the status of a legal person through which 
it can establish pacts and agreements with other states.
  Thus within the analogy of the body politic, we can acknowledge a 
shift from a genuine physiological likeness to a more heuristic approach: 
the state was not a real natural body, but could be likened to one for dif-
ferent purposes. This transition, however, was not reflected merely on the 
level of political and legal theory, but it was based on a significant transi-
tion in the very notion of nature itself. Against the Greek idea of fysis as 
a teleological process leading to the perfection of each thing, nature was 
now interpreted in terms of immanent and mechanist unity of causal laws, 
which, despite its changing seasons and even violent outbursts, remained 
fundamentally the same in essence. It was exactly this sense of sameness 
and staticism that served as the single most important foundation for the 
idea of political subject in the social and political thinking of modernity. 
The nature of this subject – as in the case of Hobbesian “state of nature” 
(presented in the chapter XIII of Leviathan) – was now conceived in terms 
of eternal and unchangeable foundation, which remains the same despite 
the changes in political institutions. And while Locke, for one, could not 
accept Hobbes’ account of this nature as violent and completely asocial – 
and described the state of nature as that of “perfect freedom” – even he 
equalled “natural” with the static and unchangeable. “Nature, I confess, 
has put into man a desire of happiness and an aversion to misery,” writes 
Locke in the second chapter of his Essay – “these indeed are innate practi-
cal principles which […] continue constantly to operate and influence 
all our actions without ceasing: these may be observed in all persons and 
all ages, steady and universal.”36 Thus political institutions, through their 
constantly changing character, could only be acknowledged as something 
supplementary in regard to nature. 
35 Hobbes 1928[1640]: 93. From a Husserlian perspective, the liberal tradition was of 
great importance, for it represented the primary adversary for Husserl’s own moral and 
political philosophy. Although many would find Husserl’s interpretation of Hobbes’ philo-
sophical anthropology as purely egoistic to be simplistic or out-dated, for Husserl, the 
fundamental presuppositions of the liberal tradition were still influential. On the critique 
of Hobbes as an egoistic philosopher, see Gert 1967.
36 Locke 1996[1689]: 16.
— 68 —
. P   C  E M
  It was exactly this transition from the teleological to the causal-mech-
anist idea of nature that constituted one of the primary points of departure 
for Husserl’s account of modernity in the Crisis.37 According to Husserl’s 
well-known thesis, modernity unfolded with the Galilean discovery of ex-
act mathematical ideality as the universal language of nature, resulting in 
the unquestionable triumph of the natural sciences.
  Nature, according to the Galilean account, was conceived as a homog-
enous space in which individual bodies interact with each another; instead 
of an innate striving towards their natural place, the movement of bodies 
was now explained in univocally causal terms, as resulting from external 
forces impacting the individual bodies. By applying the idea of an infinite 
geometrical space (“plenum”) to the real world, Galileo was able to re-
place the Aristotelian threefold classification of movement with the univo-
cal notion of motion according to place (what Aristotle had called kinēsis 
kata topon). This blueprint, as it turned out to be efficient in the measuring 
and prediction of the movement of natural entities, posed a radical chal-
lenge for the notion of teleology as a category of “objective” science. 
  Husserl’s account of this development in Crisis was primarily theoreti-
cal. He wanted to point out the imminent corollary of the Galilean meta-
physics in the fatal unclarities concerning the relation between the mental 
and the physical, resulting in the emergence of modern physicalism and its 
corollary, naturalistic psychology.38 This did not entail, however, that Hus-
serl would have ignored the practical consequences of this development. 
As Husserl emphasized in several occasions, the physicalist and naturalist 
psychology entailed a radical challenge for our ethical theories of the hu-
man being, particularly, to the ideas of individual responsibility and practi-
cal autonomy. If, indeed, innate striving could only be acknowledged as 
a subjective phenomenon, how could we speak of the political domain as 
something which arises from the voluntary co-operation of subjects? How 
can the state be anything else but a preventative measure for the arrange-
ment of social relations?
  Husserl critique of Hobbes was neither psychological nor moral. 
Already in his 1920/24 lecture course on ethics, Husserl criticized 
37 For Husserl’s reading of Galileo, see HuaVI: 20–41. Cf. HuaIX: 3; HuaXXVII: 116; 
HuaXXIX: 131ff. See also Moran 2000: 142–145.
38 See e.g. HuaVI: 64ff.; HuaXXV: 319; HuaXXIX: 110ff.
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Hobbes’ theory of state for its one-sided “ontological” presuppositions, 
which were apparentespecially in his account of human sociality. Although 
Husserl credited this theory for its inclination towards an a priori account 
of the normative ideal of human sociality (what Husserl called formalen 
Mathesis der Sozialität, “formal discipline of sociality”), due to Hobbes’ ato-
mistic view of human being this description could only amount to a “one-
sided construction” of the social reality.39
  By returning the essential complexity of our practical motives (e.g. 
empathy, hunger, sexuality, love, hate) to the will to self-preservation as 
the most natural drive of human existence, Hobbes could only acknowl-
edge a preventative function for political institutions. As Husserl interest-
ingly noted, “the empiricist Hobbes acts, without understanding this, as 
idealist. He constructs pure, supraempirical ideas.”40 Like Galileo surpassed the 
variety of eidetic givenness for the sake of exact mathematical ideality, 
similarly Hobbes founded his ethical and political theory on an idealized 
concept of human being as driven by “purely egoistic” motives. 41 
  Thus from the perspective of political and social ontology, this transi-
tion had at least two far-reaching consequences. First, the early modern 
idea of human nature as the static and underlying character of man had 
produced a fundamental discrepancy between the human subject and his 
political, cultural, and social conditions.
  This process was of course corresponded by the concrete disintegra-
tion of pre-modern social institutions (e.g. feudal institutions, estates and 
privileges); however, these transitions were based on a more profound 
transformation in the social ontology of modernity. By divesting the con-
cept of natural law from its theological and teleological connotations, the 
political philosophy of modernity refused to take any form of human com-
munality as simply natural or self-explanatory. Instead, by arguing for the 
essential artificiality of social and political institutions, this thinking intro-
39 HuaXXXVII: 58.
40 “Der Empirist Hobbes betätigt sich, ohne dass er sich selbst versteht, hier als Idealist. Er 
konstuiert reine, überempirische Ideen.“ HuaXXXVII: 57.
41 As Leo Strauss – one of the greatest political philosophers of the past century, and 
a student of Husserl’s – put it, it was exactly this Hobbesian-Lockean problematic that 
introduced the fundamental dilemma of modern political philosophy: should the “non-
teleological conception of the universe” be “followed up by a non-teleological conception 
of human life” – or, should we be content with the “typically modern, dualism of a non-
teleological natural science and a teleological science of man”? Strauss 1953: 8
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duced a novel sense of crisis in the very heart of our modern concept of 
sociality: the body politic was, if not fundamentally unnatural, constantly prone 
to disintegration. 
  Secondly, because of the novel artificiality of the political institutions, 
this transition resulted gradually in the separation of two discourses of 
sociality: the moral and the political. Political sovereignty could no longer 
present itself as the moral foundation of its own power, but this power 
was to be assessed through a discourse external to it. Locke was the first 
to articulate this dependency in terms of state and civil society; for him, 
the civil society preceded the state and its institutions both morally as well 
as historically. As for instance Reinhart Koselleck has pointed out in his 
Kritik und Krise (1959), the 17th-century distinction between civil society 
and state was not only the beginning of a novel discourse of commonal-
ity – a new societal critique – but even more importantly, it gave way to 
a novel form of utopian consciousness. The state could no longer proclaim 
moral authority over the body of people, but instead, its legitimacy was 
to be contested in the sphere of public discourse: the society at large was 
now considered the moral conscience of the political community through 
which it gains its utopian thrust.42 
  The essential discrepancy that the early modern liberalism created 
in regard to the domains of the social and the political was not the final 
outcome of the problem of communal co-existence. Instead, the immi-
nent crisis of the political body was tackled by several of the 18th and 19th 
century philosophers. From the perspective of this work, however, the 
answer given by G.W.F Hegel is perhaps the most important one, for his 
work points towards two ideas that turned out to be crucial in regard to 
Husserl’s phenomenological social ontology: the idea of a transpersonal 
consciousness (“the objective spirit”) and the teleological development of 
human sociality. Against the view of an atomistic individual, Hegel pres-
ents us with a teleological idea of human subject which necessarily con-
stitutes its own self in relation to other subjects – and which finds its 
ultimate essence within a specific political institution, the state. Although 
42 Koselleck 2000: 83. This promise of a communal life free of political antagonisms, 
however, could not end but in a disaster. According to Koselleck, this replacement of the 
political for the sake of the ethical could only amount to the suppression of the essential 
multiformity of societal reality. As such, it paved way to the totalitarian forms of gover-
nance presenting themselves as the closure of political antagonisms.
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Husserl’s and Hegel’s views on the development of self-consciousness had 
significant differences – to which I will return in the second part of this 
work – what they share in common is the idea that human life finds its 
genuine essence only within an intersubjective context that guarantees the 
realization of human freedom in its concreteness. 
  How does this teleology constitute itself? According to the classic 
description of the Phenomenology of Spirit, all conscious life is fundamen-
tally desire and as such, it is essentially directed towards its outside. In 
its primitive form, consciousness sustains itself by negating its outside, 
by consuming material from the outside world (for instance, by eating). 
However, this negating cannot yet afford consciousness with its specific 
autonomy; instead, it must find other means to secure its own personality 
as self-consciousness. Thus selfhood, Hegel argues, cannot be constituted 
only on the basis of one’s reflexive capabilities, but it must be understood 
in relation to other self-consciousnesses: my perspective to the world is 
not absolute but partial and particular. Particularity, however, can only be 
understood in relation to the validation of other perspectives – of other 
selves who likewise need to confirm my particularity as indispensable. It is 
exactly this movement what Hegel calls by the title “recognition” (Anerken-
nen): “Self-consciousness exists in itself and for itself, in that, and by the 
fact that it exists for another self-consciousness; that is to say, it is only by 
being recognized.”43 Thus in recognition, desire transcends its unilateral 
consumptive function – it appears as desire for the desire of the other.
  Recognition, however, is never attained once and for all. Instead, it 
must be acquired through a battle in which the consciousness sets itself 
into danger. As individual subjects aim at validating their sense of exis-
tence through others, they necessarily descend into a “struggle of life and 
death” (Kampf auf Leben und Tod) that, according to Hegel, can be seen as 
the general form of all human conflicts.44 As Leo Strauss has argued in 
The Political Philosophy of Hobbes (1936), in this regard Hegel’s view on the 
struggle for recognition could be read as analogical to Hobbes’ idea of war 
of each against all – a reading that was also evident in Alexander Kojève’s 
Introduction to the Reading of Hegel (1934).45 In its initial stage, this struggle 
43 “Das Selbstbewußtsein ist an und für sich, indem und dadurch, daß es für ein anderes an 
und für sich ist; d.h. es ist nur als ein Anerkanntes.“ Hegel GW 9, 109 (PhG §178).
44 Hegel, GW 9: 111.
45 Strauss 1996: 57; Kojève 1980: 3–30.
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unfolds in the dialectic of Master and Slave, in which only one of the par-
ties is recognized as autonomous, and in which the other side merely sets 
into the service of the desire of the other. This dialectic comes to its end 
only through a reciprocal relation in which both parties acknowledge their 
dependence on the recognition of the other. And here Hegel breaks with 
Hobbes: despite the inherent element of struggle, “the essential nature 
of self-consciousness is not bare existence, is not the merely immediate 
form in which it at first makes its appearance”, but its nature or essence is 
that what it makes itself to be after this struggle for life and death.46 (I will 
return to this topic in chapter 1.2). 
  All this belongs to the development of spirit (Geist). What we discover 
as a result of this dialectic is nothing less than the essential intertwining of 
our personal life with the common life, that is, the idea according to which 
individual consciousnesses can exist for themselves only within a unity of 
consciousnesses. Thus in the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel presents this 
interdependence in terms of reciprocal analogy: “I that is a We, and the 
We that is an I”.47 This analogy was not to be conceived primarily with re-
gard to bodily capabilities – although Hegel did resort to bodily and even 
dietary metaphors especially in the Philosophy of Right – but in terms of a 
teleological development in which the individual subjects come to their 
own right. It is exactly the “We” through which the individual secures its 
“objective” existence. Freedom cannot be understood merely in terms of 
the spontaneity of the subject, for this would lead to endless conflictuality, 
but is must be reconciled with the freedom of the others. Thus individuals, 
as they strive to secure this objectivity, establish for themselves a culture 
in the form of morality, customs, laws and institutions, which are able 
to secure my freedom as “objective”. In Hegelese, the spirit transcends 
simple subjectivity and becomes an “objective spirit” (objektiver Geist). 
  According to Hegel’s well-known thesis in the Philosophy of Right, the 
struggle for recognition is modern societies can only be pacified through 
a particular instantiation of the objective spirit, i.e. the state. It is only the 
state (and especially its public domain, the civil society) that can genu-
inely solve the imminent discrepancy between the subjective and objec-
46 ”Und es ist allein das Daransetzen des Lebens, wodurch die Freiheit, wodurch es be-
währt wird, daß dem Selbstbewußtsein nicht das Sein, nicht die unmittelbare Weise, wie es 
auftritt, nicht sein Versenktsein in die Ausbreitung des Lebens“ Hegel, GW 9: 111.
47 ”Ich, das Wir, und Wir, das Ich ist.“ Hegel GW 9: 108. (PhG §177).
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tive aspects of human freedom. Although Hegel conceived this domain 
as essentially finite, it incorporated within itself an essentially universal 
component in the idea of citizenship; it is only within civil society that 
the individual is conceived solely from the viewpoint of humanity, and 
“not because he is a Jew, Catholic, Protestant, German, Italian etc.”48 Thus 
the state, as it presents itself as the resolution for the crisis of modernity, 
pertains to the general rational structure of the world. It is, as Hegel puts 
it, “the unmoved end in which freedom comes to its supreme right”49 –
Insofar as the state, the fatherland, constitutes a community of ex-
istence, and in so far as the subjective will of human beings submits 
itself to laws, the opposition between freedom and necessity disap-
pears. The rational, as the substantial, is necessary, and we are free 
insofar as we recognize it as law and follow it as the substance of 
our own existence; the objective and subjective will are then rec-
onciled in one and the same untroubled whole.50
I will argue in part 2 that it was exactly this tendency of conflating the 
common spirit of community with its objective accomplishments that 
constituted the primary point of departure for Husserl’s critical stance. 
In Hegel’s description, the ideas of “We” and “culture” were fused in the 
quasi-personal objective spirit without really making explicit the differ-
ence between the constitutive process of the “We” and the constituted 
accomplishments. Therefore, Husserl insisted on differentiating between 
the transcendental genesis of the community (constituting a “personality 
of a higher order”) and its accomplishments (which Husserl labeled as 
“culture” or “tradition”). This distinction served as the basis for Husserl’s 
social ontology, which, as I will show in the last part of this work, should 
be understood in a critical relation towards the modern tendency of lo-
cating the best possible ethical community within a particular political 
institution.
  Is there such a phenomenon as a crisis of “objective spirit”? Within 
Hegel’s description of communality, the notion of crisis does not play any 
crucial role. However, there are good reasons to claim that Hegel also 
48 “Der Mensch gilt so, weil er Mensch ist, nicht weil er Jude, Katholik, Protestant, Deutscher, 
Italiener usf. ist.“ GW 14.1: 175 (PR §209)
49 “Diese substantielle Einheit ist absoluter unbewegter Selbstzweck, in welchem die Frei-
heit zu ihrem höchsten Recht kommt.“ GW 14.1: 201 (PR §258)
50 Hegel 1970: 57.
— 74 —
. P   C  E M
articulates a novel possibility of articulating the fundamental crisis of mo-
dernity – a concept that was like to argue that find its antecedent in the 
phenomenon which Hegel sees as crucial to the development of human 
culture, i.e. the process of cultural alienation (Entfremdung). Although this 
notion can be seen as defining the development of consciousness from the 
beginning on (consciousness alienates itself in the other), it acquires its 
specific cultural objective validity only in the formative process of culture 
(Bildung).51 In its primitive form, alienation takes place in language, which 
constitutes the basic condition for individual interaction as well as the 
general social order (Sittlichkeit), which finds its abiding form in laws and 
institutions.52 
  Culture, accordingly, is never merely something that human beings 
actively create; it is also already given to individual as a model of life. We 
are born in the midst of accomplishments and ideals that are simply given 
to us: because we belong to different social contexts (e.g. family, civil 
society) we find ourselves situated between their different and sometimes 
even competing requirements. This discrepancy gives way to a peculiar 
form of alienation that Hegel calls the “tragic” or “unhappy” consciousness 
(das unglückliche Bewußtsein)53 manifesting itself, for instance, in the com-
peting loyalty-claims of the family and the fatherland (as in the case of An-
tigone), or one’s children and God (Abraham). I want to live an authentic 
life which I can justify, but as a finite being, I am constantly compelled to 
choose between several different possibilities of action. This discrepancy, 
argues Hegel, produces an inherent “split” within the consciousness itself 
resulting in the “restless process of contradictory thought”54. At certain 
occasions it can rise above the complexity of its finitude and arrive at au-
thentic self-certainty; at other times it must discover itself as being torn 
by the finitude of its existence. 
51 ”Wodurch also das Individuum hier Gelten und Wirklichkeit hat, ist die Bildung. Seine 
wahre ursprüngliche Natur und Substanz ist der Geist der Entfremdung des natürlichen 
Seins.“ (“The means, then, whereby an individual gets objective validity and concrete actu-
ality here is the formative process of Culture. The estrangement on the part of spirit from 
its natural existence is here the individual’s true and original nature, his very substance.”) 
Hegel, GW 9, 267. (PhG §489)
52 ”Diese Entfremdung aber geschieht allein in der Sprache, welche hier in ihrer eigentüm-
lichen Bedeutung auftritt.“ Hegel, GW 9, 276 (PhG §508).
53 See Hegel, GW 9, 116–131.
54 Hegel GW 9, 125
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  In his introduction to the English translation of the Crisis, David Carr 
argues for a radical distinction between Husserl’s and Hegel’s historical ap-
proach. Whereas Husserl’s account of historical teleology pointed towards 
the opening up of a horizon of action for the present moment, for Hegel 
this idea was basically unknown. “The very idea of a true crisis of man,” 
writes Carr, “with the fate of the human spirit undecided and hanging in 
the balance, is unthinkable in the context of the Hegelian theodicy.”55 
  This idea, although suggestive, leaves room for closer examination. 
Although Hegel did not describe the idea of unhappy consciousness in 
terms of crisis, it was done so by some of the so-called Young Hegelians 
(Junghegelianer) – a group of philosophers who became known for their 
suspicion towards the finality of the bourgeoisie revolution. These phi-
losophers such as Arnold Ruge, Bruno Bauer and Gustav von Mevissen 
all employed the concept of crisis in connection to the pre-eminently 
modern idea on the discrepancy between culture and the social body. As 
von Mevissen put it, the sole reason for the crisis of the modern age was 
the essential “incongruence between the culture (Bildung) of the century 
and its actual customs, forms of existence and conditions.”56 For him, it 
was one of the focal questions of the nineteenth century whether it could 
adapt itself to the demands of the modern age voluntarily or whether 
these changes would come about in the form of uncontrollable revolu-
tions. In this regard, the idea of crisis was on the side of freedom – at the 
same time it was constantly attached to the organic and naturalist meta-
phors of revolution and evolution, of growth and decay. Bauer, in his turn, 
argued that while history was on the side of freedom, it would ultimately 
show the way for the solution of the crisis and create the world into a new 
form.57 The idea of crisis as an exhaustion of culture was also articulated 
by Proudhon: 
Today civilization is truly in a crisis, one that has but one sole 
analogy in history, namely the crisis which determined the rise 
of Christianity. All traditions have been exhausted, all faith worn 
out; on the other hand, the new program is not yet ready and has 
55 Carr 1970: xxxv.
56 von Mevissen 1906: 129. Quoted in Koselleck 2006: 385.
57 Koselleck 2006: 386ff.
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not yet penetrated into the consciousness of the masses. This is 
why there is now coming what I call dissolution.58
It was particularly this idea of crisis as the incongruence between culture 
and human activity that turned out to be crucial to some of the most 
important crisis-thinkers of the late 19th and early 20th century such as 
August Comte, Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Jose Ortega y Gasset. In all of 
their works, the development of modernity was inseparable from the pro-
cess of alienation which gave this era its essential characteristic as a period 
of crisis. Already in his early works on the systemic character of social sci-
ences, Comte addressed the crisis of modernity on a European scale, and 
saw it as resulting from the collapse of the old metaphysical-theological 
prejudices of the monarchic rule. The great flaw of European societies, 
however, was that they conceived this crisis in purely national terms and 
thus failed to appreciate the imminent need for a transnational societal 
reform. As Comte maintained, “the European crisis requires a European 
treatment”59; positivism must wretch itself out of the old metaphysical 
fallacies – and its reactionary political implications – and work out a new 
progressive-critical social ontology. This could only be brought about by 
“adopting an organic attitude”, that is, by “turning all efforts towards the 
formation of the new social system as the definite object of the crisis”.60 
For Marx, especially in his earlier writings, the modern alienation was 
produced above all by the capitalist economy and its tendency to dislocate 
human beings from their most primordial activity. In the context of The 
Capital (1867), this analysis grew into a more detailed account on the 
transformation of the value-form in modern capitalism, which, by decid-
edly dissociating the exchange-value of commodities from their use-value, 
could no longer account for an idea of human labor as the universal and 
commensurable source of value.61 Instead, by divesting the commodities 
of their relation to human labor though the law of demand and supply (i.e. 
what Marx also analyzed as the “fetishization” of commodities62), modern 
capitalism had introduced a permanent “loss of foundation” into the most 
58 Quoted in Sorel 1969: 210.
59 Comte 1975: 27.
60 Comte 1975: 10.
61 On the transformation of value-form in The Capital, see especially Chapter 1 (“The 
Commodity”) in Marx 1990: 125ff.
62 Marx 1990: 165.
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fundamental cultural activity of human existence: work. Weber, in his 
turn, analyzed this development in regard to modern forms of governance 
which take the form of bureaucracy, and thus, involve increased specializa-
tion and rationalization. Jose Ortega y Gasset treated alienation as the key 
element in the constitution of mass societies that necessarily truncate the 
individual subjects under a single model of existence. Ortega’s general 
theory of crises relied on his account of “negative beliefs” that character-
ize the death-struggle of all civilizational periods – there is one thing that 
people believe in, and that is that they do not believe in anything.63 
  For this reason, despite the mechanistic and idealistic variations of 
modern social and political philosophy, the organic metaphors of sickness 
and health, of growth and decay, had not completely disappeared. Instead, 
they had acquired for themselves a novel importance in the relation of 
human communities and their culture, its institutions, accomplishments 
and practices. The crisis was, as I have argued, the constantly prospective 
contradiction between human communities and their objective conditions 
of existence. As I will argue in the next chapter (1.2), it was exactly this 
relation, its fulfillment and pacification that came to define the modern 
teleological view of history. 
  There is, however, still one important context on the basis of which 
the organic metaphors turned out to be crucial in regard to the imminent 
crisis of modern political community. Especially for the German philos-
ophers of late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, there emerged 
a novel sense of organic and homogenous foundation of sociality – ex-
pressed in the German term Volk, a “people” – which aimed at resolving 
the essential discrepancy between the state and the body of people. As 
such, it constituted the point of departure for basically all varieties of 
modern nationalism, which, through the concept of nation (which derives 
from the Latin verb nasci; be born, to grow), was able to reinstitute the 
idea of natural growth into the heart of political and social theory. Herder 
(1744–1803) was the first to equate the idea of Volk with the state as such; 
he interpreted the political community as the natural outcome of Volk as 
a collective personality with its own spirit and soul (Volksgeist), express-
ing itself in cultural accomplishments such as language, poetry and folk-
songs. 
63 See e.g. Ortega 1958.
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  Nationalism turned out to be a genuinely European phenomenon – 
“European sickness”, as Nietzsche put it64 – insofar as at the end of nine-
teenth century, practically all of the ethnic communities of Europe under-
stood themselves in nationalistic terms. Even the socialist movements of 
the nineteenth century, despite their internationalist tendencies, ended up 
in realizing their revolutionary potential in national terms. However, there 
was something special in the tradition of German nationalism not only 
because most of the early nationalists were German but because of the 
special role that was attributed to the German people. Following Herder, 
many of the early nineteenth century philosophers emphasized the idea a 
German “special route” (Sonderweg), which pointed towards the specific 
character and task of German nationalism. This idea constituted one of the 
central points of departure of J.G. Fichte’s Addresses to the German Nation 
– a lecture course which Husserl discussed especially in his 1917 lectures 
on “Fichte’s Ideal of Humanity” – which argued for the role of Germans 
as the “originary people” (Urvolk) with its specific mission in the European 
history. This mission consisted of rebutting the foreign infiltration of Latin 
and Roman culture, restoring the original relation to the primordial Ger-
man culture, and being the example of a true autochthonous culture for 
the rest of humanity.65
  Accordingly, this debate pointed towards two competing interpreta-
tions. Against the narrative of Kant and the French Enlightenment, which 
emphasized the essentially cosmopolitan tendencies of the European his-
tory, the German nationalism had a somewhat different take on this de-
velopment. Besides presenting the history of Europe as that of particular 
peoples, this tradition emphasized the essential connection that prevailed 
between the spiritual traditions of Germany and Classical Greece. Articu-
lated in its different forms by Winckelmann, Fichte, Hölderlin, and many 
others, it was a shared presupposition of this tradition that Germany could 
resist the foreign infiltrations of French universalism (seen as an heir of 
Roman cosmopolitanism) only by rearticulating the sense of mythologi-
cal communality characteristic of the Greek world. This was also the path 
taken by Heidegger in his lecture courses of the 1930s – especially those 
of Hölderlin and Nietzsche – which emphasized the return to Greek ideas 
64 “den Nationalismus, diese névrose nationale, an der Europa krank ist […]” KSA 6.360.
65 On Fichte’s role in regard to the philosophy of the early twentieth century, see Bambach 
2003: 72ff.
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of polis, “people” and “rootedness” as the spiritual revival of Germany. It 
was the Greeks, as Heidegger put it in his Introduction to Metaphysics, who 
still understood the essential connection between truth, history and the 
political domain – who comprehended the polis not in terms of an agree-
ment, but as the essential foundation (the Da of the Da-sein of people) for 
the sake of which the Greek humanity is historical.66 It was the central task 
of Germany to reject the crisis of modernity by resuscitating this motive, 
for only German language, Heidegger argued, “still corresponds to Greek 
in terms of its philosophical character of depth and creativity.”67 Husserl, 
in his turn, followed the critique of the idea of Urvolk articulated already 
by Hegel in his lectures on world-history. As Hegel had argued, the spiri-
tual strength of Germany had little to do with its natural characteristics or 
with the apparent semblances of German language to Greek. If Germany 
and Greece stood in connection, this was due to the teleological devel-
opment of spirit, permeating the whole of Occidental history since the 
Classical period. As Husserl put it later, it was the unity of “task” (Aufgabe) 
instigated by the Greeks which connected us moderns to our historical 
foundations.
  The organic nationalism of nineteenth century is an important phe-
nomenon also because it brings us face to face with the most important 
rendition of the body politics of the early twentieth-century: fascism. Es-
pecially in the language of the National Socialist philosophers, the crisis 
of the Weimar republic was consciously framed through the organic idea 
of the “body of the people” (Volkskörper). This term gained prominence 
insofar as that it replaced the more traditional term “people’s community” 
(Volksgemeinschaft). As Boaz Neumann has argued, the National Socialist 
ideology conceived the Volkskörper indeed as a “real body” that was prone to 
scientific, medical and technological manipulation.68 This body of a people 
was seen as suffering from both the slow reproduction of its constituent 
parts as well as the harmful influence of a “foreign body” (Fremdkörper) – 
i.e. the Jewish people – which called for the imminent reaction of exclu-
sion. 
  In the existing scholarship of Husserl, it is an often presented claim 
that his later reflections on Europe ought to be understood in connection 
66 Heidegger, GA 40: 161.
67 Heidegger, GA 31: 209; Cf. Bambach 2003: 209.
68 This tradition is well illuminated by Neumann 2009.
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to the rise of fascism, to the frenzy nationalism and the rhetoric of Blut 
und Boden.69 While I do not wish to undermine this influence, I believe 
that fascism constituted only a partial phenomenon of the overall crisis of 
modern political philosophy, instituted through the collapse of the teleo-
logical structure of human sociality. Even the emergence of fascism was to 
be conceived in relation to this crisis, as a kind of perverse return to the 
serene naturalness of the pre-modern humanity. If the Greek idea of body 
politic was to be revived, it was to be done in relation to the inextricably 
idealistic motive of Greek political philosophy, i.e. to what we might call 
the “political epoché” of Plato. I will return to this idea in part 3.
  “Even more than comparing society to a family,” Susan Sontag writes, 
“comparing it to a body makes an authoritarian ordering of society seem 
inevitable, immutable.”70 There are, indeed, good reasons to consider the 
idea of supraindividual persons and bodies as solidifying the existing so-
cietal relations – or, what is even more dangerous, as potential tools for 
the extinction of their unwanted parts. Still, as our social and political 
theory grapples with the problematic of social life on the basis of wide 
variety of individual-based analogies, this relation is far from being clear. 
While we are familiar with a set of conceptual frameworks referring to 
the artificial and mechanistic character of societal reality, it seems that 
these analogies still miss some of the most important aspects of human 
sociality. Thus, from Emile Durkheim’s “collective consciousness” to John 
Searle’s “collective intentionality”, from Freud’s “collective unconscious” to 
Frederic Jameson’s “political unconscious”, or, from the organism-driven 
economic theory of crisis and resuscitation to the Deleuzian imagery of 
“bodies without organs”, our social and political theory is fundamentally 
entangled with the relation between the individual and the community – 
its spiritual, personalistic as well as corporeal implications. However, to 
fully appreciate the scope of these implications and their relation to Hus-
serl’s crisis-thinking, we need to consider the idea of crisis in relation to its 
temporal connotations in the modern teleological view of history.
69 See e.g. Smith 2007: 388; Gasché 2009: 1ff.
70 Sontag 1991: 92.
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1.2.  The Concept of Crisis
in the Modern Philosophy of History
As we observed in the previous section, it was already a general tendency of Ancient philosophy to deploy the metaphor of the body politic in order to solidify a certain social and political order. 
The king was endowed with his throne because he naturally represented 
the head of the state. Although he may had been corrupt and ought to be 
replaced by a nobler soul, the practical analogy of the body and the state 
was rarely called into question. This goes also for the novel political theory 
of the seventeenth century, which seemed to push the framework of body 
politic towards a more heuristic direction: the corrupt monarch should 
be replaced, but the general category of sovereign power was to be left 
intact. 
  The implications of this analogy, however, were interestingly called 
into question by Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s treatise The Social Contract (Du 
contrat social, 1762). In this work, Rousseau argued against the common 
inclination to simply separate between good and bad forms of governance 
– as in the case of “righteous” European governments and Oriental des-
potism. For Rousseau, corruption was not primarily a simple antithesis 
to good government but the natural outcome of all political institutions: 
every form of sovereign power has an innate tendency to lose its contact 
to the political body and to descend into conflict with the general will of 
the people. “This is the inherent and inescapable defect”, wrote Rousseau, 
“which, from the birth of the political body (corps politique), tends relent-
lessly to destroy it, just as old age and death destroy the human body.”71 
What Rousseau wanted to call into question with this comparison was 
the seeming eternality of political order: like organic bodies, all political 
constitutions (that legitimate the political power) should be understood as 
essentially transitory structures that can be reworked and renewed. This 
71 Rousseau 1968: 131. Thus for him, the political institutions are justified only insofar as 
they serve the natural sociality of human beings. “What makes the constitution of a State 
really solid and lasting”, wrote Rousseau in The Social Contract, “is the due observance of 
what is proper, so that the natural relations [of individuals] are always in agreement with 
the laws on every point, and law only serves, so to speak, to assure, accompany and rectify 
them” (1968: 56).
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was the significant modification that Rousseau conducted with regard to 
the idea of sovereignty: its only abiding foundation can be attributed to the 
body of people and its general will (volonté générale).
  In the educational treatise which appeared on the same year, Émile 
(1762), Rousseau tried to find concrete evidence for the aforementioned 
split between state power and the body politic. Like many of his contem-
poraries, Rousseau had acknowledged a growing tension between the old 
absolutist state and the civil society; what he anticipated was a general 
cultural transformation that was taking over European nations one by one. 
This revolution, for Rousseau, was what he considered to be the “crisis” 
of Europe:
The crisis is approaching, and we are on the edge of a revolution. 
Who can answer for your fate? What man has made, man can de-
stroy. […] In my opinion it is impossible that the great kingdoms 
of Europe should last much longer. Each of them has had its period 
of splendor, after which it must inevitably decline.72
What was particularly special about Rousseau’s use of the word crisis was 
that it gathered together two important aspects that were decisive for our 
modern understanding of the concept.73 First of all, Rousseau conceived 
the crisis as a disease that, instead of taking over a particular branch of 
culture, affected the political body as a whole. The crisis had revealed 
not only the inherent societal tensions within the body politic, but the 
fundamental artificiality of all political institutions: virtue had nothing to 
do with sovereign power, but it could only be attained by dismantling it. 
Rousseau introduced the “crisis of modernity” as the essential vacuity of 
those forms of human sociality that are upheld by “cultural” structures, 
e.g. laws, institutions, and conventions. Secondly, for Rousseau the crisis 
was not merely a description of the present moment but it was under-
stood in an essential connection to a temporal horizon of expectation. 
Resembling the prophecy of Isiah on the Day of the Lord which brings 
“princes to naught and the rulers of this world to nothing” (40:23), Rous-
seau predicted a literal “revolution” within the existing social and political 
order – a revolution through which “the great become small, the rich 
72 Rousseau 1993: 188.
73 Koselleck 2006: 372.
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poor, and the king a commoner.”74 This sense of a recurring movement was 
also implied in the pre-modern sense of the Latin revolutio, which denoted 
the uniform and circular movement of celestial bodies, referring to the 
idea of inevitable return to the original state of affairs. In Rousseau’s view, 
the “crisis” was exactly that moment of transition through which the body 
politic had reached its ultimate artificiality and taken a turn towards the 
natural social condition. In this regard, he was able to endow the notion of 
crisis with an important element of prediction, which linked this notion 
into a wholly new dimension of human thinking: the philosophy of history. 
This dimension, I argue, turned out to be crucial in regard to Husserl’s 
crisis-thinking but also to phenomenology in general. On the basis of the 
broadened understanding of phenomenology as an essentially historical 
science, Husserl was able to articulate a notion of crisis that contributed 
not only to the identification of different discrepancies of meaning and 
sense but also to the creative transformation of the present moment on 
the basis of a future horizon of possible development. Instead of a neces-
sary evil, the crisis was to become a condition of progress.
  The idea of crisis as a form of historical prognosis rather than mere 
cultural diagnosis gained foothold especially towards the end of the eigh-
teenth century. It seemed as if historians were no longer dealing with the 
past as such, but – to use the phrase of the medieval commentators – they 
stood on its shoulders in order to make sense of its direction. Herder, for 
one, saw Europe to be in the midst of a “great crisis”, one, that was sup-
posed to “discover and assess the inner forces of history, rather than con-
tinue paying homage to a naïve idea of progress”75. Novalis (1772–1801), 
whose basic stance was a bit more optimistic, observed the popular ten-
dency to observe the Revolution as a “life-threatening and contagious ill-
ness”, although this was basically “nothing else but the crisis of beginning 
puberty”76. Thus, it seemed that there was no real consensus on the out-
come of the crisis – what was clear, however, was that this was not a mat-
ter of a mere local conflict. “It appears to me as if I were in a great crisis”, 
wrote Edmund Burke (1729–1797) in 1790, “not of the affairs of France 
74 Ibid.
75 Quoted in Koselleck 2006: 377. 
76 See Novalis’ essay “Christianity or Europe” (1996: 29) where he insists on developing 
an emotional-based cosmopolitan philosophy in comparison to the legalistic universalism 
of Kant.
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alone, but of all Europe, perhaps more than Europe. All circumstances 
taken together, the French Revolution is the most astonishing that had 
hitherto happened in the world”.77 For the observers of the revolution, 
1789 had turned the crisis into a supranational phenomenon, depicting 
not only the current situations of single monarchies but of the whole of 
Western world. 
  It is by no means a simple incident that through the French Revolu-
tion, the notions of crisis and revolution became practically interchange-
able. Both reflected the great modern transition in the notion of history 
itself: the new idea of history as a self-sufficient and self-regulating process, “tran-
scendent” flow of time. Whereas for the Ancient and Medieval thought, the 
concept of history (Gr. historia) was mainly used to denote a basic “story” 
or “narrative” dealing with past events, the eighteenth century – through 
the specific idealization of this narrative – aimed at discovering a hidden 
plane behind the day-to-day events. This new idea of history as consisting 
of “homogenous empty time”78, as Walter Benjamin put it, offered the ba-
sic framework for the history as a transcendental field of historical laws, 
temporal causality and so on.79 If the seventeenth century was defined 
by the tendency to rationalize and systematize the phenomena of nature 
in a radically new way, the eighteenth century tried to do the same in 
respect to history: it aimed to find a systematic method and conceptual 
framework in order to work out the logic of historical development. Both 
“crisis” and “revolution” appeared as suitable notions for this new purpose 
because of their natural-scientific background: both of them depicted a 
recurrent movement which can be understood as apart from its particular 
appearances.80 Both of them carried within themselves an aura of irrevers-
ibility, which suited well the purpose of progress.
  Thus what is evident is that at the end of the eighteenth century, the 
concept of crisis gained itself a new temporal horizon. Rather than ex-
plaining short-term transformations, the concept began to denote exten-
sive, and in many cases open-ended developments. As a philosophical-his-
torical concept, crisis began to stand on its own: the medical connotations 
of a sudden change as well as the theological-eschatological sense of a final 
77 Burke 2007: 7.
78 Benjamin 1992: 261.
79 On this specific temporalization of history, see Koselleck 1983: 4ff.
80 Koselleck 1983: 39ff.
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judgment were gradually brought together under the idea of great histori-
cal transformation, which has its background-horizon in the overall devel-
opment of humanity. Friedrich Schlegel (1772–1829), for one, spoke of 
three “great evolutions” of the European state system that had been estab-
lished through the three great “crises” of the modern age – the crusades, 
the Reformation and the discovery of America – all referring to the idea of 
humanity’s development at large.81 In the work of Johann Gustav Droysen 
(1808–1884), crises were likewise referred to as “monumental events” 
that mark the turning-point from one historical epoch to another.82 Fol-
lowing these connotations, Jacob Burckhardt (1818–1897) spoke of cri-
ses as “accelerations of historical processes” that result from a repression 
and emancipation of different forces: as such, they were to be conceived 
as essentially similar in all historical periods.83 Burckhardt, like Herder, 
warned against the typically modern tendency to conceive all political 
transitions as simple improvements, for the crises that mark the genuine 
evolution of humanity are rare, and moreover, they are difficult to recog-
nize. Thus history, as it was articulated by the thinkers and philosophers of 
the eighteenth and nineteenth century, revealed itself as the interplay of 
two different elements: the necessary core or “logic” of development and 
the empirical crust of historical occurrence accompanying it.
  This interplay between the ideal and the empirical was to become 
the defining element of the modern idea of scientific historiography. With 
regard to the first aspect, the ideal, Giambattista Vico’s (1668–1744) Sci-
enza nuova (1725) marks a special turning-point as the first consistent at-
tempt to articulate the general dynamics of historical time. According to 
Vico, the idea of scientific historiography was made possible through the 
unique character of historical knowledge. According to him, history could 
be understood, because it is created by man. Actually, history was even 
more scientific than the natural sciences, for nature, as Vico argued, was 
essentially incomprehensible because it is created by God.84 Behind the 
empirical course of events, Vico conceived the development of nations as 
a cyclical process, in which they progress from the archaic forms of life 
towards a more rationalized world-view. The threefold division between 
81 Koselleck 2006: 380.
82 Droysen 1933: 328. Cf. Koselleck 2006: 386.
83 Burckhardt 1943: 79, 289. Cf. Hinde 2000: 199ff.
84 Croce 1913: 5.
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“Divine”, “Heroic”, and “Human” stages was reflected in all domains of 
culture: in customs, language, politics etc.85 This progressive “course of 
nations” was balanced by the regular “recourse” (ricorso) through which the 
societies return to the primitive simplicity of archaic world. “The nations 
mean to dissolve themselves,” wrote Vico, “and their remnants flee for 
safety to the wilderness, whence, like the phoenix, they rise again.”86
  In the tradition of German idealism, to which we shall here include 
also Kant, the tension between the two types of history was reworked 
into the form of conceptual distinction: Historie and Geschichte. Whereas 
the first denoted a basic narration of past events, Geschichte (which origi-
nally means a “story”) became the field of idealized teleology in which the 
general logic of historical development takes place. Now, it was namely 
this type of study – “history a priori” (Geschichte a priori), as Kant called 
it87 – that became the central preoccupation for the idealists: it was their 
basic conviction that history should not consist of mere fact-oriented ac-
counts of the past events but it should assess their meaning and purpose 
in a more general context. Most importantly, this intention should also 
include a normative element, that is, it should show how historical develop-
ment is ultimately righteous.88 As Kant wrote in his essay on universal his-
tory, because there one does not discover a natural purpose in the course 
of human affairs it is the task of the philosopher to unfold the secret plan 
of world history, ultimately leading towards the right and just global or-
der.89 Because human action appears to be driven by sporadic motives and 
arbitrary interests, the philosopher must set out to find the “secret art 
of Nature”, which is internally directed towards the fulfillment of man’s 
ethical capabilities. For Kant, the telos of this process was to be found in 
the perfect civic constitution (republikanische Verfassung), which would fi-
nally establish a universal cosmopolitan condition.90 Finally, in the works 
of Schell-ing, Fichte and Hegel, Geschichte was basically coined with the 
85 Vico 1984: 336–340.
86 Vico 1984: 425.
87 On the possibility of “history a priori” in Kant, see his Akad-A. VII: 79–80, 108ff..
88 See especially the essays “Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Ab-
sicht“ in Akad.A VIII: 15–32; and ”Zum ewigen Frieden“ in Akad.A VIII: 341–386.
89 Kant, Akad.A VIII: 17. 
90 Kant, Akad.A VIII: 351ff.
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concepts of reason, spirit and humanity as such: history is the description 
of the humanity’s cultivation into a higher level of reason.91 
  Since our interest lies in explaining the background of Husserl’s philo-
sophical discourse on crisis, I will focus on a particular instance of the 
modern philosophy of history that is particularly crucial from the per-
spective of this work. This is the teleological (or narrative) model of his-
tory that was anticipated by many of the eighteenth-century theorists, but 
systematically articulated by G.W.F. Hegel. According to my interpreta-
tion, Hegel’s reflections bring together two important elements that were 
crucial from the perspective of Husserl’s work. First, Hegel’s theoretical 
framework articulated the course of history in terms of a linear develop-
ment, which, through its teleological structure, pertained within itself a 
particular genesis targeted towards the fulfillment of an ultimate goal-
idea (Endzweck or Zweckidee). Secondly, Hegel’s philosophical-historical 
reflections were founded on the essential conviction on the pivotal role of 
Greek philosophy in regard to the continuity and unity of the whole Eu-
ropean-Occidental tradition. Although Hegel’s basic framework was not 
merely European but world history, he treated the Greeks as an important 
watershed between the spiritual worlds of the Orient and the West – as a 
point of transition that marked the emergence of the universal idea of rea-
son. Through this transition, Hegel argued, the European character first 
obtained its “pliability and capacity for freedom”, which came to function 
as the founding elements in the constitution of the modern nation-state. 
But most importantly, the Greeks were the first to articulate a notion of 
intellectual activity that was not confined to the traditional bounds of a 
cultural or ethnic unity, but which enabled the dissociation of spiritual 
meaning (or culture) from these bounds. “What makes us especially at 
home with the Greeks,” Hegel wrote, “is that they made their world their 
home”92 – and their name for this universal homeliness was nothing less 
than philosophy. Husserl’s reflections on Europe, I argue, pointed towards 
a radical rearticulation of this idea.
  The view that Husserl’s reflections on Europe rely on an arche-teleo-
logical model of historical development has been widely acknowledged, 
and it has served as an important point of departure for several critical 
91 Scholz 1974: 361.
92 Hegel 1995: 149.
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responses.93 According to Jacques Derrida’s influential critique, Husserl’s 
allegiance to this idea prevented him of taking a critical stance towards the 
fundamental presuppositions of modern historical consciousness. Besides 
committing itself to an unquestioned Euro-centrism, Derrida criticized 
Husserl’s teleological-historical reflections for its unwavering allegiance 
to the ideas of inevitability and progress – an allegiance that Derrida in-
terpreted in terms of unwavering commitment to the philosophical con-
sciousness of modernity.94 These critiques will be answered in the last part 
of this work. As I will argue in part 4, Husserl’s reflections on Europe 
committed themselves to the historical thinking of modernity in the sense 
that they took their point of departure from the ideas of teleology and prog-
ress. However, instead of simply paying homage to these ideas, Husserl 
aimed at a radical rearticulation of these ideas on the basis of his phenom-
enological approach. In order to appreciate the radicalism of Husserl’s 
approach, let us focus on their background in Hegel’s work.
Hegel, History, and Teleology
Hegel’s approach to the problem of history was founded on the basic pre-
supposition according to which philosophy – the universal science of be-
ing – represents the highest and most comprehensive form of historical 
reflection. In the introductory part to his Lectures on the Philosophy of His-
tory, Hegel introduced the philosophical account in contrast to two alter-
native models of historical reflection: the original and the reflective.95 Hegel 
introduced this threefold division in connection to the aforementioned 
distinction between Historie and Geschichte and aimed at giving it a more 
detailed and concrete form. Instead of simply separating between the em-
pirical and ideal aspects of historical development, Hegel argued for the 
necessity to approach this division from the viewpoint of the historian and 
the respective modes of cognition: all forms of historical reflection, as 
they apply general concepts and categories to particular events, embody 
93 See e.g. de Man 1983: 14ff.
94 Derrida 1992: 27.
95 Hegel 1970: 12ff.
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within themselves both ideal as well as empirical aspects. Therefore, even 
the philosophical reflection cannot simply do away with the concrete his-
torical events of a time; instead, the point is to understand this form of 
reflection as a specific approach to the particular and general aspects of 
history.
  Let us focus shortly on the differences between these forms. With 
the idea of “original” historiography, Hegel basically denoted a direct ac-
count of past events that does not impose any moral standards upon the 
described events nor speculate about their general meaning. In this form 
of historiography – represented by figures such as Herodotus, Thucydides 
and Julius Caesar – there is really no difference between the “spirit of the 
writer” and the “spirit of the actions”: the act of narration and the story 
told are essentially bound together. The reflective history, in contrast, is 
marked by a peculiar distance to the past events. In this form of historiog-
raphy – which is divided into several subdivisions – the writer discusses 
the historical material out of his own situation, “in his own spirit which 
is different from the content itself ”96. Reflective history can be either (a) 
general in the sense that it deals with extensive historical connections; (b) 
pragmatic in the sense that it leans towards moral teaching; (c) or critical in 
its motive for examining the credibility of the past descriptions. 
  Closest to the final form of historiography, the philosophical, is a par-
ticular instance of the reflective historiography, “specialized history”. This 
form examines the historical development of the objective spirit and how 
it is reflected in the domains of art, justice and religion. Accordingly, this 
type of history aims at explaining the historically conditioned character of 
cultural accomplishments, and it does so through abstract concepts and by 
adopting a general “point of view”. This type of historiography had been 
introduced before Hegel by the German historian and archaeologist Jo-
hann Joachim Winckelmann (1717–1768) who first introduced the cat-
egory of historical style to art history. Winckelmann was the first to differ-
entiate between the unique historical standards of Greek, Greco-Roman 
and Roman art; the late eighteenth century neo-classicists movement that 
accentuated Germany’s close relation to the Greek world drew inspira-
tion from his writings. It was this inclination that gave Winckelmann the 
label of a “historicist”, which here meant basically the sensitivity towards 
96 Hegel 1970: 14.
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the different standards of historical periods. In his lectures on aesthet-
ics, Hegel relied on Winckelmann’s ideas by developing his own theory 
of aesthetic standards and their progression. More importantly, Hegel de-
veloped this standpoint into a general theory of the “spirit of the age” and 
how it is reflected in all domains of culture. Even philosophy – although 
it deals with universal truths – was to be comprehended in regard to its 
culturally and historically specific conditions. “As far as the individual is 
concerned, each individual is in any case a child of his time,” writes Hegel 
in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right, “thus, philosophy, too, is its own 
time comprehended in thoughts.”97
  This insight constituted the point of departure for the ultimate form 
of historiography, the philosophical. This form did not restrict itself to a 
particular domain of culture, but it aimed at an overarching account of the 
development of spirit as a whole; hence, it deserved to be called universal 
history. But even more importantly, philosophical history was not defined 
merely by its scope, but by its methodological presupposition, that of ra-
tional development: “The only thought that philosophy brings with it is 
the simple thought of reason, that reason rules the world, and that world 
history has therefore been rational in its course”98. In other words, for 
Hegel philosophical history was namely this contemplation, which aimed 
at revealing the purposeful character of world history by showing how it is 
directed towards the fulfillment of its own inherent principle: reason. In 
other words, it did not merely compare individual historical periods with 
one another but it aimed at discovering their essential interdependence, 
and finally, their overarching unity. In other words, this type of history 
was to be called teleological – it aimed at discovering the underlying telos 
of historical development.
  However, to take this idea of teleology as a leading clue of historical 
development does not mean that it should be accepted simply and blindly. 
Hegel set himself forcefully to oppose those professional historians – as 
well as the earlier idealist tradition – which in his view had imposed “a 
priori fictions” into history at the cost of actual historical evidence. Hegel 
was quite explicit in claiming that we should take “history as it is, and 
97 ”Was das Individuum betrifft, so ist ohnehin jedes ein Sohn seiner Zeit; so ist auch Phi-
losophie ihre Zeit in Gedanken erfaßt.“ Hegel 1991: 21. 
98 Hegel 1970: 20–21.
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proceed historically, empirically”99; the metaphysical dimension of world 
history should be understood as the result of our historical considerations, 
not as a given presupposition of philosophical speculation. At the same 
time, Hegel was arguing against those historians who claimed to be purely 
“receptive” and merely surrendering to the given historical material. His-
tory is a narrative: not merely by convention but by “the nature of its 
content, which it makes prosaic”100. 
  But what really is meant by rational development? The conceptual 
framework of Hegel’s Lectures is, as known, highly abstract. He portrays 
the world history as a process in which its substance, the “spirit” (Geist), 
gradually attains a higher level of self-consciousness. By doing so, the spir-
it realizes its inherent principle, the idea of freedom: “As the substance 
of matter is gravity, so, we must say, the substance, the essence, of spirit 
is freedom”101. Thus for Hegel, world history has its goal in nothing else 
than in the consciousness of spirit of its freedom, and thus the full “reality” 
(Wirklichkeit) of its freedom in general. What makes this process rational is 
namely the fact that it is guided by the principle of self-transparency – the 
spirit becomes more reflective of its ultimate telos – and by doing so, it el-
evates humankind into a higher level of responsibility. Even though Hegel 
often deploys the notion of spirit in congruence with God – and asserts to 
be clarifying the basic problems of Christian theology – the spirit is not an 
abstract entity that could exist on its own. The spirit does not create the 
world nor does it judge its events. On the contrary, the spirit lives incor-
porated in human existence, in the form of human consciousness and will. 
Thus for Hegel, the essence of the spirit converges with the essence of 
humanity, which is also aimed in realizing its own freedom: in world his-
tory, the spirit is manifested in the element of human will. “This is the true 
Theodicy,” writes Hegel, “[…] that what has happened, and is happening 
every day, is not only not ‘without God’, but is essentially his work.”102 
  This did not entail, however, that Hegel would have completely ne-
glected the categories of nature in his philosophy of history. With regard 
to the mode of historical time and its development, the analogy of organ-
ism turned out to be significant in two regards. First, Hegel employed this 
99 Hegel 1970: 22.
100 Hegel 1970: 96.
101 Hegel 1970: 30.
102 Hegel 1970: 29. See also 539ff.
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analogy to describe the self-perpetual character of historical development. 
“Just as the seed bears within it the whole nature of the tree and the taste 
and form of its fruits”, wrote Hegel in the Introduction, “so also do the first 
traces of spirit contain virtually the whole of history”103. What Hegel was 
proposing here, was by no means a doctrine of historical predestination. 
On the contrary, what he was sketching was more like a theory on the 
origin-dependency of history. In the same way as a tree relies on its roots 
while growing, historical development always braces against its origin and 
preserves this within itself: the genesis of history is univocal because of 
its arche. Secondly, even though the spirit as such cannot be destroyed, 
its particular instances follow the somewhat “natural” pattern of growth 
and degradation. These instances – the spirits of peoples and nations – go 
through the periods of maturation, bloom and decay, for it belongs to the 
very structure of spirit to renew itself and pave way for new forms of life. 
Thus in the Hegelian framework we should not interpret the dissolution 
of particular cultures as a harmful phenomenon: from the perspective of 
world history, the transition of particular spiritual forms is always a form 
of progress. 
  Despite the concurring use of organic metaphors, Hegel also insisted 
that the idea of historical development should be distinguished from that 
of natural entities. Even though both can be understood as following a te-
leological pattern – both are aimed in fulfilling a principle that is inherent 
to their essence – the way in which historical development is disposed to 
this teleology is fundamentally different: “World history arises from the 
soil of the spirit, not of nature, and so its ultimate end can only be deduced 
from the nature of spirit”104. This soil, which constitutes the genesis of his-
tory, is by essence a conflictual one. Whereas according to Hegel, natural 
development is in its essence “immediate, unopposed and unhindered”, 
producing the similar form over and over again, the spirit finds itself in “a 
hard and unending struggle with itself ”105. The development of spiritual 
entities does not follow the blind regularity of natural growth, but as an 
autonomous and self-regulating progress it is open to even radical varia-
103 Hegel 1970: 31.
104 Hegel 1975: 212. ”The reawakening of nature is merely the repetition of one and the 
same process; it is a tedious story with always the same cycle. There is nothing new under 
the sun.” (1975: 61).
105 Hegel 1975: 127. 
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tion. In other words, the unfolding of the spirit and its accomplishments is 
always reflective in respect to the acquired form.106 
  Already in the Phenomenology of the Spirit, Hegel stressed the role of 
negativity as the guiding principle of the development of conscious life: 
the whole development of “living substance” is spurred by the observation 
that it is not self-sufficient, that it is “truly realized and actual (wirklich) 
solely in the process of positing itself […] from one state or position to the 
opposite.”107 Now, as Hegel acknowledged, although some of the Ancient 
thinkers did consider “void” or “nothingness” to be the central principle of 
movement, even they did not think comprehend this negativity (Negativ-
ität) on its own right, but only in terms of privation of being. The negativity 
that Hegel had in mind, however, did not denote mere privation; it was 
rather the perpetual “overturning” or “evacuation” of a particular positive 
substantiation of the spirit.108 “Spirit is usually spoken of as subject”, Hegel 
writes in his Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, “as doing something, and apart 
from what it does” – however:
[…] it is the of the very nature of spirit to be this absolute liveli-
ness (Lebendigkeit), this process, to proceed forth from naturality, 
immediacy, to sublate, to quit its naturality, and to come to itself, 
and to free itself, it being itself only as it comes to itself as such a 
product of itself; its actuality being merely that it has made itself into 
what it is.109
In the phenomenological tradition, primarily because of Heidegger’s in-
terpretation, it has become common to consider Hegel as a thinker of 
pure presence, of actuality and self-sufficiency. As Heidegger put it, He-
gel’s philosophy followed the basic question of Ancient philosophy (ti to 
on? – what is a being?), and in this pursuit “Hegel understood being as 
absolute, in advance and without question”.110 However, there is a good 
106 Hegel 1975: 61. As Hegel argues in his lectures, even though the Romans adopted their 
gods from the Greeks, the whole metaphysical framework of divinity and the practical field 
of idolatry were radically different. Whereas the Greeks “made their Pantheon the embodi-
ment of a rich intellectual material, and adorned it with bright fancies”, writes Hegel, “the 
spirit of Romans did not indulge and delight itself in that play of a thoughtful fancy”: their 
relation to the divine was that of “frigid understanding and of imitation.” 
107 Hegel GW 9: 18.
108 Ibid.: “Sie [die lebendige Substanz] ist als Subject die reine einfache Negativität […]”
109 Hegel 1978: 6–7.
110 “Es war gefordert, weil das Sein für Hegel ohne Frage vorhinein absolut verstanden 
war und diese Absolutheit und Unendlichkeit selbst nicht weiter Problem wurde [...].“ 
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reason to claim that for Hegel, the “actuality” of spirit was really, however, 
the constant de-absolutisation of its particular contents. It is not the case 
as if there was first an actual spirit, which then would alienate from itself 
and consequently return to an elevated actuality; rather, this very move-
ment of negativity is the very substance of the spirit.111 
  The general form of this perpetual struggle is, of course, what He-
gel calls dialectics. The world history is constituted through an antithetical 
struggle of competing views, passions and accomplishments – a struggle 
in which the humanity constantly re-establishes its own being. Now, as He-
gel points out, the great scene of world history has not been (and is not) “a 
theatre of happiness”: the transition from one historical epoch to another 
is often established through a violent outburst. Like in the case of French 
Revolution, the collapse of absolutist monarchy was followed by Montes-
quieu’s Reign of Terror, which in turn needed to be overcome in order to 
arrive at what one might call a normal state. This is exactly what Hegel 
means with his renowned concept of “cunning of reason” (List der Vernunft): 
what first seems like an irrational burst of passions – a fall to barbarism, 
a loss of direction – contributes to the common good at the end. For this 
reason, it is the destiny of the true agents of history, the great historical 
individuals, to find themselves in peril of their life. Like Alexander, Caesar 
and Napoleon – because they do not actually belong to the spirit of time, 
but they are aroused by the nascent and unconscious spirit of future – they 
die early, are murdered or deported. It is namely this feature that gives 
history its progressive character: “In the world of spirit, every change is a 
form of advancement”112.
  It was exactly this thesis on the essential progressivity of history that 
ultimately distinguished Husserl’s notion of teleology from that of He-
gel’s. As I will show later in part 4, while Husserl rearticulated the motive 
of negativity in history, and conceived history in terms of an origin-depen-
dent teleology, he nevertheless insisted on a more radical idea of openness 
as the guiding motive of historical reflection. Teleology was to be divested 
not only of its naturalistic connotations but also of its eschatological sense 
as the necessary progression of humanity. Instead of the dialectical or “syn-
thetic” development of thesis and antithesis, the inner logic of history was 
Heidegger GA 32: 105.
111 Ameriks 2000: 91.
112 Hegel 1975: 128.
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to be conceived through the interplay of “absolute” and “relative” ideals, 
pointing towards the essential inexhaustibility of historical development.
  But how did Hegel conceive the telos of history? For some time, the 
well-known phrase on the “end of history” has been one of the most salient 
legacies of Hegel’s philosophy of history. Especially through the works 
of Marx and Alexander Kojève – as well as the more recent analyses by 
Francis Fukuyama (1992) – this idea has gained new relevance by becom-
ing one of the central themes of contemporary socio-political criticism. 
Hegel’s thesis has been called forth in order to make sense of the ideologi-
cal clashes of the twentieth century as well as the hegemonic structures of 
today’s world politics. Looking back in the twentieth century, it has been 
an inseparable feature of socialist movements as well as our contemporary 
form of liberal democracy that they have presented themselves in the light 
of this idea, as representing the last stage of history (or the Marxist “end of 
prehistory”) or the exhaustion of other possible ideologies. On a broader 
scope, this view has become one of the main features of the intellectual 
position we know as postmodernism: the idea that we have lost faith in all 
forms of “grand narratives”, which give history its universal direction.113
  Despite the popularity of this idea, with regard to Hegel’s own view 
the edge has often been a somewhat more critical one. It has been often 
argued that Hegel, who was willing to attach this expression to his own 
age, fell into the victim of both political conservatism as well as a general 
hubris with regard to his position in world history. By exaggerating the 
emancipatory achievements of the French Revolution and its effect on 
the Germanic nations, Hegel neglected the significance of later historical 
development: the rise of the United States of America, the European revo-
lutions of the late nineteenth century, the ideological clashes of twentieth 
century and so on. Particularly Kojève has entertained the idea that for 
Hegel, the Battle of Jena in 1806 signified the moment when “history is 
being completed or has been completed”114. 
  In his discussions on the goal-directed character of history, Hegel in-
troduced the concept of “ultimate goal” (Endzweck).115 In his Lectures, Hegel 
113 On the idea of “grand narratives”, see Lyotard 1979: 1ff. I will return to this issue in 
part 4.
114 Kojéve 1980: 44.
115 Hegel was relying particularly on Kant’s and Fichte’s discussions on the teleological 
and normative character of human life, in which the concept of Endzweck played a crucial 
role. Hegel 1970: 29.
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defined the notion of Endzweck as the basic principle of historical devel-
opment, towards which the world history strives for – but also, as that 
what God wants of the world. It is important to note that for Hegel, the 
concept of ultimate goal was by no means a purely formal principle of 
historical development. As Hegel maintained, the idea of ultimate goal 
implied merely that the end is to be “realized, made actual”116. Historical 
progress in infinitum was an impossible category, for without a definite 
aim, historical development would make no sense. Again, we can see the 
influence of Christian eschatology at work: for Hegel, as also also Kojéve 
affirms, the teleology of world history is by no means infinite but limit-
ed.117 Without this ultimate limit of the “Last Judgment”, the whole idea 
of the righteous character of the world would lose its ground. However, it 
equally important to pay attention to the fact that for Hegel, the ultimate 
goal did not denote end in the sense of extinction nor did he sketch an 
apocalyptic vision of destruction. What he meant with this concept was 
the fulfillment of the guiding idea of history and thus the exhaustion of all 
the central possibilities of historical development. Time does not stop, 
but the fundamental struggles that have characterized the development of 
the spirit are reconciled in a way that the dialectical movement of history 
comes to an end.
  Yet in the framework of Hegel’s Lectures, the end of history as a concrete 
event does not find a simple and univocal answer. In the most general level 
of inspection, it is the very broad definition of European culture that takes 
the place of the ultimate goal: “World history travels from East to West, 
for Europe is absolutely the end of world history, Asia the beginning”118. 
According to Hegel’s controversial thesis, the ‘German nations in Chris-
tianity’ represent the “end of history” in the sense that they were the first 
to guarantee the “objective freedom” through the universalistic legislation 
of the civil society. This was the great achievement of the German Enlight-
enment, and with its “formally absolute principle [of universal reason] 
we come to the last stage of history, to our world, to our time.”119 However, 
there are also indications that seem to question this view. Hegel refers to 
America as “the land of the future”, on whose role “has yet to be revealed 
116 Hegel 1970: 29.
117 See also Kojéve 1980: 148.
118 Hegel 1970: 134.
119 Hegel 1970: 524.
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in the ages which lie ahead”120 – similar kinds of references are made with 
respect to the Slavic world.121 These kinds of remarks remain somewhat 
ambiguous, for Hegel does not fully elaborate whether the New World 
truly represents a different stage in the course of world history, or merely 
the continuation of the European world.
  Despite the imminent controversies regarding Hegel’s account of the 
“end of history”, what we can perhaps say without hesitation is that his idea 
of historical development was ultimately unilineal in its progression. As he 
concluded in his lectures on world history, philosophy was ultimately con-
cerned only with the “glory of the Idea mirroring itself in the history of 
the world”, and as such, it could not imagine any greater alternative than 
the modern nation-state. The state reflected, as Hegel put it in Philosophy 
of Right, the “march of God in the world”.122 It was basically unimaginable 
that it could undergo a deep crisis, that the universalistic motive of the 
civil society could undergo a genuine decline.
  Hegel’s ideas were not univocally accepted. Marx, like many of the 
Young Hegelians, emphasized the essentially incomplete character of the 
French Revolution, which had merely replaced the old estates with the 
new tyranny of the bourgeoisie. Hegel’s view could only amount to a 
highly idealized view of political freedom – one, which completely ab-
stained from the material inequalities of concrete societal reality. Still, 
even Marx – especially in his earlier works that were keener to specu-
late on the direction of history – could not let go on the narrative and 
progressive character of historical development. The Manifesto of 1848, 
for instance, emphasized the self-destructive character of the bourgeoisie 
state, which, by endowing its conditions of existence to the hands of the 
proletariat produced nothing less than its “own grave-diggers”.123 Hence 
the fall of the bourgeoisie and the victory of the proletariat were “equally 
inevitable”124 – as Burckhardt’s crisis, this event merely released the histori-
cal forces hidden due to the incubation. 
  It was perhaps Nietzsche who was the first to articulate the most 
comprehensive critique against the concept of progress, not just as an 
120 Hegel 1970: 114.
121 Hegel 1970: 422, 500.
122 GW 14.1 §258.
123 Marx and Engels 1967: 94.
124 Marx and Engels 1967: 96.
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empirical phenomenon, but as a general category of modern historical 
reflection. Already in his early work The Birth of Tragedy (1872) Nietz-
sche presented his reading on the suppressed Dionysian element of pre-
classical Greek culture in contrast to the “phlegmatic emotionlessness” of 
the modern culture, which, in its hatred towards everything “barbaric”, 
had lost the genuine vitality of all artistic creation.125 In his later works, 
this insight grew into a more comprehensive critique on the anti-humane 
character of Western philosophy and Christianity, which had lead to the 
suppression of our basic instinctual energies – a process which he often 
called by the name of decadence.126 Following the Rousseauan insight on the 
corruptedness of culture, Nietzsche proclaimed that “mankind surely does 
not represent an evolution toward a better or stronger or higher level as 
progress is now understood […] This ‘progress’ is merely a modern idea, 
which is to say, a false idea.”127 But even Rousseau, Nietzsche claimed in 
his late fragments assembled together under the title “The Will to Power”, 
fell victim to the “defense of providence”, for “he needed God in order to 
be able to cast a curse upon society and civilization; everything had to be 
good because God had created it[.]”128 In other words, despite his skepti-
cal attitude towards the development of culture and civilization, Rousseau 
needed to cling on to a faith on the essential incorruptedness of human 
nature and how it would ultimately reflect in the just course of world his-
tory. What Nietzsche called by the name of “good European” was exactly 
the figure of a person that refused to cling on to this faith – who posits his 
own criteria of development, his own values anew.
  In this sense, Nietzsche prepared the novel transformation of sense 
that the concept of crisis went through in the beginning of the twentieth 
century. As he himself predicted in the final part of the Ecce Homo (“Why 
am I Destiny?”), his name was to be attached to the most “profound crisis” 
of modernity, a “decision that was conjured up against everything that had 
125 KSA 1.163
126 See especially KSA 6.73: ”Die Instinkte bekämpfen müssen — das ist die Formel für 
décadence“
127 “Die Menschheit stellt nicht eine Entwicklung zum Besseren oder Stärkeren oder Hö-
heren dar, in der Weise, wie dies heute geglaubt wird. Der „Fortschritt“ ist bloss eine 
moderne Idee, das heisst eine falsche Idee.“ KSA 6.171.
128 “[…] er brauchte Gott, um den Fluch auf die Gesellschaft und die Civilisation werfen 
zu können; alles mußte an sich gut sein, da Gott es geschaffen.“ KSA 12.448.
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been believed, demanded, hallowed so far.”129 Instead of denoting the re-
curring movement of human culture towards its uncorrupt foundations, 
or, its elevation into a higher level of spirit through an epochal transfor-
mation, Nietzsche conceived the crisis in terms of a radical break, which 
pointed towards the possibility of a complete exhaustion of the founding 
ideas of the European-Occidental culture. This idea of exhaustion, which 
Nietzsche also discussed in terms of cultural illness (cf. Introduction), was 
to become one of the defining elements of the early twentieth-century 
debate on crisis – a debate that first introduced the ideas of radical finitude 
and relativity in to the cultural consciousness of the European modernity. 
  As I believe, it is necessary to situate Husserl’s reflections on Europe 
– its universality and crisis – in this debate. In the following, I will argue 
that the early twentieth-century debate introduced a completely new cri-
sis of reason, which could no longer commit itself to an idea of scientific 
rationality as the guiding principle of cultural development. Instead, by di-
vesting scientific reason of its teleology and universality, this novel debate 
on crisis pointed towards an all-embracing loss of foundations within the 
field of culture – a loss that was also reflected in the domain of political 
thought. I will focus on this transition in chapter 1.3.
1.3.  The Idea of Crisis in the Early Twentieth-
Century Debate: Finitude and Relativity
We are now approaching the more imminent influences of Hus-serl’s crisis-philosophy, namely, the philosophical, intellectual and political situation of the early twentieth-century Europe. 
This is the situation which forms the primary framework for Husserl’s 
own critical position. Albeit influenced by the crisis-philosophy of the pre-
vious century, the crisis of the early twentieth century took on a signifi-
cantly different form, contesting some of the fundamental categories of 
129 See KSA 6.365: ”Es wird sich einmal an meinen Namen die Erinnerung an etwas Unge-
heures anknüpfen, — an eine Krisis, wie es keine auf Erden gab, an die tiefste Gewissens-
Collision, an eine Entscheidung heraufbeschworen gegen Alles, was bis dahin geglaubt, 
gefordert, geheiligt worden war.“
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the eighteenth and nineteenth century historical development; above all, 
the impregnable faith in progress that I have been sketching in the previ-
ous sections. 
  The idea of a radical break was of course inseparable from a particu-
lar event that set the course for the remaining century: the First World 
War. From today’s perspective, the word “crisis” may seem too weak to 
describe the experience of all-embracing devastation and destruction pro-
duced by this conflict. Following Erich Ludendorff’s famous recollection 
in his work Der Totale Krieg (1935), it might be justified to speak of the 
first “total war” in modern history. This idea of totality came forward, first 
of all, in the imperialistic motives of the war: the growing imbalance of 
colonial resources between the Great Britain, France and Germany had 
already spurred a series of conflicts at the outskirts of Europe at the begin-
ning of the twentieth century. It seemed inevitable that the forthcoming 
conflict would be global instead of local. Secondly, it became clear that 
the guiding motive of the new warfare was not merely to prove one’s 
relative power by conquering particular regions that belonged to another 
sovereign power, but to maximize the devastation of the enemy – even to 
destroy the opponent as such. As Ernst Jünger put it in his thesis on “total 
mobilization”, for the first time the war was fought not merely between 
national armies but between societies as mobilized wholes.130 Economy, 
industry, science, art – everything seemed to be harnessed to serve the 
purpose of destruction.
  To capture the complex traits of this extended fin-de-siècle period 
would of course be an insuperable task. Since my interest lies in articulat-
ing the basic framework of Husserl’s position, I will focus especially on 
two themes that I consider as important with regard to his critical stance: 
the ideas of finitude and relativity of culture. As I will show in the follow-
ing, “crisis” became a central symbol for both of these ideas: it denoted 
the situation in which the European-Occidental culture had to face the 
possibility of its extinction as well as the loss of its universal significance. 
In addition, I want to point out another important feature in the early 
twentieth-century debate on crisis, which ought to help us in understand-
ing the specific conceptual approach of Husserl’s work – namely, the idea 
of crisis as a performative or perlocutionary act. For the philosophers, intel-
130 See the essay ”Die totale Mobilmachung“ (1931) in Jünger 1980: 119–142.
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lectuals and political reformists of the early twentieth century, crisis did 
not only signify a certain state of exception, but it was fervently used as 
an imperative to react, as a demand to take exceptional measures. Rather 
than distancing himself from what I call here the decisionistic motive, Hus-
serl aimed at transferring it from the sphere of politics to philosophy.
  Despite the somewhat rapid emergence of an overarching crisis-con-
sciousness at the turn of the century, it would be misleading to character-
ize this period solely as pessimistic or that of negative beliefs. As Fritz 
Ringer argues in his work The Decline of the German Mandarine (1969), at 
least for the German academic community of the early twentieth century, 
the imminence of the war was also greeted with enthusiasm.131 As Arthur 
Liebert put it in his crisis-pamphlet of 1923, “a time without crisis is a 
dead time”132 – the military conflict had introduced a novel countermove-
ment to the rapid modernization and urbanization that had taken place 
at the turn of the century. The war, with its ideals of communality and 
sacrifice, was also seen as the possibility to return to a more conservative 
worldview, that of heroic and archaic values. As such, the war represented 
a powerful countereffect to the alienating powers of modern society: the 
urban social alienation and the abstract values that were brought by politi-
cal cosmopolitanism and cultural-economic globalization. 
  Especially in the context of German intelligentsia, there emerged a 
variety of “war-philosophies” that aimed at interpreting military conflicts 
in terms of cultural revival and self-assertion. One of the most influential 
figures of this movement was Max Scheler, who wrote his enthusiastic 
and high-spirited work Der Genius des Krieges und der Deutsche Krieg (The 
Genius of War and the German War) at the outset of the war in 1914–1915. 
Scheler, who became known for his engagement with the phenomenologi-
cal movement and especially the themes of value-ethics and philosophy of 
religion – and whom Heidegger called (posthumously) the “the strongest 
philosophical force in modern Germany”133 – viewed the crisis of war in 
terms of a critical decision between Europe’s rebirth and the “beginning 
of its atrophy”134. This gesture of reducing manifold historical develop-
ments into the form of simple oppositional conflict was an inherent feature 
131 Ringer 1969: 180, 245ff. 
132 Liebert 1923: 5.
133 Heidegger GA 26: 62.
134 Bambach 2003: 128. Scheler 1917: 322–323.
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of the early twentieth century history of philosophy, something for which 
the crisis appeared as a simple and useful tool. Scheler’s ultimate goal was 
to promote what he called “the spiritual unity of Europe”135 that would 
have been based on a clearly delineated spiritual essence. For this reason, 
Scheler emphasized Germany’s need to repudiate the weak empiricism 
of the “British Mind”, the “vague” rationalism of the French, and the au-
tocratic Orthodoxy of Russia – all of which were unable to construct this 
essence. 
  Husserl was no stranger to this pre-war enthusiasm. On the contrary, 
he was convinced that the impending militarily conflict would lead to the 
spiritual strengthening of the German nation. Emphasizing the immense 
courage of the German soldiers – two of them his own sons – Husserl 
praised the emergence of a collective will, which had introduced a nov-
el sense of political idealism penetrating the whole of body politic. “We 
hardly live any longer as private persons”, wrote Husserl in an enthusiastic 
letter to Hugo Münsterberg on the first year of the war: “Everyone expe-
riences concentrated in himself the life of the whole nation, and this gives 
to every experience its tremendous momentum”136. 
  For the generation of the early twentieth-century Germans, it was 
especially the work of J.G. Fichte that had become the most central point 
of reference for the ideas of cultural self-assertion and German unifica-
tion by the means of warfare. Especially his Reden an die deutsche Nation 
(1807–1808) were fervently looked back as a model for the militarily-
nationalist “ideas of 1914” – heroism, self-sacrifice and the establishment 
of a new collective will.137 More importantly, through his encounter with 
the tradition of just war theory (bellum iustum) Fichte had introduced a 
novel idea of “war of liberation”, which was to serve the autonomy and 
freedom of the German nation by refuting the foreign (i.e. French) influ-
ences and control.138 As Husserl himself attested, the Germans had “gone 
135 Scheler 1917: 253–260.
136 HuaXXV: 292. The letter appeared in English.
137 Heidegger, who served as a young weatherman during the First World War, shared a 
similar passion of interpreting military conflicts in philosophical terms. Agitated by the 
French-Belgian intervention to Ruhr in 1923–1924, Heidegger proclaimed “the Ruhrkampf” 
to be the German version of “gigantomachia, once fought by the great Greek philosophers, 
which we Germans, in this ‘land of poets and thinkers’, are destined to make into our 
Kampf!” This excerpt belongs to the manuscript of a talk delivered on several occasions in 
1923–1924, quoted in Kisiel 2000: 190. 
138 On the idea of just war, see Fichte 1971: 401–430.
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out to fight this war in the Fichtean spirit as a truly sacred war and to of-
fer themselves with full hearts as a sacrifice for the fatherland”139 – in this 
regard, the war was to become the central antidote of the modern crisis of 
liberalism and its egoistic and self-centered view of the individual. Hence 
Paul Ricoeur’s description of Husserl as a “thinker naturally unaccustomed 
to political concerns”140, who came to realize the spiritual crisis of Europe 
only at the late stage of his career, seems somewhat unjustifiable. Although 
Husserl’s Kaizo essays of the early 1920s represent a significant transition 
of perspective with regard to the problematic of just war, he nevertheless 
held on to the essentially political and social underpinnings of the modern 
crisis of reason.
  Moreover, it would also be misleading to portray the crisis as a single, 
unified phenomenon. As Ringer points out, in the academic circles of the 
Weimar period (1919–1933) it was highly usual to claim that a crisis was 
in progress without really defining the exact character of this crisis.141 
Crises were claimed to appear everywhere: its variations extended from 
scientific “paradigm changes” to economic recession, from local quarrels 
to major conflicts in global politics. Judging on mere theoretical litera-
ture, the concept of crisis denoted different forms of social, political and 
economic devastation, reaching its fulfillment in the cultural and spiri-
tual crisis of Europe.142 Politically speaking, The Weimar Republic was in-
deed a “nation of crises” – a highly unstable political system that between 
the years 1919 and 1924 witnessed the formation of 12 different gov-
ernments.143 Between 1919 and 1933, the infamous “emergency decree” 
(Article 48) was invoked more than two hundred and fifty times until the 
whole constitution was subsumed under it in 1933.144 The crisis became, 
very concretely, the permanent state of exception that was also inscribed 
to the existing juridical order.
139 HuaXXV: 293. For Husserl the war had revealed “the historical mission of the German 
people [...] to light the way for all other peoples in philosophy.” HuaDokV: 172. 
140 Ricoeur 1967: 143.
141 Ringer 1969: 245.
142 See e.g. Harry Ritter’s article on the notion of crisis in his Dictionary of Concepts in His-
tory (1986: 82ff.).
143 West 1985: 1ff.
144 Dyzenhaus 1999: 118–132. As Agamben notes (2005a: 3ff.), the jurists of the National 
Socialist movement spoke of a “willed state of exception” (gewollte Ausnahmezustand).
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  However, as Hans Sluga has argued, it was perhaps the aforementioned 
indeterminacy that gave the concept of crisis its efficient force in the day-
to-day debate. The crisis became a general symbol of the present that al-
lowed several readings: unlike most political symbols – such as flags, em-
blems, gestures and rituals – this notion carried within itself also a deeper 
intellectual dimension that allowed also philosophical underpinnings.145 
However, as it often happens with concepts that are extensively used, they 
turn into clichés. For many, the “crisis” became an empty phrase. Indeed, 
if we take a look at Husserl’s comments to the debate on crisis – especially 
those of the post-war period – we often find formulations marked by ex-
treme reservation with regard to “fashionable” debates.146 Husserl wanted 
to distinguish himself from the typical brochure-writing hucksters or false 
doctors of culture preaching the “end of the world”. However, he did not 
completely abandon this notion. On the contrary: instead of a topical is-
sue of the day-to-day political debate, the crisis was to be seen primarily 
as a philosophical topic – as a useful category that needed to be “uprooted” 
and reinterpreted with regard to renewed understanding of the history of 
philosophy.147 Before I move on to these reinterpretations, I will offer a 
sketch of their backgrounds.
Crisis of war as a sign of finitude. 
“We later civilizations, we too know that we are mortal”. These are the 
opening words of the essay “The Crisis of Spirit” (“La crise de l’espirit”) 
written by a French poet and essayist Paul Valéry in 1919. Valéry, like 
many others, greeted the end of the war with somewhat mixed emotions. 
The sense of relief that accompanied the end of the military crisis was fol-
lowed by the awareness that “the intellectual crisis, being more subtle and, 
by its nature, assumes the most deceptive appearances”148. “This crisis”, he 
argued, “will hardly allow us to grasp its true extent, its phase”. Following 
the basic tenets of many of his contemporaries, Valéry claimed that the 
Great War had deprived the Western mind of its fundamental belief in the 
145 Sluga 1993: 62
146 See Ch. 1.4.
147 On the idea of “uprooting” (entwurzeln), see HuaVI: 317.
148 Valéry 1962: 25.
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ideas of progress and the autonomy of reason, diminished the faith in the 
omnipotence of science and in Europe’s role as some kind of torchbearer 
of humanity. Especially with the destructive outcome of technological in-
novations, the Western civilization had to confront an unseen experience 
of finitude: “Everything has not been lost, but everything has sensed that 
it might perish.”149 Taking advantage of the essential openness belonging 
to the notion of crisis, Valéry sketched the future of Europe as a kind of 
either/or situation between the options of remaining a little cape of Asia 
or becoming what it really was hoping to be: “the brain of a vast body”, 
that is, the guiding force for the whole of humanity.
  For the thinkers of the post-war Europe, these kinds of expressions 
were not unusual. The experience of devastation that the Great War had 
produced was indeed something inexperienced: 15 million casualties, al-
most 7 of them civilians; 21 million people were left seriously wounded. 
As if this had not been enough, the so called Spanish flu pandemic – al-
though not straightforwardly caused by the war, but followed by it – raged 
globally between 1918 and 1920, killing at least 50 million people (though 
only 3 of them in Europe). Between the years of 1914 and 1918, Germany 
lost approximately 15 percent of its male population, and by the time 
of 1923, the heavy war indemnities had driven the nation into a severe 
economic crisis that was followed by a massive hyperinflation.150 There 
was something in the very totality of these experiences that could not be 
neglected, something that gave the notion of crisis an apocalyptic stamp. 
  The primal reason behind the magnitude of the devastation was of 
course the significant changes in the modern warfare. The WWI was the 
first conflict to take advantage of the successive revolutions of modern 
technology, which raised the substantial damages into a wholly another 
level. As Martha Hanna and Kurt Flasch have shown in their extensive 
treatises, the WWI was also the first conflict in world history to deploy 
what they have called “intellectual mobilization”: the use of academic 
community and intellectuals in order to create propaganda and arguments 
149 Ibid.
150 For the first time, war was extensively studied from an economic framework: even 
though the warfare decreased the production of civilian goods, slowed down international 
trade and increased public expenditure, it also stimulated national economies and helped 
to fight growing unemployment.
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for the war.151 The war was fought also textually – in addition to the more 
theoretical war-philosophies, both the French as well as the German intel-
lectuals debated frequently on the more practical questions (such as the 
famous Manifesto 93) relating to military actions. In addition, the war 
spurred a series of quasi-intellectual reflections on the national character-
istics of the parties involved. The critique on the essentially German “ego-
ism” and “militarism” was often matched by invoking to French “coward-
ice” or Anglo-American “superficiality” – a rhetorical topos that was also 
employed by the phenomenologists.
  However, despite the sense of total annihilation that the Great War 
produced, there was also a shared feeling that perhaps the war as such 
was not the catalyst of devastation, but rather an outcome of a process 
that had long since been coming. Many were willing to subscribe to Stefan 
George’s famous phrase “These are fiery signs – not tidings”; the crisis of 
war was interpreted to be a symptom of a more profound disease that 
had taken over the European-Occidental culture. As Rudolf Pannwitz ar-
gued in his post-war treatise Die Krisis der europäischen Kultur, the crisis of 
modern Europe was indeed something forgotten, rather than something 
recently erupted – something that the Great War merely brought back to 
consciousness instead of triggering it off.152 Even before the war, it was 
somewhat usual to question the “naive confidence” in continuous progress 
and sustainable development. For instance, the French socialist philoso-
pher George Sorel had published his ominously sounding work Les Illusions 
du Progrès in 1908, in which progress was criticized not only as a historical 
category, but as a false “ideology” whose origin was not in true science, 
but in the political visions of the eighteenth and nineteenth century bour-
geoisie.153 The ideology of progress, which Sorel wanted to replace with 
an essentially open view of historical development, was haunting also the 
Marxist tradition that was supposed to get rid of its unfounded historical 
prejudices. In the 1920 appendix to his work, Sorel maintained that “Marx 
easily abandoned the terrain of materialist philosophy of history in order 
to let himself be guided by the doctrine of Weltgeist.”154 As we shall see 
in the last part of this work, this interpretation is somewhat one-sided: 
151 On the idea of intellectual mobilization, see Hanna 1996; Flasch 2000.
152 Pannwitz 1933: iii. Cf. Sluga 1993: 53.
153 Sorel 1969: 13ff.
154 Sorel 1969: 208–209.
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Marx, like Husserl, emphasized the contextuality of historical reflection, 
which was supposed to function as the critique of the present moment.
  Accordingly, in the academic literature of the post-war period, it was 
a common theme to explain the intellectual breakdown as something that 
essentially belonged to the notion of modernity itself. Especially in the 
humanistically oriented historiography of the early twentieth century, the 
crisis was often treated as a latent disease whose origin was to be discov-
ered by returning to the previous centuries. José Ortega y Gasset, for 
one, traced the origin of this crisis back to the period of 1550–1650, to 
the birth of our modern ideas of “science and pure reason”155 – whereas 
the French historian Paul Hazard located the roots of the modern “cri-
sis of mind” in the period of 1680–1715.156 As I noted in chapter 1.1, 
Egon Friedell lead the “crisis of the European soul” back into another, very 
concrete sickness: the Black Death. Despite the seeming incongruence of 
these analyses, what united them was a perception that the ideas that were 
fundamental to the modern edifice had come to their end – either in the 
sense of their exhaustion, or in the sense that they revealed to be unsound 
in the first place. As Robert Musil put it at the end of WWI: “The war 
can be reduced to a formula – one dies for ideals, because they are not 
worth living for”157 – it seemed as if the war had suddenly demonstrated 
the burn-out of the European culture. This exhaustion, this idea of radical 
break was defined as the crisis. It was no longer a symbol for the transition 
to a higher level of culture, or to another historical epoch, but an expres-
sion of the radical finitude of the European-Occidental culture. 
  In the context of German philosophy, this experience of finitude found 
its most powerful expression in the work of Oswald Spengler. Spengler, 
whose academic career was somewhat unfortunate – he failed his first 
doctoral thesis –, shook the post-war intellectual world with his exten-
sive treatise The Decline of the West (Der Untergang des Abendlandes, published 
in two volumes in 1918 and 1923). With its radical vision of historical 
development as well as its unique style of expression, Spengler’s work 
became one of the most important touchstones for the German intelli-
gentsia – and one of the most powerful expressions for the European crisis 
155 Ortega 1958: 216.
156 Hazard 1973.
157 Musil 1955: 857–58.
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of the twentieth century. As Gadamer put it in his recollections, although 
Spengler’s “romance” was “made up partly of scholarship and mostly of 
world-historical fantasy […], it was a genuine putting in question of the 
modern faith in progress and its proud ideal of profiency and ‘accom-
plishing things’.”158 However, Spengler’s vision was not greeted with sole 
acceptance and commendation – at least in the German academic com-
munity. On the contrary, his tendency to mysticism and obscure “poetic” 
expression made him an easy target of critique for both the positivist his-
torians, the neo-Kantians and, of course, for phenomenologists. All in all, 
Spengler’s work was better received among artists, novelists and essayists 
– and of course, among the masses. 
  What gave Spengler’s work its eminent reputation was a flavor of mes-
sianic prophecy. Spurred by the so-called Agadir Crisis of 1911, Spengler 
had formulated his basic position well before the war, finishing the writing 
process already in 1914: 
In 1911, I proposed myself to put together some broad consid-
erations of the political phenomena of the day and their possible 
developments. At that time the World War appeared to me both as 
imminent and also as the inevitable outward manifestation of the 
historical crisis, and my endeavour was to comprehend it from an 
examination of the spirit of the preceding centuries – not years.159
In the foreword to his work, Spengler claimed to be the first to attempt 
what he called a “venture of predetermining history” – a project whose 
character was obviously highly exaggerated. As we have seen in the previ-
ous chapters, the urge to control and predict historical events had been 
the central motive of crisis-philosophies since the eighteenth century. 
What is more, Spengler’s morphological model relied heavily Vico’s Sci-
enza Nuova (1720–21) – which portrayed the development of cultures as 
a three-stage process from birth to decline – and the Russian ethnologist 
Nikolai Danilevsky, who relied on morphological metaphors in his work 
Russia and Europe (1869). However, what was special about Spengler’s 
work was that it managed to draw together several characteristics of the 
modern crisis-consciousness, formulate them in a topical and grandilo-
quent fashion, as well as to point out many interesting analogies between 
158 See Gadamer 1986: 479. 
159 Spengler 1991: 36. My italics.
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different world-historical cultures. After Spengler, for any historian trying 
to make sense of cultural development, it became a necessity to confront 
the biological and organic metaphors of growth and decay. It is namely 
this antithetical setting to the Spenglerian decline – what Husserl called 
the “latest theory of the weak-hearted philosophical scepticism”160 – which 
ought to be recognized as the implicit background of Husserl’s reflections 
on the European crisis.
  Let me recapitulate Spengler’s basic position. In his view, the tra-
ditional philosophies of history had come short in two crucial respects. 
First, by relying on either purely idealized or strictly mechanical concepts 
of history, the dominant interpretations had completely misinterpreted 
the basic character of cultural development. The historical positivists, who 
relied on the ideas of causal uniformity and measurability, had made histo-
ry lifeless; the idealists were false optimists in their belief in a progressive 
teleology, or as in the case of Kant and Hegel, in some kind of divine prov-
idence or Theodicy.161 According to Spengler, both had failed to recognize 
the essentially dynamic and organic character of historical development: 
cultures, like plants, are living organisms that aim at realizing a principle 
that is inherent to their existence. This dynamism could be grasped, not in 
scientific terms, but only with the help of artistic expression – or by what 
Spengler called the creative “work of genius”.162 
  Secondly, in Spengler’s view the traditional conceptions of history 
had been old-fashionably Ptolemaic in the sense that they had “revolved 
around” the European-Occidental culture; they gave this culture a privi-
leged position in the world-history by interpreting it as the culmination 
or perfection of all historical civilizations.163 What Spengler was after was 
indeed a “Copernican revolution” of historical development: all cultures 
follow the same pattern of organic growth, bloom and decease, and the 
Occidental culture makes no exception to this. In addition, all high cul-
tures – Babylonian, Egyptian, Chinese, Indian, Mexican, Classical, Arabian 
160 “Der Untergang des Abendlandes, diese neueste Theorie eines schwachherzigen philo-
sophischen Skeptizismus […]”. HuaXXVII: 122.
161 See Chapter 1.2.
162 Spengler 1991: 360ff.
163 In fact, Spengler argued that the whole notion of Europe should be “struck out” of 
world-history because of its broadness (1991: 12n1.).
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– have their unique systems of expression (art, poetry, science) which can-
not be settled into one overarching framework.
  Let us focus on the first point. The most imminent consequence of 
Spengler’s organic vision was of course his thesis on the inevitability of the 
decline. If cultures truly are organisms, it is their destiny – after they have 
realized their inherent essence – to descend into a process of withering 
and make way for new forms of life. In other words, all cultures are by 
necessity finite entities that all have their limited existence in the great 
cycle of life. To put it in Spengler’s own decorative style, they are nothing 
but “ephemeral waves” in the great sea of world-history. Blending with one 
another, they rise to their peak just to experience a downfall. 
  It was namely this thesis of finitude that came to define Spengler’s ap-
proach to the problematic of the crisis. Instead of regarding the European 
crisis as a transitional phase from one historical epoch to another – or as 
the Last Judgment of world-history – Spengler conceived it as a kind of 
“fatal disease” denoting the incipient “death-struggle” of culture.164 This 
struggle is something that all cultures descend into by necessity without 
the possibility of prevailing through a voluntaristic renewal – for Spengler, 
the crisis was an irreversible process of destruction. Contrary to a com-
mon misconception, Spengler did not view the First World War as the 
closure of the European-Occidental culture as such, but rather as a fierce 
sign of the forthcoming decline. All in all, his notion of decline was by no 
means a sudden catastrophe but more like a process of erosion that, in the 
case of this culture, would reach its end in approximately 300 years. 
 According to Spengler, it was namely this struggle that had erupted 
within the European-Occidental culture in the course of the nineteenth 
century:
We [Europeans] are now facing the last spiritual crisis that will 
involve all Europe and America. What its course will be, Late Hel-
lenism tells us. The tyranny of reason – of which we are not con-
scious, for we are ourselves its apex – is in every culture an epoch 
between man and an old-man, and no more.165 
What marks the final stage of culture – the period of spiritual crisis – is a 
process of transmutation into what Spengler calls civilization. In this stage 
164 Spengler 1991: 157. 
165 Spengler 1991: 221.
— 111 —
1.3.  The Idea of Crisis in the Early Twentieth-Century Debate
of maturity, the culture has moved from a living and productive expres-
sivity into what he calls the “winter stage” – the stage of decay and begin-
ning evaporation. In contrast to the vivacious springtime of a culture, the 
period of civilization is characterized by artificiality, soullessness, and the 
loss of true communality; instead of defining itself with regard to home-
land, people and race, a civilization witnesses the rise of cosmopolitanism, 
the disappearance of national traditions and birth of rootless metropolises. 
True artistic expression is replaced by mass culture; earthly and concrete 
values (“values of blood”) give way to abstract goods such as money. Politi-
cally speaking, this stage witnesses the emergence of imperialism, which 
Spengler sees as the “pure form of civilization”. This, according to him, is 
exactly what happened to the Classical culture of the Greeks: “Greek soul 
and Roman intellect – this is how culture and civilization differ from each 
other”166. In the shape of imperial Rome, the Hellenic spirit lost its cre-
ativity and sensitiveness for beauty. Instead of true religiosity and cult the 
Roman Empire relied on panem et circenses (bread and circuses), instead of 
rootedness to a native soil, it wanted to conquer the earth.167 
  From the perspective of Husserl’s crisis-thinking, it was perhaps the 
inherent anti-rationalism of Spengler’s that came to serve as the single 
most important point of criticism. It was one of the guiding insights of 
Spengler’s view of cultural development that periods of crises were not 
defined primarily by irrational outbursts, but on the contrary, by an em-
phatic tendency to rationalization. Instead of creative expressivity, a culture 
in the phase of civilization turns into a “cult of exact sciences, of dialectic, 
of demonstration, of causality”168. Spontaneity is smothered by control; 
philosophy and science stand no longer for creative and evocative thinking 
166 Spengler 1991: 25.
167 The somewhat strict separation between the notions of Kultur and Zivilisation had been 
a central trait of the German self-understanding even well before Spengler. As Richard 
Wolin has shown, this distinction was first used by the German middle classes of the eight-
eenth century, who wanted to distance themselves from the superficially “civilized” aristo-
crats who were perceived to be lacking inner “cultivation” (Wolin 1990: 24ff.). Especially 
through the Napoleonic conquests, this distinction was established between the vitality of 
national traditions (primarily that of Germany) and the destructive levelling of imperial 
tendencies (of Britain and France), often labelled as “European”. The organic metaphors 
of birth (Lat. natio; from the verb nasci, to grow) and nurturing (Lat. colere) that were at-
tached to the ideas of nation and culture were often contrasted with the artificiality and 
soullessness of European civilization. 
168 Spengler 1991: 221.
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but become mere organization and accumulation of facts. Philosophy, un-
able to fill the void that is left by the collapse of old order, becomes mere 
critique that eventually ends up in skepticism. This is what Spengler called 
the “tyranny of reason” characteristic of the period of civilization: a cul-
ture is capable only of imitating the greatness of the past, of producing the 
similar form again and again. “Finally”, writes Spengler, “weary, reluctant, 
cold, it loses its desire to be, and as in Imperial Rome, wishes itself out 
of the overlong daylight and back in the darkness of proto-mysticism”.169 
Insecure and mistrusting any technological, economic and scientific ide-
als, the masses begin to look for new meaning, which opens up a new 
space for religiosity. However, in this phase the organic development has 
reached its end: the old civilization either dissolves or is transformed into 
another culture. 
  Spengler was not in any case alone with his considerations. Towards 
the end of the nineteenth century, there emerged a wide variety of cri-
tiques that treated the Western concept of reason as an untimely idea – 
as essentially narrow, even repressive definition of humanity. Wilhelm 
Dilthey, for one, attacked what he considered the lifeless, rational subject 
of Locke, Hume and Kant – a subject whose veins were not filled by “real 
blood, but rather the diluted juice of reason conceived as an empty faculty 
of mind”170. According to Dilthey, the modern idea of rational subjectiv-
ity was fundamentally inadequate in capturing the peculiar facticity of 
human experience – our embeddedness in the all-embracing life-nexus 
(Lebenszusammenhang) – but also the non-rational element belonging to 
it.171 This Spenglerian idea was also formulated by one the most influen-
tial psychologists of the Weimar period, Richard Müller-Freienfels, for 
whom the basic framework for the “modern, rationally ordered life” was 
that of mechanism, of “machine-like existence”172. Despite these critiques 
were often dealt with under the title of irrationalism, we ought to avoid 
169 Spengler 1991: 75.
170 ”nicht wirkliches Blut, sondern der verdünnte Saft von Vernunft als blosser Denktätig-
keit” (Dilthey 1979: xviii)
171 The basic unit of this givenness is what Dilthey calls Erlebnis (lived experience), a pre-
reflective experience of something as meaningful and immediately present. For Dilthey, 
lived experience was a broad concept that encompasses – not only our perceptions and 
sensory experiences – but also memories, instincts, passions, acts of volition and commu-
nication, aesthetical experiences and so on. Dilthey 1997: 43ff.
172 Müller-Freienfels 1921: 274–275.
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considering them as simply antirational. As Müller-Freienfels put it, our 
scientific concept of rationality had been formed by abstracting from the 
irrational “residual” of human cognition: reason was not to be destroyed 
but emancipated from the yoke of traditional logic which was suppressing 
the peculiar “vitality, personality and mystery” of human existence.173 
  Perhaps the most influential analyses on the concept of rationalization 
were conducted in the works of Max Weber. Weber – who became known 
for his thorough elaborations on the history of the capitalist system and 
its concomitants (such as his famous characterization of the Protestant 
work ethic) – defined the whole project of modernization in terms of an 
overarching rationalization that was realizing itself in different fields of 
culture: science, politics, economy and religion. For Weber, rationaliza-
tion denoted basically the consistent organization of knowledge, which is 
comprised of three basic strands: control of worldly events, the systemati-
zation of meaning (religion, ethical principles) and the arrangement of life 
under rules and principles. Now, because this process had the tendency to 
eliminate those particular beliefs that do not fit into the formal system, 
the modern world had witnessed what Weber called the “elimination of 
magic” (Entzauberung der Welt)174; it had become controllable and lost its 
enigmatic character. For Weber, this was what he called the “crisis of mo-
dernity”: the dissolution of traditional meaning and value. 
  However, as Weber described in his lectures on world history, the pro-
cess of rationalization was a more complex phenomenon than one would 
think in the first place:
For in all the above cases it is a question of the specific and peculiar 
rationalism of Western culture. Now by this term very different 
things may be understood […] There is, for example, rationaliza-
tion of mystical contemplation, that is of an attitude which, viewed 
from other departments of life, is specifically irrational, just as 
much as there are rationalizations of economic life, of technique, 
of scientific research, of military training, of law and administra-
tion. Furthermore, each one of these fields may be rationalized in 
terms of very different ultimate values and ends, and what is ra-
tional from one point of view may well be irrational from another. 
173 Müller-Freienfels 1922: 5, 15.
174 Weber 1997: 71.
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Hence rationalizations of the most varied character have existed in 
various spheres of life and in all areas of culture.175
As Weber observed, the urge to organize and control the different cultural 
phenomena had not made the world simply more reasonable or compre-
hensible. On the contrary, the growing specialization in different fields of 
culture had actually led into the co-existence of several competing and 
conflicting rational paradigms. Thus from the viewpoint of highly rational-
ized economic observation, ascetic religious life may seem quite irratio-
nal; however, the same goes the other way around. According to Weber, 
this process was due to the especially formal character of modern rational-
ity: instead of defining itself with regard to substantive content, modern 
rationality was characterized by power-relations and systems of control. 
Accordingly, irrationalism did not result from a mere lack of reason, but 
it was born as a necessary by-product of modern rationalism – as the im-
minent consequence of the incongruence between different forms of rational-
ity. Reason was no longer unified but dispersed – and it was exactly this 
dispersion that served as one of the key points of departure for Husserl’s 
analysis of the crisis (Ch. 1.4).
Crisis of relativism
As I mentioned in passing, one of the central motives of Spengler’s proj-
ect was what he called a “Copernican revolution” of world history. In op-
position to the classical idea of universal history, which had mostly con-
centrated around the European-Occidental culture, Spengler conceived 
the world history as a process of conflicting and competing cultures. All 
great world-historical cultures have their unique souls and form-languages 
which define their existence and accomplishments. For instance, the Clas-
sical spirit was by its nature “Apollonian” – defined by appreciation for 
pure forms and the present moment – whereas the Western spirit is in 
its essence “Faustian”, that is, directed towards future, striving beyond its 
present spiritual accomplishments. According to Spengler, the peculiar 
character of a culture was expressed in its “prime symbol”, by which he 
175 Weber 1997: xxxviii.
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meant a kind of common denominator that unifies the different branches 
of culture. In the Western culture this prime symbol was to be found in 
“pure and limitless space”: the accomplishments of the Western culture 
were defined, above all, by a sense of infinity (in the modern natural sci-
ence, space and time are infinite; in the Christian faith the God is given an 
infinite character).
  What is noteworthy from our vantage point is the philosophical conclu-
sion of this position. For Spengler claimed that not only are the particular 
form-languages different from each other but they are also irreconcilable 
in a pregnant sense. Each culture has its own way of expressing, organizing 
and explaining the world, and although the different frameworks are not 
totally incomprehensible with regard to each other, they are still essen-
tially incommensurable with one another. “What is lacking to the Western 
thinker, the very thinker in whom we might have expected to find it”, 
writes Spengler, “is the insight into the historically relative character of his 
data […] the conviction that his unshakable truths and eternal views are 
true simply for him and him only”176. Even though the modern European-
Occidental culture was the one and only culture which had been able to 
develop a somewhat highly refined historical sense, it had not been able 
to radicalize this view up to the point of forthright relativism, i.e. the idea 
that truth is always that of a certain historical periods. For Spengler, this 
thesis on relativity did not concern merely aesthetic products (sculpture, 
painting, poetry, architecture), but also those scientific accomplishments 
which we usually consider as defined by absolute and universal principles. 
For instance, every culture has its own mathematics whose character is 
solely dependent on the culture in which it is rooted:
There is not, and cannot be, number as such. There are several 
number-worlds, as there are several cultures. We find an Indian, an 
Arabian, a Classical, a Western type of mathematical thought and 
a type of number. […] Consequently, there are more mathematics 
than one. […] The style of any mathematic which comes into be-
ing depends wholly on the culture in which it is rooted; the sort of 
mankind it is that ponders it.177
Accordingly, this form of radical anti-universalism concerned also the very 
science which was supposed to deal with the absolute principles of real-
176 Spengler 1991: 18.
177 Spengler 1991: 59.
— 116 —
. P   C  E M
ity itself: philosophy. “There are no eternal truths”, writes Spengler, “for 
every philosophy is merely an expression of its time”.178 Philosophy – like 
all other branches of culture – is an accomplishment that can be found in 
all high cultures, and accordingly, it is bound to the contingencies of their 
particular form-languages. Whereas Hegel could still hold on to the unity 
of philosophy through the teleological structure of objective spirit, for 
Spengler, this idea of a single historical narrative turned out to be ground-
less. For him, philosophy did not bear within itself any supratemporal sig-
nificance, for it is essentially nothing else but expression of its respective 
world-view (Weltanschauung). 
  Even before Spengler, the division between Wissenschaft and Weltan-
schauung had become one of the key topics of the German academic phi-
losophy. The growing tensions between natural and human sciences at the 
end of the nineteenth century had led to the so-called “controversy over 
method” (Methodenstreit) motivated especially through the succession of 
the naturalistic or positivistic sciences.179 This controversy was reflected 
also in the field of philosophy, in which it often denoted two conflicting 
views of philosophical undertaking: philosophy as a pursuit for universal 
truths, and philosophy as an expression of one’s spiritual-historical situ-
ation. Even though the notion of Weltanschauung did not originally relate 
to any particularly “relativist” conception of philosophy – it was first used 
by Kant to describe the apperceptive unity of world in perception – at the 
turn of the century it nevertheless turned into a certain antipode of uni-
versal philosophy. This was mostly due to the meaning coined to it by Wil-
helm Dilthey, Max Scheler and Karl Jaspers, who all linked the concept of 
world-view to the arising historical consciousness of modernity. Although 
history – as it emerged during the nineteenth century German academia – 
wanted to present itself as rigorous Wissenschaft, it seemed that the taper-
ing conceptuality of the modern natural sciences could not account for the 
unique characteristics of historical investigation. Dilthey, for one, rejected 
the idea of causal explanation as the basic principle of historical research, 
which was supposed to proceed through interpretation.
  Let me briefly focus on this development. Within the philosophical 
discourse of the early twentieth century, perhaps the most common term 
178 Spengler 1991: 31.
179 See e.g. Bambach 1995: 58ff.
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that was used to describe this idea of the incommensurability of different 
historical frameworks was that of historicism (Historismus).180 In the context 
of German philosophy, this notion appeared for the first time at the end 
of the eighteenth century in Friedrich Schlegel who used it in a rather 
positive sense to denote the idea of historical sensitivity. Drawing back to 
“Winckelmann’s Historismus”, Schlegel wanted to accentuate the idea that, 
especially in art critique, one should always pay attention to the historical 
circumstances in order to avoid loose anachronism: the accomplishments 
of Greek art, for instance, should not be assessed in modern standards.181 
However, at the beginning of the twentieth century – and especially 
through the works of Husserl, Windelband and Rickert – historicism 
became to denote primarily a position of historical relativism: the idea 
that all knowledge is historically determined, and that there is no way to 
overcome the contingencies of a certain historical period. Arthur Liebert, 
for one, saw the root of the modern crisis precisely in “the fatal historical 
skepticism and relativism nourished by historicism”182. Thus historicism 
seemed to go hand in hand with the idea of philosophy as a world-view: 
philosophy ought to be seen primarily as an articulation of its respective 
spiritual-historical situation. 
  Still, we should not exaggerate the popularity of this stance. As Her-
bert Schnädelbach has put it in his German history, although the term 
historicism itself dates back to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
it first came into general use around the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury, however, not as a particularly celebrated term. “Like most -isms”, 
Schnädelbach writes, “[historicism] was first use to denounce – it signi-
fied something to be overcome, something which was in crisis, something 
outmoded.”183 Through works such as Ernst Troeltsch’s Die Krisis der His-
torismus (1922), historicism itself was presented as a bygone movement; 
indeed, many of the alleged historicists appeared as such only in their 
opponents’ works. For instance, Dilthey opposed fiercely Husserl’s char-
acterization of him as a historicist in the sense of a supporter of historical 
relativism. “The knife of historical relativism,” Dilthey wrote, “which has 
180 On the development of historicism in the late 19th and early 20th century German phi-
losophy, see Schnädelback 1984; Bambach 1995.
181 Schlegel 1981: xvi, 35–41.
182 Liebert 1923: 7. 
183 Schnädelbach 1984: 34. 
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wounded all metaphysics and religion, must also bring with it a healing 
touch.”184 The key thesis of Dilthey’s late Weltanschauungsphilosophie was 
that the constitution of different world-views could well be adapted in the 
framework of universalistic epistemology. 
  Thus, it is possible to differentiate between two articulations of the cri-
sis of relativism. First of all, as a result to the development of the late nine-
teenth century, there emerged a novel question that concerned the very 
possibility of absolute and universal knowledge and the mode of thinking 
which was supposed to provide its conditions of possibility, namely, meta-
physics understood as universal transcendental philosophy. This tendency was 
not only due to the historicist critique but also to the influential positivist 
stances that either dismissed the very possibility of “first philosophy” or at 
least rejected the idea of its attainment in the framework of speculative 
idealism. The void that was left behind by traditional metaphysics was not 
a mere philosophical problem, but it was widely debated by several cul-
tural critics – such as C.G. Jung who renounced the idea that “the modern 
man has lost all the metaphysical certainties of his medieval brother […] 
everything becomes relative and therefore doubtful”.185 Secondly, although 
closely linked to the first sense, there emerged a more particular debate 
concerning those ideals and forms of knowledge that had been essential 
to the European-Occidental philosophy. Especially through the growing 
sensitivity towards the non-European intellectual traditions, there arose 
a doubt whether the European sciences as such bore within itself any uni-
versal significance – or, whether the ideas and ideals articulated in this 
tradition could be explained by a historical contextualization, deriving 
them from purely empirical or “material” conditions. As Troeltsch argued, 
historicism was committed to, not only to the idea of historical contingen-
cy of all knowledge, but perhaps more importantly, to the societal relativ-
ity (gesellschaftlichen Bedingtheit) of all spiritual-cultural phenomena.186 As 
I will argue in part 1.4, this broadened critique of historicism in the sense 
of cultural relativism was also important part of Husserl’s reflections on 
the European crisis.
184 Dilthey 1960: 232. See Bambach 1995: 127.
185 Jung 1933: 204, 211.
186 Troeltsch 2002: 437ff.
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Crisis and Decisionism
Let me briefly pay attention to yet one important feature in the early 
twentieth-century discussion on crisis. As I showed in the previous chap-
ter (1.2.), one of the fundamental transitions that took place through the 
philosophical-historical discussion of the eighteenth century, was that the 
“crisis” turned from a purely descriptive notion into a prognostic one. This 
notion was used to denote incipient anticipation and expectation, which 
gave it a novel temporal stretch: crises were historical events that presume 
a certain understanding of the past, but their primary orientation was to 
be found in the future. Because of their essentially “open” character, crises 
seemed to pave way for the attitude of a doctor, that is, for a certain active 
element on behalf of the interpreter of the crisis. According to this line of 
thought, crises demand intervention: they are to be actively recognized, 
wrestled and resolved in one way or another. 
  The idea of crisis as a prognostic category increased substantially 
among the German intelligentsia of the early twentieth-century. One of 
the unique features of this development was that the concept was now 
even more attached to lexicon derived from military context – it was 
coined with notions such as battle (Kampf), power (Macht) and decision 
(Entscheidung) – which strengthened the latent agonistic implications of this 
notion. As in the case of Scheler’s pre-war manifesto, crisis was used to 
anticipate the impending struggle of Germany for its existence, the criti-
cal solution between its demise or revival. For Scheler and many others, 
crisis was no longer a passive condition of culture but rather, it connoted 
a somewhat explicit imperative to act – a calling to engage into a struggle 
in order to resolve the crisis. Despite the somewhat unequivocal defeat 
that Germany suffered in the WWI, this talk did not end with the war; 
on the contrary, the 1920s and 1930s witnessed a new emergence of this 
agonistic interpretation of crisis. Especially in the writings of the National 
Socialist philosophers, ‘crisis’ was frequently employed to denote the new 
impending struggle for the true identity of Germany. 
  This transformation in the use of the concept of crisis reflected the 
overall trend of the political theory and constitutional thought of the Wei-
mar period (1919–1933), which was completely permeated by militarily 
concepts such as of combat, battle, enmity and conflict. Against Carl von 
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Clausewitz’s notorious definition of “war as the continuation of politics by 
other means”, politics was now defined as “the continuation of warfare”– 
a phrase that was formulated by several political philosophers including 
Spengler, Jünger and Hermann Heller.187 However, the Weimar period 
also strengthened the tendency to read the lexicon of crisis, struggle and 
conflict, not primarily as mundane events, but as fundamental metaphysi-
cal categories – or respectively, as deep (subconscious) forces of the hu-
man psyche. The first tendency was articulated already by Nietzsche who 
considered the idea of struggle as an inherent feature of all striving for 
truth – as something that was already as an inherent feature of Greek 
philosophy.188 For Nietzsche, “all happening, all movement all becoming 
[…] is to be perceived as a struggle (Kampf)”189 – the basic principle of 
this struggle was, of course, what he called the “will to power” (Wille zur 
Macht). The more psychological reading of struggle was put forward by 
Jünger who in his Der Kampf als inneres Erlebnis argued that particularly 
in war human being is in contact with his original thrives and instincts. 
Echoing Heraclitus’ fragment (DK B80) on conflict (polemos) being “com-
mon to all”, Jünger argued that “[i]t is war that has made human beings 
and their age what they are […] War, father of all thinks, is also ours; he 
has hammered us, chiseled and tempered us into what we are […].”190 By 
revoking the original thrive to survive as well as the fundamental division 
of good and bad, Jünger saw war as fleshing out the Urmensch in us.
  On a more general level, this transition in the concept of crisis mir-
rored the overall philosophical development in which history itself seemed 
to move from mere factual description to the sphere of will. In the spirit 
of Nietzsche’s “critical history”, it was often asserted that the amenity of 
history can be decided only from the perspective of the present – history 
ought to serve life, and thus it is justified to read it in a way that serves 
this goal. “In this elementary sense, history is a matter of ‘freedom’, not 
of ‘necessity’”, Paul Natorp wrote in 1918, “[it is] a matter of willing, not 
187 This idea of politics as a continuation of warfare (”Fortsetzung des Krieges mit verän-
derten Mitteln”) was first articulated by Jünger in his essay “Unsere Politiker” (1925). 
See Jünger 2001: 64. On the metaphors of warfare and conflict in the context of Weimar 
politics, see Pankakoski 2010.
188 KSA 6.71
189 KSA 6.2, 49.
190 Jünger 1980: 9ff.
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blind obligation; matter of fact: matter of doing, not of being done; of life, 
not of being lived.”191 As it should be clear, crisis was more than eligible 
category to serve this purpose, a simple tool to render the past and the 
present into the form of clear opposition: life or death. Crisis was namely 
that moment of decision that urges to resolve this opposition. 
  Perhaps the most extensive and influential analysis on this relation 
between crisis and decision was provided by Carl Schmitt who first intro-
duced the notion of Dezisionismus – the assertion of power by the means 
of radical intervention – to the academic debate.192 Schmitt conducted 
his reflections in a series of works in the 1920s – out of which the most 
eminence gained two lengthy essays Politische Thelogie (1922) and Der Beg-
riff des Politischen (1927) – that culminated in Schmitt’s major work Verfas-
sungslehre (1928) that dealt with the problematic of Weimar constitution. 
Even though these works covered of a wide variety of problems within 
the scope of political ontology, Schmitt’s main framework remained that 
of legal theory – especially the question between law and political sover-
eignty. This relation, argued Schmitt, had been neglected by the liberal 
tradition which presented itself as having surmounted the problems of 
despotic rule. However, in the light of actual political conditions, the con-
stitutional rules of modern nation-states had not consumed the problem-
atic character of sovereign power. On the contrary, the constant dismissal 
of constitutional law for the sake of the crisis – understood as a state of 
exception – had revealed the importance to question the genuine charac-
ter of sovereign power. 
  Schmitt’s position was established in relation to the influential posi-
tivist and normativist theories of justice that emphasized the autonomous 
character of all norm-systems. According to Hans Kelsen, one of the most 
eminent legal philosophers of the early twentieth century, a legal system 
should be understood as analogical to the facts of nature – as functioning 
according to causal laws that can be derived from a few basic axioms. In 
the heart of Kelsen’s considerations was the idea of a Grundnorm, which for 
him denotes the original “ideal norm” regulating and justifying all particu-
lar legal systems – and thus providing the perquisites for any political or-
191 Natorp 1918: 7.
192 First appearance of the word decisionism can be found in Schmitt’s preface to his work 
Die Diktatur (1928), originally published in 1921. See Wolin 1990: 179.
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der.193 Accordingly in Kelsen’s model, there was no real incongruence be-
tween the legal system and the state: the actions of sovereign are justified 
insofar as he functions in accordance with the constitutional law, which 
in turn is founded on the ideal ground-norm. Schmitt, on his part, found 
this position to be in conflict with not only the political reality, but with 
the origin of sovereignty as such. Following Hobbes on the idea that the 
whole justification of political power drives its force from the collective 
decision of individuals to submit themselves to the will of the sovereign, 
Schimtt argued that the “raw material” of politics was that of “the people” 
(Volk); however, without the form-giving function of the sovereign power, 
this material remains numb and idle. Referring often to the Hobbesian 
principle autoritas non veritas facit legem (“Authority, not truth, is the basis 
for legitimacy”), Schmitt argued that it was namely the act of sovereign 
that founds the legal system and holds it together; without this political 
power, no system of norms can justify itself.194 
  What, then, constitutes the essence of the sovereign? Schmitt’s answer 
was simple: decision. Or more precisely, the ability to decide on a state of 
crisis: “Sovereign is the one who decides on the state of exception.”195 The 
ultimate foundation of all political order is to be found in law but the 
act of the sovereign, which, however, does not lead simply to arbitrariness. 
Schmitt held that for a legal order to make sense, a certain normal situ-
ation – legal order based on constitution – must be presupposed, but “it 
is sovereign who definitely decides whether this normal situation actually 
exists”196. For Schmitt, sovereign’s recourse to exception does not entail 
chaos but on the contrary, it ought to be understood as a proof of the 
vitality of political order. In other words, a certain political whole – for 
instance, a nation-state – is in contact with its essence at the very moment 
when it is able to repudiate the legal order for the sake of a sovereign will. 
At the moment of unilateral and autonomous decision, the body politic 
comes alive. However, this does not mean that Schmitt would have come 
up with arguments for the state of emergency decree that enabled the Na-
tional Socialists to take power in 1933; as he often accentuated, exception 
should never become the rule itself. Even so, his key thesis was that the 
193 See Kelsen 1934.
194 Schmitt 1985: 33.
195 Wolin 1990: 38.
196 Schmitt 1985: 13.
— 123 —
1.3.  The Idea of Crisis in the Early Twentieth-Century Debate
ultimate foundation of poli-tical community was neither “co-operative” 
nor “natural”, but decisionistic.
  It is exactly in Schmitt that we find the most radical conclusion to 
the political crisis of modernity as the loss of natural human sociality. As 
Schmitt argued in The Concept of the Political, “all genuine political theo-
ries presuppose man to be evil”197 – and the neglecting of this idea would 
only amount to the dismissal of the essential struggle-like character of 
the political domain. Politics is not about agreement – not even in the 
very general level of “social contract” – but it unfolds only as a perpetual 
struggle for power, and the periodic abatement of this struggle through 
the emergence of sovereignty.
  Schmitt’s idea of decisionism had both divine and earthly elements. 
As the title of Schmitt’s book Politische Theologie indicates, the primary 
framework for his vision of political order was to be found in theology – 
according to the key thesis of the work, all political concepts should be un-
derstood as secularized theological notions. In particular, the figure of the 
sovereign was to be understood as analogical to God in Christian theolo-
gy: sovereign is the one who ultimately decides on right and wrong, and is 
able to make a “divine intervention” with regard to the established order. 
However, in Schmitt’s decisionistic model there was also a certain vitalist 
motive, which presented the “state of exception” as the core of all organic 
life: “In the exception the power of real life breaks through the crust of 
mechanism that has become torpid by repetition”198. Echoing Spengler’s 
organic metaphors, Schmitt saw that the idea of strong sovereignty was 
also reflecting the latent force of life repressed by cultural factors. (This 
idea has been further developed by, for instance, Jacques Derrida in his 
analyses on the relation between bestiality and sovereignty).
  Thus it is understandable that Schmitt’s position was echoed in the 
writings of the National Socialist philosophers. In the writings of Alfred 
Bäumeler and Alfred Rosenberg the notion of a crisis (in the sense of “his-
torical decision”) was constantly employed to justify the extremely cen-
tralist model of governance and its fundamental prerogative to break loose 
from the confines of the established legal framework. 199 The ability to 
197 Schmitt 1985: 61.
198 Schmitt 1985: 15.
199 As Alfred Bäumler put it, the liberal idea of state as such was a fundamentally un-
Germanic idea – something that the Anglo-French axis had falsely imposed to the German 
— 124 —
. P   C  E M
rise above the law – what we nowadays would consider as dictatorship – 
was indeed treated as both divine and organic gesture. Crisis was a divine 
event because it was materialized in the Führer; it was profane because it 
reflected the organic essence of the elemental Volk. (This was also the view 
of Spengler, for whom democracy was essentially a political model of the 
civilization period – culture, at the highest point of its organic develop-
ment, was defined by either monarchic or aristocratic rule.200)
  Although the political implications of Husserl’s phenomenology – if 
we can speak of such – pointed towards another, more cosmopolitan di-
rection, it is well possible to point towards a certain decisionistic element 
in his theory of the crisis. As I will argue in the following chapter (1.4), 
Husserl’s reflections on the ownmost character of human rationality was 
founded on his commitment to the essentially voluntaristic and self-respon-
sible character of this idea – against the blind and instinctive character of 
animal life, Husserl defined the human existence in terms of structural 
capability to inspect one’s own life as a totality, i.e. to act according to 
norms that are legitimated in regard to the total perspective of one’s own 
existence. As Husserl emphasized, this reflexivity could only be enter-
tained on the basis of a perpetual critique, which has its horizon in the pre-
given horizon of traditionality and its norms – being responsible entails 
a necessary relation to the acquired contents of meaning and sense.201 In 
this regard, the “crisis” was understood as that point of rupture, in which 
the groundlessness or “emptiness” of our beliefs, values or norms comes 
about: it was the the point which motivates the decision concerning our 
commitment to the tradition we live by. In this sense, the idea of crisis 
acquired for itself an inextricably positive sense, which related itself to 
the motive of decision: the crisis is what motivates the process of renewal 
on the basis of an established tradition. Even the imminent crisis of philo-
sophical reflection, brought about the dispersion of rationality, was to be 
rearticulated in regard to a historical decision, which can open up a ho-
rizon of future development. “It is the fate of the philosophical modern 
age”, writes Husserl, 
people. Bäumler 1934: 5.
200 See esp. Spengler 1991: 360ff.
201 On autonomy as Willensentschiedenheit, see HuaVI: 272
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that it has first to seek out, in the course of a gradual self-disclosure 
motivated by new struggles (Kämpfen), the definitive idea of phi-
losophy, its true matter and its true method; it has first to discover 
the genuine enigmas of the world and bring them in to the trail of 
decision (Entscheidung).202
From this perspective, I believe, it is possible to point towards a motive of 
philosophical decisionism in the works of late Husserl.203 Not only was it 
the task of philosophical reflection to grasp the current demise of reason, 
but it was supposed to open up a novel horizon of action that could have 
pointed towards the renewing potential of philosophical reason. 
 
1.4. The Idea of European Crisis
in Husserl’s Late Works
In the framework of 20
th century phenomenology, the concept of crisis 
is best known from Husserl’s late works. The word appears in numer-
ous texts of Husserl’s, most notably, in the title of his last major work: 
The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. In differ-
ent kinds of philosophical and intellectual-historical overviews of the 20th 
century, it is also quite usual to find a description of Husserl as the phi-
losopher – or even the prophet – of the European crisis. Husserl is usually 
seen as a thinker, who, on the one hand, defined the state of Europe with 
the notion of crisis, and on the other hand, led this crisis back into the mis-
202 The full quote: “In dieser hält sie sich für berufen, eine neue Zeit anzufangen, ihrer Idee 
der Philosophie und wahren Methode völlig sicher; sicher auch, durch ihren Radikalismus 
des neuen Anfangens alle bisherigen Naivitäten und so alle Skepsis überwunden zu haben. 
Aber unvermerkt mit eigenen Naivitäter, behaftet, ist es ihr Schicksal, auf dem Wege ei-
ner allmählichen, in neuen Kämpfen motivierten Selbstenthüllung die endgültige Idee der 
Philosophie, ihr wahres Thema, ihre wahre Methode allererst suchen, allererst die echten 
Welträtsel entdecken und auf die Bahn der Entscheidung bringen zu müssen.” HuaVI: 12. 
See also Dodd 2004: 2.
203 Actually, in his lectures on passive synthesis, Husserl saw it as one of the main constitu-
ents of our conscious life: our experience, which is essentially futural by character and thus 
directed towards the anticipation of empty horizons, is internally directed towards making 
a decision with regard to the new intuitive content. This ability of deciding “in-favor-of ” 
of “against” is at the very core of the establishment of judgment (Urteil). HuaXI: 36–39; 
52–53.
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interpretation of scientific rationality – or more generally, in science’s loss 
of meaning for life.
  This common understanding of crisis, although correct in many re-
spects, seems to suffer from at least two important omissions. First, even 
though the notion itself appears for the most part only in the Husserl’s 
later works, it is actually quite possible to see it as a kind of leading clue 
for Husserl’s whole philosophical project. As many critics – such as Ro-
man Ingarden, Tom Rockmore, James C. Morrison and Dermot Moran204 
– have argued, Husserl’s late works on the crisis should actually be seen as 
the culmination point of his lifelong project: the struggle with naturalism 
and physicalism, the overcoming of the inner dissolution of science and 
the return to concrete world-experience. Reinhold Smid, the editor of 
Husserliana volume 29, has also accentuated the central role of the topics 
of Europe and scientific autonomy – often regarded as Husserl’s mature 
interests – already in his work of the 1920s.205 Thus one can rightfully ask 
whether Husserl’s late reflections on crisis actually contribute anything 
substantially new to his philosophical project.
  Secondly, it is often overlooked that despite the central position that 
the concept of crisis employed in Husserl’s last works, he seemed to have 
a reserved relation to it. For instance, in his Prague lecture in November 
1935 – which later came to serve as the basis for the opening chapter of 
the Crisis – Husserl asked straightforwardly whether the popular debate 
on crisis could be taken seriously at all.206 Extremely concerned of the 
current development of scientific and the more general political atmo-
sphere – especially the rise of National Socialism – Husserl nevertheless 
presented himself as vermeintliche Reaktionär to the debate on crisis, not 
204 Within the existing Husserl scholarship, a wide debate has been established concerning 
the “new approach” of Husserl’s Crisis-work with regard to his earlier philosophy. Follow-
ing Husserl’s own emphasis on the novel historical dimension of phenomenology, Husserl’s 
later works have been interpreted as departures or breaks in regard to his the earlier tran-
scendental philosophy – an idea that was perhaps first articulated by Merleau-Ponty (1962: 
58n1). David Carr sees the novelty of Crisis in Husserl’s growing interest in the problem-
atic of historicity: in contrast to the more systematic approach of the early Husserl, in his 
later work the historical considerations are seen, not only as mere contextualization, but 
as a necessary starting-point for phenomenology (Carr 1987: 74). Ingarden, in his turn, 
has argued that the novel approach of Crisis ought to be explained in terms of a different, 
wider audience that Husserl wished to address (1972: 22). See also Rockmore 1984: 247; 
Morrison 1977; Moran 2000.
205 See also Reinhold Smid’s introduction to HuaXXIX: xiii.
206 HuaXXIX: 103
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only in the sense of a philosophical conservative, but also as someone who 
takes a critical stance towards the popular debate.207 “Is not this talk [i.e. 
the crisis of science] heard so often these days, an exaggeration?”208 Hus-
serl asks in the opening pages of the Crisis. It seems obvious that he did 
not want to escalate the popular day-to-day but to “root out the popular 
misunderstandings”209 concerning it, take up the challenge that the crisis-
talk had set forth.
  Are these stances reconcilable with one another? Is it possible to see 
the “crisis” as a defining topic of Husserl’s lifelong project – and at the same 
time, adhere to Husserl’s explicit distancing from the debate on crisis? I 
would like to answer affirmatively. It is my argument that the problematic 
of crisis ought to be seen as a kind of leading clue for Husserl’s whole 
philosophical project; however, it is well justified to assert that through 
his reactive position with the twentieth-century debate on crisis, Husserl 
deepened as well as broadened his position in order to tackle some of the 
basic presuppositions of this debate, and to formulate his own position 
anew. Thus, in order to grasp the specific character of his later work, es-
pecially the problematic of culture and community, we need to situate it 
into the context of the crisis-debate of modernity.
  It is actually quite often overlooked that especially in Husserl’s later 
texts and manuscripts, the notion of crisis appears in connection to Eu-
rope. Husserl speaks of the crisis of the European humanity, of the European 
sciences and also simply of the crisis of Europe. In this chapter, I would 
like to argue that this is by no means a sheer coincidence. The thematic of 
crisis in Husserl’s work is intimidately tied to the problematic of Europe at 
least in two respects. First of all, as I argued in the previous chapters, the 
crisis was a characteristically European topic in the sense that it seemed to 
permeate the whole of the European nations. Europe or the European tra-
dition – and not merely Germany or France – was the genuine “subject” of 
the crisis, that which had descended into a state of confusion and despair. 
Even more importantly, Husserl interpreted the crisis as something which 
concerned the founding idea of the European tradition, namely, the mo-
tive of universal reason as the guiding principle of cultural development. 
Instead of a mere regional dissolution of an individual discipline (for in
207 HuaVI: 337.
208 “Ist diese heutzutage vielgehörte Rede nicht eine Übertreibung?” HuaVI: 1.
209 HuaVI: 317.
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stance, a crisis of logic or scientific psychology), the crisis penetrated into 
the very founding ideas of reason and human sociality. In this regard, the 
crisis appeared, not as a mere possibility of cultural obliteration (e.g. the 
Rousseauan extinction of European political institutions), but as a more 
profound and thoroughgoing setback of rational culture. Nevertheless, 
instead of simply refuting the crisis as a cultural phenomenon, I argue, 
Husserl aimed at a radical rearticulation of this idea – one, that could have 
accounted for the inevitable yet productive role of crises of meaning. 
The topic of crisis in Husserl’s work
The concept of crisis found its way into Husserl’s vocabulary through a se-
ries of reflections, which received their original spark around the halfway 
of the 1930s. Before that, the word appears only in passing, for instance, in 
connection to the so-called “foundational crises” of special sciences.210 The 
story behind the emergence of the notion is pretty well documented. Fol-
lowing the invitation to the annual International Congress of Philosophy 
at Prague in 1934, titled as “Crisis of Democracy”, Husserl was urged to 
reflect upon the problematic of “European crisis” and the “contemporary 
task of philosophy” linked to it.211 Out of these reflections evolved three 
important texts: firstly, the original Prague text “Über die gegenwärtigen 
Aufgabe der Philosophie” written in 1934; secondly, a lecture given to 
the Vienna Kulturbund in May 1935, “Die Krisis der europäischen Men-
schentums und die Philosophie”; and thirdly, “Die Krisis der europäischen 
Wissenschaften und die Psychologie”, a presentation delivered in Prague, 
November 1935. These three texts served as a foundation for what came 
to be Husserl’s last contribution: The Crisis of European Sciences and Tran-
scendental Phenomenology. This work, published in the Phänomenologische 
Jahrbuch of 1936, was only partially finished: as Eugen Fink’s outline of the 
work shows, Husserl had planned the Crisis to consist of five different sec-
210 See for instance, HuaIX: 297. 
211 This lecture “Über die gegenwärtige Aufgabe der Philosophie” is included in the vol-
ume 27 of Husserliana, see HuaXXVII: 184ff.
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tions, out of which only three were published (and Husserl was somewhat 
unsatisfied with the third part).212 
  Of course, the topics of these writings – the dissolution of scientific 
rationality, the historical character of philosophy, and cultural renewal – 
had already been discussed in a series of texts and essays since the early 
1910s. One way of capturing the guiding idea of Husserl’s earlier criti-
cal reflections is to say that they were a response to an all-encompassing 
“crisis” of reason whose basic character he articulated, for instance, in the 
1911 programmatic essay “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science” (Philosophie 
als strenge Wissenschaft).213 First, as a consequence to physicalist and natu-
ralist approaches, our scientific rationality was defined by what Husserl 
calls “false objectivism”: the absolutization of nature or natural-scientific 
abstractions. In their progress, modern natural sciences rely on a certain 
omission that concerns their foundations; by operating with scientific 
abstractions such as “atom” or “synapse”, they have a tendency to forget 
the concrete experience that forms their origin. Conversely, the second 
sense of the crisis could be described as “false subjectivism”, for in Hus-
serl’s view, a considerable part of modern philosophy was in the process 
of abandoning the whole idea of science as a rational pursuit of necessary 
and all-embracing truths – this for the sake of subjective preferences. Ac-
cording to Husserl, philosophy and science were succumbing into an un-
founded relativism, most importantly, to the historicist idea that there are 
no truths that would transcend their respective cultural frameworks, and 
would thus be valid in every possible condition.214 
  Thus there exists a certain analogy between these false forms of ra-
tionality. Both share a similar feature of absolutising a position that is funda-
mentally relative. Both fail to see the limitedness of their perspectives and 
thus fall victim to hasty reductionism: “Whereas the natural scientist sees 
everything as nature”, claims Husserl, “the humanistic scientist sees every-
thing as spirit, as historical creation”215. This one-sidedness is what Husserl 
212 For the Fink-outline, see HuaVI: 514–516. See also Carr’s introduction to Crisis 
(1970). Cf. Steinbock 1994b.
213 HuaXXV: 3ff.
214 HuaXXV: 41ff. See also HuaXXVII: 251. See also HuaVI, 385–386.
215 The full quote: “Den herrschenden Auffassungsgewohnheiten entsprechend neigt eben 
der Naturwissenschaftler dazu, alles als Natur, der Geisteswissenschaftler als Geist, als 
historisches Gebilde anzusehen und demgemäß, was so nicht angesehen werden kann, zu 
mißdeuten.” Hua XXV: 8. On the idea of crisis as a “cutting off ”, see Buckley 1990: 25.
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often refers to as naivety.216 This term, which primarily bears no negative 
content, simply denotes the human tendency to take beings as they are 
given to us, to believe  and “trust” in the world around us without any ex-
plicitly critical or reflexive stance. It is natural in the sense that it we have 
grown (Lat. nasci) into it and continue to take it for granted.217 Thus the 
specific naivety of our scientific endeavor is thus in the fact that we have a 
tendency to cling to those abstractions and conceptualizations which are 
most imminent to us, and avoid the question of their origin.218 
  Now, as Husserl occasionally remarks, there is actually nothing malign 
with this naivety and one-sidedness. Since science is an infinite domain 
of tasks, all concrete attempts to disclose a part of this domain actually 
take place within a limited scope. Abstraction from the given, whether 
mathematical or simply linguistic, belongs necessarily to all development 
of sense – and without a certain technization, the natural sciences could 
not execute their task.219 Thus Philip J. Buckley hits the nail on the head 
by asking, is there not “an implicit inevitability to the forgetfulness which 
Husserl so hopes to overcome?”220 In other words, is not the crisis of rea-
son which Husserl so passionately seeks to resolve a necessary point of 
departure for phenomenology?
  I think that in order to understand the core of Husserl’s concept of 
crisis, we must differentiate between two senses of naivety, which I would 
like to describe here as necessary and radical. Even though Husserl some-
times speaks of “transcendental naivety”221 that concerns all objectivistic 
philosophy from Galileo to modern forms of physicalism and natural-
ism, we can also point towards a crucial difference that distinguishes the 
contemporary scientific rationality from the philosophy of the early mo-
dernity. Through the modern physicalist naturalism, the false objectivism 
of the early modern philosophers turned into a more severe “hostility of 
spirit” (Geistfeindschaft)222, which, as Buckley puts it, appeared as the pos-
216 See e.g. HuaIII: 87–89.
217 Especially in the Crisis-period, Husserl often uses the expression “natural naivety” 
(natürlichen Naivität), see HuaVI: 442; HuaXXVII: 218; HuaXXIX: 155.
218 Hua VI: 342–343. Especially Philip J. Buckley has stressed the idea of forgetfulness 
(Vergessenheit) with regard to Husserl’s analysis of the crisis. See Buckley 1992: 80–91.
219 HuaVI: 45ff., Cf. HuaXXVII: 209.
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sibility of a “total, irrevocable, uncontrollable loss of meaning”.223 Thus, 
instead of a structural crisis of meaning characteristic of the development 
of all scientific activity, the crisis of naturalism appeared as a possibility of 
a “permanent defeat” – a defeat analogical to the novel sense of the crisis 
introduced by the World War I (cf. 1.3).
  Let me sketch the aforementioned difference in detail. Within the 
framework of the Crisis, Husserl attributes what he calls “necessary naive-
ty” primarily to Galileo, Descartes and to some extent to the rationalism 
of the Enlightenment (especially to Hume and Kant). In the second part 
of the Crisis, Husserl discussed Galileo as the leading figure of the mod-
ern natural sciences, whose “primal establishment” (Urstiftung) consists 
of the mathematization of sensible nature. However, this exact idealiza-
tion of the real world included a certain “fateful omission” (verhängnisvolles 
Versäumnis)224, for Galileo did not question his ideal of exactness, but he 
was forced to abstract from the inexact, spiritual characteristics of the 
human lifeworld. Galileo did not fully investigate into the origins of his 
mathematization; but took “for true being what is actually a method.”225 
Galileo took mathematics to be “The Book of Nature”; what he did not 
appreciate was the fact it is we who write it, we who distance ourselves from 
the concrete life-world experience and furnish it with “a garb of ideas” 
(Ideenkleid). 
  However, the essential naivety that Husserl ascribed to all of the great 
modern thinkers – Descartes, Hume and Kant – did not yet amount to 
an all-embracing crisis of philosophical rationality.226 What constituted the 
peculiar character of late nineteenth-century positivism and naturalism 
was not merely their one-sidedness but the fact that they were an explicit 
attack on the idea of humanity as a domain of reason. These stances were dan-
gerous for the simple reason that they were an attack on the autonomy of 
our spiritual life: they were undermining the very idea of rational ground
223 Buckley 1992: 131. We find this idea echoed in Heidegger’s 1935 lecture course In-
troduction to Metaphysics (Einführung in die Metaphysik): “The spiritual decline of the earth 
has progressed so far that people are in danger of losing their last spiritual strength, the 
strength that makes it possible even to see the decline”. Heidegger, GA 40, 29.
224 HuaVI: 49.
225 ”Das Ideenkleid macht es, daß wir für wahres Sein nehmen, was eine Methode ist […]” 
HuaVI: 52.
226 Husserl speaks of an “einer absolut notwendigen Einseitigkeit” characteristic of the es-
sence of reason and its unfolding in the infinite task of philosophy. HuaVI: 338.
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ing and behavior as a realm of self-sufficient or uncompelled activity. This 
attack was clear, for example, in behaviorist psychology which, to use John 
B. Watson’s expression, recognized no essential difference between “a man 
and a brute”227. The same could have been said about B.F. Skinner’s radi-
cal determinism, which proclaimed the non-freedom to be single most 
important point of departure for any scientific account on the human be-
ing.228 Thus, whereas Descartes and the rationalism of the Enlightenment 
still had faith on the traditional idea of man as rational animal, that is, an 
essentially voluntaristic and self-responsible being, for the philosophy of 
the nineteenth century this fundamental “faith in man’s freedom”229 was 
starting to collapse. Through the physicalist naturalism the whole idea of 
humanity was projected “in the manner of plants or stones”230 – or to use 
the more popular metaphor of Leibniz and Julien Onfray de La Mettrie, as 
a “machine” that functions deterministically with regard to external mo-
tives.231 Naturalism, behaviorism and mechanist materialism claimed that 
our conscious life is not the true ground of our actions, but a mere causal 
effect of a force that is external to us. This radical naivety which not only 
crosses the limits of reason, but willingly turns against the very idea of ratio-
nality, is what constitutes the radical crisis of our times.
The crisis of sciences and at the same time the whole modern cul-
ture based on the autonomy of scientific reason is in its ground 
alone a crisis of philosophy […] [it] has its ground in a crisis that 
concerns the self-understanding of human being. The overcoming 
of this crisis will be established only through a fundamental trans-
formation in human self-understanding.232
227 Watson 1913: 158.
228 Perhaps the most straightforward formulation is to be found in B.F. Skinner’s Science 
and Human Behavior: “The hypothesis that man is not free is essential to the application of scien-
tific method to the study of human behavior. The free inner man who is held responsible for the 
behaviour of the external biological organism is only a pre-scientific substitute for the kinds of causes 
which are discovered in the course of a scientific analysis.” Skinner 1953: 447.
229 HuaVI: 11.
230 HuaXXVII: 199.
231 On the “mechanization” of nature and psyche, see HuaIX: 143; HuaXIII: 377; HuaXXX-
IX: 293.
232 “Die Krise der Wissenschaften und damit der ganzen, auf der Autonomie der wissen-
schaftlichen Vernunft basierenden modernen Kultur ist im Grunde allein eine Krise der 
Philosophie. [...] Die Krise der Wissenschaften hat ihren Grund in einer Krise des Selbst-
begreifens des Menschen. Die Überwindung dieser Krise wird einzig und allein durch 
eine Tieferlegung des menschlichen Selbstverständnisses gelingen konnen.” HuaXXIX: 
137–138.
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Judging by these passages, it seems that instead of cultural, political or 
societal transformations, Husserl’s idea of resolving the crisis of reason 
relied on the transformation of the individual. We discover this idea in 
many of the ethical thinkers appreciated by Husserl – such as Socrates, 
Buddha, Jesus, or even George Bernhard Shaw – who all emphasized the 
crucial significance of a personal “change of attitude” as the ultimate pre-
supposition of a genuine ethical stance. This insight, however, is only a part 
of the truth. As I would like to argue, Husserl’s idea of a “fundamental 
transformation in human self-understanding” did not entail a return to 
the idea of rationality as a mere subjective faculty. Instead, reason was to 
be discovered anew in its communal and practical relevance, i.e. as an es-
sentially intersubjective notion that reaches its genuine sense only through 
the critique of those structures that separate human individuals from each 
other.
  As Husserl was willing to admit, reason was a “broad topic”, and the 
popular critique against the “naïve” rationalism of the Enlightenment, for 
instance, was in many respects justified.233 Within the Western forms of 
rationality there was indeed a certain tendency towards control and domi-
nation – what Max Horkheimer later defined as “instrumental rationality” 
– which had undermined the axiological and practical aspects of human 
rationality. By emphasizing the essentially theoretical underpinnings of the 
idea of reason, the modern concept of rationality had avoided the ques-
tions of value, purpose, sense and meaning. Reason, in this post-Galilean 
sense, had become a technique that knows only means without ends. Clas-
sical liberalist economic theory, for instance, considered the selfish and 
calculative utilitarian as the prime example of a “reasonable person”, and 
even in the contemporary political discourse, “rational decision-making” 
is often contrasted with idealism and utopianism. 
  However, Husserl remained a fierce defender of rationality through-
out his career. Recall that already in Ideas I, he defined his project simply 
as “phenomenology of reason”234, and this for very simple motives. For 
Husserl, reason was not primarily a separate faculty (Fähigkeit, Tätigkeit) 
233 HuaVI: 337. See also HuaXXVII, Beilage XIX: “Der neuzeitliche Rationalismus erfüllt 
nicht den Ursprungssinn der Rationalität”.
234 HuaIII: 333ff. Cf. HuaI: 22: ”Vernunft und Unvernunft, im weitesten Sinn verstanden, 
bezeichnen keine zufällig-faktischen Vermögen und Tatsachen, sondern gehören zur allge-
meinsten Strukturform der transzendentalen Subjektivität überhaupt.”
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of the mind but the guiding structural principle of our conscious life in 
general. Reason basically encompassed all different forms of intentionality 
and their respective forms of sense-bestowing (Sinngebung). Besides the 
objectifying acts characteristic of perceptual experience (i.e. the doxic 
modes of intentionality), Husserl accounted also for a wide variety of non-
objectifying acts such as feeling-sensations (Gefühlsempfindungen) that are 
likewise characterized as forms of givenness with their degrees of intuitive 
fulfillment. Instead of a modern division between reason and sensibility, 
Husserl’s domain of rationality encompassed both the theoretical as well 
as practical manners of “positing” (Setzung) on the basis of which we take 
something as valid or untrue, valuable or non-valuable, desirable or non-
desirable. In this regard, the problematic of reason was intimidately tied to 
the question of evidence and motivation, that is, to the question on what 
grounds do we justify our beliefs, values, and actions.
  Thus, instead of characterizing human life primarily in terms of bio-
logical attributes or the inextricable singularity of the worldly ego, Hus-
serl defined the idea of rationality primarily in terms of a unique reflexive 
capability extending to the totality of one’s acquired habitualities.235 Hu-
man life in rationality, Husserl maintained, denotes the general possibility 
of regarding one’s personal life as a totality, which does not mean the 
complete transparency of one’s personal history or latent drives. Instead, 
it means the possibility of self-reflection that focuses upon the total ho-
rizon of one’s own life. In other words, human life is distinguished from 
all other forms of life by its capability to understand itself as personal, as 
embodying a unified subjective history. This does not mean, however, that 
we should identify this reflexivity with the concrete human being – what is at 
stake here, argues Husserl, are the a priori capabilities and forms of activ-
ity that characterize the animal and human life in general.236 Thus human 
life is a possibility that can realize itself within the life of an individual, 
but it can also reach beyond this life by executing itself in interpersonal 
co-operation. 
235 HuaXXVII: 23–26. 
236 „Selbstverständlich ist hier nicht von empirischen Eigenheiten von Menschen und Tie-
ren die Rede, sondern von Wesensscheidungen, von Unterschieden a priori möglicher 
Aktformen und Fähigkeiten, a priori möglicher „Menschen“ und „Tiere“.“ HuaXXVII: 
25.
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  It is crucial to pay attention to the central role of the idea of respon-
sibility (Verantwortlichkeit) in Husserl’s definition of rationality.237 Husserl 
used this term primarily in an epistemological sense, to denote the pecu-
liar accountability we have for our beliefs and conceptions. All knowledge 
must derive its legitimacy straight from the experience in which things 
are given, and we should avoid all empty presuppositions and preconcep-
tions that characterize our basic existence, the “natural attitude”. In the 
context of first volume of Ideas, this insight was formulated under the 
title of “principle of principles” claiming that “every originary presentive 
intuition (originäre gebende Anschauung) is a legitimizing source of cognition 
(Erkenntnis), that everything originarily […] offered to us in “intuition” is 
to be accepted simply as what it is presented as being, but also only within 
the limits in which it is presented there.”238 Responsibility, as it defined 
the structure of theoretical reason, was thus essentially tied to the idea of 
intuitive evidence. In a certain sense, Husserl saw this idea of “theoretical 
responsibility” as the defining feature of all genuine philosophy since Plato 
– a feature that was rendered into a rigorous methodological form espe-
cially through Descartes, who defined philosophy as a quest for “knowl-
edge for which he can answer from the beginning, and at each step, by 
virtue of his own absolute insights”.239 
  However, Husserl also employed the term responsibility in a more 
general sense, that is, in the sense of ethical responsibility. Especially in 
his early Göttingen lectures on ethics, Husserl approached the question 
of value-statements in terms of intuitive givenness. Just as the cognitive 
(or doxic) acts have their own mode of fulfillment, so do the axiological: 
for instance, the value of another person is not postulated through ratio-
nal deliberation, but it is immediately lived through as evident. In addi-
tion to typical modes of perception (Wahrnehmung) – for instance, seeing 
and hearing – our intentional lives are also defined by what Husserl calls 
value-perceptions (Wertnehmungen), which have their own modes of in-
tuitive fulfillment.240 These perceptions, argued Husserl, have their origin 
237 On the idea of responsibility, see HuaVIII: 198ff.; HuaI: 47. This concept is thoroughly 
analyzed by Buckley 1992. Cf. Zahavi 2001: 2–3.
238 “Am Prinzip aller Prinzipen: daß jede originär gebende Anschauung eine Rechtsquelle der 
Erkenntnis sei, daß alles, was sich uns in der „Intuition“ originär, […] darbietet, einfach hinzunehmen 
sei, als was es sich gibt, aber auch nur in den Schranken, in denen es sich da gibt […]” HuaIII: 52.
239 HuaI: 44. Cf. HuaVI: 426
240 HuaXXVIII: 340ff. Cf. HuaIV: 186.
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in the feelings of pleasure (Gefallen) and displeasure (Misfallen). They are 
also able to create lasting value-objects (Wertobjekt) – what Husserl also 
calls “objectivities of a higher level”241 – which then become a part of our 
habitual directedness to the world. Together with cognitive acts, the axi-
ological acts serve as the foundation for a third class of acts, the practical. 
These acts have their foundation in the domain of drives and instincts, and 
as such, they are also characterized by intuitive fulfillment. 
  Actually, the division between the three domains of reason appears 
itself as a somewhat crude abstraction. As Husserl puts it, in our concrete 
experience, the cognitive, valuative and practical acts are “intervowen 
everywhere with one another”242. When seeing a person in trouble, this 
perception involves immediately all of the aforementioned elements: it 
appears as “true”, as “harmful”, and, at least in a normal situation, it moti-
vates the will to help the other in despair. However, our experience bears 
within itself a certain motivational hierarchy, whereby certain intentional 
acts logically presuppose the existence of others. I cannot interpret the 
situation as harmful without seeing or hearing about it; likewise, my will 
is essentially tied to the experience of pleasure of displeasure. Thus in 
Husserl’s motivational hierarchy, the cognitive or doxic modes of percep-
tion have a peculiar “privilege” (Bevorzugung) in regard to the axiological 
and practical acts – the latter have their foundation (Fundierung) on the 
doxic.243
  The relation between theoretical and practical reason, however, is not 
as straightforward as it seems. Although Husserl privileged the cognitive 
acts of theoretical reason in his constitutive analyses, in his later works he 
also emphasized the essentially practical character of all theoretical un-
dertaking. The theoretical attitude, as Husserl understood it, could only 
be attained by abstaining from all practical interests towards the given 
environment – although, as Husserl emphasized, this should not entail the 
complete separation of theory from praxis. It was exactly this occasional 
conflation of “theoretical reason” with the “theoretical attitude” that led 
Heidegger to criticize Husserl for privileging the theoretical modes of 
intentionality in regard to the dynamic and practical modes of intentional-
241 HuaIV: 9.
242 HuaXXVIII: 72.
243 On the primacy (Vorzug) of the doxic, see e.g. HuaIII: 289.
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ity. “This privilege of the theoretical must be broken,” as Heidegger put it 
already in his early lecture courses of 1919/20, “not by proclaiming the 
primacy of the practical […] but because the theoretical itself and as such 
refers back to the pre-theoretical.”244 Here, Husserl would have obviously 
agreed with Heidegger that theory – as it is understood as an interest-free 
spectatorship, which focuses on the present givenness of things – has its 
foundation in the sphere of praxis, of interested action, willing and do-
ing. It is exactly the difficulty of philosophical thinking to not completely 
alienate the theoretical attitude from the domain of human action – an 
alienation that was exactly characteristic of the philosophical crisis of mo-
dernity.
  It is exactly here that we arrive at Husserl’s most general definition of 
crisis. As a general category of our intentional life, the crisis signifies a sit-
uation defined by “lack of intuition” (Anschauungslosigkeit) – a situation in 
which our objectivities and validities have lost their evidential foundation. 
“A crisis of religion takes place”, writes Husserl, “as the intuitive value-
insights are singled out in lively intuition, as the religiously motivated in-
dividual moves lively in his direction from intuition to intuition […] hav-
ing forsaken the residual of purely mythical façade from the tradition”245. 
As we discover that we are living according to convictions, principles, or 
practices that cannot be justified in rational insight, this is the situation of 
a crisis. To put it in the language of Husserl’s earlier works, a crisis is not 
a total absence of meaning, but rather, an “emptying” of intuition: the in-
ability to find evidence for one’s own concepts and ideas.246 
244 ”Diese Vorherrschaft des Theoretischen muss gebrochen werden, zwar nicht in der Wei-
se, dass man einen Primat des Praktischen proklamiert, und nicht deshalb, um nun mal 
etwas anderes zu bringen, was die Probleme von einer neue Seite zeigt, sondern weil das 
Theoretische selbst und als solcehs in ein Vortheoretische zurückweist.” Heidegger GA 
56/57: 59.
245 “[…] so vollzieht sich eine Krise in der Religion dadurch, daß die intuitiven Wertgehal-
te in lebendigster Intuition herausgehoben werden, daß das religiös bewegte Individuum 
in ihrer Richtung von Intuition zu Intuition lebendig fortschreitet […] und von der Tra-
dition den bloßen mythischen Rahmen als einen Rest irrationaler Faktizität übrigbehält.“ 
HuaXXVII: 65.
246 This was, quite concretely, the spiritual crisis that had affected Husserl’s work at the 
end of 1910s. “Through the [First World War] I lost the continuity of my scientific thread of 
life”, Husserl wrote to his Fritz Kaufmann, “and if I cannot work productively, understand 
myself, to read my manuscripts but without bringing them to intuition, then I am badly off ”. Hus-
serl’s letter to Kaufmann (20.IX.1915) in HuaDokIII: 340.
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  As Husserl suggests, “crisis” in this general sense is not simply a nega-
tive event. Instead, it points towards the structural feature of our con-
scious striving to fix itself into certain ideas, convictions, and modes of 
behavior. In its most general sense, this is what Husserl calls the process of 
habituation that constitutes one of the central categories of genetic devel-
opment of subjectivity (cf. Ch. 2.1) – we grow into certain beliefs, ten-
dencies and practices, which become our “second nature” in the sense that 
we “grow into them” and do not ask for their justification. In the domain 
of the development of sense, this process has its counterpart in the process 
of sedimentation, in which novel layers of meaning accumulate upon one 
another thus making possible the concealment of original intuitions.
  The idea of full self-responsibility according to a complete transparen-
cy of our beliefs and practices – a full “life in truth” – was of course an un-
attainable ideal. Husserl was fully aware that in our concrete existence we 
are constantly gripped by certain hindrances that prevent us from reach-
ing this ideal: we are constantly fixated to unfounded beliefs and conven-
tions, or, we are always burdened by the dead weight of tradition. Instead 
of defining the absolute telos of human life simply in terms of full intuitive 
givenness – what Aristotle called the “divine” life of theoretical contem-
plation247 – Husserl aimed at articulating a more dynamic approach to the 
idea of rational self-responsibility, which would have acknowledged the 
inherently “factical” dimension of human existence, that is, our tendency 
to settle in to certain modes of behavior. This relation is what Husserl 
delineated with the concept of renewal (Erneuerung).248 With this concept 
Husserl meant simply the possibility to fight against the essential “forget-
ting” that has its origin in the transcendental structures of subjectivity and 
meaning-constitution. Through the process of renewal, we have the inher-
ent possibility not to completely protect ourselves against the loss of intu-
ition but to reflect upon our facticity, the beliefs and convictions we have 
acquired. It is exactly this idea of a loss of meaning that makes possible 
the development of a greater responsibility. “As inadequacy announces it-
self through obscurities and contradictions”, writes Husserl in the Vienna 
Lecture, “this motivates the beginning of a universal reflection”249. Thus, 
247 Aristotle, E.N. X.7 1177b30ff. See also E.N. VI.9 1141a33.
248 On the concept of “renewal” (Erneuerung) and “self-renewal” (Selbstereuerung), see 
HuaXXVII: 20ff.; HuaVI: 486; HuaXXIX: 107; HuaXXXVII: 166. 
249 “Meldet sich in Unklarheiten und Widersprüchen die Unzulänglichkeit, so motiviert 
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renewal is fundamentally an active procedure that contends with the es-
sential passivity in us – a movement that Husserl considered indispensable 
for philosophical reason: “Only through this constant reflexivity is a phi-
losophy universal knowledge”250.
  As I would like to argue, it was exactly this general idea of a loss of 
meaning that Husserl extended to his analysis on the current state of the 
European culture. Instead of a mere category of individual life, Husserl 
reinterpreted the crisis as an essential category of historical development, 
which necessarily accompanies the generative development of sense and 
meaning. Culture, as it unfolds in intergenerational transmission of be-
liefs, values, and practices, is fundamentally defined by inadequately given 
beliefs and meanings that we acquire by becoming a part of certain gen-
erative histories and traditions. I will return to this concept in the last 
part of the work – now it suffices to conclude that rather than treating the 
crisis as a contingent event of a particular historical period, the Husserlian 
phenomenology pointed towards a radical reformulation of this idea that 
would have ascribed it a necessary role in the generative and historical develop-
ment of sense. This role will help us to acknowledge the cultural aspect of 
the phenomena of crisis and renewal. 
Naturalism and the crisis of culture
Even though Husserl’s reflections on ethical life and renewal took their 
starting-point from the problematic of individual life, they were by no 
means restricted by this perspective. As Husserl argued in his Kaizo es-
says, the goal of his reflections was nothing less than to establish “a ra-
tional reform of community”251 that would explicate the idea of personal 
self-responsibility also on a communal level and thus, to make possible 
the idea of cultural renewal. This task was particularly imminent for the 
European culture, which had lost the foundation of some of its guiding 
beliefs. The First World War showed just how easily national solidarity can 
spark ethnic conflicts, how scientific innovations can be turned into means 
dies einen Ansatz für eine universale Besinnung” HuaVI: 339.
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of destruction, and how liberal democratic culture can become the play-
ground of short-sighted and egoistic Realpolitik. Thus, what the war had 
revealed was exactly the “loss of meaning” that characterized the most 
fundamental practices and institutions of the European culture, what Hus-
serl called its “inner untruth” (innere Unwahrheit) and “meaninglessness” 
(Sinnlosigkeit).252 
  Furthermore, as Husserl maintained, the completely self-responsible 
Vernunftmenschheit appeared as a distant ideal that was hindered by the 
skeptical pessimism and political sophistry of his time.253 However, the 
root of the problem was not in the loss of individual ideals of culture but 
in the fundamental crisis of rational development as a whole. The First 
World War had revealed not only the inner inconsistencies of democracy 
and nationalism – of modernization and technological development – but 
a more devastating collapse of philosophical reason as the driving force of 
cultural progress. Philosophy, which had given up the promise of the his-
torical progress through reason – the secret providence (Kant) or eman-
cipation (Hegel) supporting the European tradition – seemed to had lost 
its creative strength as a critical force of cultural development. Unable to 
nurture the motive of rational renewal, it merely descended into a posi-
tion of disinterested spectator divested of its critical potentiality.
  It is exactly here that we discover the primal reason for Husserl’s re-
served and critical relation towards the discourse on crisis. Whereas for 
the historical consciousness of the 18th and 19th centuries, the idea of crisis 
was still related to the idea of regeneration and cultural renewal, for the 
discourse of the early twentieth century, these ideas seemed to lose their 
ground. Instead, the concept of crisis – as it was employed to denote the 
idea of cultural sickness by Spengler and others – served as the key factor 
for the infiltration of organic-naturalist as well as historicist metaphors into 
the basic logic of cultural development. As Husserl himself put it in the 
Vienna Lecture: 
Now clearly there exists the distinction between energetic thriving 
and atrophy, that is, one can also say, between health and sickness, 
even in communities, peoples, states. Accordingly the question is 
not far removed: How does it happen that no scientific medicine 
has ever developed in this sphere, a medicine for nations and su-
252 HuaXXVII: 3. 
253 HuaXXVII: 5
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pranational communities? The European nations are sick; Europe 
itself, it is said, is in crisis. We are by no means lacking something 
like doctors of nature.254
These lines should be interpreted cautiously. Husserl was by no means 
simply ascribing to this lamentation on the absence of scientific medicine 
for nations and supranational communities. He was clearly speaking from 
an ironic distance: the reference to the “doctors of nature” (Naturheilkun-
digen) was an allusion to the different forms of naturopathy whose indoc-
trination was an inseparable part of the early twentieth-century Leben-
sphilosophie movements. This branch – nowadays referred to as “alternative 
medicine” – included such treatments as homeopathy, herbalism and other 
forms of folk medicine whose efficiency, at least from the perspective of 
scientific medicine, was highly questionable. What was clear, however, was 
that the discourse of crisis strengthened the logic of a cultural disease, 
which portrayed the whole development of culture as an essentially pas-
sive occurrence. As he continues:
But what if the whole way of thinking that manifests itself in the 
foregoing presentation rested on portentous prejudices and, in its 
effects, itself shared in the responsibility for the European sickness?255
Thus the discourse on crisis, with its medicalist and naturalist implica-
tions, was itself contributing to the loss of an ideal – the ideal of an active, 
self-responsible culture. In the similar manner as the naturalist and be-
haviorist psychology had attacked the idea of self-responsible and volun-
taristic individual, the naturalist-organic categories of Spengler and oth-
ers had been explicit attacks on the idea of rational culture. In Husserl’s 
view, the human sciences had become “blinded by naturalism”256 insofar 
as that even the notion of culture itself was considered a natural phenom-
enon. Whereas for Plato and Rousseau, the metaphor of body politic had 
254 “Offenbar besteht nun der Unterschied zwischen kraftvoliem Gedeihen und Verküm-
mern, also, wie man auch sagen kann, von Gesundheit und Krankheit, auch für Gemein-
schaften, für Völker, für Staaten. Demnach liegt die Frage nicht so fern: Wie kommt es, 
daß es in dieser Hinsicht nie zu einer wissenschaftlichen Medizin, einer Medizin der Natio-
nen und übernationalen Gemeinschaften gekommen ist? Die europäischen Nationen sind 
krank, Europa selbst ist, sagt man, in einer Krisis. An so etwas wie Naturheilkundigen fehlt 
es hier durchaus nicht.” HuaVI: 315. Cf. HuaVI: 550.
255 “Aber wie, wenn die ganze in dieser Darstellung sich bekundende Denkweise auf ver-
hängnisvollen Vorurteilen beruhte und in ihren Auswirkungen selbst mitschuldig wäre an 
der europäischen Erkrankung?” HuaVI: 317. My italics.
256 HuaVI: 318.
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still pointed towards the possibility of active-practical renewal – either 
through the co-operation of philosophers or the underlying general will 
– the early 20th century had turned this “living body” into a mere object 
that allows manipulations or interventions to take place. As Spengler him-
self put it, the development of humanity did not contain within itself any 
“aim, idea, or plan, any more than the family of butterflies or orchids”, 
but instead, humanity was nothing else than “a zoological expression or 
an empty word.”257 Thus, against the organic and non-teleological view 
of Spengler’s, Husserl maintained that in order for a cultural renewal to 
come about, we need to radically rethink our fundamental concepts of 
cultural development:
[In the development of the European culture] it is not a case of 
one of those purposeful strivings which give the organic beings 
their character in the physical realm; thus it is not something like 
a biological development from a seminal form through stages to 
maturity with succeeding ages and dying-out. There is essentially 
no zoology of peoples. Nations are spiritual unities and they do not 
have, and in particular the supranational Europe does not have, a 
mature shape that has ever reached or could be reached as a shape 
that is regularly repeated.258
Thus what Husserl was insisting on was a new understanding of cultural 
development that would have allowed the possibility of a rational renewal 
– a renewal that was still on the horizon of the philosophers of modernity. 
In order to arrive at such an understanding, Husserl needed to rediscover 
the philosophical sense of the idea of spiritual teleology; however, this idea 
was to be divested of its unfounded theological and metaphysical connota-
tions. As I will argue in part 4, it was exactly this insight that constituted 
the basic point of departure for Husserl’s renewed understanding of the 
historical consciousness of modernity. At this stage, it suffices to point out 
that the problematic of Europe was indeed tangled with the very concept of 
crisis, above all, with its organic-naturalist implications that had also infil-
trated our understanding of culture.
257 Spengler 1991: 17.
258 “Nicht als ob es sich hier um eine der bekannten Zielstrebigkeiten handelte, die dem 
physischen Reich der organischen Wesen ihren Charakter geben; also um so etwas wie 
biologische Entwicklung von einer Keimgestalt in Stufenbis zur Reife mit nachfolgendem 
Altern und Absterben. Es gibt wesensmäßig keine Zoologie der Völker. Sie sind geistige 
Einheiten, sie haben, und insbesondere die Übernationalität Europa hat keine je erreichte 
und erreichbare reife Gestalt als Gestalt einer geregelten Wiederholung.” HuaVI: 320.
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Crisis of historicism revisited: cultural relativism
However, naturalism was not the only sickness that had attacked the idea 
of philosophical rationality, and consequently, the development of culture. 
As I argued in chapter 1.3, one of the central motives of the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth century philosophy was the growing division 
of natural and humanistic sciences that was particularly reflected in the 
novel debate on historicism. This idea, which first originated through the 
historical-hermeneutical movements of the nineteenth century, was origi-
nally employed in a positive sense, denoting something like a historical sen-
sitivity: in our attempts to interpret and reconstruct historical events (or 
texts), we should always be cautious with regard to the temporal distance 
between the historical evidence and ourselves. However, in the course of 
the nineteenth century, historicism became gradually synonymous with 
the idea of historical relativism according to which all knowledge is essen-
tially context-dependent, and there is no absolute position through which 
we could overcome the particularity of different historical world-views. 
  As I argued at the beginning of this chapter, Husserl’s early philosophy 
was defined by a highly critical attitude with regard to historicism. Usually 
taking Dilthey as his main adversary, Husserl saw historicism as a false so-
lution to the growing authority of the modern natural sciences. By empha-
sizing the unique character of historical research, historicism seemed to 
undermine the need for a radical reflection concerning the ultimate unity 
of scientific enterprise. The central position that historicism had given to 
such notions as Weltanschauung or Zeitgeist had driven the human sciences 
to consider all cultural accomplishments – including philosophy – as mere 
phenomena of their own times. Even though Husserl did not oppose the 
idea of “historical sense” that was inherent to the development of modern 
historiography, he interpreted its growing popularity as a threat for a uni-
fied transcendental philosophy.
  However, in Husserl’s later works on crisis, the critique of historical 
relativism took a somewhat different direction. Even though the word 
historicism had itself gone through a crisis during the first decades of the 
twentieth-century – it was heavily criticized and lost a lot of its philosoph-
ical significance – it had not completely disappeared. Instead, it had taken 
a different form. The rapid expansion of cultural, anthropological and eth-
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nological studies at the beginning of the twentieth century emphasized 
the relativist tendencies of historicism, however, this time in the guise of 
cultural relativism. Comparative studies such as E.B. Tylor’s Primitive Culture 
(1871), Andrew Lang’s Custom and Myth (1884), and J.G. Frazier’s classic 
The Golden Bough (1890) brought new attention to the rich and manifold 
cults and myths of the newly discovered West African cultures.259 Even 
though many of the authors found significant analogies between the sym-
bolic structures of Western and other cultures – and nurtured the 18th 
century idea of the Noble Savage – it was also common to see the “primi-
tive” forms of life as essentially incongruent with those of the Western 
world. One of the most influential critics of the so-called “unilineal evo-
lution” was Franz Boas, who became known for his insistence on several 
standards of progress. Civilization, Boas argued, was not to be conceived 
as something absolute, but as something fundamentally “relative, and that 
our ideas and conceptions are true only so far as our civilization goes”260. 
Alongside with historical relativism, Husserl came to acknowledge what 
seemed to have become the imminent corollary of historicism: the cultural 
asymmetry of truth and value. 
  Actually, when Husserl speaks of historical relativism in his later texts, 
he often refers to a stance that accentuates the specific relativity of cultural 
accomplishments. For instance, in a manuscript dated to November 1933 
Husserl sets himself to counter the “objection of historical relativity: all of 
our interpretations are European” (“Einwand der historischen Relativität: Alle 
unsere Auslegung ist europäisch etc.”261). As the title indicates, Husserl was 
asking whether the popular contrast between European and other world-
views should compel us to think that ultimately, they do not share any 
common ground, and that we should abandon the whole idea of universal 
philosophy for the sake of cultural-historical contingencies. 
259 Husserl was also acquainted with at least Tylor’s work, for he refers to him in his Phi-
losophy of Arithmetic. On Husserl and anthropology see Bernasconi 2005, Moran 2011.
260 Boas 1988: 142. Emphasis was laid especially on the linguistic structures of differ-
ent cultures, which were seen to reflect the more fundamental forms of experience and 
reason. Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf, for one, discussed the lack of verb tense 
in the Hopi Indian language, and interpreted it as reflecting the absence of linear time in 
this culture. The lack of verb tense was not merely a matter of linguistic peculiarity, but 
of world-openness: in the framework of the Hopi culture, events are tightly linked to one 
another. On the different senses of “anthropology” in Husserl, see Orth 1987: 106–107.
261 HuaXXXIX: 170
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  In this regard, one particular source that turned out to be crucial 
for Husserl was Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, a French anthropologist whose works 
Husserl had studied avidly from 1920s onwards.262 The two developed a 
personal relationship and also engaged in scientific correspondence dur-
ing the 1930s. Husserl credited Lévy-Bruhl not only for providing rich 
empirical material – Lévy-Bruhl was particularly known for studying the 
preliterate tribes, although his work relied heavily on secondary sources 
– but also for his striving for a “rigorous scientific ethnology”263, that is, 
for his attempts to lay foundations for a systematic science of cultural 
development. According to Husserl, it was particularly Lévy-Bruhl whose 
work had pointed out the necessity to establish a “pure human-scientific 
anthropology”264 – an autonomous branch of scientific research with its 
unique methodology and concepts. As Husserl emphasized in his letter to 
Lévy-Bruhl, the anthropological studies had “set out the problem of corre-
lation between ‘We’ and ‘environment’ (Umwelt) as “transcendental-phe-
nomenological” […] finally referring back to the problem of the absolute 
ego.”265 As analogical to the domain of “pure psychology”, pure anthropol-
ogy would have delineated the general forms of social co-operation, which 
serve as the foundation for the constitution of cultural objectivities (such 
as language, religion, the economy).
  However, Lévy-Bruhl’s analyses seemed to be accompanied by some 
controversial presuppositions. Already in his early study Les fonctions men-
tales dans les sociétés inférieures (1910), Lévy-Bruhl had put forward a con-
troversial thesis concerning the essentially unique character of rationality 
among the preliterate tribes. This character, argued Lévy-Bruhl, differed 
significantly from the Western idea of rationality due to its different logi-
cal structure. Since the publication of La mentalité primitive (1922), Lévy-
Bruhl articulated this difference in terms of a “primitive mentality” and 
(Western) “civilized thought”, out of which only the latter deserved to 
be called logical in a pregnant sense. Even though the primitive mind was 
not completely illogical, it lacked some of the central elements of abstract 
262 The Husserl Library in Leuven contains a series of Lévy-Bruhl’s works, including two 
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reasoning, for instance, the idea of causality or the law of the excluded 
middle. According to Lévy-Bruhl, the pre-logical character of the primi-
tive mind was evident in the fact that allowed contradictions to appear 
– for instance, the same object could appear in two different places at the 
same time – and it was in some cases unable to distinguish between subjec-
tive and objective reality (e.g., it did not strictly separate between dream 
and reality).266 These insights were further advanced by Wilhelm Nestle’s 
influential study of Greeks, Vom Mythos zum Logos (1940). Moreover, lean-
ing to the Durkheimian notion of “collective representations”, Lévy-Bruhl 
accentuated the radically divergent way of positing the relation between 
individual and community among the primitive tribes. According to Lévy-
Bruhl, although the primitive tribes did not completely lack the idea of 
individual person, it treated this as a kind of extrapolation of the collective 
representations. Thus, what they lacked was a concept of human subjectiv-
ity as the zero-point of experience, which would constitute the ultimate 
point of departure for the idea of “objective world”.
  From Husserl’s perspective, Lévy-Bruhl’s discoveries appeared as 
significant challenges for phenomenological theory of subjectivity. First, 
by arguing for the radically non-subjectivist worldview of the primitive 
tribes, Lévy-Bruhl came to contest the possibility of such “pure psycholo-
gy” that could be constructed apart from anthropological and ethnological 
insights. Individual psychology, as Lévy-Bruhl interpreted it, made sense 
insofar as it is situated in the context of a cultural, societal and religious 
framework of sense. The subjectivist, self-centered approach of Western 
psychology was not simply false; however, from the perspective of the 
primitive mind it was clearly inadequate. Thus the somewhat unforesee-
able remark in Husserl’s Vienna Lecture – “Even the Papuan is a man and 
not a beast”267 – becomes understandable in contrast to Lévy-Bruhl’s La 
mythologie primitive (1935), which had related the theoretical framework to 
the empirical material of Australian and Papuan tribes.268 Secondly, Lévy-
Bruhl’s findings seemed to question the possibility of a universal moral 
266 Lévy-Bruhl 1923: 101–107.
267 “Nach der guten alten Definition ist der Mensch das vernünftige Lebewesen, und in 
diesem weiten Sinne ist auch der Papua Mensch und nicht Tier.“ HuaVI: 337. The figure of 
the Papuan was central for German philosophers also because New Guinea was a German 
colony from 1884 to 1914.
268 The subtitle of the work was Le monde mythique des Autraliens et des Papous.
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philosophy that would overcome the inherent discrepancies between indi-
vidual societies. Morality, as he saw it, could only arise from the conditions 
of a particular cultural environment, which meant that Western standards 
should not be applied to the non-Western societies. Thus the only reason-
able position that moral philosophy could take after the introduction of 
preliterate tribes was that of cultural and historical relativism.269
  In his letter to Lévy-Bruhl from 1935, Husserl went as far as to claim 
that “historical relativism does have an undisputed justification”, however, 
it does so only as “an anthropological fact”.270 But this fact – announing 
itself in the incongruence of cultural accomplishments – merely corrob-
orated the need to articulate phenomenology in a way that could have 
described the process of normative specification that takes place in the 
generative development of individual cultures. Moreover, what the an-
thropological studies had also revealed was the novel requirement to in-
vestigate the “theoretical attitude”, not merely in regard to other personal 
attitudes (e.g. the natural, the personalistic), but as a temporally evolving 
form that has its foundation in the pre-theoretical (i.e. mythical) attitude. 
Following the ideas of Émile Durkheim, Edward B. Tylor and Andrew 
Lang, Husserl accentuated the need for a teleological description that would 
have explained, first of all, the transition from the spiritual-animistic re-
ligions to monotheism, which – according to the narrative provided by 
Husserl – executed itself through a peculiar “logicisation” of the primitive 
myths.271 Thus theory, which constituted one of the central perquisites for 
the idea of Europe, was to be conceived not as a simple origin, but as a 
peculiar “transformation” (Umstellung) from the pre-theoretical.272 I will 
return to this idea in the third part of the work.
269 See Stoller 1998: 242. 
270 HuaDokVII: 163.
271 HuaVI: 335. On the “lifeworld of the primitive” as the point of departure, see HuaXX-
VII: 225.
272 HuaVI: 326. Cf. HuaVI: 329–330: “For a deeper understanding of the Greek-European 
science (universally speaking, philosophy) in its fundamental difference from the Oriental 
philosophies judged equal to it, it is now necessary to consider more closely the practi-
cal-universal attitude which created these philosophies prior to European science and to 
clarify it as the religious-mythical attitude.” (“Für das tiefere Verständnis der griechisch-
europäischen Wissenschaft (universal gesprochen: der Philosophie) in ihrem prinzipiellen 
Unterschied von den gleichbewerteten orientalischen „Philosophien“ ist es nun notwen-
dig, die praktisch-universale Einstellung, wie sie vor der europäischen Wissenschaft sich 
jene Philosophien schuf, näher zu betrachten und sie als religiös-mythische aufzuklären.“)
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  It was perhaps Merleau-Ponty who was the first to emphasize the sig-
nificance of anthropological considerations with regard to Husserl’s late 
phenomenology of generativity. As Merleau-Ponty points out, the anthro-
pological considerations had provided Husserl with a new and a valuable 
motive, that is, the need to engage in a rational dialogue with the pre-
scientific idea of culture. But this also meant that phenomenology – con-
trary to what Husserl had insisted in his earlier works – could not execute 
its task merely by abstaining from the results of individual sciences. As 
Merleau-Ponty put it: “Judging by Husserl’s later views, philosophy would 
gain autonomy after, and not before the positive sciences.”273 This shift of 
position, he continues,
[…] no longer makes philosophy the rival of scientific knowledge, 
now that we have recognized that the “interior” it brings us back 
to is not a private life but an intersubjectivity that gradually con-
nects us ever closer to the whole of history. When I discover that 
the social is not simply an object but to begin with my situation, 
and when I awaken within myself the consciousness of this social-
which-is-mine, then my whole synchrony becomes present to me, 
through that synchrony I become capable of really thinking about 
the whole past as the synchrony it has been in its time, and all the 
convergent and discordant action of the historical community is 
effectively given to me in my living present. Giving up systematic 
philosophy as an explanatory device does not reduce philosophy to 
the rank of an auxiliary or a propagandist in the service of objec-
tive knowledge; for philosophy has a dimension of its own, the 
dimension of coexistence – not as a fait accompli and an object of 
contemplation, but as the milieu and perpetual event of the uni-
versal praxis.274
As I will elaborate in more detail later, Husserl’s preoccupation with the 
social and intergenerational dimension of phenomenology – the generative 
phenomenology – did also signify a growing interest towards the idea of co-
existence at the heart of human subjectivity. By emphasizing the need for 
a renewed stance towards the “presuppositions” of phenomenological re-
search, Husserl was able to point towards an understanding of philosophy 
not merely as an individualistic endeavor but as an essentially intergenera-
tional process, which realizes itself only through a critical relation towards 
273 Merleau-Ponty 1968: 108.
274 Merleau-Ponty 1968: 112–113.
— 149 —
1.4. The Idea of European Crisis in Husserl’s Late Works
one’s cultural and historical situation. This process, as we shall observe 
later, involved also an essential relation to the other not merely as an ob-
ject of conversion but as the fundamental perquisite of a critical stance. 
  These reflections provide us with the possibility of providing a prelim-
inary delineation of the idea of crisis as a category of cultural development 
(discussed in part 4). Instead of the passive and medical connotations that 
had become dominant for this notion, Husserl still aimed at rediscovering 
this notion according to the underlying sense of active resolution that had 
been concealed by the naturalist paradigm. Against the idea of crisis as an 
overarching demise of culture – an irrevocable “loss of meaning” – Hus-
serl insisted on rearticulating the idea of crisis according to the idea of 
historical decision, which, by realistically assessing the present moment 
according to its guiding beliefs, could have still nurtured the idea of cul-
tural renewal. Instead of a mere collection of acquired validities, tradition 
is also something that we ought to bring into a crisis, something to which 
we have to make a difference (Gr. krinein). This, I believe, is the ultimate les-
son of the European crisis:
The “crisis of European existence”, which manifests itself in count-
less symptoms of a corrupted life, is not an obscure fate nor an im-
penetrable destiny. Instead, it becomes manifestly understandable 
against the background of the philosophically discoverable teleology 
of European history. […] The crisis of European existence has only 
two possible outcomes: either the ruin of a Europe alienated from 
its rational sense of life, fallen into barbarian hatred of spirit; or in 
the rebirth of Europe from the spirit of philosophy, through the 
heroism of reason that will definitively overcome naturalism.275
275 “Die heute so viel beredete, sich in unzähligen Symptomen des Lebenszerfalls doku-
mentierende “Krise des europäischen Daseins” ist kein dunkles Schicksal, kein undurch-
dringliches Verhängnis, sondern wird verständlich und durchschaubar auf dem Hinter-
grund der philosophisch aufdeckbaren Teleologie der europäischen Geschichte. [...] Die 
Krise des europäischen Daseins hat nur zwei Auswege: Den Untergang Europas in der Ent-
fremdung gegen seinen eigenen rationalen Lebenssinn, den Verfall in Geistfeindschaft und 
Barbarei, oder die Wiedergeburt Europas aus dem Geiste der Philosophie durch einen den 
Naturalismus endgültig überwindenden Heroismus der Vernunft.” HuaVI: 348. Translation 
modified. We find this idea of a clear-cut historical decision also in Heidegger’s so-called 
Rome lecture of 1936 Europa und die deutsche Philosophie: “Our historical existence (Dasein) 
is experiencing with growing anxiety and clarity that its future will amount to an ‘either–
or’ that leads either to Europe’s salvation or to its destruction.” Heidegger 1993: 31. On 
Husserl’s and Heidegger’s notions of crisis, see Buckley 1992; Miettinen 2009.
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  Thus phenomenology, instead of being mere description of the exist-
ing state of affairs, was to be conceived as an essentially normative praxis, 
which, instead of abstaining from the concrete reality of societal and po-
litical affairs, finds its genuine essence through the recognition of cultural 
crises of meaning. Through the growing sensitivity towards the essentially 
practical and normative underpinnings of phenomenology, Husserl be-
came a philosophical decisionist – someone who necessarily formulates 
his stance in relation to the social, historical and cultural presuppositions 
of the present moment. As Husserl himself confirmed in a letter in 1934, 
this shift of position, besides being motivated by the inner development of 
his own phenomenological method, had been imposed upon him by the 
present state of affairs: “The role of a completely disinterested spectator is 
for us, in this moment, all too difficult to maintain.”276 
* * *
I began this chapter by considering Foucault’s characterization of the mod-
ern age in terms of a specific attitude towards the present moment. As I 
pointed out, Foucault insisted on reading the modern fascination towards 
the notion of crisis in terms of a heroization of the present moment, as 
the condensation of historical time into the form of a singular ‘now’. We, 
the philosophers of the twenty-first century, are of course familiar with 
this tendency, though not primarily in the sense of philosophical heroism. 
Through the repeating economic, political, and social crises of our time, 
our situation resembles a bit of the post-war Europe in the sense that we 
have gradually descended into a permanent “state of exception”, which 
focuses all of its attention to the demands of the present moment. We no 
longer think we can escape this yoke of this exception; instead, our politi-
cal action is more and more targeted towards the management of different 
crises: political, economic, social and cultural. Whereas the modern age 
began with the essential interdependence of crisis and political idealism 
– as for Rousseau, the crisis had revealed the transitory character of sover-
276 “Die Rolle des völlig “unbetheiligten Zuschauers” ist – für unsereins, zur Zeit – allzu 
schwer innezuhalten” HuaDokVII, 13–14.
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eign power – for our own time the situation seems the opposite. We have 
lost this connection between crisis and utopia; our politics of the crisis 
present us with mere imperatives to react. 
  In his History of the Idea of Progress, Robert Nisbet writes: “The idea of 
progress holds that mankind has advanced in the past – from some aborigi-
nal condition of primitiveness, barbarism, or even nullity – is now advanc-
ing, and will continue to advance through the foreseeable future.”277 Ac-
cording to his detailed account, losing sight of this belief would entail also 
the loss of other central ideas of our own tradition, most importantly, the 
sound belief in the self-governing and self-responsible humankind. Keep-
ing with this (Hegelian) definition, however, it is perhaps easy to take sides 
with the cultural pessimists such as Burckhardt and Nietzsche, and claim 
that the barbarism of culture has not vanished altogether but it surfaces 
in different forms. In the contemporary threat of ecocatastrophes, global 
warfare, and growing social disintegration, perhaps the very idea of self-
responsibility entails a more critical relation towards the idea of progress.
  We arrive at the following questions: Is it possible, following Husserl, 
to rediscover this connection between crisis and political idealism? Is it 
possible to promote the idea of a critique of the present moment withdrawn 
from the false preconceptions concerning its status in the grand narratives 
of world history? Can the notion of crisis become, as Husserl insisted, not 
only the problem but also the solution – something that opens up a cre-
ative horizon of action? These questions will be answered in the following 
parts of this work.
277 Nisbet 1980: 4–5.
 — 152 —
 — 153 —
I
t is a rather evident feature of human existence that we find 
ourselves to be in contact with other people. In our everyday 
lives, our dealings and projects are intertwined with those of other 
people – our daily praxis relies not only on the existence of the 
outer world but also on our fellow dwellers. We expect others not 
only to be there but also to “do their part”, to fulfill whatever roles or 
duties they carry as being a part of different social bodies. This trust is, 
however, something that has to develop in the course of our lives: it may 
be shaken, distorted, or even exhausted. Following Aristotle, it is perhaps 
justified to call human sociality natural (fysei)1 in the sense that one needs 
to grow (fyō) into it. What makes human beings “the most social animal” 
(mallōn zōon politikon) is not that we would need (or enjoy) each other’s 
company more than other species, but rather, because of the complexity of 
our social relations: our mutual trust can be built and broken in endlessly 
many ways. We may choose to withdraw from the life of the community 
into a momentary solitude – where, as Cicero once put it, one might 
feel the least lonely2 – but we can never really leave behind the facticity 
of communal life. The others are embedded in our experience through 
various cognitive and practical relations: beliefs, desires, and volitions. 
  Nevertheless, in the contemporary debate it is one of the most per-
sistent claims against phenomenology that it has neglected the social di-
mension of human existence, or, that it has failed to develop a sufficient 
conceptual framework for it. This idea is quite often linked to the ap-
parent “individualism” of phenomenology: from Husserl to Heidegger, 
from Merleau-Ponty to Sartre, phenomenology has concentrated on the 
1 On the ”naturalness” of polis and human sociality, see Aristotle, Pol. I.1.1253a2–3.





. G  T P
existence of the individual human being both methodologically as well as 
ontologically. Taking its point of departure from the experience of the first 
person singular, phenomenology has directed its attention to the different 
modes of individual experience, whether these modes have been framed 
in regard to the idea of transcendental subjectivity as the ground of all being 
(Husserl), or its explicitly anti-subjectivist variations such as Heidegger’s 
early ontology of Dasein. Despite the immense variation of approaches 
within the post-Husserlian tradition, the limits of phenomenology have 
been conceived according to the lines of modern transcendental philoso-
phy: phenomenology investigates the different modes of personal world-
disclosure whose general structures are to be located within the experi-
encing individual.
  There is something in Husserl’s phenomenology that, perhaps even 
more than in the case of other philosophies, predisposes it to this type 
of critique. Husserl was a philosopher of subjectivity whose conceptual 
framework was significantly influenced by modern transcendental philos-
ophy. Especially after the publication of the Logical Investigations, Husserl’s 
philosophical terminology became more and more invested with Carte-
sian-Kantian notions, and, as we may learn from his Briefwechsel, during 
the early 1910s he had envisioned a “critique of reason” upon a “Kantian 
foundation”3. This project, as it was realized through the transcendental 
nomenclature of Ideas (ego, subject, cogito and self-consciousness), was 
to be conceived a form of transcendental idealism, which posited the “tran-
scendental ego” as the uncontested foundation of all meaning and sense. 
Moreover, in the later period of his thinking, Husserl invoked the Leibniz-
ian idea of “windowless” monad in order to describe the temporal becom-
ing of the subject. Thus, it is perhaps understandable that for philosophers 
interested in questions of the social sphere, Husserl’s phenomenology has 
not appeared the most fertile or relevant starting point. It seems inward-
looking and individualistic, perhaps even negligent towards the socio-po-
litical sphere.
  This argument on the dismissal of the social phenomena in Husserl’s 
reflections has been articulated at least in three different preconceptions. 
First of all, there is a long tradition of critique proposing that Husserl’s 
phenomenology promotes an idea of an abstract, solitary subject, and 
3 HuaDokV: 14. See Mohanty 1996. 
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thus, it falls into the trap of solipsism or subjective idealism.4 From early on, 
this critique was based on an interpretation of Husserl’s notion of consti-
tution as a subjectivist construction, according to which the ego was said 
to “edify” the world and other subjects from the particular contents of 
consciousness. This idea was coined with the Kantian notion of atemporal 
transcendental subjectivity. Although Husserl worked sedulously on the 
problematic of temporality from 1904 onwards, the first volume of Ideas 
devoted only a single paragraph to the problem of time-consciousness.5 
Thus it is not surprising to find that Adorno, one of the first critics of phe-
nomenology-as-idealism, considered Husserl the “the most static thinker 
of his period”6. Secondly, a more refined line of critique – formulated also 
within the phenomenological tradition – acknowledged Husserl’s interest 
in intersubjectivity, but saw it as conceptually and methodologically insuf-
ficient with regard to the concrete phenomena of the social sphere. Alfred 
Schütz, for one, emphasized the significance of Husserl’s constitutional 
analyses for his reinterpretation of the Weberian interpretive sociology, 
but argued that Husserl’s own philosophy was not “conversant with the 
concrete problems of the social sciences”7. Behind Schütz’s position was 
his conviction that one could not advance very far with the transcenden-
tal analyses of Husserl, and that one needed to accompany these analyses 
with a “constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude”8, an investiga-
tion of social relations as they appear within concrete experience. During 
the past decades, the development of sociology and cultural studies has 
benefitted perhaps more from the non-Husserlian currents of phenom-
enology such as structuralism and (Heideggerian) hermeneutics. Thirdly, 
because of the specific importance that Husserl bestowed upon the descrip-
tive element of phenomenology, many critics have been discontent with 
the apparent lack of a normative dimension in his philosophy. Habermas, 
for one, has put forward the notion of Husserlian “scientism” that focuses 
on “pure theory”, and has contrasted this with the “emancipatory sciences” 
of the Marxist tradition as well as the Frankfurt School.9 It is often stated 
4 On the early critiques of Husserl’s idealism, see esp. Adorno 1940; Hook 1930.
5 This was the paragraph §81 (“Die phänomenologische Zeit und das Zeitbewußtsein”) of 
Ideas I, see HuaI: 196ff.
6 Adorno 1940: 7.
7 Schütz 1959: 88.
8 Schütz 1967: 44.
9 Habermas 1971: 316ff.
— 156 —
. G  T P
that phenomenology has nothing to say to the concrete problems of social 
existence, that it withdraws from the sphere of politics, or, that it is negli-
gent with regard to the ideological constellations of, for instance, today’s 
capitalist market economy. In this vein, phenomenology may help us to 
see, but not to act – it may provide us with an analysis of truth and falsity, 
but not of right or wrong. 
  These critiques should not be bypassed as mere historical curiosities. 
The development of later Continental philosophy (or post-phenomenol-
ogy) has been significantly directed by the dissatisfaction to the alleged 
subjectivism of the father of phenomenology – or, to put it in Lacanian 
terms, from the disavowal of not the actual father but the symbolic one, 
that is, from the disavowal of the complete set of beliefs and practices that 
interdict the Husserlian praxis of philosophy. As Michel Foucault once put 
it in an interview, “everything that took place in the sixties arose from 
a dissatisfaction with the phenomenological theory of the subject”, mo-
tivating the well-known “escapades, subterfuges, breakthroughs […] in 
the direction of linguistics, psychoanalysis, or Nietzsche”10. As Foucault 
corroborated elsewhere, the main source of dissatisfaction was the seem-
ing non-historicity of the Husserlian theory of subject, which made it im-
mune to the critical approach of his own philosophical generation. “One 
has to dispense with the constituent subject”, Foucault argued, “to get 
rid of the subject itself, that’s to say, to arrive at an analysis which can ac-
count for the constitution of the subject within a historical framework.”11 
For Foucault, this alternate approach was of course what he called the 
Nietzschean genealogy: the investigation of different discourses embodying 
historically constructed structures of power, which, rather than being at 
the subject’s disposal, constantly produce human subjectivity as well as its 
normative ideals. 
  As I will argue in this part, these critiques are based on an inadequate 
understanding of Husserl’s phenomenological project. Besides being gross 
misinterpretations of Husserl’s notion of constitution, they also neglect 
the immense stress that Husserl laid on the problematic of intersubjec-
tivity. Instead of a formal principle of experience, Husserl understood 
10 See Raulet’s interview of Foucault (1983: 199).
11 Foucault 1984c: 59.
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transcendental subjectivity as fundamentally singular, personal and tem-
poral – as something which necessarily involves a relation to other ex-
periencing subjects within a particular cultural or historical situation. 
Moreover, these critiques also ignore the highly refined conceptual frame-
work of Husserl’s “social ontology”, i.e. the phenomenological analysis of 
interpersonal communities, their temporal genesis and different modes 
of meaning-constitution. Despite the inextricably first-person oriented 
character of the phenomenological method, phenomenology itself was 
not restricted to the problem of individual consciousness and its charac-
teristics – instead, this domain merely provided the necessary point of de-
parture for the vast variety of problems relating to communal, historical, 
cultural-linguistic, and even territorial forms of meaning-constitution.
  Instead of rushing straight to the problem of intersubjectivity, I will 
start by focusing on the idea of genesis and its respective method of inves-
tigation – the genetic phenomenology – in Husserl’s philosophy (Ch. 2.1). 
This topic is important for two reasons. First, by opening up the temporal 
dimension of constitution this analysis enables us to distinguish Husserl’s 
theory of transcendental subjectivity from its Kantian predecessor. Sec-
ondly, by accommodating the process of meaning-constitution into the 
overall communal-traditional horizon – what Husserl calls the structure 
of generativity – the topic of genesis leads us to locate the (Foucauldian) 
idea motive of subject-constitution within a historical framework. These 
insights constitute the point of departure for the following chapter, in 
which I will turn to the basic questions of Husserl’s “social ontology” (Ch. 
2.2). I will situate Husserl’s position against two contemporary variations 
of social philosophy – the analytical social ontology and the ideology-crit-
ical current of contemporary Marxism – and show that Husserl’s analy-
ses on intersubjectivity transcended the idea of co-operation as the basic 
framework of the social sphere. The problem of intersubjectivity should 
be understood in essential connection to the domain of passivity, which, 
unlike for the tradition of modern transcendental philosophy, is to be un-
derstood as fundamentally temporal and social. As I will show, instead of 
a domain of self-enclosed domain of subjective receptivity, Husserl un-
derstood passivity in close connection to the problem of objective and 
intersubjective world-constitution. It was exactly this insight into the in-
extricably social character of constitution – all objectivity is necessarily 
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grounded in intersubjectivity – that served as the transition to the social, 
cultural, and historical specification of this process. 
  This specification, founded on the problem of empathy and social acts, 
leads us to the problem of lifeworld (Ch. 2.3). Through a genetic analysis 
of the lifeworld, Husserl was able to endow this notion with two seem-
ingly opposite senses, i.e. that of universal correlate of intersubjective 
experience and the normatively delineated horizon of experience (e.g. 
a cultural lifeworld). In order to clarify this process of normative speci-
fication and the sense of familiarity implied within it, Husserl introduced 
a novel conceptual distinction between “homeworld” and “alienworld”. 
This distinction, besides referring to the constitution of cultural identi-
ties through the encounter with the alien, pointed towards the essential 
intertwining of generativity and territoriality: interpersonal associations, 
besides defining themselves through manifold historical accounts or “nar-
ratives”, acquire for themselves a sense of collective identity through a 
necessary relation to lifeworld and its cultural accomplishments. This in-
sight on the essentially reciprocal relation of community and culture will 
be discussed in the last chapter of this part (Ch. 2.4). This relation is cen-
tral to Husserl’s theory of generativity and historicity because it enables 
us to locate one of the crucial shortcomings of Hegel’s theory of objective 
spirit: the distinction (or “correlation”) between different modes of inter-
personal co-operation and its respective accomplishments. As I will show, 
this distinction between “community” and “culture” serves as the point of 
departure for Husserl’s somewhat controversial analysis on intersubjective 
associations as “personalities of a higher order”, i.e. communities as per-
sonal and self-regulating totalities. Although this approach did not entail 
a complete break with Husserl’s commitment to phenomenology and its 
first-person perspective, it served as the key transition to the broadened 
idea of renewal as an essentially interpersonal and cultural process.
  It is namely this methodological and conceptual background against 
which we ought to read Husserl’s considerations of Europe – not as distinct 
exercises of contemporary critique but as critical confrontations with the 
problems of historical teleology and communal co-operation constituting 
a normative ideal of rational culture. Europe, as I will argue in part 3, was to 
be understood as a specific idea of cultural rationality, which articulated 
itself through a renewed understanding of home and alien, manifesting 
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itself in the new forms of cultural objectivity and a personality of a higher 
order.
2.1. Genesis and the Life of the Subject
In the previous section that dealt with the topic of crisis in Husserl’s philosophy, I stressed the importance of the post-WWI discourse for Husserl’s philosophical commitment. During these years, what first 
seemed more like an internal crisis of science turned out to involve a 
more thoroughgoing concern on the possibility of a rational culture. Hus-
serl was disappointed not only to the development of worldly events but 
to the inability of philosophy in enforcing its cultural, societal or political 
potential. Through its adherence to the one-sided naturalistic rationality 
of the objectivist sciences, philosophy did not seem to contribute to the 
rearticulation of the normative ideals of humanity, of good and bad, right 
and wrong. Instead, it seemed to accept Carl Schmitt’s thesis on the pe-
rennially conflictual nature of the political domain. Military or economic 
power, not truth or reason, dominated the discourse on the ultimate foun-
dation of community. 
  This disappointment extended into the very foundations of Husserl 
philosophy insofar as he felt the need to rework his phenomenological 
project in order to react to this empirical event and the loss of meaning 
entailed with it. Alongside with the ego-oriented approach of transcen-
dental phenomenology, Husserl began to emphasize the communal and 
normative dimensions of the phenomenological method. Especially during 
the years 1917–1921, Husserl introduced a set of new topics into his tran-
scendental phenomenology: (i) genetic phenomenology, i.e. the idea of 
temporal genesis resulting in the theory of transcendental person (ii) the 
idea of lifeworld as the transcendental horizon of experience (iii) social 
ethics based on the idea of lasting intersubjective associations, i.e. the idea 
of a personality of a higher order. Let me focus on the first one.
  The word “genesis” – as we may learn from the Ancient Greek genesis – 
refers basically to two different modes of being: birth (origin) and genera-
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tion (the process of coming-into-being). In the Hellenic world, this term 
was associated also with family and ancestry, which bring the two ideas 
together: the story of ancestral lineage tells one on where one comes, but 
also how one has arrived there.12 The same holds for the Biblical sense of 
the word that is most apparent in the Book of Genesis: alongside the event of 
creation of the world (the origin), the First Book of Moses informs us of 
the foundational relations of divine and earthly elements as well as of the 
complex dynamism of The Fall which has made us humans what we are, in 
this case, fallen, finite, and self-reflexive beings. 
  We find this double structure also in Husserl’s works. For him, the 
notion of genesis refers both to the process of founding sense as well as its 
generation in the course of time. It denotes a whole set of transcendental-
eidetic structures that guide the development of intentional relations, par-
ticular meanings and meaning-complexes. These relations and structures 
are at play in different levels of individual and interpersonal meaning-con-
stitution and they also take part in temporal shaping of their correlative 
structures, i.e. human lifeworld and its cultural accomplishments.
  The idea of genetic phenomenology appeared at the beginning of the 
1920s, and Husserl introduced it as complementary to static phenomenolo-
gy.13 This distinction was also expressed in terms of “a genetic and a static 
method”14, which referred to the same idea. Phenomenology, as Husserl 
understood it, was fundamentally a methodological and not a substantial 
notion, and it referred to a specific mode of inspection and not of content. 
As the manuscripts on the genetic method reveal, Husserl did not con-
ceive the genetic dimension as a break with regard to the static analyses 
but it was to be understood as complimentary to these. Alongside with the 
“universal doctrine of consciousness” and the “constitutive phenomenol-
ogy” studying “the general structures and modalities that encompass all 
12 As Steinbock notes, this twofold sense is also present in Husserl’s recurring use of the 
notion of Stamm – translatable as “stem”, “root”, “genealogical lineage” etc. – referring 
to the different modes of generative transmittance of tradition (1995: 194ff.). Unlike in 
the case of the temporal genesis of individual consciousness, in which all institutions of 
meaning can – at least in principle – be located at a certain moment in time, in the case 
of intergenerational constitution, such univocal moments of institution cannot be easily 
acknowledged. I will return to this issue in part 4.
13 HuaXIV: 34–43. See also HuaXV: 613ff. On the relation between static and genetic 




2.1. Genesis and the Life of the Subject
categories of apprehensions” – the static phenomenology – Husserl felt 
the need to add “a universal theory of genesis”, which would investigate 
these structures with regard to their origin as well as the process or origi-
nation.15 
  To put it more simply, what the genetic dimension brought along was 
basically a broader notion of meaning-formation. Whereas the earlier 
analyses of intentionality had concentrated on the established correlation 
between the ego and the world (of noesis and noema) and the different 
modes of intentionality by which the validity and meaning of being is con-
stituted, the genetic analyses turned their focus into the dynamic character 
of this process. Husserl wanted to understand how exactly different types 
of affectivity and activity follow and presuppose one another; in which 
way do particular modes of intentionality and meaning-constitution ac-
quire for themselves a temporally lasting character. For this reason, he 
referred to genetic analyses as “explanatory” (erklärende) as distinguished 
from the “descriptive” (beschreibende) analyses of the static phenomenol-
ogy – it explains how certain intentional relations and forms of experience 
emerge at a certain moment, and why they do so.16 This form of expla-
nation was not interested in empirical causality but what Husserl called 
relations of motivation, i.e. those founding relations that make possible the 
emergence of different attitudes.17 
  Husserl called the general form of this set of relations by the con-
cept of “teleology” (Teleologie). This concept, however, was to be distin-
guished from the Aristotelian or other forms of mundane determinism 
necessarily guiding the development of the forms of nature (often called 
“ontogenesis”).18 Introduced as a part of the static analyses of conscious-
ness, teleology referred to the basic associative or synthetic structure of 
conscious life: to say that our conscious life is “teleologically oriented” 
simply means that we do not live through mere fleeting experiences but 
our conscious life aims at creating concrete beings as unities. For instance, 
individual perceptions of particular “sides” of a thing have their telos in the 
constitution of “complete” objects.19 Accordingly, instead of a separate cat-
15 HuaXI: 340ff.
16 HuaXI: 340. Cf. Steinbock 1998b: 128.
17 HuaI: 109.
18 HuaXI: 339.
19 HuaI: 12–13; HuaIII: 213.
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egory of being, teleology was to be understood as the “form of all forms” 
(Form aller Formen), that is, as the general structure of all meaning-consti-
tution that we are constantly living through.20 Already in Ideas I Husserl 
distinguished his own definition of teleology from all (Hegelian) interpre-
tations referring to a kind of transcendent “theology” guiding the rational 
development of sense. “The ordering principle of the absolute must be 
found in the absolute itself ”, and this absolute was nothing else than tran-
scendental subjectivity.21 Being “teleological through and through”, this 
subjectivity always embodies a certain constitutive history which delin-
eates a horizon of possibilities for further development.22 
  The general form of this teleology is structured by what Husserl calls 
by the notion of Stiftung that could be translated as “institution”, “estab-
lishment”, or “foundation”. It is perhaps instructive to note that although 
the notion itself refers to the positing of a particular validity or sense it 
is practically absent from the early static analyses of constitution.23 Al-
though this notion is very close to what Husserl, in the first volume of 
Ideas, calls “positing” (Setzung) or “thesis” (Thesis), it differs from these by 
paying attention to the temporal aspect of meaning-institution. The notion 
of Stiftung denotes is the abiding character of a particular affect, act or 
meaning-content, and as such, it opens up the problematic of the temporal 
genesis of sense. The notion of Stiftung introduces also a whole family of no-
tions – Urstiftung, Nachstiftung, Neustiftung, and Umstiftung – which refer 
to the dynamic transformation of meaning-institution, its development 
both in the conscious life of an individual as well as in the field of cultural 
accomplishments.24 Hence, it is possible to distinguish between two levels 
20 HuaXV: 380.
21 “Im Absoluten selbst und in rein absoluter Betrachtung muß das ordnende Prinzip des 
Absoluten gefunden werden“ (HuaIII: 121).
22 HuaIX: 254.
23 “Und so ist es also Gesetz: daß jede “Meinung” eine Stiftung ist [...]” (HuaIV: 113); “So 
lebe ich in einem Milieu immerfort sich aneinander fügender, sich immer neu ergänzender 
In-Geltung-Setzung (Stiftung einer Seinsgültigkeit für mich, oder, in der geraden Blick-
richtung auf das Gegenständliche, Stiftung für mich „daseiender” Erfahrungsgegenstände)” 
(HuaIX: 462–463).
24 As James Dodd argues in his work Crisis and Reflection, we ought to avoid the temptation 
of conceiving the notion of Stiftung in “architectural terms”, for instance, in the sense of 
Greeks laying the foundation for Western civilization. Whereas the architectural frame-
work points towards the idea of rigid and solid foundations, Husserl’s idea of original 
“institutions” make possible a wide variety of different beginnings. For Husserl, argues 
Dodd, “Greek philosophy is the “foundation” for a project, in that it represents the original 
motivation that projects a certain course of understanding.” (Dodd 2004: 63). This begin-
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of genetic phenomena: (i) the different temporal modes of consciousness 
and (ii) the meaning-formations produced by it (the process Husserl re-
fers to as the “sedimentation of sense”, Sinnsedimentierung).25
  The notion of Urstiftung, “original institution”26, is evidently the most 
common formulation that Husserl employs while speaking of meaning-
constitution in genetic terms. With this notion, Husserl simply means the 
constitution of sense that takes place for the first time – for instance, as in 
Husserl’s own example of familiarizing with previously unknown object 
such as scissors – creating a lasting validity and a horizon of expectation 
for future experience.27 After this kind of institution, I do not have to cre-
ate the meaning of scissors each time anew (e.g. learn how to use them), 
but the institution of their sense stays in my experience as an “abiding 
possession”28. Of course, the original sense or validity does not neces-
sarily stay the same, for the meaning of things and places as well as our 
own convictions change constantly. Take the example of scissors: although 
I may have learned to use this object as a tool for cutting things, I may later 
discover that it is also suitable for curling ribbons. As this happens, the 
original institution undergoes what Husserl calls Nachstiftung or Neustif-
tung, “re-establishment” or “novel establishment”, that is, a transformation 
ning does not predelineate the results of this particular activity, but merely the attitude or 
a sense of project characteristic of it. On the concept of Stiftung and its connotations, see 
e.g. Held 1966: 37ff; Buckley 1992: 39. 
25 HuaVI: 380.
26 See e.g. HuaI: 118, 143–146; HuaIV: 117; HuaXI: 203–207; HuaXXXIX: 1–6. Urstif-
tung as a generative notion, see HuaVI: 10–11, 72–73; HuaVIII: 17ff.; HuaXXIX: 15ff. At 
times, Husserl makes a distinction between an “absolute” and a “relative” Urstiftung – the 
first denoting the creation of a completely novel type of meaning, while the latter stands 
for a inception which is more or less conformed with an existing framework of sense. 
HuaXXIX: 421. This distinction is somewhat analogical to Husserl’s distinction between 
Urstiftung and Ur-urstiftung within individual genesis. Cf. HuaXXXIX: 2.
27 See HuaI: 141. Here, the existing scholarship points towards two competing inter-
pretations. As Antony Steinbock puts it, the problem of primal institution belongs to “the 
sphere of genetic development which is fully passive” (1995, 41), whereas, in contrast, 
Philip J. Buckley calls Urstiftung “the moment of original authenticity”, which “occurs […] 
through a deliberate act of self-reflection and direction of will, a new type of conscious-
ness directed at a new type of intentional object is formed” (1992, 39). I believe this di-
vergence is best explained in terms of two modes of consciousness: Although the original 
institution of sense takes place in an attentive mode of consciousness, its validity is attested 
inattentively.
28 HuaI: 95. “Aber jeder Akt, “erstmalig” vollzogen, ist “Urstiftung” einer bleibenden Ei-
genheit, in die immanente Zeit hinein dauernd (im Sinne eines dauernden Identischen)” 
HuaIV, 311.
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of sense that carries the former meaning with it.29 The “original” function 
is not necessarily swiped away, but the object is bestowed with a new di-
mension of sense – one, which broadens its horizon of meaning. 
  Husserl calls this accumulation of sense also by the term sedimenta-
tion (Sedimentierung).30 As a category of genetic phenomenology, sedimen-
tation refers to the building up of sense that takes place in the course of 
time – a process, in which different acts or layers of meaning are stratified 
upon one another. The living body (Leib), for instance, is not a mere col-
lection of different faculties – seeing, hearing, walking, touching etc. – 
but also a sedimented history of different capabilities. Individual skills and 
competences are never isolated faculties but they follow and presuppose 
one another.31 For instance, children usually learn to walk first by acquir-
ing themselves the necessary gross motor skills by crawling and standing 
against objects. These abilities, in their turn, are made possible by a series 
of kinaesthetic and proprioceptic faculties (the sense of balance, muscle 
memory etc.). And while children might not exercise the faculty of crawl-
ing very often after they have learned how to walk, it still remains as a 
latent possibility in the sedimented history of faculties.
  Not all processes of sedimentation, however, take the form of simple 
accumulation. In some cases, it is exactly the forgetting or dismissal of 
a previous layer of meaning that makes possible the constitution of new 
ones. Having grown into a fear of heights, for instance, I must somehow 
get rid of this “habituation” (i.e. sense of fear) in order to acquire for my-
self the ability to climb again into high places. As Husserl suggested, it is 
exactly this type of forgetting that is not only characteristic, but absolutely 
essential to the development of scientific objectivity. As I showed in the 
previous part, Husserl conceived the Galilean discovery of mathemati-
cal ideality through the twofold process of discovering and concealing: 
although Galileo’s projection of mathematical universe was able to create 
wonderful technique in order to predict the movement of natural objects, 
it was based on a simultaneous “forgetting” of the concrete subjective ori-
gin of this abstraction, including a wide variety of other types of idealities 
that we encounter within our concrete environment. 
29 See especially HuaIX: 212–215. Cf. HuaVI: 12, 72, 471; HuaXXIX: 417.
30 See esp. HuaVI: 371ff. Cf. HuaXI: 180ff.; HuaMatVIII: 22ff.
31 „Der Leib mit seinen abgegliederten Organen ist eine Sedimentierung von Vermögen 
des in solchen und solchen typischen Formen Tun-Könnens.“ HuaMatVIII: 345.
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  Especially in his later works, Husserl located the foundation of this 
tendency in the general structure of human language. Although he often 
emphasized the essentially expressive function of language, which makes 
possible mutual understanding on the basis of a shared symbolic reality, he 
also maintained that it would be one-sided to conceive language as a mere 
functional ability, an “organ of spirit”32. Not only is language a medium of 
understanding, but it also contains within itself a dimension of objective 
existence, which makes possible the sedimentation of meaning, and, cor-
respondingly, the process of forgetting. Language, as it materializes itself 
in words and signs, is also a kind of phraseology, a collection of symbolic 
intentions whose meaning has been exhausted by repetition and conven-
tion. This is what Husserl in his essay on geometry called the “seduction of 
language” (Verführung der Sprache) – the general tendency of life to “relapse 
into a kind of talking and reading that is dominated purely by association”.33 
What often hinders us from saying what we mean is not simply the com-
mon perception that “words are not enough”: because language contains 
an inclination towards phrases and clichés – the conventional modes of 
saying with their associative structures –words are sometimes “too much”. 
They invoke all sorts of cultural, historical and social connotations and 
associations, which are alien to the experience itself. Language, too, is a 
domain of passivity.
  But what really constituted the novelty of the genetic method? Did 
Husserl not understand the process of constitution in terms of sedimen-
tation already in his static analyses? Jacques Derrida, for one, has raised 
this question with regard to Husserl’s earlier works. Already in the first 
32 HuaXIV: 205.
33 “It is easy to see that even in [ordinary] human life, [...] the originally intuitive life 
which creates its originally self-evident structures through activities on the basis of sense-
experience very quickly and in increasing measure falls victim to the seduction of lan-
guage. Greater and greater segments of this life lapse into a kind of talking and reading 
that is dominated purely by association [...].” (“Es ist leicht zu bemerken, daß im mensch-
lichen Leben schon, [...] das ursprünglich anschauliche Leben, das in Aktivitäten auf dem 
Grunde sinnlicher Erfahrung seine ursprünglich evidenten Gebilde schafft, sehr schnell 
und in wachsendem Maße der Verführung der Sprache verfällt. Es verfällt in großen und 
immer größeren Strecken in ein rein von Assoziationen beherrschtes Reden und Lesen 
[...]“ HuaVI: 372.) We are perhaps reminded here of Hannah Arendt, who in her work on 
the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem, pointed out the interesting connection between 
Eichmann’s recurring use of worn-out phrases and clichés and his incapability to think in 
moral-ethical terms. On Eichmann’s concurring use of “stock phrases” and “self-invented 
clichés”, see Arendt 1977: 49.
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part of Husserl’s Philosophy of Arithmetic (1890) – a work that deals with 
the constitution of number through the synthetic activity of consciousness 
– Derrida argued that “the problem of genesis is posed in all its scope”34. 
Even these early analyses did not consider meaning-constitution merely 
in terms of truth and validity but with regard to relations of foundation: 
large numbers (or what Husserl calls “symbolic numbers”), for instance, 
refer back to the more simple, “authentic numbers” that can be evidently 
verified in simple experience (e.g. I can see four objects on the table). 
These simple numbers, in turn, have their foundation in the synthetic acts 
of consciousness, which make possible the very categories of unity and 
multiplicity. For this reason, also Philip Miller holds that “[counting and 
calculation] are both instances of what Husserl would later call ‘sediment-
ed’ thinking”.35 
  Indeed, in a letter to Paul Natorp from 1918, Husserl claimed that he 
had “overcome the level of static Platonism more than a decade ago, and set 
the idea of transcendental genesis as the main theme of phenomenology”36. 
As I see it, this “overcoming” did not relate to the early analyses Philoso-
phy of Arithmetic or the Logical Investigations and the constitutional analyses 
presented in them. Even though they presented the constitution of sense 
as proceeding from the simple sensuous and categorical intuitions to the 
higher-order objectivities, they did not yet investigate into the dynamic 
unity of acts that constitute the temporal “figure” of conscious life itself. 
This point was also confirmed also by Husserl himself, who explicitly ex-
cluded the problems of genesis from the project of the Investigations.37 
34 Derrida 2003: 20.
35 Miller 1992: 81. This point is also related to Husserl’s alleged Platonism – or Platonic 
idealism –, according to which he would have considered the laws and concepts of logic 
(and arithmetic) as “ontologically” self-sufficient entities. However, as it is clear from Pro-
legomena, if Husserl’s position could be described as Platonism, it is by character logical, 
not ontological. Ideal objects cannot be reduced to particular psychological states – this 
would amount to a form of psychologism –, but it makes no sense to speak of their truth 
without reference to their becoming evident in the sphere of conscious life. Husserl’s own 
characterization of Platonism, see HuaXXII: 156–157; HuaVI: 367. Cf. HuaIII: 48–50; 
Tieszen 2010. HuaVI: 367. Cf. HuaIII: 48–50.
36 ”wobei ich noch bemerken darf, dass ich schon seit mehr als einem Jahrzehnt die Stufe 
des statischen Platonismus überwunden und der Phänomenologie als Hauptthema die Idee 
der transzendentalen Genesis gestellt habe” (R I Natorp, 29.VI.1918). Quoted in Gadamer 
GW 1: 247.
37 See for instance HuaXIX/1: §35. 
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  Two works are here of special importance. First of all, the topic 
temporality per se was introduced in the context of Husserl’s lectures 
on time-consciousness of 1905, which discussed the temporal structure 
conscious life by analyzing the flow of experience. These analyses were 
complemented by the lecture series Ding und Raum (1907), which intro-
duced the theme of so-called kinaesthetic syntheses that are essential to 
the constitution of thinghood, motion and spatiality. Although the notion 
of genesis was absent from both of these lecture series, it may well be 
accommodated into both: as Husserl put it in the Cartesian Meditations, 
the problem of time-consciousness – by portraying the present moment 
as something which necessarily embodies a retentional trace – belonged 
to the “first and most fundamental level of genetic problems”38. A similar 
point was also raised in a short 1916 addendum to the Ding und Raum 
lectures, where Husserl retrospectively referred to the kinaesthetic analy-
ses as “genetic”39. What these analyses revealed was the basic structure of 
“associations” – a concept that Husserl picked up from Brentano – which 
structure the intentional objects according to coexistence and succession, 
and thus constitute the intentional flow as unitary. This is what Husserl 
later called the theory of universal genesis investigating infinite nexus of 
associative syntheses.40
  There are actually two reasons why the theme of genesis is important 
in refuting the alleged subjective idealism in Husserl’s phenomenology. 
First of all, by proceeding from the idea of inner time-consciousness to 
the problem of transcendental genesis, Husserl was able to avoid the idea 
according to which the transcendental ego would function as a mere for-
mal principle of experiential unity. By calling forth the associative struc-
ture of consciousness, Husserl was able to confront a wholly new level of 
transcendental experience, that of passive genesis leading to a theory of the 
transcendental person. Secondly, by elaborating the manifold levels of pas-
sive genesis, Husserl was able to rearticulate his notion of constitution to 
encompass also those structures of meaning, which do not originate solely 
within our own conscious life. The topic of genesis provided the necessary 
38 HuaI: 169.
39 HuaXVI: 369
40 HuaI: 114; HuaIX: 534; HuaXI: 24.
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link to the idea of historical facticity, our embeddedness in a tradition of 
values and validities. This discovery had extremely important consequenc-
es with regard to Husserl’s notion of the transcendental as well as the ab-
soluteness of the individual ego. Moreover, the novel historical dimension 
urged Husserl to rearticulate his idea of concreteness in phenomenology.
  The first point can be illuminated by a comparison with Kant. As is 
well known, Kant approached the problem of subjectivity in terms of two 
necessary aspects: the transcendental and the empirical. It was one of the 
basic insights of Kant that we find ourselves as someone who perceive 
the world but also as worldly beings as such, i.e. both as constitutive as 
well as constituted beings. In his Critique of Pure Reason (first published in 
1781), Kant introduced the division between the two aspects of the self 
basically in terms of form and matter, between the general principle of 
self-consciousness and its psychological manifestation in concrete experi-
ence.41 According to this view, the ego “possesses” its experiences in two 
distinct, although closely related, regards: experiences are joined together 
by the unitary structure of consciousness, but they are also lived through 
as my personal experiences, my concrete perceptions, acts, and so on. The 
first regard – the transcendental – expresses the idea that our experience 
is always self-centered but it also allows to speak of consciousness as con-
sisting of several simultaneous modes of experience. For instance, to hear 
a melody is not the same as to receive acoustic signals, but it means to 
constitute this tune as a meaningful piece of music – as something which 
arouses a certain emotion, as something which piques aesthetic interest. 
  To describe the specific mode of givenness in which the transcenden-
tal ego appears to itself, Kant employed the notion of apperception (liter-
ally: the “surplus” of perception): every experience is conceivable only 
as belonging to someone, as an experience of the “I”.42 With this idea of 
apperceptive self-awareness, Kant was able to avoid, first of all, Hume’s 
41 This is the basic division presented in the part on “transcendental deduction” (“Tran-
scendentale Deduction der reinen Verstandesbegriffe” §§15-27) in Akad.-A. III: 107ff. See 
especially III: 108.
42 Akad.-A. IV: 223. “The “I think” must be able to accompany all my representations: for 
otherwise something would be represented in me that could not be thought at all, which is 
as much as to say that the representation would either be impossible or else at least would 
be nothing to me.” (“Das: Ich denke, muss alle meine Vorstellungen begleiten können; 
denn sonst würde etwas in mir vorgestellt werden, was gar nicht gedacht werden könnte, 
welches eben so viel heißt, als die Vorstellung würde entweder unmöglich, oder wenigsten 
für mich nichts sein.“) Akad.A. III: 108.
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empiricist conception according to which we would experience ourselves 
merely as objects of perception.43 Secondly, although Kant was favorable 
towards the Cartesian cogito in the sense that an experience always entails 
a thinking “I”, he denied that the transcendental ego could be understood 
in terms of a thinking substance. Instead of a mental being, the selfhood 
of the cogito was to be understood as a non-intuitable pole of experience 
lacking “any quality whatsoever”44. Thus in its apperceived form, Kant 
argued, the transcendental ego “contains nothing manifold”.45 Though it 
transcends the idea of a purely logical function (i.e. first-person pronoun) 
it remains essentially the same. Without this atemporal principle of expe-
rience there would be no givenness at all.46
  In order to explain how the unified structure of conscious life come 
about, Kant needed to develop a notion of givenness that would describe 
how single perceptions or intuitions are transformed into coherent ex-
periences. For this purpose, he invoked the notion of synthesis that de-
scribed the conjunctive character of our intuitions and representations. 
Here, Kant distinguished between two kinds of synthesis, those of sensu-
ous experience – bringing together particular intuitive contents – and 
those of conceptual-discursive thinking, which bring these contents under 
logical notions. The sensuous synthesis was developed as a part of Kant’s 
theory of transcendental aesthetics, which, as an investigation of sensuous 
intuition and its pure (i.e. non-derivative) forms of space and time, was 
to be distinguished from the transcendental analytics that deal with the 
categories of reason as well as the transcendental dialectics operating with 
the supreme realities of autonomous ego, world and God. 
  Kant called the basic structure of this synthesis association, which, un-
like for Hume, was not to be understood as a psychological feature, but 
as an a priori, transcendental function of consciousness. Instead of merely 
connecting single intuitions to one another, Kant understood the sensu-
ous association as a constructive faculty, which makes possible the high-
er-order categorical syntheses of reason. Kant spoke here of a “figurative 
43 “For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on 
some particular perception or other (…) I never can catch myself without a perception, 
and never can observe anything but the perception.” Hume 1888: 252.
44 “[…] ohne die mindeste Eigenschaft desselben zu bemerken.” Akad.-A IV: 224 
45 “[…] das Ich, welches im ersteren Verstande gar keine Mannigfaltigkeit in sich faßt.“ 
Akad.-A III: 511. Cf. Akad.-A IV: 224.
46 Akad.-A. IV: 117; Akad.-A. III: 157.
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synthesis” or a synthesis speciosa, which, by conjoining sensuous experiences 
on the basis of their likeness and resemblance, gives the pre-predicative 
experience its peculiar structure.47 
  Accordingly, Husserl credited Kant for his unique attempt of describ-
ing the field of sensuous intuition not only as a raw data-like givenness but 
as a productive activity, which founds the predicative forms of experience. In 
other words, Kant succeeded in transferring the field of receptivity from 
the sphere of mere psychology to that of transcendental investigation. 
However, because of the rather constrained function that Kant attributed 
to the figurative synthesis, he avoided its crucial implications for the con-
stituting ego. “[Kant’s] brilliant doctrine of the transcendental necessity 
of association is not supported by a phenomenological eidetic analysis”, 
Husserl argued – “It does not investigate what is actually at issue under the 
rubric of association with respect to elementary facts and essential laws, 
and thereby making understandable the genetic unitary structure of pure 
subjective life”48. In this regard, Kant did not bring together the associative 
synthesis with the temporal structure of transcendental consciousness: his 
account failed to question how individual associations provide the tran-
scendental life with its peculiar shape.49 This was due to the fact that for 
Kant, temporality was inherently a feature of the empirical consciousness: 
as a general principle of experience, the transcendental consciousness is 
fundamentally atemporal. 
  Husserl’s phenomenology – which took its point of departure from 
the subject as concrete and personal – implied a severe challenge for the 
Kantian concept of the transcendental. Not only did Husserl’s concept of 
the transcendental denote the structures through which the ego establish-
47 Akad.-A. III: 119. This synthesis was not to be confused with imagination (Einbildung-
skraft), which denotes the reproductive capacity of transcendental apperception. See Ibid.: 
120–122.
48 HuaXI: 119
49 See e.g. Kant’s Akad.-A. IV: 91–92: “Actual experience, which is constituted by ap-
prehension, association (reproduction), and finally recognition of appearances, contains 
in recognition, the last and highest of these merely empirical elements of experience, certain 
concepts which render possible the formal unity of experience, and therewith all objec-
tive validity (truth) of empirical knowledge.” (“Die wirkliche Erfahrung, welche aus der 
Apprehension, der Association (der Reproduction), endlich der Recognition der Erschei-
nungen besteht, enthält in der letzteren und höchsten (der bloss empirischen Elemente der 
Erfahrung) Begriffe, welche die formale Einheit der Erfahrung und mit ihr alle obiective 
Gültigkeit (Wahrheit) der empirischen Erkentniß möglich machen.“) My italics.
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es itself as a unity of experiences but also as a unity of a temporal flow. This 
flow, argued Husserl, is always personal in the sense that it belongs to an “I” 
but also in the sense that it generates a manifold of eidetic structures by 
which the transcendental subject finds itself as particular. This was one of 
the major transformations in Husserl’s notion of the transcendental with 
regard to the classic Kantian definition: the transcendental ego is not an 
empty logical principle but always and inextricably my own. 
  This transformation, whose implications were vast, led Husserl to de-
velop a unique theory of transcendental person with its abiding style and 
habitus. We do not merely “live through” individual acts, but these acts 
have the tendency of creating lasting tendencies, patterns and inten-
tions, which become a part of my personal history. These tendencies may 
manifest themselves, for instance, in the form of lasting “convictions” 
(Überzeugungen), a “decisions” (Entscheidungen), or “resolution of the will” 
(Willenentschluss)50 which are not simple empirical generalizations: a last-
ing conviction, for instance, has a general structure whether it has been 
acquired through seeing, hearing, reading etc. As such, these convictions 
endow my transcendental ego with its essential uniqueness, its personal 
history and character. This is why Husserl stresses that the notions of ha-
bitus and style should not be taken in their everyday sense of custom and 
routine nor should they be equated with memory or recollection. Instead, 
they should be understood as transcendental features that belong primor-
dially to the sphere of pure ego.51 
  It is perhaps surprising that in order to describe both the unified char-
acter of the transcendental life and its essential openness towards other 
subjects, Husserl employed the Leibnizian concept of monad. Without go-
ing to further details on the history of this concept, we should pay at-
tention to at least two features that Leibniz discusses in his Monadology 
(paragraph §18). Monads, argues Leibniz, are a form of substance, and 
following the Aristotelian dictum, they can be understood according to 
an “entelechy”, that is, as striving towards their full actuality or essence. 
However – and this is where Leibniz breaks off with Aristotle – “they have 
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internal activities”52. And this is what Leibniz means with the well-known 
idea of “windowlessness”: not only do monads “stand outside” the empiri-
cal causal processes but they contain the forms of genesis and teleology 
within themselves.53 
  So it is for Husserl: “Under the rubric of monad we have had in mind 
the unity of its living becoming, its history”54. Instead of a mere pole of 
experience, the monad is a dynamic unity of experiences, “as continu-
ously becoming in time”55 with its sedimented history which allows the 
future possibilities to come about. Thus teleology, understood as the gen-
eral structure of the monad, is not an objectively given purpose but an 
immanent principle of development.
  Neither for Leibniz nor Husserl did this idea of windowlessness 
equal with complete isolation. By excluding the causal relations between 
monads, both of them were able to take the question of their interrelation 
into another dimension, that of transcendental investigation (although 
with regard to Leibniz, this term should be understood in its pre-Kantian 
sense). As Leibniz famously put it, every monad “expresses” the whole 
world by “mirroring” every other monad so that while sustaining its au-
tonomy and particularity, it has potentially the totality of monads within 
itself. It was exactly this idea that came to be one of the central motives 
of Husserl’s transcendental monadology. Instead of being mere distinct 
objects of experience, the others are embedded in my experience not only 
as objects but as someone who participate in the process of constitution. 
Actually, it is only through others that I am able to constitute for myself an 
objective reality, which makes possible social interaction in the pregnant 
(i.e. active) sense of the word. 
  Accordingly, it is understandable that in one of his earliest character-
izations of the genetic phenomenology, Husserl introduced the topic of 
intersubjectivity in terms of a twofold monadic interrelation – passive 
and active genesis: 
[We are led to ask:] In what sense can the genesis of a monad be 
implicated in the genesis of another, and in what sense can a unity 
52 Leibniz 1898: 229.
53 Leibniz 1898: 219. 
54 „Aber wir haben jetzt unter dem Titel Monade ins Auge gefasst die Einheit ihres leben-
digen Werdens, ihrer Geschichte.“ HuaXIV: 36.
55 Ibid.
— 173 —
2.1. Genesis and the Life of the Subject
of genesis, according to [genetic] laws, combine a multiplicity of 
monads? 
[i. In the sense of a] passive genesis, on the one hand, which in the 
case of the constitution of an anthropological world refers to the 
constituted physiological processes and to their conditions in the 
unity of the physical world with the lived-body of another;
[ii. In the sense of] active genesis, on the other, which refers to the 
form of motivation of my thinking, valuing, willing through that 
of others. 
Thus, considering the individuality of the monad leads to the ques-
tion of the individuality of a multiplicity of coexisting monads, 
monads genetically connected to one another […].56
Thus, what Husserl opened with the problem of genesis was nothing less 
than the intrinsic “communalization” (Vergemeinschaftung) of the transcen-
dental subject: the fundamental openness of transcendental life towards 
other subjects, its coalescence in different social units – personal relation-
ships, communities, civilizations. Again, it is possible to elucidate Husserl’s 
position in a clear contrast to the Kantian concept of the transcendental. 
For Kant the problem of intersubjectivity was basically excluded from the 
transcendental analyses of Critique of Pure Reason, and it did not really be-
come relevant until the Critique of Practical Reason (1788) and the Critique 
of Judgment (1790) with respect to the concrete phenomena of respect, 
love, aesthetic taste, culture and so on. Despite the insightful character of 
these analyses, Kant considered the question of other subjects primarily 
in practical-ethical terms, as a question of a just and responsive relation 
towards other people. He did not endow the other subjects any kind of 
role in the transcendental structures of constitution, but the doctrine of 
categories which explained the constitution of objectivity and the world 
was to be understood solely on the basis of the ego and its relation to the 
56 “Und mit all dem haben wir verbunden die Fragen, in welchem Sinn die Genesis einer 
Monade in die einer anderen hineingreifen und eine Einheit der Genesis eine Vielheit von 
Monaden gesetzlich verbinden kann; einerseits die passive Genesis, die im Fall der Kon-
stitution einer anthropologischen Welt (bzw. einer animalischen) auf die konstituierten 
physiologischen Prozesse und die Bedingtheit derselben in der Einheit der physischen Welt 
mit dem Gegenleib verweist, andererseits die aktive Genesis in der Form der Motivation 
meines Denkens, Wertens, Wollens durch das anderer. Also die Betrachtung der Individua-
lität der Monade führt auf die Frage der Individualität einer Vielheit koexistierender und 
miteinander genetisch verbundener Monaden […]“ HuaXI: 342–343.
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world. For this reason, Husserl was able to call the Kantian ego funda-
mentally “isolated”.57 Kant did not investigate into the basic structures of 
passive genesis, or, to be more precise, his analyses failed to recognize the 
essentially intersubjective character of this domain: besides the associative 
and synthetic activity of the individual, our concrete world-constitution 
entails a necessary relation towards the other subjects without which no 
idea of objectivity or world could ever come about. (I will return to this 
idea in Chapter 2.2).
  Remaining solely within this description, one might still confront 
the critique proposed by Foucault, according to which Husserlian pheno-
menology would still resolve itself “into a description […] of actual ex-
perience, and into an ontology of the unthought that automatically short-
circuits the primacy of the ‘I think’.”58 This is to say that although Husserl 
provides us with a transformed notion of cogito, which finds itself not as 
a mere center of conscious life but as being essentially open towards a 
horizon of alien experience, this analysis is not enough: it falls short with 
regard to the historical, social and political processes of meaning-forma-
tion and their concrete practices or “techniques”. It is only on the basis of 
these conditions, Foucault claims, that we are able to question the peculiar 
identity, unity and self-understanding of the human being.
  Although Foucault’s interpretation of Husserl’s concept of constitu-
tion seems to refer to an idea of active “construction” performed by the 
ego – an idea that Husserl refuted in several occasions – it is also possible 
to confront the criticism on the essential egocentrism of phenomenology 
from another, more constructive point of view. While it is certainly evi-
dent that Husserl never gave up on the fundamentally idealistic undertone 
of phenomenology, I believe this idealism – like phenomenology itself – 
was to be understood as primarily methodological.59 In other words, for 
Husserl the specific “primacy of the cogito” was nothing more than the 
necessary methodological insistence to approach the constitution of ob-
jectivity, meaning and sense starting from an experiential, first-person 
point of view. It was not an ontological commitment concerning the fun-
57 HuaXXIX: 120.See also Zahavi 2001:17.
58 Foucault 2002: 355.
59 As Husserl puts it in the Crisis, the epoche creates a unique philosophical “solitude” (Ein-
samkeit), but merely as a “methodological requirement” for a genuinely radical philosophy 
(HuaVI: 188). This point has been emphasized also by Carr 1987: 68.
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daments of reality as such; the world is not a simple construction of the 
subject but it also has a form of existence that transcends this. Although all 
meanings and meaning-formations gain their validity and sense ultimately 
through the conscious life of the individual, it is possible to discuss their 
existence and temporal development apart from it, for instance, in the 
form of cultural objectivities, accomplishments, written documents, and 
so on. As I will argue in chapter 2.4, instead of a one-sided, accomplishing 
relation between individual and culture, Husserl conceived this relation as 
essentially reciprocal – as a specific instantiation of the “paradox of subjec-
tivity” arguing for the constitutive as well as constituted character of human 
existence.
  The primacy of the individual ego in Husserl’s phenomenology was 
called into question, above all, by the problem of generativity (Generativität).60 
As the terminological affinity yields up, Husserl introduced the problem 
of generativity as mounting from the general problem of genesis. With 
generativity, Husserl basically denoted the temporal modes of meaning-
constitution that take place in the interpersonal and intergenerational 
forms of co-existence – in different associations, communities, cultures 
and all kinds of traditions. In this regard, the domain of generativity de-
noted nothing less than the “unity of historical development in its wid-
est sense”61 – those structures of genetic development that constitute the 
unified character of traditionality and historicity in general. Against the 
Hegelian idea of universal history proceeding through the development 
of spirit, Husserl did not conceive generativity primarily as a universal, 
formal principle of historical development.62 Instead, as in the case of 
60 On the idea of generativity, see Introduction. Before introducing the notion of genera-
tivity, Husserl occasionally referred to problems of “communal genesis” (Gemeinschaftsgen-
esis), see HuaXIV: 221. In Crisis, the problem of generativity was introduced as a general 
structure of transcendental historicity proceeding through a “[…] transcendental inquiry 
which starts from the essential forms of human existence in society, in personalities of a 
higher order, and proceeds back to their transcendental and thus absolute signification.” 
(„[…] der transzendentalen Rückfragen von den Wesensformen menschlichen Daseins in 
Gesellschaftlichkeit, in Personalitäten höherer Ordnung, auf ihre transzendentale und so-
mit absolute Bedeutung.“) HuaVI: 191–192. Cf. HuaXXIX: 37, 60ff.
61 HuaXXIX: 63.
62 As Merleau-Ponty suggests in his lectures on “institution” and “passivity”, it was exactly 
due to this essential incompleteness that Husserl went on to develop a phenomenology 
of culture instead of spirit: “The traditionality of consciousness means forgetfulness of 
origins, hands over a tradition, founds it. And correlatively, there is the tradition received, 
i.e. the possibility of reactivation. […] Not philosophy of participation in the one, of intel-
lectual creation, of Spirit, but philosophy of culture.” Merleau-Ponty 2010: 52–53.
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individual consciousness, generativity was to be approached through its 
particular instantiations in individual traditions. As human subjects, we 
are constantly participating in several generative traditions, which, de-
spite their variations (e.g. family, nation, civilization), all share the general 
structure of descending and evolving, that is, they are all something passed 
forward.
  Within the existing Husserl-scholarship, the problems of historicity 
and tradition have often been treated as secondary issues, as merely com-
plimentary analyses with regard to the core questions of phenomenology. 
If we adhere only to Husserl’s published works, this conception is some-
what justified, for the problem of generativity – excluded from the scope 
of static phenomenology – is most often introduced only in passing. In the 
Cartesian Meditations, the only reference to this phenomenon is made only 
at the final section of this work (§61) where Husserl refers to the “genetic 
problems of birth and death and the generative nexus of psychophysical being” as 
belonging to a “higher level” of investigation, presupposing “a tremendous 
labor of explication pertaining to the lower spheres”63. Respectively, in the 
paragraph §55 of Crisis, Husserl introduces the problem of generativity 
with the metaphor of levels (Stufen).64 While the problems of communal 
and historical genesis represent the highest stiles of the phenomenological 
stairway, we must walk them backwards in order to arrive at the funda-
mental levels of world-constitution.
  Again, this idea of a specific order should be understood as primarily 
methodological. As phenomenologically philosophizing subjects, everything 
that makes sense must be examined beginning with our conscious life; 
however, this does not mean that all of our constitutional analyses would 
remain solely on the level of individual experience. The transcendental 
ego, as Husserl puts it, is indeed the final absolute – but it is not the sole 
absolute. To be more precise, the ego is not the sole modality of phenom-
enological absolute, but rather an abstraction from what Husserl calls the 
“concrete absolute”65 that is constituted within transcendental intersub-
63 “Nur daß damit freilich noch die oben bezeichneten generativen Probleme von Geburt 
und Tod und Generationszusammenhang der Animalität nicht berührt sind, die offenbar 
einer höheren Dimension angehören und eine so ungeheure auslegende Arbeit der unteren 
Sphären voraussetzen, daß sie noch lange nicht zu Arbeitsproblemen werden können.“ 
HuaI: 169. 
64 HuaVI: 191. On the metaphor of levels, see e.g. Depraz 1995: 6ff.
65 Cf. “Die Vielheit des Subjekte als das konrete Absolute”, HuaXIV: 272.
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jectivity. In other words, by focusing solely on the constitutive activity of 
the ego, we abstract from the overall processes of meaning-constitution, 
which, in the case of our worldly experience, are inextricably intersubjec-
tive. They are realized in different historical, cultural, and socio-political 
matrixes. How exactly Husserl worked out the difference between the 
levels of subjective, intersubjective and communal spheres of constitution 
becomes evident as soon as we probe more deeply into the Husserlian 
social ontology – however, we must first pay attention to the significant 
methodological possibility that the generative dimension brings about.
  Let us first take seriously the claim made in Fifth Meditation: why 
exactly are birth and death introduced here in connection to the problem 
of generativity? Are these really problems of the transcendental genesis? We 
encounter here one of the major controversies with regard to Husserl’s 
phenomenological project, namely, the question on the transcendental sig-
nificance of birth and death. Traditionally, the alleged dismissal of human 
finitude has been seen one of the major weaknesses of Husserl’s project 
– an accusation that can be traced back to the first overviews of Husserl’s 
phenomenological project, such as Levinas’ 1940 essay “The Work of Ed-
mund Husserl”.66 These conceptions rely often on the view that Husserl, 
while recognizing the unquestioned finitude of human existence, had to 
66 In this essay, Levinas credited Husserl for dissociating his own phenomenological view 
of consciousness (i.e. consciousness as concrete and singular) from the abstract notion of 
Geist of the German idealism. Despite this emphasis on the singularity of the ego, Husserl 
did not clarify, Levinas claims, the fundamental connection between singularity and factic-
ity – and thus the problem of mortality: “How this individuality of consciousness in gen-
eral, divested of all the “facticity” of birth and death, can be individual – this is a problem 
Husserl does not deal with, at least in his published works” (Levinas 1998: 75). According 
to him, it was only Heidegger who first introduced the “constitutive” significance of these 
ideas through the analysis of Dasein and its specific finitude in “being-towards-death” (GA 
2: §§51-53). However, since the publication of several manuscripts dealing with problem-
atic mortality, several commentators have rectified this view by elucidating the unique role 
of these notions in Husserl’s body of work. Zahavi, for one, has argued for the constitutive 
significance of mortality on the basis of Husserl’s emphasis on corporeality, i.e. as the 
necessary corollary of the finitude and singularity of the transcendental subject (Zahavi 
2003: 108). Here, Zahavi confirms the basic argument presented by Steinbock (1995: 
189ff.) according to which birth and death could be acknowledged as transcendental no-
tions only in the context of generative phenomenology. As phenomenological categories, 
birth and death allow themselves to be distinguished from sleep only within the context of 
interpersonal and intergenerational activity, in which the irreversibility of death – and the 
genuine singularity of the transcendental ego – can be acknowledged. Cf. HuaXXIX: 87: 
“Zur transzendentalen Intersubjektivität in ihrem Kern gehört das Generative mit Geburt 
und Tod […].“
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exclude the topics of birth and death from the field of the transcendental. 
As Husserl put it: “Transcendental life and the transcendental ego cannot 
be born; only the human being in the world can be born”67 – the tran-
scendental ego stands always between the horizons of past and future, of 
retentional and protentional awareness, without which any idea of con-
sciousness would be conceivable.68 In consequence, we cannot imagine 
neither its inception nor cessation in a strictly phenomenological sense, 
for their givenness would of course presume the intentional flow of a 
transcendental ego to which they are given. Thus mortality, according to 
this view, stands as the final gatekeeper between the transcendental ego 
and the empirical person.
  With regard to the topic of finitude, however, we should acknowledge 
a certain shift of position in Husserl’s thinking. From the beginning of 
the 1930s, Husserl came to realize that both birth and death do indeed 
connote a certain transcendental significance, that is, they both have an 
essential role in the process of world-constitution. They do so, however, 
not as occurrences within experience – death cannot be intuitively expe-
rienced – but as a kind of horizontal structure delimiting the span of our 
lives within a socio-historical, generative context.69 Following the Heide-
ggerian dictum, it might be possible to speak of “impossible possibilities” 
that are never straightforwardly given but that function as kinds of con-
tinuously postponed horizons of human existence. However, the similari-
ties stop here. Whereas for Heidegger, death functions as the “ownmost” 
(eigenste) possibility of human existence, which singularizes and singles out 
the human being from the forgetfulness of everyday sociality, for Husserl 
the order is reversed. It is particularly through the dimension of inter-
subjective generativity that birth and death have any significance for me as 
transcendental categories. It is not until I grow into the idea of historical 
community that this horizontal structure of finitude is realized.70 I grow 
into my own mortality through others – without this intersubjective dimen-
sion, the transcendental significance of finitude falls short.
67 „[…] transzendentale Ich, nicht das empirische Welt-Ich, das sehr wohl sterben kann.“ 
HuaXI: 379.
68 This point is discussed also by Heinämaa 2010: 88.
69 On birth and death as limit-phenomena, see Steinbock 1998b: 305ff. 
70 HuaXV: 140. On Husserl’s critique of Heidegger’s concept of death, see HuaXXIX: 
332
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  Thus, from the perspective of phenomenological theory of the sub-
ject, the topic of generativity entailed a significant distention of the scope 
of meaning-constitution. Alongside with the forms of meaning-constitu-
tion that have their origin in the conscious life of the individual, Husserl 
began to discuss also those forms of meaning and sense that have their 
genuine origin outside of the activity of the individual ego. These forms, 
rather than being actively instituted through particular Urstiftungen, are 
essentially “appropriated” (übernehmen, aufnehmen). This means that they 
involve an element of asymmetry and partiality in regard to the original 
institution of sense – an asymmetry that originates from our mortality 
and finitude.71 But it is exactly this partiality that endows the human tradi-
tions their unique character as something “passed forward”. Accordingly, 
instead of delineating the temporality of individual traditions merely in 
terms of Hegelian dialectics (thesis–antithesis–synthesis), Husserl empha-
sized the fundamental elements of activating, forgetting and emptying of 
sense characteristic of the passing forward of traditions. It is exactly this 
elementary structure which endows the individual traditions with their 
specific “periodization” (Periodisierung). In the similar manner as the re-
tentions and recollections of the individual have a tendency to build as 
sociative groupings by virtue of their structural affinity – “memories of 
childhood”, “times of happiness”, and so on – traditions are likewise struc-
tured by the successful processes of activating and deactivating of sense 
and meaning.
  To put it in simpler terms, what the dimension of generativity opened 
up was the idea of inheritance as the essential condition of human exis-
tence.72 Becoming a part of a human community that transcends my fi-
nite being means that we are swept into this complex process of tradition 
precisely in the form of “passing forward” (Lat. tradere) of sense: we find 
ourselves in a specific historical situation defined by a nexus of cultural 
objectivities and practices, a certain socio-symbolic order and political 
institutions. The whole idea of inheritance means that as finite beings, we 
are never fully on our own but necessarily forced to carry the weight 
of the past. The inherited sense and meaning is never given to us in full 
71 See especially HuaXIV: 222; HuaIV: 119. Cf. Steinbock 1995: 196. 
72 Cf. HuaXXIX: 51 where Husserl makes a distinction between the past as an “idol” (Vor-
bild) and a “decedent […] through its will” (“Erblasser […] durch ihr Testament”).
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intuitive evidence; we are in touch with signs and symbols whose world 
has permanently deceased, we are addressed by narratives that have been 
handed down to us. Thus as Husserl puts in a late manuscript: “The de-
velopment of the future is the task of the living, but the future is realized 
only through a permanent form of activity, which has the character of 
reawakenment of the spirit of the deceased […]”73. In other words, since 
our embeddedness in a world of sense is dependent on the process of 
origination, the only way of bringing this condition to light is to engage in 
a conversation with the past. 
   “Men make their own history”, Marx once wrote, “but they do not 
make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circum-
stances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted 
from the past”. As Husserl would have put it, this process is not one of 
simple mediation of sense but of constant transformation, forgetting, ne-
gotiating. “Inherited tradition (Erbschaft) is not repetition”, Husserl writes, 
“but intentional agreement, conversion, concealment, and even transforma-
tion through this concealment”74. Not only is history a series of crises in the 
sense of “losses of meaning”, but it is also a series of deliberate oblivions, 
which make possible the emergence of novel meanings and attitudes. For 
this reason, our contemporary age stresses so vigorously what especially 
Germans call the Vergangenheitsbewältigung, “the control” or “mastery” over 
the past, referring to the indispensable role of historical narratives in cul-
tural, political, and social reality. There are some things that we must not 
forget; there are others that we ought to. 
  I will return to this topic of historical teleology in chapter 4. Now it 
suffices to say that although Husserl sometimes refers to the Kantian idea 
of the “novel” (Roman) of history, one ought to be careful in employing 
this term in this connection. Although history does pertain within itself a 
pre-given, a priori structure, we should abstain ourselves from commit-
ting to any Kantian-Hegelian ideas of “Theodicy” or “Cunning of reason” as 
the underlying narratives of historical development.75 History is, as Hus-
73 „Die Entwicklung der Zukunft ist Sache der Lebenden, ihre Fortbildung ist es, die Zu-
kunft schafft. Aber die Zukunft wird durch eine ständige Aktivität, die den Charakter einer 
Wiederverlebendigung des Geistes der Verstorbenen hat [...].“ HuaVI: 489.
74 “Aber Erbschaft ist nicht Wiederholung, sondern intentionale Einigung, Wandlung, Ver-
deckung und eben Wandlung durch diese Verdeckung.” HuaMatVIII: 436.
75 On Husserl’s use of the “history a priori”, see HuaVI: 362–363, 380.
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serl put it, “from the start nothing else than the vital movement of the 
co-existence and the interweaving of original formations and sedimenta-
tions of meaning”76 – and as such, it can only be approached by proceeding 
backwards from the present moment. This teleology, however, should be 
divested of its “deterministic” features. Its sole necessity lies in the moti-
vational structures that regulate the development of meaning and sense. 
From a transcendental perspective, history knows no necessities.
  It is possible to observe why the topic of generativity entailed also a 
novel methodological approach, that of teleological-historical reflection 
(as entertained especially in the context of Crisis). Once we acknowledge 
that our beliefs, values, practices have their origin not only in ourselves 
but in the tradition preceding us, we are prompted to proceed from the 
constituted, ready-made sense back to its process of constitution. It was 
exactly for this reason that Husserl began to define his late “teleological-
historical reflections” through the notions of “questioning back” (Rückfrage), 
“destruction” (Abbau) or “reconstruction” (Rekonstruktion). Thus method-
ologically, what we have is not the accused “primacy of the ‘I think’”, but 
the primacy of the factical, historical and social matrix of sense – in which 
we ourselves belong – whose becoming and sense the phenomenologist 
sets out to discover.77 
  Heidegger once wrote that as soon as we understand the essentially 
historical character of human essence, the question of “What is human 
being?” is turned into the form: “Who is human being?”78 The question of 
temporality implicates a transition from quidittas or whatness to quissity, 
whoness (Werheit)79 bringing about a new understanding of human exis-
tence that is not categorical but existential – it involves a specific reflexive 
stance towards its own being. In other words, it seeks to answer not only 
the question of what is a human being, but who he or she is. This transi-
tion, I believe, can also be located within Husserl’s own project. What 
the transition from static to genetic phenomenology finally entailed was a 
transformed sense of human being as such – one that seeked to investigate 
76 “Geschichte ist von vornherein nichts anderes als die lebendige Bewegung des Mitein-
ander und Ineinander von ursprünglicher Sinnbildung und Sinnsedimentierung.” HuaVI: 
380.
77 See e.g. HuaVI: 191–192, 489; HuaXXIX: 47.
78 Heidegger, GA 40: 110
79 Heidegger, GA 24: 169
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the normative character of action not merely according to a set of possible 
choices but in regard to the personal history of one’s acquired faculties 
and capabilities. Unlike Kant, who defined the categorical imperative in 
terms of infinite repeatability of a particular act, Husserl, through his ge-
netic conversion, began to understand ethical behavior in regard to one’s 
personal history of habituation and sedimentation. By doing so, Husserl 
was able to acknowledge an idea of ethical subject, which does not do 
away with the differences in personal features or individual capabilities but 
which can only be understood only in relation to this individuality. This 
transition can be understood in terms of concretization.
  Recall that for Husserl, phenomenology was to be understood as a 
“science of the concrete”. But what really is concrete? In the static analyses 
of Logical Investigations and of Ideas I, Husserl had distinguished between 
two types of essences, self-sufficient and non-independent (i.e. relation-
al). Whereas the idea of number “1”, for instance, can be conceived in its 
own terms (the primal unity of counting), without any reference to other 
essences, most of the essential determinations we encounter in our daily 
lives are of another kind. A melody, for instance, can appear as “wistful” 
or “elegiac”, which are determinations that cannot perhaps be understood 
without reference to sadness, longing, feeling of nostalgia, hope etc., that 
is, purely in their own terms. Husserl had employed the notion of con-
crete or concretum to describe the first category, that is, those essences (or 
entities) that can be conceived as absolutely self-sufficient – and in the 
early works such as Ideas I he had reserved the category of abstractum to the 
latter forms, those of non-independent essences.80 
  However, as Husserl confessed in one of the earliest manuscripts on 
the idea of genetic phenomenology, as soon as the dimension of temporal 
genesis sets in, “one cannot identify the notion of “the independent” with 
“the concrete” like I did in the Logical Investigations”.81 Why not? Because 
even those essential forms, that the static analyses had discovered as self-
sufficient, have a history through which they have been uncovered – a 
history that is more fundamental and more concrete than what the static 
method had been able to appreciate. For instance, arriving at a concrete 
80 See e.g. HuaIII: 35ff.
81 “[…] alles Konkrete in der Monade ist unselbständig, und es zeigt sich, dass man den 
Begriff des Selbständigen nicht mit dem des Konkreten identifizieren kann wie ich in den 
Logischen Untersuchungen.“ HuaXIV: 37.
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notion of philosophy presupposes not only that we single it out from the 
natural or the personalistic attitudes, but that we investigate its histori-
cal transmittance – the way it has been handed down to us – by locating this 
process in a genetic-generative context. As I will show in the next chapter, 
this transition indicated also a growing significance of transcendental in-
tersubjectivity as the most concrete domain of meaning-constitution.
  It was perhaps Merleau-Ponty who was the first to truly realize the 
historical-critical potential of Husserl’s late phenomenology. In the pref-
ace to his Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty referred to the broad-
ened notion of intentionality in Husserl’s later writings and credited these 
analyses for discovering a novel dimension of phenomenological philoso-
phy – a “phenomenology of origins”.82 What this idea seemed to provide, 
was a transformed notion of meaning-constitution, one, which does not 
assume the traditional metaphysical priority of self-sufficient essences but 
works to appreciate the genesis of sense in its historically transmitted, 
intertwined character. As Merleau-Ponty asks: 
Should the starting-point for the understanding of history be ideol-
ogy, or politics, or religion, or economics? Should we try to un-
derstand a doctrine from its overt content, or from the psycho-
logical makeup and the biography of its author? We must seek an 
understanding from all these angles simultaneously, everything has 
meaning, and we shall find this same structure of being underlying 
all relationships. All these views are true provided that they are not 
isolated, that we delve deeply into history and reach the unique 
core of existential meaning which emerges in each perspective.83
The affinity of Husserl’s late phenomenology with Hegelian dialectics is 
precisely the idea that philosophy should start with the present and from 
the present with all of its existing realities, tasks, contradictions and para-
doxes – because their intertwinement provides us with the most concrete 
level of investigation. As Husserl himself put it in the beginning of the Crisis, 
phenomenology was to be understood in relation to the “struggles of our 
time” (Kämpfe unserer Zeit) and to the historical and critical retrospection 
(Rückbesinnung) that is necessary in order to work out a radical self-under-
standing.84 As I will show later in detail, Husserl conceived this undertak-
82 Merleau-Ponty 1962: xx.
83 Merleau-Ponty 1962: xxi.
84 HuaVI: 16. Cf. the introductory part in chapter 1.
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ing as pertaining within itself a normative element, calling forth the prob-
lem of renewal of tradition. For now, it suffices to conclude that if one is 
willing to pursue a truly phenomenological investigation in a Husserlian 
fashion, one cannot give up on the universal teleology of history, because 
it is only through the quest of this teleology that one is capable of grasping 
the possibilities of present thinking.
  After these reflections, one might be allured to claim that once Hus-
serl had introduced the dimension of generativity into phenomenology, he 
could no longer account for any kind of idea of infinity that concerns the 
transcendental subjectivity. However, as I would like to argue, rather than 
turning this idea down completely Husserl aimed at locating this notion 
elsewhere, namely, in the field of culture and communal life. Accordingly, 
this is what makes his analyses of Europe relevant in this perspective: the 
novel idea of philosophy that Husserl saw as beginning with the Greeks 
opened up a possibility of a completely different kind of genesis, that of 
infinite teleology, which seeks to guide the development of humanity with 
regard to ideal goals. Before we engage in a discussion on the peculiar 
structure of this teleology, we must first provide a reading of its conditions 
of possibility. It must be asked how exactly does the genesis of a higher-
order come about in the concrete process of intersubjective life?
2.2. Transcendental Social Ontology:
Beyond Interaction
Husserl’s earliest manuscripts that deal with the topic of intersub-jectivity date back already to 1905.85 The early analyses take their point of departure from the role of other subjects in the field 
of individual experience, more precisely, from the observation that the 
others are not merely a part of the world, but they appear to me as con-
taining a unique inner depth. In its basic form, this depth is based on the 
perception according to which the other subjects carry within themselves 
a personal world of experience into which I have no direct access. Despite 
85 On the early development of intersubjectivity, see Iso Kern’s introduction in HuaXIII: 
xxiv–xliii.
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its unattainability, this world is by no means without significance. It plays 
a crucial role in my personal world-constitution. It is exactly through this 
dimension of alien experience that I am able to have a world, which makes 
possible communal co-operation and the development of human culture. 
  With regard to the Husserl’s early analyses on intersubjectivity, we 
are able to distinguish basically between two lines of approach. First of 
all, since the manner of givenness that characterizes other subjects dif-
fers radically from that of natural and cultural objects, Husserl wanted to 
find a suitable conceptual approach in order to account for this givenness. 
Around 1908, this problem was first answered under the title of “empa-
thy” (Einfühlung) and “alien experience” (Fremderfahrung): even though I 
have no direct access to the experience of the other, I can relate to his or 
her situation.86 By taking his point of departure from the idea of empathy 
– and for instance, not from Hegelian recognition (Anerkennung) – Husserl 
wanted to distinguish himself from the Neo-Kantian tradition for which 
the topic of intersubjectivity had become primarily a political-ethical 
problem dealing with the questions of political legitimacy, of state and 
civil society. As Husserl insisted, the problem of communality was to be 
located in the very heart of theoretical reason – more precisely, to the 
constitution of the common world – which provides the basic conditions 
for practical co-operation.87 Here, Husserl’s work was influenced espe-
cially by the so-called Munich phenomenologists – a group of students 
assembled around the Neo-Kantian philosopher Theodor Lipps who had 
made significant contributions to the theory of empathy.88
  Secondly, beginning from the early 1910s, Husserl began to sketch 
what he called a phenomenological “social ontology” (soziale Ontologie), 
an investigation of those forms of givenness that characterize our sense of 
86 HuaXIII: 3, 8–9, 17ff., 42–54.
87 As Husserl puts it in an appendix to Crisis: “We already have a certain “community” in 
being mutually “there” for one another in the surrounding world (the other in my sur-
rounding world) — and this always means being physically, bodily there.” (“Eine gewisse 
„Gemeinschaft“ haben wir schon, wenn wir wechselseitig für einander in der Umwelt 
(der Andere in der meinen) da sind, und darin liegt, leiblich-körperlich da sind, immer.“ 
HuaVI: 307
88 Husserl’s aim, however, was to show why Lipps’ position fell short in explaining the 
true character of emphatic encounter. Already in the Logical Investigations, Husserl had been 
critical of what he considered to be the psychologistic position of Lipps, and towards the 
turn of 1910s, almost every piece written on empathy took its point of departure from the 
criticism of Lipps. See e.g. HuaXIII: 21ff., 70ff.; HuaXIV: 236ff.
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belonging to a community.89 This line of investigation – sometimes called 
also the phenomenology of “socialities” (Sozialitäten)90 – was based on 
Husserl’s basic perception on the two-sided character of these relations: 
unlike other forms of intentionality, social relations embody within them-
selves a specific sense of reciprocity through which the social objectivities 
(e.g. families, communities) acquire their unique objectivity. Already in 
Husserl’s early manuscripts, this approach was developed into a theory 
on the specific social “functions” entailing an intrinsic practical relevance: 
my relation towards the others is fundamentally characterized by different 
kinds of responsibilities and practical anticipations that are fundamentally 
different than in the case of nature or cultural objects.91 Social relations, 
besides that they contain elements that are characteristic of all experience 
(e.g. seeing, listening), are characterized by uniquely interpersonal expe-
riences such as friendship, love, persuasion – but also the use of power 
and violence.
  What these approaches seemed to exclude, however, was the genuine-
ly phenomenological question of the inner life of communities. Although 
many forms of human communality are embedded in worldly institutions 
– families, societies, states and so on – these are not intended merely by 
singular subjects but they also structure the co-operation of individual 
subjects. At the end of 1910s, Husserl began to consider human com-
munities as “personal unities of a higher order”, which, as he proclaimed, 
“have their own lives, preserve themselves by lasting through time despite the 
joining or leaving of individuals”92. Instead of mere correlates of individual 
consciousness, communities were to be understood as subjectivities that 
have their own personal existence, a personal history (genesis) as well as 
a teleological structure. This idea of social communities as guided by the 
idea of personal community – an idea that was especially entertained by 
Max Scheler in his theory of “collective person” (Gesamtperson)93 – was 
89 HuaXIII: 98–104. 
90 As Husserl put it in C-manuscripts, for the constitution of “socialities”, the community 
of empathy is like what “the spatial form is for reduced nature”, i.e. the “social space” which 
allows the temporal simultaneity and succession of individual subjects. HuaMatVIII: 317.
91 HuaXIII: 104.
92 „die Personen sind vielmehr Glieder von Gemeinschaften, von personalen Einheiten 
höherer Ordnung, die als Ganze ihr Leben führen, sich bei Zutritt oder Abgang von ein-
zelnen in der Zeit fortdauernd erhalten […]“. HuaIV: 182.
93 Scheler 1980: 512. Here, Scheler ascribes the collective person a unique form of inten-
tional consciousness (“Bewusstsein-von”), which cannot be returned to individual subjects. 
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developed more thoroughly in Husserl’s manuscripts on intersubjectivity. 
  For the phenomenological analysis, the idea of a collective person was 
by no means a mere thought-experience or a meaningless bypath. Already 
in Ideas II Husserl presented the division between theory of the person and 
theory of community as one of the fundamental questions on the basis of 
which “our entire world-view is fundamentally determined.”94 This em-
phasis was highlighted through the gradual substitution of “social ontolo-
gy” with a phenomenological account of social ethics, which Husserl began 
to develop especially through the so-called Kaizo essays of early 1920s.95 
This idea – whose origin Husserl located in Plato96 – referred primarily to 
the close alliance of the descriptive and normative aspects of social theory. 
As for Hobbes and Hegel, the basic question of interpersonal relations was 
intimidately tied to the teleological and normative development of hu-
man sociality, that is, to the question what constitutes a just and righteous 
form of human community. As Husserl argued, the idea of social ethics 
could not “be attained by subjecting the practical relations towards ones 
companions (Nebenmenschen) to individual-ethical investigation.”97 Instead 
of a mere derivative of individual ethics, social ethics was to be conceived 
as an autonomous sphere of investigation that has its own essential forms 
and regularities.
  With regard to this topic, we should acknowledge the crucial role 
of one particular character, Edith Stein. It is well known that during the 
period of writing Ideen II, Stein worked as Husserl’s assistant and con-
tributed significantly to the final form of the work. Besides her disserta-
tion on empathy in 1916, Stein wrote several treatises and essays on the 
phenomenology of intersubjectivity, including the two works published 
in Husserl’s Jahrbuch: “Individual and Community”, (written in 1919, pub
As we shall observe, Husserl’s theory of social communities relied on this idea.
94 HuaIV: 172.
95 It is exactly in these essays that we encounter the topic of Europe in connection to the 
problematic of rational development of culture: especially in the essay Formale Typen der 
Kultur in der Menschheitsentwicklung, Husserl addresses the birth of Greek philosophy in 
terms of a transition from the religious-mythical to the scientific world-view, resulting in 
the “philosophical form of culture” characteristic of medieval and modern times.
96 HuaVII: 14ff. Cf. HuaXXVII: 88.
97 Letztere ist nicht etwa damit schon gegeben, daß das praktische Verhalten des Einzel-
menschen zu seinen „Nebenmenschen“, das ist zu seinen Genossen in der Einheit der Ge-
meinschaft, individualethischer Forschung unterzogen wird. Es gibt notwendig auch eine 
Ethik der Gemeinschaften als Gemeinschaften. HuaXXVII: 21. 
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lished in 1922) and “The Problem of State” (written in 1921, published in 
1925). Especially in the first work, Stein developed a theory of interper-
sonal motivations, which, by conjoining particular streams of conscious-
ness with one another, provided human communities with their distinc-
tive “life-force” (Lebenskraft). Community, Stein argued, was not a mere 
sum of individual subjects and their motivations; rather, it was based on a 
special class of intentions that have the character of “intertwinement” (Ver-
schmelzung) with other intentions. Accordingly, in “The Problem of State” 
Stein worked towards a phenomenological concept of state not in terms 
of an objective structure – the civil society or political institutions – but in 
terms of specific acts intending the idea of the state (e.g. voting in national 
elections).98 The other student of Husserl’s who took up this theme was 
Gerda Walther, whose dissertation Ein Beitrag zur Ontologie der sozialen Ge-
meinschaften. Mit einem Anhang zur Phänomenologie der sozialen Gemeinschaften 
appeared as a single volume in Husserl’s phenomenological yearbook in 
1922.99
  As Dan Zahavi has put it in his detailed work on the problem inter-
subjectivity in Husserl’s phenomenology, even though we might subscribe 
to the idea that Husserl was striving towards the constitutive significance 
of intersubjectivity, most of his concrete analyses dealt with the constitu-
tion of intersubjectivity beginning with the individual ego.100 Despite the 
strong socio-critical ethos in Husserl’s later philosophy, most of his manu-
scripts followed the idea of a “constant beginner” who was interested in 
the givenness of other subjects within personal experience. To do justice 
to Husserl’s analyses, I will also take my point of departure from this ques-
tion. However, since we are already familiar with a number of fine analy-
ses on the primordial levels of Husserl’s theory of intersubjectivity – and 
since we lack an overview on the higher-order phenomena of community, 
common will, and culture – I will direct my focus on these matters rather 
quickly. It is my conviction that the Husserlian current of phenomenology 
has not perhaps yet realized the full potential of these analyses; moreover, 
they have not been brought into dialogue with the main currents of con-
98 Cf. Sawicki 2003.
99 Walther’s treatise was motivated by the insistence to discuss the specific normativity 
characteristic of social communities, which she portrayed as “self-sufficient, real, animal-
spiritual unities of a higher order” (selbständige, reale, seelisch-geistige Einheiten höherer Art). 
See Walther 1922: 144ff. 
100 Zahavi 2001: 17.
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temporary social and political philosophy. For the problematic of Europe, 
this line of approach is absolutely crucial.
  Perhaps the easiest way of introducing the idea of interpersonal sub-
jectivity is to start with the simple division between subjective and com-
munal accomplishments.101 Beginning with the simple static analysis of 
intentional experiences, most of the objectivities we constitute appear as 
our own personal accomplishments. I see a table – its “reality” is a result of 
my active constitution. “Luke, I am your father” – this statement, although 
it is shared by two (or more) persons, can be attributed to a single person; 
it is “my” expression. However, in our daily lives we encounter a whole set 
of objects, expressions, and accomplishments that cannot be attributed to 
any particular subject. A piece by a symphonic orchestra, a novel theory 
created by a scientific research group, or even a “collective” declaration 
of independence (cf. the Preamble: “We, the people…”) – these are all 
examples of collective accomplishments that cannot really be attributed 
to any particular agent but they are created and shared together. They are 
based on a common resolution or they strive for a common goal.
  Therefore, it is perhaps not surprising to discover that our contempo-
rary philosophical theories of the social sphere (or “social ontology”) ha-
ven often taken their point of departure from the phenomenon of “social 
interaction”, that is, the active and reciprocal co-operation of individual 
agents. Such activity takes place in numerous occasions such as in the case 
of a music orchestra, a football team or a scientific research group, but 
also in the more complex forms of interaction such as the networks of 
cyberspace (internet, social media), political parties or states. In the con-
temporary debate, one of the main currents of this topic has been the 
idea of “collective intentionality” – a shared directedness inherent to so-
cial bodies – which John Searle, for one, considers the key psychological 
presupposition of all social reality. According to this account, collective 
intentionality is that feature of the social reality which affords the things 
of the world their intersubjective functionality, for instance, when money 
is used as a medium of commerce. In line with his realist ontology, in The 
Construction of Social Reality (1995) Searle distinguished the “social” and 
“institutional” facts that belong to collective intentionality from the “brute 
101 Also Husserl follows this procedure in many of his manuscripts, cf. HuaXIV: 192. Cf. 
Donohoe 2004: 105ff.
— 190 —
. G  T P
facts” of nature on the grounds of voluntary acceptance: whereas the facts 
of nature exist mind-independently, the social and institutional facts are 
based on human agreement.102 This stance is also common to other leading 
theorists of social ontology, for instance, Raimo Tuomela. In his analysis of 
what he calls the “we-mode of collective intentionality”, Tuomela consid-
ers two conditions that need to be fulfilled in order for the shared direct-
edness to come about: “(i) the shared “for-groupness” based on collective 
acceptance and (ii) collective commitment to the shared content”103. If 
these conditions are not fulfilled, social facts cease to exist: they need to 
be confirmed and corroborated by others.
  The frailty of these stances, however, has been the fact that they have 
been incapable of dealing with those forms of collective experience that do 
not really presuppose any kind of initiative on behalf of individual subjects. 
Alongside with the active forms of social co-operation, there is a wide 
variety of social phenomena that rely on what we might call involuntary 
adaptation, or, to put it in terms of John Dewey, on “social conditioning”104 
– phenomena that have their bearing through repetitive patterns of behav-
ior. These conventions are acquired, for instance, through similar growth 
environment, education or the media, and as such, they are by no means 
“natural”.105 However, since human life is inextricably embedded in in-
voluntary cultural and societal conditions, it would also seem incorrect 
to base them on any kind of active acceptance or collective agreement. 
Instead, they derive their leverage through passive habituation, through 
entanglement with all sorts of worldly practices and conventions.
  A wonderful example of the actuation of passive collective beliefs is 
provided by the classic folk-tale “The Emperor’s New Clothes” by Hans-
Christian Andersen. In the story, an anonymous Emperor is approached 
by two weavers who promise to prepare the finest suit ever, however, by 
using a special fabric invisible to those who are either stupid or unworthy 
102 Searle 1995: 46. Searle has been rather explicit in distinguishing his own naturalistic 
philosophy of mind from traditional transcendental philosophy, especially that of phenom-
enology, arguing that even a theory of collective intentionality should survive the thought-
experiment of brains-in-a-vat. “I am confident that collective intentionality is a genuine 
biological phenomenon, and though it is complex, it is not mysterious or inexplicable” 
(2006: 16).
103 Tuomela 2008: 3.
104 See Dewey 1984: 35. 
105 Thus Dewey contrasts his idea of social conditioning with the “myth” of the natural 
capabilities of the individual. See Dewey 1988: 299. 
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of the Emperor’s position. As it is clear from the beginning, the project is 
a hoax: there is no real fabric and the weavers are only miming the process 
of fabrication. After the suit is done, the Emperor is first approached by 
ministers who all praise the new suit with one accord. He then proceeds 
to take a stroll among the city folks who likewise admire the new array. 
The scene is interrupted by a headstrong child who starts to make fun of 
the naked Emperor, gradually drawing in the adults to the mockery as 
well. Instead of withdrawing into shame, the Emperor descends into sus-
picion on the true state of the matters. Still, he boldly continues his stroll 
despite the ridicule.
  As it is clear from the tale, on the level of individual experience the 
naked truth on the Emperor’s clothes is there all along. What sustains the 
illusion of the clothed Emperor is the common “will to believe”, the un-
articulated aspiration to submit oneself to the socio-symbolic order. The 
Emperor believes in the clothing because any kind of doubt would deprive 
him of his position; the ministers follow him because they wish to appear 
as worthy of the highest principle in the social order. Lastly, the city folks 
follow him because they wish to avoid the label of stupidity. The illusory 
character of the establishment is of course revealed by the agent who has 
not yet been inscribed into the collective order, the headstrong child. Thus 
the reality of the clothing is a social construct: it is sustained by a shared, 
though unarticulated “agreement” on the state of things.
  In the context modern philosophy, this idea of collective adaptation 
as the basic form of political and social co-operation has been articulated, 
above all, by the ideology-critical current of Marxist philosophy. Accord-
ing to the dominant idea of this tradition, it is an inherent feature of all 
ideologies to regulate our beliefs and practices in a manner which funda-
mentally distorts our shared perception of the real world. By offering a 
skewed view of the existing societal conditions – by concealing the history 
of suppression that founds the existing relations of power – the dominating 
ideologies aim at presenting the existing societal divisions and relations as 
natural, as if they had always existed.106 By promoting a form of collective 
“false consciousness” (a notion that is absent from Marx’s own writings) 
ideologies hinder the formation of a true class consciousness. Instead, they 
suppress the revolutionary potential of the oppressed. This experiential di-
106 See e.g. Marx/Engels 1970: 47. 
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mension of ideologies is also known from the works of a few psychoana-
lytically oriented social theorists. Following Freud’s later insights on the 
“collective unconscious” (Kultur-Über-Ich), theorists such as Erich Fromm 
and Herbert Marcuse have analyzed the suppressive character of modern 
(capitalist) ideologies and their relation to the unconscious dimension of 
human existence.107 This line of interpretation has been continued by, for 
instance, Fredric Jameson’s well-known theory of “the political uncon-
scious” – a hermeneutic-narratological study of the production of ideo-
logical subjectivity.108
  Speaking from a Husserlian perspective, however, even these concep-
tions can be said to suffer from certain inadequacies. First of all, because 
the Marxist critique of ideology has focused on analyses of the capitalist 
mode of production as well as its respective accomplishments – national-
ism, culture production, and so on – it has fallen prey to the same confu-
sion between the subject and object of culture that we encountered with 
regard to Hegel’s theory of “objective spirit” in chapter 1.2. Jameson, for 
one, defines his project in terms of an “unmasking of cultural artifacts as 
socially symbolic acts”109, and thus evades the division between the acts 
and accomplishments of a collective. In other words, what these analyses 
have lacked is the distinction between the dimensions of cultura culturans 
and cultura culturata, that is, the community as a set of interpersonal rela-
tions and its common accomplishments.110 Secondly, in order to present 
themselves as efficacious, these reflections have usually promoted some 
form of historicism with regard to the socio-symbolic structures they 
wish to criticize. “The only effective liberation from the constraint [of 
the political unconscious]”, argues Jameson, “begins with the recognition 
that there is nothing that is not social and historical – indeed, that ‘in the 
last analysis’, everything is political.”111 Thus it is not surprising to find 
Jameson describing his project under the title of hermeneutics: rather than 
relying on a transcendental theory of subjective or collective experience, 
this investigation starts from the “fact” of the irreconcilability of differ-
ent socio-cultural frameworks and seeks to demonstrate their historically 
107 See Fromm 1961; Marcuse 1987. 
108 Jameson 1983.
109 Jameson 1983: 5
110 On this division see Hart 1992b: 643ff.
111 Jameson 1983: 5.
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constructed character. Within this approach, there is no need for an “ide-
ology of ideo-logies”, but all critique remains solely on the level of gener-
alizations derived from historical evidence.
  What seems to me as the critical potential of Husserl’s phenomenol-
ogy of intersubjectivity in this respect is that it is quite possible to come 
up with a theory of social ontology, which does not begin with the phe-
nomenon of interaction but seeks to address its unconsciously constituted 
basis in different forms of passive genesis. These forms, I argue, extend 
from the very basic level of intersubjective experience to higher-order 
normative presuppositions, including all kinds of collective habitualities, 
styles and convictions. What I consider to be the key feature of this Hus-
serlian approach is that the recognition of the seemingly constructed (or 
“top-down”) character of collective beliefs and desires does not result in 
neglecting the transcendental approach. Rather, it is precisely on the basis 
of a “rigorous social philosophy”112 – a transcendental social ontology – that 
one is able to do justice to the “constructed” and political character of 
socio-ideological commitments.
  Despite Husserl’s insistence on the specifically “childish” approach of 
phenomenology,113 we should not equate the phenomenologist with the 
child in Anderssen’s narrative. If we are to confirm Husserl’s idea that the 
phenomenological reduction does not lose anything from the world, and 
that phenomenology merely investigates the natural attitude in its becom-
ing, it should take seriously the validity of collective beliefs instead of 
simply denying them. In this regard phenomenology is actually a realist 
undertaking. “There can be no stronger realism than this –” Husserl writes 
in the Crisis, “I am certain of being a human being who lives in this world, 
etc., and I doubt it not in the least (if this is what is meant by realism.) The 
great problem is precisely to understand what is here so ‘obvious’.”114 In 
the case of historical narratives that make up our generative history, for 
112 HuaXXVII: 57.
113 As Husserl puts it in his lectures on phenomenological psychology: “The investigating I 
[…] appears, from the perspective of natural attitude, as a child of the world […]” (“dem 
forschenden Ich, … und in der natürlichen Einstellung, sozusagen als „Welt-Kinder” er-
scheinenden)” HuaIX: 216.
114 “Einen stärkeren Realismus kann es also nicht geben, wenn dieses Wort nicht mehr 
besagt als: „ich bin dessen gewiß, ein Mensch zu sein, der in dieser Welt lebt usw., und ich 
zweifle daran nicht im mindesten“. Aber es ist eben das große Problem, diese „Selbstver-
ständlichkeit“ zu vestehen.“ HuaVI: 190–191.
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instance, we are not dealing with the simple division between truth and 
untruth, or reality and illusions; since our experience is embedded in the 
generative nexus of community and tradition we are necessarily forced to 
live with all sorts of beliefs and narratives that are not simply given in full 
evidence. Instead, it is exactly by appropriating these narratives that we 
become a member of a particular community. Intersubjectivity, as it mani-
fests itself in the abiding forms such as clubs, societies and states, refers 
essentially to the idea of passive habituation. How, then, are passivity and 
intersubjectivity conjoined with one another?
  As I already hinted in connection to passive genesis, instead of ac-
tive co-operation Husserl based his social ontology on an involuntary and 
non-reflexive relation to others – an approach we might designate with 
the term interpassivity.115 Before any concrete encounter with other sub-
jects, the others are embedded in my experience through the horizontal 
structure of experience, though not as concrete subjects but as someone 
who participate in the constitution of the common world. But the scope 
of interpassivity does not end here. As we engage with each other in dif-
ferent kinds of social relations – the phenomenon to which we referred 
earlier as the active genesis – not only do we create all sorts of common ac-
complishments, but we also build for ourselves a common history: things 
that are said and done remain within our experience as a kind of back-
ground for further orientations. This phenomenon of habituated sociality, 
which encompasses all kinds of social conventions, manners, and common 
beliefs, is also to be regarded as a form of shared passivity. Thus, what 
we have under the Husserlian notion of interpassivity is (i) the passively 
constituted basis of social interaction, which is both doxic-theoretical as 
well as practical; (ii) all kinds of collective beliefs or “social habitualities”116 
that originate from an active institution of meaning, but do not presup-
115 In his intriguing work Die Illusionen der anderen, Robert Pfaller has coined the term 
“interpassivity” to describe the common tendency of human beings to realize their beliefs, 
acts and desires with regard to an unconscious relation to other subjects (2002: 25ff.). 
Echoing Heidegger’s analyses on the anonymous others (das Man), as well as the Lacanian 
idea of symbolic father, Pfaller has paid attention to different modes of self-transposition 
that take place not only on the level of beliefs – like when I say that “People are envious”, 
when I actually mean: “I am envious” – but also with regard to emotions, desires, and 
thrives. It is an inherent feature of especially the modern era that it works towards the 
transposition of our passive reactions. This happens in the case of canned laughter on TV, by 
which we engage in a TV show by letting the object do the laughing for us.
116 HuaXV: 208.
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pose any kind of active confirmation on behalf of the agents themselves. 
  For those who have been accustomed to discuss passivity primarily 
in terms of affectivity and receptivity, Husserl’s notion of passivity may 
strike one as odd and unnecessarily broad. Moreover, it seems that Husserl 
himself understood passivity as denoting several things, beginning from 
pre-predicative (or pre-linguistic) perceptual experience to all sorts of 
involuntary affects which lie beyond our active attentiveness. With respect 
to the first category, Husserl spoke of the sphere of “pure passivity” (reine/
pure Passivität) – which we could read as synonymous to transcendental 
aesthetics – that investigates the associative structures of conscious life 
that constitute the foundation for abiding forms of intentionality.117 In the 
sphere of affectivity, we are also dealing with practical and axiological 
passivities – instincts, drives, feelings of pleasure and disgust – that serve 
as the motivational ground for practical and axiological reason, that is, 
for acts of willing and valuing. The introduction of time-consciousness 
certainly brings a new dimension to the notion of passivity, by which it 
becomes to denote the past sphere of retentions, that is, all sorts of past 
experiences in the light of which the present moment is given. This tran-
sition forms the point of departure for the most general formulation of 
passivity as the inattentive, unreflected modes of intentional awareness. 
“In general,” writes Husserl, “passivity is the realm of associated nexuses 
(Verbindungen) and affiliations (Verschmelzungen), where all meaning that 
emerges is put together passively.”118 In this regard, it also encompasses 
the realm of acquired convictions, or, what Husserl sometimes calls by the 
name “secondary passivity” (sekundare Passivität).119
  What we can say without hesitation, however, is that Husserl want-
ed to overcome the modern division between the domain of passivity as 
purely subjective receptivity and the sphere of activity as synthetic and 
communicative engaging: 
My passivity stands in connection with the passivity of all oth-
ers. One and the same thing-world is constituted for us as 
well as the one and the same time as objective time so that my 
“now” and the “now” of others […] are objectively simultane
117 HuaXV: 75–82.
118 ”Passivität überhaupt ist das Reich assoziativer Verbindungen und Verschmelzungen, in 
denen aller entspringende Sinn passive Zusammenbildung ist”. (HuaVI: 372)
119 HuaXXVII: 110.
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ous. […] My life and the life of another do not merely exist, each 
for themselves; rather, one is “directed” toward the other.120
By arguing that “my passivity extends to the passivity of all others”, Hus-
serl was by no means suggesting any kind of telepathy or parapsychism. 
My experience, my stream of consciousness is given to me only, and I 
have no direct access to those of the others.121 All meaning and validity is 
dependent on the subjectivity of consciousness understood as the “final 
absolute”122. What he was suggesting, however, was that already in my ex-
perience of the world as an independent, transcendent reality of its own 
there is an internal reference to other possible subjects not as objects of 
consciousness but as someone who constitute the world with me. 
  Actually, as I see it, if one is to locate the antecedents of Husserl’s 
concept of passivity, one needs to go beyond the tradition of modern 
philosophy to Aristotle, particularly, to his theory of affects (pathē) as it 
presented especially in Rhetorics. Unlike modern philosophy, Aristotle did 
not conceive the domain of primal sensibility (aisthēsis) in terms of pure 
sense-data but as an intentional relation, which projects its objects either 
as pleasurable or painful.123 Primal receptivity, according to this account, 
formed the basis for all other forms of affectivity, which, as especially in 
the case of human experience, become infected by different degrees of 
imagination (fantasia) and discursive reasoning (logos): for instance, fear 
is a feeling of anxiety accompanied by an imagination of a future pain. 
Thus, despite the essential self-centeredness of affectivity and sensibil-
ity, Aristotle could not view them as something immanent to the soul or 
“consciousness” – instead, he portrayed the psychē in terms of fundamental 
openness towards the world and to other subjects. As a result, his notion 
120 “Meine Passivität steht in Konnex mit der Passivität aller anderen: Es konstituiert sich 
eine und dieselbe Dingwelt für uns, ein und dieselbe Zeit als objektive Zeit derart, daß 
durch diese mein Jetzt und jedes anderen Jetzt und so seine Lebensgegenwart [...] und 
meine Lebensgegenwart objektiv „gleichzeitig” sind. [...] mein Leben und das eines ande-
ren existieren nicht nur überhaupt beide, sondern eines ,,richtetw sich nach dem ande-
ren.“ HuaXI: 343. See also HuaXXVIII: 68.
121 HuaXIII: 111, n1.
122 HuaXIX: 115. Cf. HuaI: 130.
123 As Aristotle puts it in the second book of Rhetorics, all affects can be discerned ac-
cording to three elements: the content of the affect (fear, anxiety, joy etc.), its cause (the 
motivation), and the object of affect (the intentional relation). See e.g. Rhet. 1382a22. On 
the intentionality of affects, see Nussbaum 1994: 81.
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of pathē could not be defined as subjective receptivity but as an intersub-
jective sharing of the world which forms the basis for all social activities.124
  In a manuscript written at the time of the Cartesian Meditations, Hus-
serl put forward the claim according to which “everything worldly is in-
tersubjectively constituted”125. Evidently, for those who have accustomed 
to proceed to intersubjectivity from the phenomenon empathy, this claim 
appears as problematic. If I do perceive others as being in the world with 
me – as someone whose body I perceive as analogical to mine – but at 
the same time, this very perception entails that I have constituted oth-
ers in one way or another, the problem of intersubjectivity appears as a 
circulus vitiosus.126 How can the others be both the precondition as well as 
the target of empathy? Now, according to Husserl, the vicious circle is 
evaded as soon as we pay attention to the fact that the others are indeed 
there already at the elementary level of perceiving a world, however, not 
as objects to be constituted or bodies to identify with but as the manifold 
of co-given perspectives. This idea is what Husserl sometimes calls “open 
intersubjectivity” (offene Intersubjektivität), which constitutes the primary 
form of Husserlian “interpassivity”:
In the normal experience of the world, which has the character 
of an objective (intersubjective) experience of the world from the 
start, myself and everything objectively experienced has the char-
acter of an apperceptive conception in relation to the open inter-
subjectivity. Even when I do not possess an explicit representation 
of the others, their presence is in constant co-validity and in an 
apperceptive function.127
124 As Aristotle puts it in the beginning of Rhetorics II, in order for any discursive state-
ment to convince its listeners, a certain degree of shared affectivity must be presupposed, 
for “when people are feeling friendly and placable, they think one sort of thing; when 
they are feeling angry or hostile, they think either something totally different or the same 
thing with a different intensity.” Aristotle, Rhet. 1377b31–1378a1. Thus it is perhaps not 
surprising that Heidegger, in his 1924 lecture series on Aristotle’s Rhetorics, calls this work 
the first hermeneutics of being-with-others (Mitsein), and further, in Sein und Zeit, went on 
to translate pathos not as affectivity but as “attunement” (Befindlichkeit), the basic mode of 
finding oneself in the world, on the basis of which all understanding (Verstehen) takes place. 
Heidegger GA 18: 109ff.
125 HuaXV: 45.
126 Indeed, the genetic problem of first empathy was something that Husserl tackled since 
the beginning of the 1920s onwards (see e.g. HuaXIV: 112–120).
127 „In der normalen Welterfahrung, die von vornherein den Sinn einer objektiven (in-
tersubjektiven) Welterfahrung hat, hat jedes als Objekt Erfahrene und so auch ich selbst 
eine apperzeptive Auffassung in bezug auf die offene Intersubjektivität. Auch wenn ich 
keine explizite Vorstellung von Anderen habe, ist doch das Dasein von Anderen in konti-
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The others are there in my structure of perception not necessarily as ac-
tual others but as potential others who give validation to the otherwise 
latent horizons. “The intrinsically first other (the first non-ego)”, Husserl 
writes, “is the other ego”128 – and here we should be careful – not as an 
“object” of empathy, but as the anonymous other devoid of any spatio-
temporal or personal existence.129 Without this co-constitutive function, 
there could be no idea of objectivity, reality, or the world; simply because 
I would not be able to possess the idea of several perspectives. Without the 
idea of several perceivers, I could not imagine an object as perceived from 
two distinct perspectives at the same time, equally valid. Thus unlike He-
gel, who could attribute the constitution of thinghood to a pre-social (i.e. 
perceptual) consciousness, Husserl’s idea of object-constitution pointed 
towards “the necessity of transcendental co-existence”130 – the others, so 
to speak, secure the validity of my object-consciousness, and they do so 
exactly by verifying the multiplicity of possible perspectives to the world. 
It is here that find Husserl philosophizing in an Aristotelian manner: joint 
passivity is the condition for the having of a world
  Thus what we gain with the constitution of the objective world is noth-
ing less than the primal form of a community, that is, the ascending, though 
unarticulated, sense of a “we” (Wir).131 Against the prevalent usage of the 
first person plural, this primordial form of “we” or “we-community” (Wir-
Gemeinschaft) does not yet delimit itself with regard to a “they”. Instead 
of referring to those forms of collectivity that we encounter in mutual 
recognition or agency, this idea of a “primal we” refers solely to the co-
presence of individual perspectives through which the objective world re-
trieves its shared validity. In other words, this primal form of community 
is devoid of any norm that would separate the different perspectives from 
each other: it is constituted in a formal, universal co-existence of anony-
nuierlicher Mitgeltung und in apperzeptiver Funktion.“ HuaIX: 394. On the idea of open 
intersubjectivity, see also HuaXIV: 289. Cf. Zahavi 2001: 39ff.
128 HuaI: 137.
129 In a manuscript pointed out by Ichiro Yamaguci, Husserl interestingly makes a refer-
ence to what he calls an “anonymous” empathy, “suspended from its function” (Yamaguchi 
1982: 103). Cf. Zahavi 2001: 73.
130 “Die intentionale Beschlossenheit ist Notwendigkeit der transzendentalen Koexistenz.“ 
HuaXV: 370.
131 HuaI: 137; HuaXXIX: 80; HuaMatVIII: 126.
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mous others. Respectively, its intentional correlate is what Husserl calls 
the one identical world (“Die”  Welt or Die eine Welt) as the static foundation 
of all particular objectivity – a world which still lacks all socio-cultural 
meaning.132 
  Does this mean that after the introduction of transcendental “we”, 
Husserl was inclined to split the sphere of transcendental experience into 
two separate dimensions? This is not the case. As Husserl put it in the 
Kaizo essays, the individual and the community should be understood as 
an “a priori undistinguishable pair of ideas”133, which, from the viewpoint 
of objective world-constitution, necessarily presuppose each other. I can 
never completely renounce the personality or individuality of my experi-
ence, even if we are dealing with social forms of meaning-constitution. 
The point, rather, is to clarify the different ways in which this personal 
constitution acquires for itself novel dimensions through its associations 
with other subjects, in the life of the community. 
  Therefore, instead of conceiving the individual and the community in 
terms of two absolute spheres of constitution, Husserl articulated their 
difference in terms of two modalities of the same phenomenological absolute. 
Again, this distinction can be understood in terms of abstract and concrete 
constitution. As Husserl put it in a manuscript, the transcendental ego 
indeed the final absolute without which any sense of givenness could be 
thought of – however, it does not enclose the absolute as such. Or, to be more 
precise, the ego is not the sole modality of phenomenological absolute but 
rather a particular aspect of what Husserl called the “concrete absolute”134 
that is constituted within the manifold of subjects. By focusing on the 
constitutive activity of the individual ego we literally abstract from that 
concrete foundation that gives transcendence its sense and validity: the 
transcendental intersubjectivity. Interestingly, in a manuscript from the 
beginning of the 1930s, Husserl asked whether the ego attained by the 
transcendental reduction was actually an equivocation, albeit an “absolutely 
132 On Husserl’s use of ”die eine Welt”, see HuaXIII: 399; HuaXIV: 202; HuaXV: 358.
133 HuaXXVII: 6.
134 See “Die Vielheit des Subjekte als das konrete Absolute” in HuaXIV: 272ff., esp. Hua-
XIV: 274: “Und konkret genommen ist absolut: diese Vielheit als eine Vielheit von Subjekt-
polen, Polen für ein jedem solchen Pol gesondert zugehöriges konkretes Leben, konkretes 
Meinen, Erfahren, einstimmig Erfahren, richtig oder unrichtig Denken, darunter auch 
wissenschaftlich rechtmässig Denken.“
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necessary one”135. While paying attention to the transcendental ego as the 
absolutely necessary dative of manifestation, it abstracts from the genuine 
subject of objective reality itself, the universal community of monads. 
  This controversial point was also confirmed by Husserl in his seem-
ingly paradoxical formulation that “in their absolute being, the monads 
are dependent”.136 The apparent paradox of this statement is done away as 
soon as we grasp the constitutive role of intersubjectivity in its necessary 
function. In normal experience, the objectivity of my accomplishments is 
constantly confirmed by others not only in their validity – as it happens 
with regard to dreams and hallucinations – but in their very objectivity 
and reality per se. Dependence and not independence is what endows the 
monads their constitutive capability. The community of monads, the uni-
versal intersubjectivity – this is the concrete absolute.
  Paying attention solely to the doxic modalities of perception offers us 
a rather one-sided perspective of the primordial levels of intersubjectivity. 
What this approach seems to suggest that our fundamental relationship 
with other subjects, despite its passive character, is primarily theoretical 
and has to do with securing the objective existence of the world. However, 
this is not what Husserl had in mind. Although the problematic of objec-
tive validity plays a central role in Husserl’s work – this mainly due to his 
interest in scientific objectivity – our experiential relation to others can-
not be reduced into the domain of theoretical reason. Instead, if we are to 
understand the manifold dynamics of communal life, especially the cre-
ation of common accomplishments, we should also take into account the 
motivational basis that founds the different forms of social co-operation. 
For Husserl, this sphere was the scene of practical passivity, the life of 
drives (Triebe), instincts (Instinkte):
I can only hint briefly here to the idea that [social] affinity cannot 
be established solely on the basis of social acts. As the individual 
subjects of unfold their activity on the basis of dark, blind passivity, 
the same concerns social activity. But already the sphere of pas-
sivity, the instinctive life of drives, is able produce an intersubjective 
connection.137
135 HuaXV: 586. This point is also discussed by Hart 1992a: 165ff.
136 ”Die Monaden in ihrem absoluten Sein bedingen sich.” HuaXIV: 268
137 “Nur kurz hinweisen kann ich hier noch darauf, dass solche Verbundenheit nicht nur 
durch soziale Akte hergestellt werden kann. Wie die Einzelsubjekte ihre Aktivität auf dem 
Grund einer dunklen, blinden Passivität entfalten, so gilt dasselbe auch von der sozialen 
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In Husserl’s theory of instinctual life, we can basically differentiate be-
tween two modes of drive-intentionality (Triebintentionalität): (1) those 
drives and instincts that are primarily subjective in the sense of autono-
my, i.e. drives that are targeted towards the self-preservation of the ego 
(sometimes called “the universal lifedrive”138), and (2) “intersubjective” 
drives, that is, drives that contain within themselves an internal reference 
to other egos, and that have the character of reciprocity (sometimes de-
fined as Wechseltriebe). We should emphasize here Husserl’s insistence on 
the intentional character of instinctual life: instead of conceiving drives 
and instincts as eternal forces unfolding in the unconscious dimension of 
the human psyche, Husserl argued that even these blind motivational pulls 
acquire themselves a habitually defined character. Being fused with dif-
ferent cultural and social norms, our instinctual intentions are constantly 
intertwined with other forms of intentionality; by conflating themselves 
with societal and cultural objectivities, accomplishments and desires, our 
instinctual life is able to constantly re-create itself. This is why Husserl re-
fers to drive-intentionality, not merely as sporadic pulls, but as a “process” 
that constantly point towards new possible fulfillments.139 
  Especially through his analysis of intersubjective drives, Husserl was 
able to bring in a significant element to the fundamental interpassivity 
in the community of monads. What Husserl basically insisted was that in 
the primordial level of world-experience, the others are there not just as 
someone who constitute the world with me, but also as specific objects of 
my intentional life. 
Primordiality is a system of drives. As we understand it as the 
primitively ascending stream, [we discover] that in each individual 
Aktivität. Aber schon die Passivität, das instiktive Triebleben kann intersubjektiven Zusam-
menhang herstellen.“ HuaXIV: 405. Cf. HuaIX: 514: ”Wie die Einzelsubjekte ihre Aktivi-
tät auf dem Grund einer dunklen, blinden Passivität entfalten, so gilt dasselbe auch von der 
sozialen Aktivität”. See Hart 1992a: 184ff. 
138 See Smith 2010: 269.
139 “Die instinktive Intention und instinktive Lust der Erfüllung betrifft nicht einen End-
zustand, sondern den ganzen Prozess, kontinuierlich die Momentanintention sich erfüllen 
(zu) lassen und wieder als Träger neuer Intentionen zu neuen Erfüllungen übergehen (zu) 
lassen; also (die) Einheit des Prozesses’ der Intention-Erfüllung, das ist selbst das Telos, das 
ist, dass (sich) die instinktive Intention, die einheitlich von vornherein auf dieses Ineinan-
der der Intentionalität und ihrer Entspannung geht, und sich als einheitliche nicht in einer 
Phase, sondern im ständigen Tun erfüllt, (erfüllt). Dieser urinstinktive Prozess steht weiter 
in Beziehung zu anderen.” HuaMatVIII: 328.
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there is also a gravitating drive to the stream of another, and this 
with other I-subjects.140 
Hence, the primordial community of co-existing monads does not consist 
of mere theoretical observers. Rather, the others are given to me also 
as someone whose perspective I wish to reach. Here we find Husserl in 
his most Hegelian mode of philosophizing: self, in its primitive form, is 
essentially desire which finds its satisfaction through the consciousness of 
the other. However, we should reject here the Kojévian interpretations 
of the primordial desire as the “destruction” or the “assimilation” of the 
other “I”.141 For Husserl, this original desire of the ego to transgress itself 
does not allow itself to be characterized in any material characteristics; it 
is merely a “dark and blind” impetus from the ego to the alteri. However, 
it is exactly this original drive towards the streams of others that founds 
what Husserl names as the intentional “intertwining” (Verflechtung) of pri-
mordialities.142 This interlacement is able to produce lasting “associations” 
(Verbindungen), which, by manifesting itself in abiding habitualities, make 
possible the different forms of practical co-operation. As I will show later, 
it is exactly this intertwining and association of individual acts that serves 
as the ground for Husserl’s idea of “suprapersonal consciousness” or the 
“personalities of a higher order”.
  However, in order to fully appreciate Husserl’s idea of constitutive 
intersubjectivity, we need a more concrete understanding of social activity. 
More precisely, it must be asked how is this activity able to produce last-
ing accomplishment and pass them forward in the course of tradition. For 
this purpose we need to move forward from the problem of passive genesis 
to active genesis, that is, into that dimension where others are not solely 
anonymous others but concrete worldly subjects with whom I can engage 
in different ways: in communication, understanding, common striving, 
love, hate, sexuality, and so on. 
140 ”Die Primordialität ist ein Triebsystem. Wenn wir sie verstehen als urtümlich stehen-
des Strömen, so liegt darin auch jeder in andere Ströme, und mit evtl. anderen Ichsubjek-
ten, hineinstrebende Trieb. (HuaXV: 594).
141 Kojéve 1980: 4.
142 HuaXV: 543, 587, 599.
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2.3. Empathy and Lifeworld
In the existing Husserl scholarship it is somewhat common to introduce the higher forms of social interaction through the problem of empathy (Einfühlung).143 Accordingly, Husserl himself stressed the central role 
of empathy with regard to the higher-level problems of human sociality, 
including the problematic of cultural interaction.144 
  The concept of empathy, however, was not to be understood in the 
everyday use of the word, as a compassionate identification with anoth-
er person, his or her emotional stance.145 As Husserl put it, the problem 
of empathy was to be understood primarily as a problem of a “fictive 
genesis”146 that concerns the first (though hypothetical) identification with 
the other subject not only as someone who stands as an object of percep-
tion but who shares a common world with me. It is through this identifi-
cation, or the essential discrepancy implied in it, that this common world 
acquires an objective character, a normative specificity. 
  Let us shortly recapitulate Husserl’s basic argument. In the well-
known description of the Cartesian Meditations, Husserl defined empathy 
as a form of appresentation through which I experience the other subject 
not as a mere thing in the world but as an ensouled being who participates 
in the constitution of the world. This experience was to be understood in 
terms of a specific “pairing” (Paarung), which, as we may learn from his 
earlier analysis, was to be conceived as an associative experience of two 
similar or analogical contents of meaning. Through pairing I associate my 
experiential abilities with those of the other person: I see the other “as if 
I were there”.147 As Husserl emphasized, this did not entail a direct access 
to the inner life of the other but a relation to his or her situation. Because 
empathy has its necessary foundation in the experience of the first-person, 
Husserl claimed, the other is fundamentally given to me as an alter ego, 
143 See, e.g. Theunissen 1984: 70ff.
144 HuaI: 161; HuaXIV: 165–166; HuaVI: 320. See also HuaI: 35; HuaXV: 26.
145 HuaXXXVII: 194.
146 HuaXIV: 477.
147 HuaXV: 427. Here, Husserl distinguished his own account especially from that of 
Lipps’, who had designed empathy exactly as an immediate “projection” to the inner life 
of the other.
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another “I”.148 As Husserl noted in a manuscript, appresentation was not 
to be understood in terms of an active presentation (Darstellung) or re-
production (Abbildung) of meaning149; I do not give life to the other while 
experiencing her in empathy, rather, I live it through without active fab-
rication. 
  This emphasis on the essential “mineness” of empathy has spurred a 
wide variety of critiques, which have argued for the unquestioned ego-
centrism of Husserl’s philosophy of intersubjectivity. Levinas, in Totality 
and Infinity, criticized Husserl for conceiving the other through an analo-
gizing gaze of the ego, which suffocates the peculiar transcendence of the 
other by transforming the other to a mere duplicate or rejoinder of my-
self.150 For Levinas, this was a deeply violent gesture, one, that was in line 
with the basic tendency of Western philosophy to reduce “the other to the 
same.”151 Besides failing to appreciate the essential multiformity of human 
sociality, it also seemed to return the whole question of other subjects 
into a mere derivation of the individual consciousness – according to this 
critique, Husserl could not account for any idea of “radical otherness”, 
which fundamentally transgresses and challenges the absolute character 
of the self. 
  Things are, however, not as straightforward. First, what Husserl had 
in mind was not primarily an ontological position arguing for the absolute 
similarity of the ego and the other. Rather, the problematic of empathy 
concerned primarily the order of constitution through which the other is ex-
perienced as a living being in the first place. By taking his point of depar-
ture from the idea of association which proceeds from the subject to the 
other, Husserl claimed that he was actually avoiding the idea according to 
which the other ego would appear as my “duplicate”152. Husserl was well 
aware that the appresentative experience of the other can never amount 
to an original presentation, that is, to a full living-with the conscious life 
of the other.153 What we attain through empathy is merely a “mediate” ex-
148 HuaI: 145.
149 HuaXIV: 162.
150 Levinas 1977: 47. Behind this conviction, of course, is the more general ontological 
view on Husserl’s constitution: “It is Husserl who transforms relations onto correlatives of 
a gaze that fixes them and takes them as contents.” Levinas 1977: 95.
151 Levinas 1977: 28, 42–43.
152 HuaI: 146.
153 HuaIV: 198–200. Cf. HuaI: 146; HuaXV: 434.
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perience of the other, or, a kind of “quasi-perception” which qualifies only 
as a secondary experience. I am necessarily the “constitutive primal norm for 
all other human beings”154 in the sense that I have no direct access to the 
experience of the other, and as empathy occurs, we are still left with the 
original “abyss” (Abgrund) between individual streams of consciousness.155 
  In a parenthesis to the Fifth Meditation, Husserl presented the radi-
cal claim that not only does the other gain his or her subjectivity through 
empathy but this goes also for the mineness of the self as such. Although 
the other is experienced phenomenologically as a “modification of myself, 
I receive this character of being ‘my’ self by virtue of the contrastive pair-
ing that necessarily takes place.”156 Thus the ego, Husserl wrote, “cannot 
be thought without the non-ego to which it is internationally related.”157 
Here, perhaps the most obvious reading is of course the Fichtean-Hege-
lian one: the ego, by distinguishing itself from the other ego, gains itself 
the idea of complete self-consciousness, i.e., it realizes itself as a personal 
subject among other subjects. Self-consciousness, accordingly, does not 
emerge merely as an apperceptive unity of experience but it entails a nec-
essary relation to others, which makes the self-consciousness something 
that Kant never saw it to be: an intrinsically social phenomenon.158 
  Despite this similarity, it would be misleading to identify Husserl’s 
idea of empathy with the Hegelian recognition. Whereas for Hegel the 
process of recognition entailed a transition from the “perceptual” (wahrne-
hmende) or “understanding” (verstehende) modes of experience – modes that 
Husserl would have considered as belonging to the domain of theoretical 
reason – to that of practical reason, Husserl’s notion of empathy did not 
entail such a transition. Empathy did not “explain” merely the emergence 
of conflict of individual wills (for instance, the dialectic of Master and 
154 HuaI: 154.
155 HuaI: 150. This is also pointed out in a manuscript from 1919, where Husserl discusses 
the problem of empathy beginning from the inevitable discrepancy (Widerstreit) between 
self and other. 
156 “Notwendig tritt es vermöge seiner Sinneskonstitution als intentionale Modifikation 
meines erst objektivierten Ich, meiner primordinalen Welt auf: der Andere phänomenolo-
gisch als Modifikation mezhes Selbst (das diesen Charakter mein seinerseits durch die nun 
notwendig eintretende und kontrastierende Paarung erhält).” HuaI: 144. 
157 HuaXIV: 244. Cf. HuaIV: 96.
158 What this process of empathy implied was a transition from the anonymous functioning 
of self-awareness to its thematic or “indexical” sense (“I” as distinguished from “you”, “he/
she” etc.) from “latent” to “patent” self-consciousness. See. Zahavi 2001: 56.
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Slave) or the accomplishments of objective spirit (cultural objectivity) but 
it came to define the very existence of a common world. Since the rela-
tion between the self and other is characterized by an inevitable discrep-
ancy (Widerstreit), even empathy must take its point of departure from 
the experience of common nature.159 It is exactly this commonness that 
serves as the necessary platform for the experiences of concordance and 
discordance, which, through the mediation of individual situations, give 
the surrounding world its normatively specific character: 
We are in a relation to a common surrounding world – we are 
in a personal association: these belong together. We could not be 
persons for others if a common surrounding world did not stand 
there for us in a community, in an intentional linkage of our lives. 
Correlatively spoken, the one is constituted essentially with the 
other.160
Empathy, as it actively confirms the existence of several subjects in recip-
rocal understanding, is able to foster a “unity of similarity”161, that is, it 
is able to give the latent sense of “we” a concrete form. This reciprocity, 
Husserl argued, takes place first through the “understanding of the other’s 
organism and specifically organismal conduct”.162 It acquires for itself a 
culturally specific form only by proceeding to the “definite contents be-
longing to the higher psychic sphere”163, especially to the domain of com-
munication (Mitteilung). The emergence of communication does not entail 
that people would understand each other better; instead, it is through 
communication that the objective reality is able to acquire for itself a spe-
cific permanence in the form of lasting ideal and symbolic meanings.164 
  It was especially this idea of an intersubjective world that Husserl ana-
lyzed in detail with the help of the notion of the “lifeworld” (Lebenswelt). 
Although we find this notion already in the 1917 manuscripts published 
in the second volume of Ideas, it was not until the 1930s that the idea 
159 HuaI: 149; HuaXIV: 141.
160 „Wir sind in Beziehung auf eine gemeinsame Umwelt - wir sind in einem persona-
len Verband: das gehört zusammen. Wir könnten für Andere nicht Personen sein, wenn 
uns nicht in einer Gemeinsamkeit, einer intenlionalen Verbundenheit unseres Lebens eine 
gemeinsame Umwelt gegenüber stünde; korrelativ gesprochen: eins konstituiert sich we-
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of lifeworld gained its full prominence as the central point of departure 
for phenomenology in general. Especially in Crisis, the problematic of the 
lifeworld was introduced as a novel “path” to transcendental phenome-
nology, which, by “questioning back” (rückfragen) to the objective accom-
plishments of transcendental subjectivity, was able to fully appreciate the 
essentially intersubjective as well as dynamic character of meaning-consti-
tution. In this regard, the ontology of the lifeworld corresponded with 
the growing interest towards the genetic and generative dimensions of 
phenomenology: instead of simply turning its gaze away from the “pre-
suppositions” (Voraussetzungen) of our everyday attitude, phenomenology 
was now defined in an essential relation to these. (As I will argue in part 
4, this appreciation of the teleological aspect of philosophical undertaking 
had important consequences for Husserl’s view on the development of 
philosophy.)
  It is perhaps instructive to note briefly that within Husserl’s over-
all philosophy, the notion of lifeworld served several purposes and it ac-
quired several functions. Despite the long period of development, these 
tensions are evident even within the Crisis, where Husserl speaks of the 
lifeworld, for instance, both as the “realm of original self-evidences” (Re-
ich ursprünglicher Evidenzen) as well as the world of cultural and spiritual 
accomplishments, including the objective accomplishments of modern 
natural sciences.165 Lifeworld denotes the a priori, universal ground of all 
meaning, but Husserl speaks of it also as an essentially historical notion, as 
a world of human values, practices, norms and interests. Although Husserl 
most often employs this notion in singular form – as the correlate of tran-
scendental intersubjectivity that encloses within itself all possible forms 
of objectivity, those of nature as well as culture – we sometimes find this 
notion also in plural, for instance, in the sense of cultural lifeworlds, e.g. 
“Indian” or that of “Chinese peasants”.166 It is actually possible to speak of 
different levels of lifeworld, beginning from the practical sphere of a cer-
tain profession or a social role (“the world of a musician”) to very broad 
concepts of lifeworld, as in the case of cultural identities.
  For Husserl, however, this discrepancy was not a sheer misunder-
standing of the natural attitude. Instead, it was originally introduced by 
165 HuaVI: 130ff. Cf. HuaVI: 294–313.
166 HuaVI: 141. Cf. HuaI: 160; HuaVI: 150; HuaXXIX: 313. 
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the philosophical enterprise as such, which brought within itself “a nec-
essary and at the same time dangerous double meaning of world” as the 
universal, a priori foundation of sense (Sinnesfundament) and its individual 
realizations, i.e. “particular worlds” (Sonderwelte).167 Husserl, however, did 
not interpret this division in terms of a split in two distinct domains, for 
instance, those of universal nature and particular culture, or sensibility 
and reason. Although Husserl treated the problem of world-constitution 
as proceeding from the lower levels of intentionality – peculiar to the 
constitution of material nature – to the more complex forms of animal 
nature and spiritual accomplishments, this did not entail a transition from 
the “absolute” to a “relative” sense of the world. On the contrary, lifeworld 
is from the start a subjective-relative domain of sense – its validity, however, 
is constantly negotiated and confirmed in connection with other people. 
As Husserl maintained, the intersubjective world is permanently “on the 
march”, that is, it is constantly defined and demarcated through the gen-
erative history of meaning-sedimentation.168
  In order to avoid the scattering of lifeworld into two distinct objects 
of experience, Husserl invoked the notion of horizon (Horizont) to accen-
tuate its essentially “pre-given” (vorgegeben) nature.169 This notion can be 
understood in two regards. In its “horizontal character” (Horizonthaftig-
keit), the lifeworld does not denote a specific intentional correlate of con-
sciousness; rather, it functions as the necessary background of sense through 
which individual things acquire their meaningful character. As such, the 
lifeworld is “constantly pre-given, and constantly valid in advance”170 – the 
lifeworld is what structures our experiential field by offering a compre-
hensive pre-view of the surrounding world. It is for the sake of lifeworld 
that individual things, objects, events and practices have their “default val-
ue”, i.e., they are always projected with regard to a certain idea of expec-
167 “Erwächst hier nicht eine notwendige und zugleich gefährliche Doppeldeutigkeit von 
der Welt […].“ HuaVI: 460. As I will show later, it was already Heraclitus who articulated 
the task of philosophical undertaking as the discovery of the “one world” as the correlate of 
universal reason, i.e. the shared background of individual worlds defined by myths, social 
norms and conventions.
168 “Die Konstitution der Intersubjektivität und intersubjektiven Welt ist beständig auf 
dem Marsch“ (HuaXV: 45).
169 Lifeworld as a pre-given horizon, see HuaVI: 141–146; HuaXXXIX: 99–105. See also 
Husserl, E&U: 24ff. Cf. Yamaguchi 1982: 19; Steinbock 1995: 104ff.
170 HuaVI: 461.
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tancy and normality, of familiarity (Bekanntheit) and routine (Gewohnheit).171 
As this normality is specified through intersubjective confirmation in its 
social, historical and cultural specificities, a particular lifeworld becomes 
understandable as the “delimitation” (Gr. horizein) of the world as univer-
sal ground of experience – what Husserl sometimes called the “universal 
horizon” of all experience, or what Merleau-Ponty calls the “horizon of all 
horizons.”172 Through the stratification of ideal meanings, a sense of famil-
iarity and normality, the lifeworld acquires for itself a culturally or histori-
cally unique sense; nevertheless, it still retains its horizontal character. 
  Accordingly, the concept of lifeworld points towards two crucial fea-
tures in the constitution of human communities. (i) With the help of this 
concept, Husserl wanted to refute the idea according to which the genera-
tive unity of communities would reside merely in the acceptance or con-
struction of a common narrative. Although stories and myths may have a 
special role in strengthening the sense of unity within different social bod-
ies, these narratives have their foundation in the idea of common world that 
functions as the indispensable horizon of communal activity. (ii) Instead of 
a mere doctrine of objective spirit, Husserl’s notion of lifeworld entailed 
a necessary relation to the material, concrete conditions of the geo-social 
environment. Thus communality, before it expresses itself in different ac-
complishments of the spirit – concepts, ideas, shared norms and so on – 
finds itself in a relation to a particular territoriality (although it is possible 
to render this territoriality as virtual). This point becomes evident as we 
focus on the problematic of home and alien.
  In order to understand how individual lifeworlds acquire their norma-
tively distinct character, Husserl began to develop a theory of their nor-
mative delimitation under the vocabulary of “homeworld” (Heimwelt) and 
“alienworld” (Fremdwelt).173 In its most general sense, the idea of home-
world designates a sphere of familiarity which involves a consciousness of 
its normative specificity or “domesticity”. Although this sense of familiar-
ity characterizes even the very basic experiences of the surrounding world 
(e.g., even animals have a sense of “nearworld”, Nahwelt), it acquires for 
itself a lasting character only within a framework of spiritual meanings. 
171 HuaXIV: 623–624. See also HuaXIV: 228; HuaXV: 214.
172 HuaVI: 147; Merleau-Ponty 1962: 381.
173 On this division in Husserl, see e.g. HuaVI: 302; HuaXIV: 64, 214–218, 613–630; 
HuaXXIX: 145ff.; Steinbock 1995, Waldenfels 1997, 1998.
— 210 —
. G  T P
Thus the idea of homeworld, in its pregnant sense, denotes the idea of a 
shared cultural territory (Kulturterritorium) which involves a consciousness 
of its uniqueness with regard to its outside. As Husserl insisted, “home 
and alien designate a difference in understanding”174 – the familiarity of a 
particular lifeworld is based on its intelligible character, which is always 
delimited in regard to that which is unintelligible, that which is unfamil-
iar and strange. Therefore, rather than signifying a merely contingent fea-
ture in the constitution of human lifeworlds, the division between home 
and alien was actually a “permanent structure of every world”.175 Human 
lifeworlds, as they emerge through social co-operation, are never experi-
ences as purely self-enclosed or self-identical totalities – something that 
could be explained purely in its own terms – but always in an antithetical 
relation to what they are not. 
  Because the horizontal structure of one’s homeworld is not based 
on geographical conditions but on the level of familiarity and normal-
ity, its limits are often ambiguous and gradual. As Husserl argued, instead 
of a single homeworld we are actually part of several overlapping home-
worlds or levels of homeworld, beginning with our closest community 
(e.g. family, hometown) to our fellow countrymen and finally, to very 
broad definitions of cultural worlds or civilizations.176 The limits of one’s 
homeworld are seldom fixed but fluctuating: for instance, for two cultures 
living in close interaction through intellectual or commercial exchange 
may often undergo a process of absorption, whereby they are merged into 
a completely novel homeworld. (On this idea with regard to the interac-
tion of Greek city-states, see Ch. 3.2). In some cases, the concrete limits 
of a particular homeworld can be completely transient. For instance, in 
the case of a “nomadic people” (Nomadenvolk) the liminal horizon of their 
particular homeworld is essentially unstable, constantly exposed to the 
variation of its frontiers.177 On the other hand, for a community living on 
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  In order to emphasize the inherent connection between generativity 
and homeworld, Husserl distinguished between two forms of alienness: 
the inauthentic (uneigentlich) and the mythical (mythische).179 Although we 
may speak of unfamiliar animals or plants as strange, unfamiliar or “alien”, 
this does not yet amount to the genuine sense of the Fremde, which is es-
sentially dependent on the unintelligible tradition of the alien people. In 
this regard, Husserl emphasized, the authentically alien is the “mythical” 
alien – not necessarily in the sense of a people living according to devel-
oped mythology but in the sense of a generative distance separating their 
tradition from our own.
  Nevertheless, this idea of familiarity did not entail that the limits of 
a particular homeworld would completely lack a relation to geographi-
cal conditions. Instead of being “purely cultural” or “merely natural” 
formations, homeworlds are best described in terms of “geo-historical 
horizons”180, which constantly project the division of familiarity and 
strangeness in regard to the environing world and its geographical fea-
tures. Cultural traditions seldom exist without any relation to the earthly, 
material conditions but they are constantly localized through different 
borders, sites, monuments, and scenes.181 Following Ed Casey, we might 
argue that it is exactly through traditions that “spaces” are turned into 
“places” that embody a certain generative background.182 This is an impor-
tant point to make, since it helps us to see the fundamental difference in 
Husserl’s treatment of lifeworld to the other prevalent use of the word, 
namely, that of Jürgen Habermas who employs it mainly in connection 
to his theory of communicative action, as a specific region of human ac-
tivity.183 Moreover, it anticipates the crucial insight in regard to Husserl’s 
delineation of Europe as a “spiritual form” (geistige Gestalt), which, despite 
179 HuaXV: 432
180 HuaXV: 411.
181 In the age of digital communication, it might seem that the geographical conditions 
would play a lesser role in the constitution of unique homeworlds. With the help of inter-
net, we have been provided with possibilities to create lasting associations regardless of 
geographical distances. Still, it seems that even these electronic homeworlds necessitate 
the existence of a kind of “virtual geography”, which manifests itself in the metaphors 
of websites, chat-rooms, or virtual worlds. Even these mediums seem to presuppose some 
kind of delimited locality, which serves as the platform for different types of social co-
operation.
182 Casey 2007.
183 See e.g. Habermas 1981: 196.
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its fundamental spirituality, does not leave behind geographical factors (as 
Derrida wants to maintain).
  In his work Home and Beyond – Generative Phenomenology after Husserl 
(1995) Anthony Steinbock provides the richest available discussion on the 
problematic of the homeworld in Husserl’s work. According to one of the 
key theses of the work, although some of Husserl’s formulations point to-
wards an understanding of the home–alien distinction as analogical to the 
emergence of selfhood through empathy, this should not prevent us from 
considering the essential difference that prevails between the two. Instead 
of a foundational relation between self and other, in which I act as the con-
stitutive norm for the other, Steinbock argues, the structural difference 
between home and alien is constituted from the start as co-generative and 
non-foundational, i.e., as essentially interdependent and equal structures 
of experience. Home and alien are, as Steinbock puts it, essentially “limi-
nal” notions not merely in the sense that they involve a process of limit-
formation but on the virtue that “they are mutually delimited as home and as 
alien, as normal and as abnormal.”184 Home, Steinbock maintains, should 
not be understood in terms of “one-sided original sphere”, but as “being 
co-constituted as home by encountering an alienworld.”185 
  There are indeed passages in which Husserl seems to confirm this 
idea. “An alien humanity or humankind is constituted as an alien people,” 
writes Husserl, “and at the same time, there is constituted for me and for 
us ‘our own’ community of homecomrades, community of a people in 
relation to our cultural environment as the world of our human validi-
ties that are unique.”186 However, it is possible to ask whether this reci-
procity expresses anything new in regard to the constitution of the self-
consciousness through empathy: as I already pointed out, Husserl argued 
that it is also the ego that gains its sense of selfhood through the emphatic 
encounter with others. In its pre-emphatic form, we can speak of the ego 
merely in terms of empty pole of acts, for it derives its genuine sense of 
self-awareness only through the emphatic encounter with others. 
184 Steinbock 1995: 179.
185 Steinbock 1995: 182.
186 „Es konstituiert sich also fremdes Menschentum, eine fremde Menschheit, als fremdes 
Volk etwa. Eben damit konstituiert sich für mich und für uns „unsere eigene“ Heimge-
nossenschaft, Volksgenossenschaft in Beziehung auf unsere Kulturumwelt als Welt unserer 
menschlichen Geltungen, unserer besonderen.“ HuaXV: 214. Cf. Steinbock 1995: 182.
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  There is also another reason why the characterization of the home–
alien division as a non-foundational relation appears as problematic.187 Un-
like empathic encounter, which takes its point of departure from two in-
dividual consciousness that are ultimately distinct, the categories of home 
and alien point towards a common foundation in the idea of one identical 
world. Unlike the conscious life of the individual, which is defined from 
the start by a specific privacy – my experiences cannot be lived by anyone 
else – particular homeworlds with their unique generative traditions arise 
always on the basis of a common world of nature (what Husserl sometimes 
calls the “nature-totality”, Allnatur). As Husserl maintains, homeworlds ac-
quire for themselves their unique character through a process of norma-
tive specification, through which they “set themselves apart” (abhebt sich) 
from the “anonymity” of the real world (reale  Welt), a world whose objec-
tivity serves as the necessary point of departure for the constitution of 
individual traditions.188 As we shall observe in part 3, Husserl considered 
this idea of a common foundation as absolutely crucial for the formation 
of the philosophical attitude, and consequently, to the idea of Europe. This 
is not to say that all symbols, spiritual meanings, and descriptions would 
entail a necessary relation to this shared world: as we saw in the case of 
Emperor’s clothes, it is well possible for cultural (i.e. symbolic) objectiv-
ity to break off from its objective foundations. 
  These reservations, however, do not refute Steinbock’s ethical conclu-
sion according to which the relation between home and alien should be 
understood in terms of “axiological asymmetry”, mutual irreversibility or 
irreducibility.189 We acquire our own personality only through encounters 
with others and their unique histories: in other words, our sense of being 
home necessitates the existence of an alien generativity. Because of the 
irreversibility of home and alien, argues Steinbock, the destruction of this 
difference through “transgression” or “occupation” would entail a destruc-
tion of generativity as such: in a world without tradition and familiar-
ity, which imply an antithetical relation to the alien, we would be simply 
homeless. Against the idea of one-sided transgression of limits, Steinbock 
sketches what he calls a “responding to the alien from the perspective of 
187 The problematic character of the “non-foundational” account is also emphasized by 
Steinbock in his later article (1998c: 167).
188 HuaXV: 215.
189 Steinbock 1995: 184.
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home”190 – we can of course be responsive to the concerns, demands and 
hardships of the alien, but we ought not to interpret these merely on the 
basis of our own situation, nor should we anticipate the other to be re-
ciprocally responsive towards our concerns. Steinbock’s conclusion, then, 
resembles Levinas’ idea on the non-symmetrical relation between the ego 
and the other: I am infinitely responsible for the alien, though not as a par-
ticular representative of a universal moral principle (or what Levinas calls 
le même, the “same”) but as the infinitely different and “distant” other.191 As 
Levinas puts it in his essay “No Identity”, “man has to be conceived on the 
basis of the self putting itself, despite itself, in place of everyone, substi-
tuted for everyone by its very non-interchangeability –” 
He has to be conceived on the basis of the condition or uncondi-
tion of being hostage, hostage for all others who, precisely qua 
others, do not belong to the same genus as I, since I am responsible 
even for their responsibility. It is by virtue of this supplementary 
responsibility that subjectivity is not the ego, but me.192
Thus, against the idea of universal moral subject (“the ego”) Levinas ar-
gues for the essential singularity of ethical agency, which constantly finds 
itself tangled in a unique web of responsibility and dependency. It is ex-
actly this singularity – the fact that my actions are irreplaceable, that I am 
demanded to act as the unconditional “I” – which constitutes the genuine 
point of departure for any ethical stance.
  As I would like to argue, however, it was exactly this broadened and 
context-bound idea of responsibility that characterized Husserl’s late re-
flections on generativity and historicity. First, against the Kantian idea of 
ethical justification on the basis of a formal subject of universal moral 
principles, Husserl argued for the essentially context-bound and intersub-
jective character of ethical agency: the righteousness of our activity entails 
a necessary relation not only to those capacities that we have acquired for 
ourselves but also to the concrete (emotional, affective) relations that we 
develop towards other subjects. I will return to this idea in part 4. More-
over, the essential discrepancies that characterize the generative distances 
between home and alien did not prevent the possibility of a teleological-
190 Steinbock 1995: 185, 256.
191 On Steinbock’s reference to Levinas, see 1995: 253. 
192 Levinas 1987: 150.
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historical reflection, which seeks to uncover the common origin of gen-
erative traditions – of language, cultural objectivity and so on – in the 
universal structures of the shared lifeworld. To put it differently, I believe 
that through his reflections on generativity, Husserl’s idea of universal-
ity called for a rearticulation on the basis of this generative multiformity. 
Instead of a position that can be attained once and for all, universalism 
was to be understood, fundamentally and necessarily, as a relation or a 
“task” that necessarily articulates itself in relation to the multiplicity of 
individual traditions. As Husserl himself put it, all historical communities 
are related “to the surrounding world which is communal for them (the 
personal “world”), and this surrounding world has relative actuality for 
them – and a changing actuality for different personal communities and 
their personal times –” 
but this [fact] does not exclude the possibility that personal com-
munities, each of which has its personal surrounding world, can, 
by entering into or already being in relation with one another, have 
or attain an overlapping, common surrounding world or that they 
know themselves in their interrelations to be related to the same 
“real” world, only finding that each community views the world 
in quite a different way, accords it a completely different kind of 
actuality.193
As I will argue in part 3, it was indeed the name “Europe” that consti-
tuted the prime (though not the “good”) example of this idea of “genera-
tive overlapping”. Through the emergence of the theoretical attitude and 
the common praxis of philosophy, there emerged a novel idea of “political 
historicity”, which executed itself through a specific insistence to over-
come the generative distances that characterize the home–alien division. 
Instead of a one-sided relation of occupation or transgression, this idea of 
universal generativity was founded on a specific relativization of home and 
alien – it was to be conceived as a reciprocal mediation and co-operation of 
193 „In der Gemeinschaft ihres Lebens ist sie [die historische Gemeinschaft] bzw. ist das 
Leben ihrer Personen bezogen auf die für sie gemeinschaftliche Umwelt (die personale 
„Welt“), und diese Umwelt hat eine relative Wirklichkeit für sie - und eine wechselnde 
für verschiedene personale Gemeinschaften und ihre Personalen Zeiten; das schließt aber 
nicht aus, daß personale Gemeinschaften. deren jede ihre personale Umwelt hat, zuein-
ander in Beziehung tretend oder schon in Beziehung stehend, auch eine übergreifende ge-
meinsame Umwelt haben oder gewinnen können, bzw. daß sie sich im Verkehr auf dieselbe 
„reale“ Welt bezogen wissen, nur findend. daß eine jede die Welt ganz anders auffaßt, ihr 
eine ganz andere Wirklichkeit gibt.“ HuaVI: 299.
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individual homeworlds that also found itself a world of its own, a world of 
ideal, scientific objectivity. Before we move on to examine this idea, let us 
still take a closer look at the theoretical foundations of this framework in 
Husserl’s account of community and culture.
2.4. Personalities of a Higher Order:
Phenomenology of Community and Culture
One of the most puzzling features in Husserl’s theory of human sociality is his idea of communities as subjective or personal totali-ties. This idea, as it was developed by Husserl since the end of 
1910s onwards, was formulated with the help of several different con-
cepts, for instance, those of “we-subjectivity” (Wir-Subjektivität), “suprap-
ersonal consciousnesses” (überpersonale Bewusstsein), and “personalities of 
a higher order” (Personalität der höherer Ordnung). Although we might be 
tempted to read these notions primarily as metaphors or analogies, Hus-
serl was quite insistent in refuting this interpretation. As he put it very 
clearly, the analogy of the individual and the community was not to be un-
derstood as merely heuristic but “real” (wirklich).194 Communities were to 
be understood also as personal totalities that can be characterized through 
such attributes as “personal act”, “style”, “memory” a “collective will”.195 
They constitute for themselves a life that cannot be simply reduced back 
to individual consciousnesses – they “have their own lives, preserve them-
selves by lasting through time despite the joining or leaving of individuals.”196 
  These personalities, Husserl claimed, range from small clubs to fami-
lies, societies, political parties, and even states. This does not mean that 
the aforementioned communities would all understand themselves in a 
similar manner. As “personal unities”, family and state (or the Hegelian 
civil society) have significant differences – however, what interested Hus-
serl was their fundamental points of convergence: the idea of personality 
of a higher order does not say anything substantial about the different 
194 HuaXXVII: 21. 
195 See e.g. HuaVI: 326; Hua XIV: 205; HuaXXVII: 53.
196 HuaIV: 182.
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modes of social or political co-existence but it merely points towards the 
formation of a sense of commonness.
  These notions, however, have not been easily accepted. Alfred Schütz, 
for one, acknowledged the significance of Husserl’s analyses of intersub-
jectivity for his own phenomenology of the social world; however, he 
conceived the idea of “personality of a higher order” as being completely 
unfounded. Phenomenology was to remain a philosophy of the first per-
son perspective, and even regards to the problematic of intersubjectiv-
ity, its strength relied essentially on its capability to understand personal 
co-operation from the point of view of the individual. Thus, as Schütz 
put it: “The attempts of Simmel, Max Weber, [and] Scheler to reduce so-
cial collectivities to the social interaction of individuals is, so it seems, 
much closer to the spirit of phenomenology than the pertinent statements 
of its founder.”197 Paul Ricoeur shares this idea, although he relates it to 
Husserl: “The decisive advantage of Husserl over Hegel appears to me to 
lie in his uncompromising refusal to hypostatize collective entities and 
in his tenacious will to reduce them in every instance to a network of 
interactions.”198 Following David Carr (who is more sympathetic towards 
this idea), it may thus seem that the idea of suprapersonal consciousness 
appears at first glance as “something prima facie unphenomenological”199. 
Since the notions of consciousness, subjectivity and act seem to imply a 
form of givenness that can only be realized within the conscious life of 
the individual, their extension to the life of the community may appear as 
an unfounded hypostatization. What kind of givenness characterizes the 
suprapersonal consciousness, or, to whom is it given? 
  As I already pointed out, however, for Husserl the notions of con-
sciousness, subjectivity and person were not defined as static notions that 
could be identified with the undisturbed reflexivity of the self. Through his 
reflections concerning the genetic development of consciousness, Husserl 
began to understand the phenomenon of subjectivity essentially in terms 
of temporal development – a genesis – for the sake of which individual af-
fects and acts are conjoined with each other. Subjectivity, according to this 
account, was to be understood in terms of constant habituation through 
197 Schütz 1975: 39.
198 Ricoeur 1991: 244.
199 Carr 1987: 268.
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which these affects and acts unify themselves into the form of permanent 
personal characters. As Husserl put it in Ideas II, although this process 
realizes itself originally within the genetic development of the individual 
ego, it does not restrict itself merely to this – instead, as we consider the 
interpersonal modes of affectivity and activity we discover an analogical 
process of habituation:
In the course of these temporal ego-events, the person is consti-
tuted originally as person, i.e., as substrate of personal characters, 
as, in its temporal being, substrate-unity. [...] If one studies the 
person in his unity, which manifests itself in his acts and affections, 
then one studies how he “affects” other persons and likewise how 
he spiritually undergoes effects from them, and furthermore one 
studies how personalities of a higher order are constituted, how 
individual persons and collective personalities of a higher level 
perform, how as correlates of their spiritual performances cultural 
objectivities and cultural arrangements are constituted, now indi-
vidual persons, communal personalities, and cultural formations 
develop, in which forms they do so, in what typicality, etc.200
To speak of the collective persons as “higher order” phenomena refers ex-
actly to this idea: communities as personal wholes are inextricably founded 
on the acts of individual egos. However, as the acts of individual subjects 
associate with each other, they are also able to constitute lasting unities 
that have their unique style and habitus. A music orchestra, for instance, 
acquires for itself a personal form through the association of individual 
acts (e.g. different musicians playing different patterns) and affects (feel-
ings, moods etc.) – its unique style is due to its common history consti-
tuted in the group activity. This entails that the performed musical piece 
is to be conceived, not only as an end product of distinct individuals, but 
as something whose uniqueness originates from the personal style of the 
200 „Im Gang dieser zeitlichen Ich-Vorkommnisse konstituiert sie sich ursprünglich als 
Person, d.i. als Substrat personaler Charaktere, in ihrem zeitlichen Sein als Substrateinheit. 
[...] Studiert man die einheitliche Persönlichkeit, die sich in ihren Akten und Affektionen 
bekundet, so studiert man, wie sie auf andere Persönlichkeiten „wirkt” und ebenso geistig 
von ihnen Wirkungen erfährt, wie Personalitäten höherer Ordnung sich konstituieren, wie 
Einzelpersönlichkeiten und höherstufig kollektive Persönlichkeiten Leistungen vollziehen, 
wie als Korrelat ihres geistigen Leistens Kulturgegenständlichkeiten, Kulturordnungen 
usw. sich konstituieren, wie Einzelpersönlichkeiten und Gemeinschaftspersönlichkeiten, 
wie Kulturgebilde sich entwickeln, in welchen Formen, in welcher Typik und was derglei-
chen mehr.“ HuaIV: 357–358.
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community itself. Thus, on the basis of this specific conjoining of indi-
vidual acts, we are able to acknowledge a conscious life of a higher order:
Consciousness unites with consciousness, overlapping time in the 
form simultaneity as well as in chronological order. Personal con-
sciousness becomes one with others […] and constitutes a unity of 
a suprapersonal consciousness.201
It is exactly here that we encounter the crucial difference between Hus-
serl’s position and the Hegelian account of “objective spirit” (as present-
ed in the first part of the work). Although Husserl’s earlier manuscripts 
occasionally refer to the Hegelian notions of “objective spirit” (objektiver 
Geist)202 and “collective spirit” (Gemeingeist)203, his theory of community 
differed from that of Hegel’s in one crucial respect. Husserl insisted that in 
order to arrive at an accurate transcendental account of human communi-
ties, one should insist on the conceptual difference between the intraper-
sonal collective and its accomplishments, that is, the difference between 
community (Gemeinschaft) as a habituated form of individual activities and 
culture (Kultur) as the objective accomplishments of this community.204 
Whereas Hegel’s notion of objective spirit seemed to conflate these two 
aspects under the title of objective spirit (cf. Ch. 1.1), Husserl insisted on 
the essential difference between the two. A particular social whole cannot 
be simply reduced to its own accomplishments – language, religion, sci-
ence, or even the relations of production – for this would entail that we 
fail to appreciate the differences that prevail in their formation. A com-
munity has its habitual character only within the life of the individuals and 
the unity of their social acts, but culture has its permanent duration in the 
objective accomplishments (e.g. accomplishments that are materialized 
in writing). These aspects, of course, belong inherently together, for the 
sense of cultural accomplishments is constantly vivified by the personal 
community. However, as in the case of Rosetta stone, the extinction of a 
particular community and its habitual unity of acts does not necessarily 
201 “Bewusstsein vereinigt sich so mit Bewusstsein, alle Zeit übergreifend, übergreifend 
die Zeit in Form der Gleichzeitigkeit wie in Form der Zeitfolge. Personales Bewusstsein 
wird eins mit anderem, individuell von ihm notwendig getrennten Bewusstsein, und so 
wird Einheit eines überpersonalen Bewusstseins.“ HuaXIV: 199.
202 HuaXIII: 65n2; HuaXV: 559.
203 HuaXIV: 165, 192, 200; HuaXXVII: 53.
204 On the definition of culture in Husserl, see Orth (1987: 116ff.) and Hart (1992b)
— 220 —
. G  T P
do away with the possibility of understanding its accomplishments, or, the 
process of sedimentation that is characteristic to these.
  This contrast to Hegel can also be elucidated from an socio-ethical 
point of view. As I pointed out in chapter 1.3, Hegel conceived world his-
tory in terms of a dialectical development, in which particular formations 
of culture – styles of artistic representations, forms of political institu-
tions – are superseded with new ones. Although Hegel’s notion of spirit 
allowed for a teleological reading of this development – old culture is 
not merely replaced but also preserved in temporal genesis – he seemed 
to endow the capability of renewal primarily into the hands of individual 
subjects. “Objective spirit”, as it acquires for itself a lasting form in the 
spirit of a time, is constantly prone to the loss of meaning through cultural 
alienation; however, it is only through great “world-historical individuals” 
who transcend their own spirit of time that history realizes its reformatory 
potential. Thus for Hegel, cultural renewal takes place essentially through 
individual human subjects, “who appear to draw the impulse of their life 
from themselves”, but who secretly follow the demands of the world-
spirit.205 Against this account of cultural development through individual 
action, through hidden motives (“cunning of reason”) and often violent 
outbursts, Husserl wanted to develop an idea of communal renewal that 
would take its point of departure from the demands of intersubjective co-
operation and the complete transparency of means and goals:
A particular humanity can and must be viewed truly as a “human 
at large”, and also in its possibility for self-definition in communal-
ethical regard. Hence, it must be thought as being expected to de-
fine itself ethically. This possibility, however, must be examined in 
its principal possibility, and it must be made univocally demanding, 
so that it allows practical definition in disclosed eidetic possibilities 
and normative necessities that can be discovered through investi-
gation.206 
205 Hegel 1899: 30.
206 „Eine Menschheit kann wirklich, und muß, als „Mensch im großen“ betrachtet und 
dann gemeinschaftsethisch als sich möglicherweise selbstbestimmende, somit auch als sich 
ethisch bestimmen-sollende gedacht werden. Dieser Gedanke aber muß in seiner prinzipi-
ellen Möglichkeit geklärt, zwingend einsichtig gemacht und nach Erforschung der in ihm 
beschlossenen Wesensmöglichkeiten und normativen Notwendigkeiten praktisch bestim-
mend werden.“ HuaXXVII: 22
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  Hence, individual ethics was to be supplemented with social ethics – 
“the ethics of communities as communities”207 – clarifying the modes of 
self-inspection, self-critique and renewal characteristic of personalities of 
a higher order. Communities, like individual subjects, were to be con-
ceived as being able to understand themselves as subjective totalities, as 
embodying a personal history through habituation and sedimentation of 
meaning. Moreover, they were to be treated as being able to reflect their 
total history in mutual understanding, as potentially capable of renewing 
themselves in the course of time through social co-operation.
  What this insight revealed was nothing less than the idea of a common 
foundation of ethics and politics. Against the modern tendency to treat the 
domains of individual and interpersonal co-operation as embodying dis-
tinct principles of justification, Husserl was aiming at rearticulating their 
common foundation within the reflexive capabilities of reason. This did 
not entail, however, that these domains would have been considered as 
univocally similar – for instance, as if we could do away with the essen-
tially multivoiced character of political reality by introducing a particular 
institutional framework or an unequivocal model of political citizenship. 
As I will argue in part 4, Husserl located the common foundation of ethi-
cal and political life in the dynamic principles of critique and renewal, 
which delineated the formal condition for the idea of self-responsibility. 
Against the modern tendency to locate the best possible idea of politi-
cal life in a particular institutional or material arrangement, the “political 
epoché” of phenomenology was to secure the essentially open character 
of political reflection. 
  Let us still consider the relation between community and culture. Al-
though Husserl’s concept of culture (Kultur) denoted the objective side 
of communal co-operation, this concept was to be understood in a rather 
broad sense. According to his definition, culture comprises nothing less 
than the “totality of accomplishments that come into being in the continu-
ous activity of the communalized human beings”208, ranging from simple 
cultural objects such as tools, works of art, and religious symbols to all 
sorts of oral traditions, abiding values, beliefs, and appreciations. These 
207 HuaXXVII: 22.
208 “[…] Inbegriff der Leistungen, die in den fortlaufenden Tätigkeiten vergemeinschafte-
ter Menschen zustande kommen […]“ HuaXXVII: 21.
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accomplishments, argues Husserl, “have their lasting spiritual existence 
in the unity of communal consciousness and its continuous tradition”209 
meaning that cultural objectivity always derives its sense from the so-
cial activity that founds it. For this reason, Husserl’s notion of culture 
could not be equaled with the Hegelian objective spirit, for culture – as it 
emerges as the correlate of communal consciousness – also has a worldly 
dimension of its own. Owing to its “materialization” in different objects, 
practices, and institutions, culture allows itself to be transmitted in the 
course of generations. 
  The peculiar character of human culture, however, consists in its 
double role in the constitution of social reality. Though culture is indeed 
something created by a particular community, these objective accomplish-
ments constantly function also as the presupposition of communal life 
itself. Social co-operation is always embedded in different cultural-his-
torical horizons of meaning, which define the formation of communities 
in their turn. This insight is shown perhaps most evidently by the fact of 
language, the cultural objectivity par excellence. Language is not only pro-
duced, but constantly renewed by the community of speakers, novelists, 
poets and politicians; however, it is by learning language that one is, so to 
speak, incorporated into the community in the first place. 
  It is exactly here that we encounter a novel possibility for the formu-
lation of Husserl’s the paradox of subjectivity, according to which we find 
ourselves as both someone who constitute the world, but also as beings 
who belong to this world as constituted beings.210 According to the “cul-
tural” rendition of this idea, the human being is both the “subject as well as 
the object of culture”211 – the one who lives in the midst of socio-cultural 
structures, but also the one who has the power to create them anew. Fol-
lowing Foucault, Husserl would have indeed agreed that subjectivity, as 
a category of lived experience, is fundamentally and thoroughly defined by 
social discourses, practices, and institutions – at the same time, however, 
it would be naïve to disregard the origin of our social and political insti-
tutions in human co-operation. What the human being has created, the 
human being can transform – and this goes also for the “human at large”: 
209 “[…] die in der Einheit des Gemeinschaftsbewußtseins und seiner forterhaltenden Tra-
dition ihr bleibendes geistiges Dasein haben.“ Ibid.
210 HuaVI: 182ff.
211 HuaXXVII: 41–42. See also HuaXXXIX: 300.
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communities must be understood as self-regulating subjectivities that can 
acquire for themselves a critical relation to its cultural accomplishments. 
(I will return to the temporal or teleological implications of this idea in 
part 4.)
  Not all communities, however, have the capability of producing such 
objectivities that would amount to be called culture in a pregnant sense. 
A group of people who share the same institutional conditions – for in-
stance, prisoners who live in the same facilities and who are submitted to 
the rules, regulations, and a schedule – might be called a social grouping, 
but not one which jointly creates common accomplishments. Likewise, a 
person and a dog might embody a reciprocal relation to the extent that 
they recognize each other’s desires, emotions and needs. This kind of as-
sociation, which realizes itself through inactive “attraction” (hineinziehen) 
towards one’s companions – what Husserl sometimes calls a “symbiot-
ic community”212 – announces itself, for instance, at the moment when 
somebody is missing. 
  However, in order to describe the kind of co-operation which makes 
possible the emergence of lasting cultural accomplishments, Husserl in-
troduced the idea of social and communicative acts. These are acts through 
which individual subjects are able to communicate with each other in a 
way which makes possible the emergence of permanent ideas and mean-
ings, i.e. objective ideality. As already Aristotle put it, whereas animals are 
capable of “communicating” (hermeneuein) with each other on the basis of 
natural expressions of pain, joy, longing etc., it is only through “symbolic” 
communication based on “mutual agreement” (kata synthēken) that this co-
operation is able to produce for itself lasting objectivities. Not only do 
these objectivities make possible the emergence of human language, but 
they make possible the idea of common striving through shared goals, 
values, and beliefs. As Husserl puts it in Ideas II:
Sociality is constituted by specifically social, communicative acts, acts 
in which the ego turns to others and in which the ego is conscious 
of these others as ones toward which it is turning, and ones which, 
furthermore, understand this turning, perhaps adjust their be-
havior to it and reciprocate by turning toward that ego in acts of 
agreement or disagreement, etc. It is these acts, between persons 
212 On the notion of “symbiotische Gesellschaft”, see HuaXIII: 107.
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who already “know” each other, which foster a higher unity of con-
sciousness and which include in this unity the surrounding world 
of things as the surrounding world common to the persons who 
take a position in regard to it.213
Let us illuminate this idea with the help of an example. As I agree to have 
a cup of coffee at a local café with a friend of mine, we begin to negotiate 
the most convenient route to our destination. I present my own alterna-
tive, which I believe is the quickest way to reach the place; my friend 
agrees, but she insists on taking the longer, though more peaceful route to 
the café. I consent to her option, but due to the rush, we agree to take the 
shorter way back. Thus by asserting each other’s points of view, we have 
reached a common consensus: the end result we agreed upon was not 
chosen by an isolated individual but it was a result of a series of communi-
cative acts leading to a joint decision. This was exactly what Husserl meant 
with suprapersonal consciousness: a unity of co-existing or successive acts 
leading to the constitution of a shared belief, decision or a telos. In this re-
ciprocal activity, writes Husserl, “my act and his activity at the same time 
are a complex act which not only in part is immediately from him and only 
in part immediately dome by me or to be done by me” – 
In a higher founded sense the total action and achievement is mine 
and also his, even though each acts for himself immediately “in his 
share” of the matter and achieves a primary action which belongs 
exclusively to him; but this is also part of the secondary action 
which is founded and which has its completeness from both of us. 
So it is with all communal works.214
213 “ Die Sozialität konstituiert sich durch die spezifisch sozialen, kommunikativen Akte, Akte 
in denen sich das Ich an Andere wendet, und dem Ich diese Anderen auch bewußt sind 
als die, an welche es sich wendet, und welche ferner diese Wendung verstehen, sich ev. 
in ihrem Verhalten danach richten, sich zurückwenden in gleichstimmigen oder gegen-
stimmigen Akten usw. Diese Akte sind es, die zwischen Personen, die schon voneinander 
„wissen“, eine höhere Bewußtseinseinheit herstellen, in diese die umgebende Dingwelt als 
gemeinsame Umwelt der stellungnehmenden Personen einbeziehen.“ HuaIV: 194.
214 „Speziell was die Handlung anbelangt, so kann mein Wille darauf gehen, dass der Ande-
re will, mag ich ihm es befohlen haben und ihn als unter meinem Befehl stehend ansehen, 
mag ich ihn willentlich auf andere Weise dazu bestimmt haben, dass er etwas tue, was 
für mich praktisch Gewolltes ist. Seine Tat ist dann mittelbar auch meine Tat, und ist das 
Verhältnis ein wechselseitiges, so ist meine Tat und seine Tätigkeit zugleich für mich eine 
komplexe Tat, die nur zu einem Teil von ihm und zu einem von mir unmittelbar getan und 
zu tuende war. Die gesamte Handlung und Leistung ist meine Handlung und ist auch seine 
Handlung im höheren, fundierten Sinn, während jeder für sich an „seinem Teil“ unmittel-
bar an der Sache handelt und eine primäre Handlung vollzieht, die ausschliesslich die ihm 
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  Of course, not all communities function as smoothly as in the case 
of the aforementioned example. We know that in the contexts of science, 
politics, and religion, it is exactly dissent, rather than consensus, that con-
stitutes the prevalent mode of co-operation.215 As it is often the case, dif-
ferent interest groups may even take their conflict on the level of language, 
which “fails” to execute its function as a common cultural objectivity. As in 
the case of dispute concerning the abortion legislation, the disagreement 
does not concern a mere praxis or “human rights”, but the definition of 
life itself (“Where and when does life begin?”). As Marx already accentu-
ated in The German Ideology, we ought to be critical towards the idea of 
language as a neutral cultural objectivity, which merely functions as the 
foundation for particular, “regional” disputes. Especially the language of 
philosophy, argued Marx, has the tendency of abstracting itself from the 
conflictual and changing character of the actual world, and to present it-
self as the “objective” description of societal reality. 
  As Husserl insisted, these discrepancies should not prevent us from 
considering the possibility of rational co-operation, in which all parties 
are acknowledged as equal contributors to the emergence of shared ac-
complishments. This idea was articulated by Husserl with the notion of 
“community of will” (Willesgemeinschaft), which not only lives according to 
shared cultural constraints – common language, law, morality – but which 
is able to reflect these accomplishments through common deliberation. 
In other words, a community of will is such that it can acknowledge its 
accomplishments as a product of common co-operation, and it is able to 
take a reflexive stance towards its own personal history:
The most important issue is that the community is not a mere col-
lective of individuals, and the communal life and its communal ac-
complishments are not a mere collective of individual lives and 
individual accomplishments […] but a community as a community 
has a consciousness. As a community it can, however, have in the 
full sense a self-consciousness: It can have an appreciation of itself 
and a will to direct itself, a will to self-formation.216
eigene ist, die aber Teil der sekundären, fundierten ist, die die volle eines jeden von uns ist. 
So bei allen Gemeinschaftswerken.“ (HuaXIV: 193)
215 On this point, see especially Zahavi 2001: 85ff.
216 “Die bedeutsamste Tatsache ist aber die, daß die Gemeinschaft nicht ein bloßes Kol-
lektiv der einzelnen und das Gemeinschaftsleben und die Gemeinschaftsleistung nicht ein 
bloßes Kollektiv der Einzelleben und der Einzelleistungen sind […] eine Gemeinschaft 
als Gemeinschaft hat ein Bewußtsein, als Gemeinschaft kann sie aber auch ein Selbstbe-
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  Especially in the context of the Kaizo essays, this is what Husserl 
meant with the idea of a “personality of a higher order”, which has the 
possibility of “carrying out communal accomplishments that are not mere 
collections of individual accomplishments, but that are in a genuine sense 
personal accomplishments of the community, its striving and will.”217 Let 
us note immediately that Husserl is not referring to the idea of complete 
and undisturbed consensus of individual wills. The idea of a personality of 
a higher order entails a critical and reflexive stance towards the habituated 
form of communal co-operation and not a single, “totalitarian” model of 
life permeating the lives of individuals. Ethical life, as already accentuated, 
was to be understood as a practical idea based on an active-reflexive stance 
towards the passively habituated objectivities, styles and convictions. As 
Husserl seems to suggest in several occasions, it is exactly through the 
diverging views – and not despite of them – that a community realizes its 
“common will”, its will to self-formation. The unity of a community does 
not rest upon the “similarity of manners, forms of personal dealings, ways 
of thinking, opinions, scientific activity etc.” but, as emphatically put it, on 
“persons who stand within a unity of a spiritual communion of action”218. I 
will return to this idea in the following parts, but now it suffices to say that 
it was exactly this introduction of the phenomenological correlation to 
the being-sense of communities that was able to separate Husserl’s social 
ontology from the prevalent idealistic framework of Hegelian objective 
spirit.
  Communities, as they emerge through the co-operation of individu-
als as well as on the grounds of pre-given cultural constraints, seem to 
embody two competing tendencies. They are both actively created as well 
as artificially maintained. In a manuscript from 1921–22, Husserl approv-
ingly referred to Tönnies’ distinction between “community” (Gemeinschaft) 
wußtsein im prägnanten Sinn haben, sie kann eine Selbstwertung haben und auf sie sich 
richtenden Willen, Willen der Selbstgestaltung.“ HuaXXVII: 48–49.
217 “Personalität höherer Ordnung werden und als solche Gemeinschaftsleistungen voll-
ziehen nicht bloße Zusammenbildungen von einzelpersonalen Leistungen sind, sondern 
im wahren Sinne persönliche Leistungen der Gemeinschaft als solcher, in ihrem Streben 
und Wollen realisierte. HuaXXVII: 22.
218 “Gemeinschaft besagt nicht Gleichheit von Arten, Formen personaler Handlungen, 
von Denkweisen, Meinungen, wissenschaftlichen Betätigungen etc., sondern in Gemein-
schaft stehen Personen, die in solcher Hinsicht in der Einheit eines geistigen Wirkungs-
zusammenhanges stehen, mag im einzelnen die Wirkung überall sichtlich werden oder 
nicht.” (HuaXIV: 183)
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and “society” (Gesellschaft), that is, between a unity of close co-operation 
and kinship characteristic of traditional communities, and an “artificial”, 
top-down type of association characteristic of modern societies. Whereas 
Tönnies employed this distinction in order to account for the process of 
modernization (especially the emergence of class conflicts), which entails 
the primacy of Gesellschaft-type of co-operation, Husserl seemed to main-
tain that actually most of the known communities contain elements of 
both. 
  This discrepancy was particularly clear in Husserl’s reflections on the 
state (Staat). On the one hand, Husserl follows the position of Tönnies by 
accentuating the “artificial” character of state and political institutions. In 
this respect, “state is unity through power, through domination”219, a unity 
of relations of power ascribing the individual citizens their peculiar func-
tions. Echoing Benedict Andersson’s thesis on “imagined communities” 
Husserl emphasized the significance of “state-consciousness” as a pecu-
liar modality within a collective subjectivity, a type of community which 
rests upon the horizontal unity of citizens, most of whom will never meet 
each other.220 On the other hand, Husserl sometimes seems to refer to 
the state as a truly co-operative totality, one which rises through a “volun-
tary agreement”221. In this respect, a state can be conceived in terms of a 
personality of a higher order, expressing its ownmost being in an abiding 
common will, through constitution, or, for instance, through parliamen-
tary elections.222 
  It is perhaps surprising to find out that Husserl, despite the somewhat 
idealistic undertone of his social considerations, relied again and again on 
bodily and even organic concepts and metaphors. By doing so, he naturally 
shared one of the fundamental tendencies of Western political philosophy 
described in part 1.2, i.e., the tradition of body politic. The reasons for 
this, I believe, are threefold. First, the bodily and spatial notions were em-
ployed in order to denote the specific materiality of human communities; 
secondly, they were used to describe the specific intertwinement character-
istic of human sociality and the specific autonomy of the communal person; 
and thirdly, they were used to articulate the normative ideal of community, 
219 “Staat ist eine Einheit durch Macht. durch Herrschaft” (HuaXV: 412)
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bringing together the idea of common good with the individual responsi-
bility. Let me shortly address these points.
  Firstly, one of the shortcomings of the nineteenth-century theories of 
community – especially the idealist formulations of objective spirit (He-
gel) – was that they had failed to address the concrete or material aspects of 
communal life. Even those theories that explicitly wanted to address the 
material conditions of cultural life seemed to lead them back into a very 
restricted aspect of materiality such as “production relations” (Marx) or 
distribution of resources (T.R. Malthus). However, both communities as 
well as cultural accomplishments have their material aspects. As there is 
no community without the body of the people, there is no culture without 
relation to the material conditions (resources, landscape etc.), ultimately, 
earth. 
  In few occasions Husserl entertains the idea of “collective bodily ex-
istence” (kollektive Leiblichkeit) that communities acquire for themselves 
through their individual members.223 Although this idea could be taken 
into several directions, Husserl discusses it primarily in relation to the 
spatial orientation. Recall that for Husserl, one of the main constitutive 
functions of the living body was related to the directionality of experi-
ence: every object is perceived as being “there” with regard to the “here” 
of the living body. Living body is the primal indexical “here”, according to 
which every object is perceived as being “there”, either “left” or “right”, 
“up” or down”, and so on. However, as being part of a certain community, 
our experience defines itself also with regard to another set of indexicals, 
those of the collective. As single bodies interact with one another in a 
certain place, these relations give birth to a higher-order directionality, 
which, for instance, allows a broader definition of the indexical “here”. 
This is what Husserl means when he says that communities, like individual 
subjects, embody a form of I-centering.224 A family, for instance, often 
defines its collective spatial orientation with regard to the “geo-historical 
horizon” of its homeworld, which serves as the zero-point of orientation 
for other places.
  Secondly, in order to sketch out the relation between individual and 
collective, he sometimes calls upon the analogy of “a cell and an organism 
223 HuaXXXIX: 181. 
224 HuaXIV: 206.
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built on cells”, and also, on the analogy between organ and organism.225 
Moreover, this organic unity is not restricted merely to social relations 
between individuals, but Husserl uses it also to describe the intertwining 
of communities such as nations.226 One of the primal reasons behind these 
metaphors was Husserl’s insistence on the peculiar autonomy of collec-
tive subjects. “The organic unity of humanity”, writes Husserl, “maintains 
itself in the birth of its individual members as well as their death, as in 
the case of the recreation of multicellular organs and their withering”227. In 
other words, a certain social body is never tied to any particular subject, 
but has its existence regardless of the entry or withdrawal of particular 
members. Naturally, there are gradations with regard to different forms 
of community. For a family, a loss of member is probably a more shatter-
ing experience than, say, in the case of nation – one that can catalyze the 
extinction or dispersion of the “we”. Still, it belongs to the very notion 
of communal person that it has the possibility to transcend the individual 
streams of consciousness: it is something that cannot be returned to indi-
vidual subjects.
  Moreover, the idea that an individual always finds itself as being part 
of a “social tissue”228 helps us to articulate the peculiar reciprocality that is 
at stake in the relation between individual and community. As I already 
indicated, one of the key theses of Husserl’s analysis of intersubjectivity 
was the idea that without the apperceptive experience of other (possible) 
subjects, no form of objectivity could ever be constituted. Everything 
transcendent rests upon the transcendence of foreign subjectivity: like 
individual cells, we cannot sustain our essential “function” – the constitu-
tion of world and meaning – without being embedded in a community 
of subjects.229 Thus, what we have in the case of the organic analogy is 
not a split between two autonomous spheres of being, but rather, a shift 
of perspectives. In concrete experience, we are always primarily dealing 
with organic totalities; however, it is of course possible to abstract from 
this totality and to pay attention to its particular elements, for instance, 
individual organs or individual cells. 
225 HuaXIV: 203. See also HuaXXVII: 118.
226 HuaVI: 322. On historical relations as organic, see HuaVI: 502.
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  The third insight – that Husserl employs bodily and organic meta-
phors to describe also the normative ideal of community – is perhaps the 
most controversial one. As we argued in the previous section (1.4), the 
early twentieth-century debate on cultural diseases – crisis – was spurred 
by false organic categories, which presented the whole idea of culture as 
essentially passive. Thus the question: Why would he imagine overcoming 
the dangerous organic prejudices by returning to the organic framework 
of body politic?
  Now, the ideal of a self-regulating and autonomous community was 
sometimes characterized by Husserl as that of a “healthy” (gesund) or “vital” 
(lebendig) culture.230 With this metaphor, Husserl did not mean a simple 
well-being of the community – each individual is “happy” and social con-
flicts are absent – nor did it entail an idea of robust productivity. What he 
meant was a more specific claim on the role of philosophy within the body 
politic. For according to Husserl, philosophy was supposed to be the very 
caretaker of communal reflexivity,
[…] the spiritual organ, in which the community establishes the 
consciousness of its true definition (its true self), and they are 
also called to be the organ for the reproduction of this consciousness 
among the “laypeople”.231 
Indeed, in his Vienna lecture, Husserl did in fact attribute philosophers 
the role of an “operating brain” (fungierende Gehirn) whose “healthy func-
tioning” was essential to the present-day European humanity.232 These 
“naturalistic” metaphors should not be taken too literally. As Husserl was 
well aware, philosophy was not a natural function of all cultures but a 
specific possibility of human co-operation, which emerged at the dawn of 
the Classical period of the Ancient Greek culture. However, these meta-
phors point towards the crucial insight of Husserl’s social ethics in regard 
to the specific role or function of philosophical undertaking. As Husserl 
attested, his normative ideal of a “community of will” did not rest upon a 
230 HuaVIII: 242, HuaXXVII: 4. See also discussion on Fichte and cultural sickness in 
HuaXXV: 282–284.
231 “Die Philosophen sind […] das geistige Organ, in dem die Gemeinschaft ursprüng-
lich und fortdauernd zum Bewußtsein ihrer wahren Bestimmung (ihres wahren Selbst) 
kommt, und das berufene Organ für die Fortpflanzung dieses Bewußtseins in die Kreise 
der ‚Laien‘.“ HuaXXVII: 54.
232 HuaVI: 336.
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one-sided relation of power and domination – what he sometimes calls by 
the Hegelian idea of Master and Slave (Herr–Diener)233 – but on a shared 
responsibility of all parties. This seemed to imply that philosophers could 
not simply carry the burden of responsibility regardless of other people, 
but instead, it was the task of philosophy to reproduce (fortpflanzen) this 
idea among the non-philosophers. Thus philosophy, as Husserl understood 
it, had the crucial task of nurturing the “habitus of critique”234 within the 
whole of body politic. The societal function of philosophy did not con-
sist of informing individuals on “what to do” or “how to live” – rather, 
its task was that of motivation, the constant calling forth of critical self-
inspection.
  It was exactly this idea of communality which Husserl aimed at articu-
lating as a response to the contemporary crisis of Europe. What Europe 
had lost was exactly this idea of communal co-operation leading to a mu-
tual responsibility on the basis of an overarching generative horizon. The 
normative ideal of community based on the inalienable self-responsibility 
of individual subjects was not, however, something completely new. In-
stead, this ideal emerged as an inextricable feature of the classical (i.e. 
Platonic) motive of the philosophical praxis, with the idea of a universal 
“community of theory” and its emergence within the political domain. 
233 HuaXIV: 213, 223–224.
234 HuaXXVII: 64.
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A 
beginning is always a complicated matter. The start of the 
year, the development of a new piece of music, the birth of a 
child – these are all events that mark the start of something 
new, ruptures through which something previously non-
existent breaks into the world of human beings. However, 
as types of inception, they are all different. In the world of natural enti-
ties, the emergence of something new is always based upon a homologous 
series of past instances; however, in the world of cultural objects, the very 
relationship to past instances (repetition, imitation, refutation) defines 
the whole mode of creation. Nevertheless, beginnings are also a matter 
of perspective. Taken from an objective standpoint, a beginning is indeed 
something that marks the event of creation or birth; from the perspective 
of accomplishments that are developed, the original rupture appears to be 
the primal point of origination. This is why Aristotle, while speaking of the 
different modes of origination in Metaphysics V.1, extends the notion of be-
ginning (arkhē) to mean the “first thing from which something is, or comes 
to be, or is known.”1 It is only from the perspective of actualized meaning 
or content that a “beginning” is turned into an “origin”, that a particular 
event or moment is ascribed a meaning-originating character. 
  In this regard, origins – more than beginnings – are a matter of debate 
and contention. It is an inseparable feature of modern historiography and 
politics that they are in constant dispute over the origins of a particular 
historical phenomenon, a way of thinking, or a societal model. We like to 
think of origins, primarily, because it enables us to acknowledge a found-
ing subjectivity as the driving force of human development (e.g. Galileo 
and the institution of modern natural sciences); without this subjectivity, 
1 Aristotle, Met. 1013a 18–19
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history seems to fall outside the realm of responsible development. In 
some cases, however, origins are acknowledged in order to cover up the 
complexity of historical development as such. Foucault may be right in 
claiming that one of the most destructive features of our modern teleo-
logical view of history is that it seeks to present all origins as autonomous, 
self-sufficient events. “What is found at the historical beginning of things 
is not the inviolable identity of their origin,” writes Foucault in his essay 
on Nietzschean historiography, “– it is the dissension of other things.”23 Al-
though we may agree with Foucault that historical beginnings can indeed 
be “derisive and ironic, capable of undoing every infatuation,”4 it is like-
wise justifiable to point out the exact opposite tendency of our modern 
conception of the past: the evading of all questions of origin and genesis 
for the sake of the simple authority of the present moment. As Marx and 
Engels pointed out in The German Ideology, it is a common feature of all 
dominant ideologies that they expunge their histories by presenting the 
existing relations of power as natural – as if they had always existed.5
  For Husserl, the birth of Greek philosophy denoted both a beginning 
and an origin. It was a beginning insofar as it introduced a novel prac-
tice, a new type of intellectual activity that strove towards the creation 
of previously unknown cultural accomplishments. Through the peculiar 
attitude the Greeks called theoretical, there emerged a new realm of ideal 
truths, which were regarded as devoid of all empirical content. However, 
this event was also an origin in the sense of a point of departure for a 
completely new type of cultural development – one which radically chal-
lenged pre-philosophical ideas of historicity and communality. Through the 
emergence of the theoretical attitude, philosophy gave rise to a radically 
new idea of intersubjective association – a new form of communal co-
operation – which resisted the simple authority of tradition characteristic 
of the pre-philosophical (i.e., the mythical) world-view. Transferred to 
the sphere of culture, philosophy unfolded as a twofold critique of limits: 
2 Foucault 1984b: 79. The purpose of Foucault’s own genealogy was to resist this tendency 
by “cultivating the details and accidents that accompany every beginning”, to unfold the 
suppressive, and perhaps even violent character of historical inceptions.
3 Foucault 1984b: 80.
4 Ibid.
5 Marx/Engels 1970: 47. 
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first, in the sense of relativizing or dismantling the unquestioned differ-
ence between home and alien characteristic of the mythical world-view, 
and second, in the sense of transcending the finite liminal structure of 
everyday praxis. In regard to the latter, philosophy opened up a novel 
horizon of practical activity which defined itself in relation to infinitely 
distant goals. By resisting the tendency to appear as an accomplishment 
achievable by a limited community, philosophy unfolded as a specific de-
tachment from the territorial and temporal finitude of pre-philosophical 
humanity. 
  It was exactly this twofold detachment, I argue, that constituted the 
fundamental core of that form of culture Husserl called “European”. Eu-
rope, as Husserl understood it, denoted not only the realized history of 
a particular continent, but a more specific idea of cultural development 
animated by the praxis of philosophy.6 Philosophy, besides referring to the 
specific attitude of an individual, gave rise a completely new type of gen-
erative development that was able to transcend the immanent historicity and 
communality of pre-philosophical culture. In the sense employed by Hus-
serl in his recurring use of the word, I will characterize this novel form 
of culture as “universal” and refer to its principle of development with 
the term “universalism”. This is not to suggest that the whole of European 
history can be characterized solely by this principle: instead of rational 
co-operation, the history of European universalism has been as much a 
history of chauvinism – of political expansionism, crusades, and colonial-
ism – and the result, contemporary globalization, is an extremely limited 
interpretation of the original idea. However, in order to understand what 
Husserl called the genuine sense of “Europeanization” we need to consider 
the idea in terms of its origination.
  In this section, I want to illuminate Husserl’s idea of the emergence 
of Greek philosophy from the perspective of generativity and historicity. 
In chapter 3.1, I will start by discussing Husserl’s basic approach to the 
problematic of the origin of Greek philosophy and its revolutionary 
6 As Husserl put it in his letter to Radl in 1934, the spiritual concept of Europe was to be 
understood as a task, which consciously animates the development of the empirical Europe 
(”Europa in diesem geistigen Sinne ist also eine im empirischen Europa bewußtseinsmäßig 
lebendige Aufgabe […]” HuaXXVII: 241). As I will argue in part 4, this “animating process” 
ought to be distinguished from the Hegelian analysis of spirit’s development, i.e., the idea 
of historical Theodicy.
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significance. I will argue that Husserl approached this by the novel use of 
the vocabulary of spirituality, which, however, does not imply a simple 
dismissal of material or territorial conditions.
  Instead, through his vocabulary of “spiritual geography,” Husserl 
opened up the possibility of a novel teleological-historical approach to 
the problematic of generativity, most importantly, to the historically 
sedimented character of territoriality and culture. Following the genetic 
method of phenomenology, Husserl approached the origin of Greek phi-
losophy in terms of a unique “primal establishment” (Urstiftung) whose 
genuine sense was to be discovered and acknowledged from the perspec-
tive of the present moment.
  In chapter 3.2, I will focus on Husserl’s interpretation of the genera-
tive background of philosophy. As I will show, besides precipitating a series 
of revolutions in the domains of historicity, territoriality and communal-
ity, philosophy itself was to be conceived of as the product of a particular 
generative and historical transformation. Through the close co-operation 
of Greek city-states, there emerged a novel form of critical attitude that 
aimed to overcome the seemingly natural division between home and 
alien – an attitude that had its foundation in the pre-philosophical practice 
of theoretical observation. This practice of theoria, which aimed to medi-
ate between the validities of particular homeworlds, was an indication of 
the pressing need for concepts that could acknowledge both the inher-
ently universal character of our experience and its culturally, historically 
and intersubjectively determined variety. As I will show, Husserl under-
stood the emergence of the theoretical attitude to be closely connected 
to the dichotomy between a “national-traditional” and a “pure” notion of 
rationality; i.e., its emergence was essentially tied to the pre-philosophical 
transformations in the idea of generativity. Thus, territoriality, instead of 
denoting a simple factical condition of philosophy, turned out to be one of 
its necessary conditions.
  In chapter 3.3 I will turn my attention to the “institutionalized” form 
of the theoretical attitude, i.e., the intersubjective practice of philosophy. 
It is my argument that Husserl understood this practice not only in terms 
of an individualistic posture, but in terms of a communal process of co-
operation defined by cultural accomplishments previously unknown. By 
disclosing a domain of purely ideal truths, philosophy was able to open 
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up a completely new horizon of production, which did not demarcate it-
self according to a particular homeworld, its unique tradition and cultural 
validities. Instead, this horizon unfolded itself as a completely new type 
of generative and historical development, that of universal historicity ac-
cording to an all-encompassing community of philosophers. This idea of 
an “infinite task”, I argue, unfolded itself as a twofold deconstruction of 
liminality: (i) as an urge to overcome the generative divisions of home-
world and alienworld for the sake of the all-encompassing shared world 
of philosophical ideality, and (ii) as the transcending of the finite limits 
of practical activity for the sake of the infinitely distant (inexhaustible) 
teleological ideals of the philosophical praxis. This transformation realized 
itself also as a specific cultural intervention targeted at some of the most 
central societal and communal practices and structures, e.g. language and 
education.
  Lastly, in chapter 3.4, I will focus on a specific form of cultural trans-
formation most central from the overall perspective of this work: politi-
cal universalism. As I will show, Husserl’s renewed understanding of the 
inextricably communal character of philosophical undertaking was also 
reflected in his analysis on the centrality of the social-ethical aspect of 
Greek political thought, especially that of Plato. The Platonic motive of 
idealism was not restricted merely to the domain of scientific ideality, but 
it brought within itself a completely new horizon of societal and political 
co-operation, which aimed at formulating the conditions of best possible 
communality on the basis of the infinite horizon of philosophy. This move-
ment, which I would like to describe as the “political epoche” of Greek 
thought, executed itself as a specific rupture in the unquestioned unity 
of ethnic political citizenship. However, despite the inherent emphasis on 
the ideal character of polis as well as the teleological character of human 
sociality, both Plato and Aristotle still conceived the domain of political 
community as essentially demarcated – as something which can sustain 
itself only with the help of nature’s fundamental antithesis, the “law” (no-
mos). It is my argument that it was exactly this idea on the essentially 
“divided” character of the political body that constituted the basic point 
of departure for Husserl’s critical stance (discussed in the fourth part of 
the work).
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3.1. The Question of Origin:
Teleology and Universalism
As I argued earlier, the point of departure for Husserl’s reflections on Europe was the novel methodological idea of teleological-his-torical reflection. Proceeding through what he called a critical 
“questioning-back” (Rückfrage) to inherited cultural accomplishments, this 
reflection was supposed to reveal the present moment as dependent on a 
set of teleological developments: the objectivities and validities we live by 
point towards their origination through a variety of primal and second-
ary establishments (Urstiftungen and Nachstiftungen). By locating this pro-
cess not only within the conscious life itself (the genetic method) but also 
within the historical process of cultures and communities, Husserl was 
able to open up a wholly new domain of generativity, the establishment 
and transmission of sense from one historical generation to the next.
  Especially in texts devoted to the problematic of crisis, Husserl em-
ployed this method in order to uncover the teleological origins of contem-
porary demise of rationality, apparent from the loss of personal respon-
sibility and the dispersion of scientific methodology. As I already pointed 
out, Husserl traced this demise back to the Galilean discovery of exact 
mathematical ideality as the basic blueprint of physical nature – a discovery 
that rendered the categories of teleology, purpose and unity fundamental-
ly unscientific, i.e., subjective. By doing so, consequently, this transition 
presented a serious challenge to the social and political thought of modern 
philosophy, which could no longer hold on to the naturalness of human 
sociality and had to construct its legitimacy from the idea of a common 
agreement. However, to say that the Galilean discovery instigated a crisis 
for a certain idea seemed to imply that something had existed beforehand; 
some idea had to be presupposed in order for the crisis to come about.
  This something, Husserl argued, was the very idea of universal, scien-
tific rationality – a rationality which Husserl interpreted as fundamentally 
constitutive to the idea of Europe. However, its “primal establishment” 
was not to be located at the beginning of the modern age but in the emer-
gence of the Classical period of the Ancient Greek culture:
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Spiritual Europe has a birthplace. By this I mean not a geographical 
birthplace, in one land, though this is also true, but rather a 
spiritual birthplace in a nation or in individual men and human 
groups of this nation. It is the ancient Greek nation in the seventh 
and sixth centuries BC. Here there arises a new sort of attitude of 
individuals toward their surrounding world. And its consequence 
is the breakthrough of a completely new sort of spiritual structure, 
rapidly growing into a systematically self-enclosed cultural form; 
the Greeks called it philosophy.7 
From the perspective of Husserl’s overall oeuvre, the use of the notion 
“spiritual” (geistig) may appear surprising. Almost univocally absent from 
his work between 1890 and 1917, we find the notions of “spirit” and “spir-
itual” to be recurring themes in Husserl’s manuscripts on personality, in-
tersubjectivity, and the lifeworld – beginning with Ideas II (under the title 
“Constitution of the Spiritual World”) and the 1919 lecture series “Nature 
and Spirit” (Natur und Geist).8 In Husserl’s later writings, we find this term 
in the recurring formulations “spiritual Europe” and its “spiritual geogra-
phy”, which give rise to a specific “spiritual form” and “spiritual culture”.9 
Particularly in the context of Husserl’s Vienna Lecture, this emphasis 
on the spiritual grew into an almost Hegelian account of the autonomy 
and self-sufficiency of the spirit (“The spirit, and indeed only the spirit, 
exists in itself and for itself, is self-sufficient […] for the spirit alone is 
immortal”10) – an emphasis which seemed to question the fundamentally 
personalistic and concrete character of phenomenological description.11
7 “Das geistige Europa hat eine Geburtsstätte. Ich meine damit nicht geographisch in ei-
nem Land, obschon auch das zutrifft, sondern eine geistige Geburtsstätte in einer Nation, 
bzw. in einzelnen Menschen und menschlichen Gruppen dieser Nation. Es ist die altgrie-
chische Nation im 7. und 6. Jahrhundert V. Chr. In ihr erwächst eine neuartige Einstellung 
einzelner zur Umwelt. Und in ihrer Konsequenz vollzieht sich der Durchbruch einer völlig 
neuen Art geistiger Gebilde, rasch anwachsend zu einer systematisch geschlossenen Kul-
turgestalt; die Griechen nannten sie Philosophie.” HuaVI: 321. On the notion of “primal 
establishment” in regard to the emergence of Greek philosophy, see HuaVI: 72: “In dieser 
[griechische Urstiftung] liegt der teleologische Anfang, die wahre Geburt des europäischen 
Geistes überhaupt.“ Cf. HuaXXVII: 186ff.
8 On the notions of “spirit” (Geist) and “spiritual” (geistig), see HuaI: 112; HuaIV: 172ff.; 
HuaVI: 114–117, passim.; HuaXXV: 267–293; HuaMatIV: 118–150.
9 On the notion of “spiritual [form of] Europe”, see HuaVI: 318–321, 336, 549. Husserl 
also refers to the spiritual “space” (Raum) of Europe, see HuaXXIX: 58.
10 “Der Geist und sogar nur der Geist ist in sich selbst und für sich selbst seiend, ist eigen-
ständig […] Denn der Geist allein ist unsterblich.” HuaVI: 345–348.
11 The relation between Hegel’s notion of spirit and Husserlian generativity has been ex-
plicitly discussed by Steinbock 1998a: 163–176.
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  Why such a transition? In Husserl’s texts from the late 1910s and early 
1920s, the topic of the spirit was introduced in relation to two respective 
domains of constitution: those of material nature and of animal (seelische) 
nature. Especially in the context of Ideas II, the notion of the spirit was 
articulated in close connection to the topic of intersubjectivity and its 
respective accomplishment (i.e., the world of cultural objects), denot-
ing the specific stratification of meaning made possible by social relations. 
“For every subject that in this way is a member of a social association as 
a totality,” Husserl wrote, “there is constituted one and the same world 
of spirit.”12 Here, the notion of spirit served the double purpose of be-
ing both the animating principle of cultural objectivities as well as the 
binding force of what Husserl called the ‘communal spirit’ (Gemeingeist) 
of intersubjective associations. Thus, it seems that phenomenology, as it 
was applied to the domains of culture, history and social relations, could 
no longer abide in the univocally “Cartesian-Kantian” vocabulary of con-
sciousness, ego and subjectivity. Instead, it needed to be in dialogue with 
the inherently Hegelian doctrine of the spirit, which referred to the in-
extricably communal and historical development of sense and validity. 
Moreover, this notion provided a means of approaching the problematic 
of “natural” and “human” sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) – a distinction that 
had been addressed widely by such philosophers as Dilthey, Windelband, 
Rickert and Münsterberg.13
  Following this emphasis on the spiritual, Derrida raised a series of 
questions concerning the consistency and scope of Husserl’s thinking on 
Europe. Derrida claimed that as a result of his emphasis on the spiritual, 
Husserl’s discourse on cultural differences shifted from the sphere of ma-
terial geography to that of ideal meanings and meaning-structures. This 
entailed that Europe – which Husserl understood in terms of an “idea” or 
a “spiritual form” – was no longer “assigned a geographical or territorial 
outline”.14 As in the case of Hegel’s delineation of Europe as a specific 
phase in the development of the spirit – reason as concrete universality 
(cf. Introduction) – Husserl’s Europe was likewise able to transcend its 
12 “Für jedes Subjekt, das in dieser Weise Glied eines sozialen Gesamtverbandes ist, kon-
stituiert sich eine und dieselbe, obschon vom „Standpunkt” dieses Subjekts mit einem ent-
sprechenden […] Auffassungssinn aufgefaßte und gesetzte Geisterwelt.” HuaIV: 197.
13 Ricoeur 1967: 68ff.
14 Derrida 1987: 95.
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territorial boundaries and proclaim itself the ideal principle of universal 
rationality. However, as Derrida points out, Husserl’s delineation of the 
“spiritual geography” of Europe was by no means indifferent to the cul-
tural or ethnic divisions of his own time. According to Husserl’s highly 
controversial analysis, the “spiritual-geographical” demarcation of Europe 
included the United States, the English Dominions – and perhaps even 
Japan, which Husserl considered “a fresh branch of European culture”.15 
At the same time, this analysis excluded a wide variety of non-European 
peoples, including “gypsies”, “Indians” and “Eskimos”.16 Thus, as Derrida 
observes, this idea of spiritual geography appears simply “ludicrous” and 
illogical, an example of the deep “metaphysical racism” of Husserl’s phi-
losophy.17 
  This is not, however, what Husserl had in mind. As he emphasized on 
several occasions, the domains of “nature”, “animality” and “spirit” were 
not to be understood as distinct domains of being per se; instead, they 
were to be seen as closely intertwined modalities of constitution. Husserl 
spoke, for instance, of the idea of “spiritual nature” (geistige Natur)18 as a 
“complex” composed of the lower stratums of material and animal nature 
that pointed towards the essential connection between these modalities. 
We constantly encounter nature as “spiritualized” (vergeistigt), as some-
thing which incorporates (verkörpert) all kinds of cultural, historical, reli-
gious and ideological meanings.19 From the simple cultural objects, such 
as tools, to higher level social practices, such as the natural sciences, all 
spiritual or ideal meanings have their common foundation in the natural. 
This does not mean, however, that they can be simply traced back to ma-
terial nature. As we saw in our example of the Emperor’s New Clothes, 
spiritual meaningfulness need not even imply an intuitive givenness for 
an individual; rather, it can be sustained merely on the basis of interper-
sonal association and its peculiar mode of habituation. However, without a 
shared lifeworld, which is necessarily corporeal and which functions as the 
correlate of the interpersonal community, we could not even constitute 
purely ideal meanings. Pure geometry, for instance, has its foundation in 
15 HuaVI: 318. On Japan, see HuaXXVII: 95. Cf. Welton 2000: 306–330.
16 Ibid.
17 Derrida 1987: 119.
18 HuaIV: 29.
19 See e.g. HuaVI: 220; HuaVIII: 123, 151; HuaXIII: 469; HuaXV: 321.
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the natural shapes that we encounter within our lifeworld – shapes which 
are then further idealized into pure forms (e.g., lines, squares, circles).
  Hence, while Husserl emphasized the need to distance his analysis 
from the empirical geography of his own time (“Europe, not as it is un-
derstood geographically, as on a map”20), contrary to Derrida’s claims, this 
did not entail a complete separation from concrete, material reality. As I 
argued in chapter 2.3, Husserl’s analysis of homeworld and alienworld 
was not to be read as an alternative discourse to geographical conditions 
but as a description of the geo-historical process of individuation of a par-
ticular lifeworld in regard to alien frameworks of meaning. Understood in 
its phenomenological sense, territoriality was, above all, a “spiritual” cat-
egory demarcating the difference between familiarity and strangeness – a 
difference which also localizes itself in the natural world.21 Nevertheless, 
it is only some rivers, gulfs, tree lines or mountains that come to form the 
boundary between the familiar and the strange; therefore, mere geog-
raphy does not explain the constitution of this division. For the Romans 
of the 2nd century, it was the rivers Danube and Rhine that served this 
purpose of demarcation – they separated the Romans from the barbaric 
Germans – but the Tiber merely united the Romans in their common 
settlement. All cultures and not merely Europe are defined by a specific 
“spiritual geography”, insofar as they constitute for themselves a sphere of 
familiarity. What was constitutive to the idea of Europe, Husserl claimed, 
was that it emerged as a specific form of this geography – as a unique idea 
of generativity.
  Hence, the vocabulary of spirituality did not refer to any kind of ideal-
istic position. It was employed in order to describe the inherently “realist” 
dimension of cultural accomplishments, including those animated by the 
praxis of philosophy. In other words, it was through the nomenclature of 
spirituality that Husserl was able to relocate the emergence of different 
“establishments” (Stiftungen) within the domains of interpersonal co-oper-
ation, of community and culture. For him, spirit denoted nothing less than 
that moment of transgression which, through the reciprocal understand-
ing characteristic of intersubjective associations, introduced the domain of 
cultural meanings into the world of nature. Thus, spirit – as it unfolded in 
20 “Also Europa nicht geographisch, landkartenmäßig verstanden […]” HuaVI: 318.
21 See e.g. HuaXV: 206
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the various processes of historical, cultural, and intersubjective sedimen-
tation of meaning – coincided with the idea of the teleological develop-
ment of sense within interpersonal communities. Spirituality was, to put 
it simply, the basic principle of generativity, and it consequently provided 
the basic point of departure for the teleological-historical “questioning-
back” of the idea of Europe. 
  How, then, did the question of the origins of Europe emerge within 
Husserl’s phenomenology? Although it has become common to view the 
lectures on Erste Philosophie (1923/24) as the starting point of Husserl’s 
historical interest – as the first occurrence of the phenomenological Rück-
frage through the “critical history of ideas”22 – many of the manuscripts 
from the post-WWI period reveal Husserl’s preoccupation with the his-
torical origins of (European) philosophy. Besides the lectures on “first phi-
losophy”, Husserl discussed the Greek inception – especially Plato – in an 
introductory course of lectures in 1922–23 as in the as yet unpublished 
lecture series Einleitung in die Philosophie (1919/20).23 In particular, the lat-
ter series of lectures course provides us with a rich and detailed discussion 
on Plato, which even includes references even individual dialogues (this is 
something that we lack in Husserl’s later, rather scattershot remarks). 
  In a way, the figure of Plato evidently embodies overall “genetic con-
version” in Husserl’s account of European philosophy. Whereas, for the 
early Husserl, Plato had primarily represented a particular theoretical-
philosophical movement – Platonic idealism, the view of concepts as es-
sential, a priori features of reality – in the writings of the post-WWI peri-
od, we discover a figure that stands for the origin of Western philosophical 
praxis at large, “the father of genuine and rigorous science”24. Plato became 
the principal originator of that cultural formation we call philosophy and 
the primal instigator of that process in which Europe attained completely 
new type of generativity.25 “Should I name the philosophers that, under 
the impression rising from my conviction, light up the whole historical 
development of philosophy for me”, Husserl wrote, “I would name two 
22 HuaVII: 3ff.
23 See HuaXXXV for the 1922/23 course; the manuscript F I 40/8ff. for the 1919/20.
24 “…wird er [Platon] zum Vater aller echten und strengen Wissenschaft.” HuaXXXV: 
53. Already in texts that date from 1917, Husserl occasionally entertains the historical-
temporal trajectory that goes from Plato to modern philosophy, to Descartes and Kant. 
See HuaXXV: 271, 297.
25 HuaXXIX: 17.
— 244 —
. H   O  E
[…] in the first place the completely, fully unique Plato.”26 In second place, 
though in hierarchical not chronological order, Husserl placed Descartes, 
the initiator of the transcendental-subjectivist motif that characterizes the 
philosophy of the modern age. This formula of Greek Urstiftung of philoso-
phy and its modern Nachstiftung, leading to its full, apodictic formulation 
(the Endstiftung) in phenomenology – the trajectory of Plato–Descartes–
Husserl – was something that remained at the heart of Husserl’s philo-
sophical convictions until the end of his career. 
  At the same time, Husserl’s interest in Plato broadened significantly 
from the scope of scientific evidence towards general questions of norma-
tivity, culture and sociality. Especially in the context of the Kaizo essays, 
Erste Philosophie and the lectures on ethics (1920/24),27 Husserl’s main 
interest seemed to turn towards the practical ideals of Plato, especially 
the Socratic idea of philosophy as a form of vocational life and the Pla-
tonic view of social ethics. What these reflections revealed was the inher-
ent connection between the domains of theory and praxis, of ontology 
and ethics – and how this connection was employed to point towards the 
crucial intertwining of the individual and the community. Husserl argued 
that, for Plato, theory was not understood as the isolated activity of a com-
munity of philosophers defining themselves against the world of everyday 
praxis. On the contrary, for Plato “science is called to acquire the role 
of hēgemonikon [the governing reason] of all communal life and therefore 
the whole of culture.”28 In its Platonic form, argued Husserl, philosophy 
no longer remains a mere individual undertaking; rather, it necessarily 
becomes a quest for true and genuine culture: “Under the title of philosophy 
is the idea of rigorous science out of free reason the overarching and all-embracing 
idea of culture.”29
  It should be emphasized here, however, that when we speak of “Hus-
serl’s Plato”, we are indeed referring to a figure rather than the propria per-
sona, of Plato as a historical person living in Attica in the 5th and 4th century 
26 “Sollte ich heute unter dem aspekt der mir zugereiften überzeugungen sagen welche 
philosophern mir im rückblick auf die gesamte historische entwicklung der philosophie 
vor allem entgegenleuchten, so würde ich zwei nennen […] An erster stelle den allerdings 
ganz einzigen Platon […]”. HuaXXXV: 52.
27 Published as the part XXXVII of Husserliana.
28 HuaVII: 15
29 “Unter dem Titel Philosophie ist die Idee strenger Wissenschaft aus freier Vernunft die übergreifende 
und allherrschende Kulturidee.” HuaXXVII: 89.
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BC. All in all, Husserl’s showed little interest in interpretative questions 
about Greek philosophy (in contrast to Brentano or Heidegger’s delicate 
and precise readings). That being said, Husserl did not attempt to conceal 
his nonchalant attitude towards exegetical issues; instead, he proclaimed 
it quite openly:
I read my Plato, I construct for myself the unified, meaningful phi-
losophy of ‘my’ Plato, and this construction becomes a power in 
my philosophical life. I do not concern myself in the least about the 
philological distinction between authentic and unauthentic writ-
ings, to say nothing of philologically correct texts. In short, I do 
not seriously concern myself with the construction of the histori-
cally real Plato. “My” Plato would remain for me even if in the end 
all his writings turned out to be false attributions. It is in this way 
that every historical but also contemporary philosopher exercises a 
power over my philosophical life: as my “poetic fiction”, and there-
fore independently of the question of the degree to which my in-
terpretation corresponds or not to factual-historical truth.30
Now, by claiming Plato as his “own”, Husserl was not simply adhering to 
subjective opinion, as if philosophical tradition was merely a matter of 
drawing inspiration for personal reasons. Rather, what Husserl implied 
with the peculiar “mineness” of his Plato was the idea of the inextricable 
self-responsibility that dictates all genuine philosophical interpretations.31 
We must arrive at Plato’s insights from the viewpoint of the present mo-
ment and not from traditionally inherited themes, topics and questions. 
At the same time, because of the insurmountable temporal asymmetry 
between the past and the present, all historical interpretations involve 
30 “Ich lese meinen Plato, konstruiere mir eine sinnvolle einheitliche Philosophie “meines” 
Plato, und diese Konstruktion wird zur Macht in meinem philosophierenden Leben. Ich 
kümmere mich nicht im mindesten um eine philologische Scheidung echter und unechter 
Schriften, geschweige denn um philologisch korrekte Texte, also mit einem Worte, nicht 
ernstlich um eine Konstruktion des historisch wirklichen Plato. “Meine” Plato verblie-
be mir schlienlich auch, wenn alle Schriften unterschoben waren. In dieser Weise wirkt 
jeder vergangene, aber auch gegenwartige Philosoph auf mich als eine mein philosophi-
sches Leben bestimmende Macht, als der meiner “Dichtung”, also unabhangig von der 
Frage, wieweit meiner Interpretation historisch-faktische Wahrheit entspricht oder nicht.” 
HuaXXIX: 49. On Husserl’s historical reading of Classics, see also the short appendix “Das 
Verhältnis des Phänomenologen zur Geschichte der Philosophie” in HuaXXV: 206–208.
Here, Husserl insisten in going “back to Plato […] to his original works.” (“Zurück zu Pla-
ton […] und zu ihren originalen Werken.” HuaXXV: 206). Cf. HuaVI: 71–74.
31 HuaVI: 511
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an element of “poetic fiction” (Dichtung) – they are creative readings that 
originate from the present moment and its peculiar horizon.32 In this re-
gard, the genuine “originality” of Plato is always decided in retrospect, 
for it is only in the light of the historical generation of meaning that the 
idea of origin makes sense. “Every historical philosopher executes his self-
reflections,” Husserl wrote, “[in discourse with] the philosophers of his 
present and past” – 
He enunciates himself about all this, and fixes his own position 
through these confrontations, and thus creates a self-understand-
ing of his own deeds in accord with the way his published theories 
have grown up within him in the consciousness of what he was 
striving for. But no matter how precisely we may be informed, 
through historical research, about such “self-interpretations” (even 
about those of a whole series of philosophers), we learn nothing 
in this way about what, through all these philosophers, “the point 
of it” ultimately was, in the hidden unity of intentional inward-
ness which alone constitutes the unity of history. Only in the final 
establishment (Endstiftung) is this revealed; only through it can the 
unified directedness of all philosophies and philosophers open up. 
From here elucidation can be attained which enables us to under-
stand past thinkers in a way that they could never have understood 
themselves.33
What Husserl confirmed here was basically the old Hegelian doctrine that 
the owl of Minerva takes its flight only when the shade of night is gather-
ing: only the end can reveal the purpose of the beginning. We can acknowl-
edge the significance of the beginning of philosophy only in retrospect, for 
the genuine sense of this project can only be recognized only from that 
perspective of fullest clarity. This is what Husserl means when he says that 
in every genuine Urstiftung, the Endstiftung is already ascribed not as a pre-
32 On the idea of historical interpretation as a form of poetic invention, see Ch. 4.1
33 “Jeder historische Philosoph vollzieht seine Selbstbesinnungen, führt seine Verhandlun-
gen mit den Philosophen seiner Gegenwart und Vergangenheit. Er spricht sich über all das 
aus, fixiert in solchen Auseinandersetzungen seinen eigenen Standort, schafft sich so ein 
Selbstverständnis über sein eigenes Tun, wie denn auch seine veröffentlichten Theorien in 
ihm erwachsen sind in dem Bewußtsein dessen, daß er darauf hinwollte. Aber wenn wir 
durch historische Forschung noch so genau über solche “Selbstinterpretationen” (und sei 
es auch über die einer ganzen Kette von Philosophen) unterrichtet werden, so erfahren 
wir daraus noch nichts über das, worauf „es” letzlich in der verborgenen Einheit intentio-
naler Innerlichkeit, welche allein Einheit der Geschichte ausmacht, in all diesen Philo-
sophen “hinauswollte”.” HuaVI: 74. Translation slightly modified. On the idea of “hidden 
unity” in historical development, see Gurwitsch 1956: 384ff.
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established doctrine but as a task to be realized by future generations. It 
is what Heidegger later termed by the name “inception” (Anfang) that, in 
contrast to the mere “beginning” (Beginn), denotes origin which “by con-
trast first comes to appear in the course of events and is fully there only 
when the course of events ends.”34 It is only the inherited development 
of sense – its conflicts, intrusions and one-sided interpretations – which 
enables us to comprehend the genuine sense of this undertaking. 
  According to Husserl’s somewhat controversial view, it was exactly 
phenomenology that had brought fundamental clarity to this task: “It is my 
conviction that intentional  phenomenology has made of the spirit qua spirit 
for the first time a field of systematic experience and science and has thus 
brought about the total reorientation of the task of knowledge.”35 Hus-
serl understood phenomenology not only as a continuation of the Platonic 
movement of philosophy but as a completely new level in this development 
– a level which brings the genuine sense of this movement into relief.36 
This seeming Endstiftung of philosophy was not to be understood in terms 
of a Hegelian “end of history” or a Heideggerian “end of philosophy”, i.e., 
as the exhaustion of the development of spirit. Instead, it merely denoted 
the basic clarity concerning the foundations of philosophical methodology 
as such. Phenomenology, Husserl claimed, had brought full clarity to the 
method of philosophy; it was the first philosophical enterprise that had 
succeeded in articulating the universal foundations of theoretical, practi-
cal and axiological evidence. At the same time, however, it had revealed 
34 ”Der Beginn wird alsbald zurückgelassen, er verschwindet im Fortgang des Gesche-
hens. Der Anfang, der Ursprung, kommt dagegen im Geschehen allererst zum Vorschein 
und ist voll da erst an seinem Ende.” Heidegger GA 39: 3.
35 “Es ist meine Überzeugung, daß die intentionale Phänomenologie zum ersten Male den 
Geist als Geist zum Feld systematischer Erfahrung und Wissenschaft gemacht und dadurch 
die totale Umstellung der Erkenntnisaufgabe erwirkt hat.” HuaVI: 346–347.
36 See e.g. the Beilage XXVI to the Crisis: “Philosophy and the cultivation of the European 
culture. Philosophy of the first level, world-cognition, human cognition – this is the sec-
ond level of historicity, and the second level of humanity. The third level is the transforma-
tion of philosophy into phenomenology with its scientific consciousness of humanity in 
its history, and in the function of returning into a humanity that lets itself consciously to 
be guided by philosophy as phenomenology.” (“Philosophie und Bildung der europäischen 
Kultur. Philosophie erster Stufe, Welterkenntnis, Menschenerkenntnis; das ist die zweite 
Stufe der Historizität, mit einer zweiten Stufe des Menschentums. Die dritte Stufe ist 
Umwandlung der Philosophie in Phänomenologie, mit dem wissenschaftlichen Bewußt-
sein von der Menschheit in ihrer Historizität und der Funktion, sie in eine Menschheit zu 
verwandeln, die sich bewußt von der Philosophie als Phänomenologie leiten läßt.” HuaVI: 
503).
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the essential finitude and one-sidedness of human cognition in regard to 
the overall domain of truth. Phenomenology had not enclosed, but dis-
closed, the field of philosophy as an essentially open task that necessarily 
transcends human finitude – a task that can only be fulfilled in the inter-
generational process of co-operation and critique. I will return to this 
issue in the last part of this work; for now, suffice it to say that instead 
of arriving at a Hegelian-Heideggerian doctrine on the end of history or 
philosophy, Husserl claimed to have uncovered the fundamental openness 
and inexhaustibility of the scientific enterprise.
  What, then, was established through the birth of philosophy? Hus-
serl was well aware of the fact that the Greeks did not themselves invent 
most of the intellectual activities and practices – such as mathematics, 
astronomy and medicine – that have been passed on to us under the title 
“European sciences”. Despite his emphasis on Plato’s achievements, Hus-
serl followed the idea already proposed by Nietzsche in one of his unpub-
lished works that nothing is “more foolish than to swear by the fact that the 
Greeks had an autochthonous culture, rather, they absorbed all the culture 
flourishing among other nations, and they advanced so far just because 
they understood how to hurl the spear further from the very spot where 
another nation had let it rest”37. The Greeks were, above all, mediators of 
other cultures who understood the creative strength of traditionality – a 
strength issuing not from authority but from the essential multiformity 
evident in its contradictions and conflicts.38 Therefore, as Husserl empha-
sized, the “primal establishment” of philosophy was not to be conceived in 
terms of the simple act (or the series of acts) of instituting meaning, which 
then allows the succeeding accumulation of sense. Instead, the inception 
37 “Nichts ist thörichter als den Griechen eine autochthone Bildung nachzusagen, sie ha-
ben vielmehr alle bei anderen Völkern lebende Bildung in sich eingesogen, sie kamen ge-
rade deshalb so weit, weil sie es verstanden den Speer von dort weiter zu schleudern, wo 
ihn ein anderes Volk liegen ließ.“ Nietzsche, KSA 1.806.
38 As Geoffrey Lloyd has pointed out, what separates the Greek scientific writings from 
the extant remains of Egyptian and Babylonian medicine, mathematics and astronomy is 
the recurring gesture of deliberate alienation. Whereas the latter “can be combined in 
vain for a single example of a text where an individual author explicitly distances himself 
from, and criticizes, the received tradition in order to claim originality for himself,” Lloyd 
writes, “our Greek sources repeatedly do that.” Lloyd 1995: 57. As Rémi Brague has con-
vincingly argued in his Eccentric Culture (2002), we ought to attribute this “preservative” 
relation to the past not to Greeks, but to the “Roman attitude […] as that of one who is 
conscious of a call to renew the ancient” (2002: 35).
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of philosophy involved an inherent element of negativity which consti-
tuted its uniqueness in regard to all pre-philosophical accomplishments. 
Philosophy, wrote Husserl in an appendix to Erste Philosophie, “emerges with-
out a tradition in order to establish a tradition.”39 Its goal-positing (Zielsetzung) 
is something completely new –
[…] Philosophy wants to be “science”, universal science of the uni-
verse; in all of its different systematic forms, it wants to be general 
according to the absolutely valid truth which binds all of those who 
are capable of intuitive evidence.40
Thus the unique character of philosophy, argued Husserl, could not be 
explained in terms of substantial content, doctrine, or even a particular 
technique. Instead, philosophy unfolded through a particular critical rela-
tion towards established tradition for the sake of a new principle of justifi-
cation that binds all rational subjects in a similar manner. Instead of taking 
its point of departure from the reproduction, imitation, or refutation of 
tradition, philosophy turned its gaze to the very idea of traditionality as 
such: Why is it so that culture, as it emerges through the communal activ-
ity of individuals, assembles itself into the form of a unified tradition? Why 
is it so that despite the (seemingly) equal capabilities of individual human 
beings, we fail to understand each other due to the specific character of 
our own tradition? In other words, philosophy denoted the birth of the 
first praxis not to take its own traditionality as a given but as a question to 
be asked. It aimed to question existing traditions on the basis of universal 
reason, which fostered the ideal of a universal culture.41
  However, can this form of culture, really, be described in terms of 
“universalism”? Although the notion of “universalism” is of theological ori-
gin – it was first used in the late sixteenth century to denote the Protes-
tant (especially Lutheran) doctrine of universal salvation – we are perhaps 
better acquainted with the secular version characteristic of the modern 
39 “Traditionlos tritt sie auf, eine Tradition erst zu schcaffen.” HuaVIII: 320.
40 Philosophie will “Wissenschaft”, universale Wissenschaft vom Weltall sein; sie will, in 
allen ihren so verschiedenen Systementwürfen, dem Allgemeinen nach schlechthin gül-
tige Wahrheit sein (bzw. ein geordnetes und verknüpftes System einheitlich verknüpfter 
Wahrheiten), die jeden Einsichtigen bindet, die jeder als die eine und selbe für jedermann 
gultige, ihn bindende Wahrheit anerkennen muß HuaVIII: 320.
41 See e.g. Waldenfels 1998; Holenstein 1998.
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doctrine of legal-political universalism.42 In contemporary philosophical 
debate, it has become somewhat common to employ this term to denote 
the stance according to which all human beings are basically bound by a 
set of commonly shared norms, principles or rights. There are a number 
of historical reasons for this. Through the early modern theories of natural 
law, universalism gradually became linked to the idea of the unconditional 
value of the individual, which served as the theoretical foundation for the 
first universal declarations of human rights. As we saw in connection to 
Hobbes and Locke (Ch. 1.1), for the philosophers of early modernity, hu-
man nature was associated, first and foremost, with the universal and un-
changing features of the human character – an idea that we discover in its 
political form, for instance, in Pierre Charron’s De la sagesse (1601): “The 
sign of a natural law must be the universal respect in which it is held, for if 
there was anything that nature had truly commanded us to do, we would 
undoubtedly obey it universally: not only would every nation respect it, 
but every individual”43. In this regard, universalism came to denote a sub-
stantial position that argued for the unconditional sharedness of certain 
principles, norms and rights. Through attempts to develop a political and 
societal model that would be in line with this doctrine, universalism be-
came synonymous with the political doctrine of establishing a cosmopoli-
tan state based on the all-embracing principles of natural law. From Hugo 
Grotius’s “great society of states” to Kant’s vision of “cosmopolitan com-
munity”, the seventeenth and eighteenth century produced a wide variety 
of blueprints for a global superstate – a universal community of men.44
42 The doctrine of “universality” stems from the Latin universalis, ‘of all’ or ‘belonging to 
all’, and its respective noun universus, ‘all together, whole, entire’, we are perhaps more 
familiar with it through the modern doctrine of legal-political universalism. Both of these 
concepts are renditions of the Greek word katholikon and its root to katholou, ‘in general’, 
‘on the whole’ – a definition that Aristotle, for instance, uses to describe the generality of 
our ideas and concepts (the concept of “horse” is general insofar as it applies to all horses). 
The idea of a universal, Catholic church (Gr. hē katholikē ekklesia) comes up in the second 
century AD, and was primarily used to designate the ecclesial unity of Christian believers 
and their commitment to the Bishop of Rome.
43 “L’enseigne et la marque d’une loy naturelle est l’université d’approbation; car ce que 
nature nous auroit veritablement ordonné, nous l’ensuyvrons sans doute dün commun 
consentement, et non seulement toute nation, mais tout homme particulier.” Charron 
1836: 324 
44 However, this stance had its opponents. As the German historian Friedrich Meinecke 
argued, it was namely the “universalism of the Enlightenment [that] nurtured the par-
ticularism of modern nation-states” (Meinecke 1924: 405). With the rise of the modern 
nation-states during the nineteenth century, universalism became gradually the synonym 
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  However, according to Husserl, universalism in Greek philosophy dif-
fered from our modern understanding of the term. First of all, in relation 
to its modern counterpart, Greek idea of universalism was distinguished 
by its essentially formal character. Instead of commonly shared principles 
and norms, Greek universalism took its point of departure from the non-
substantial idea of a shared task open to all to participate in. Philosophy, 
argued Husserl, took its point of departure from the inalienable responsi-
bility of the individual participant, and, as such, it brought within itself a 
novel idea of communal co-operation based on the inextricable equality of 
its participants. Secondly, instead of the legitimization of a particular soci-
etal form or sovereign power – as was the case in early modern theories of 
political universalism – Husserl located the primal motive of Greek uni-
versalism in the most unpractical attitude of all: “wonder” (Gr. thaumazein). 
The primal mode of existence developed by the philosophical enterprise 
was that of a “disinterested spectator” (unbeteiligter Zuschauer)45 renounc-
ing all practical motives. Thirdly, rather than in a legal-political doctrine, 
Husserl attempted to locate the basic foundations of universalism in the 
structure of reason itself – an aspiration that was of course also present in 
the philosophers of modernity (e.g. Descartes46). Beginning with Hera-
clitus, there emerged a novel insistence on acknowledging the culturally 
and historically specific character of our experience, i.e., a specificity that 
was to be understood against the background of a universally shared idea 
of reason. As Husserl emphasized, although the Greeks did not formulate 
this idea in regard to the idea of transcendental subjectivity or correlation 
– e.g., the categories described by Aristotle were considered qualities of 
being, not of consciousness – they created a novel division in the structure 
of reason which attempted to acknowledge both the “national-traditional” 
and “pure” aspects of cognition (cf. Ch. 3.2).
  What such notions as “attitude” and “disinterested spectator” reveal 
in this connection is that Husserl’s reading of the Greek inception was 
of cosmopolitan idea of civilization, and consequently – at least in the German context – 
the antonym of culture that was characterized by “living” and productive expressivity. “As a 
foundation of life”, wrote Alfred Rosenberg, “universalism is as shoreless as individualism; 
the victory of either world-view is destined to lead to chaos.” (Rosenberg 1930: 321) 
45 HuaVI: 331.
46 In Discourse on Method (originally published in 1637), for instance, Descartes calls reason 
the “universal instrument” (Descartes 2003: 38).
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intimately bound up with his own phenomenological vocabulary.47 Thus, 
in order to understand Husserl’s account, the historical transformation 
that took place in the 6th and 5th centuries BC,  needs to be framed in phe-
nomenological-experiential terms, first of all, with reference to the birth 
of a novel attitude Husserl calls “theoretical”. Husserl had been working 
with this concept since the first and second volume of Ideas; however, 
what characterized his later interpretations was a novel sensitivity to the 
communal and historical conditions of this attitude.48 First of all, instead 
of defining itself against other types of individual attitudes (e.g. the per-
sonalistic, the natural), Husserl began to discuss the theoretical attitude 
in contrast to two historically preceding practices and their peculiar “at-
titudes”: the religious-mythical and the mathematical (or geometrical).49 
Instead of transcending or annulling them, the theoretical attitude was to 
be understood as something which ascends from these attitudes – some-
thing which articulates itself on the basis of these stances.
  Secondly, instead of merely being an individual conversion, the emer-
gence of the theoretical attitude was closely linked to a series of geo-
socio-historical transformations which provided some of the necessary 
conditions for the development of the theoretical attitude. In this regard, 
“the breakthrough of science was motivated by the pre-philosophical 
lifeworld”50 – not only did philosophy lead to a series of cultural revo-
lutions, but it was itself based on a series of territorial, communal and 
historical transformations which radically altered the sense of home and 
the familiar for the pre-philosophical Greek communities. To put it more 
succinctly, philosophy was this generative transformation, articulated in the 
form of a novel idea about traditionality and homeliness, of cultural ob-
jectivity and personality of a higher order. Thus from the perspective of 
relative lifeworlds, philosophy was as much an intellectual activity as it 
was, in the words of Deleuze and Guattari, a geo-philosophy – a form of 
thinking which necessarily entailed a specific “deterritorialization […] the 
movement from territory to earth”.51 For this reason, they insist, the birth 
47 On this point, see especially Held 1989b.
48 On the idea of “theoretical attitude” (theoretische Einstellung), see HuaIV: 2–17; HuaIX: 
220; HuaXV: 532–534. On the emergence of the theoretical attitude in Greeks, see Hua-
VI: 308–310, 326–328; HuaXXVII: 78–86, 186ff.; HuaXXIX: 41, 396ff.
49 On the relation between myth and theory in Husserl, see esp. Hart 1989.
50 HuaXXIX: 347.
51 Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 86. 
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of philosophy “appears in Greece as a result of contingency rather than 
necessity, as a result of an ambience or milieu rather than origin”52 – it is 
not self-establishing, it is established.53
  Husserl would have denied, of course, that the idea of universal phi-
losophy carried a necessary relationship to its historical-empirical origin. 
Understood in its ideal sense – as a transcendental form of meaning-
creation – philosophy was as Greek as phenomenology was Freiburgian. 
Instead of simply reducing philosophy back to its unfolding in the his-
tory of the Greek world, Husserl aimed to understand the cultural and 
geo-historical conditions of this transformation from the perspective of 
transcendental description, i.e., from the categories of home and alien, 
familiar and strange, particular and general etc. What happened on the 
Balkan peninsula between years 600 and 400 BC was of course an empiri-
cal development that can only be evoked through literary documents or 
archeological studies – however, it is quite possible to view this period 
from the perspective of the teleological development of spirit, commu-
nality and historicity and the novel forms of meaning-institution embed-
ded in them. From this perspective, the birth of philosophy appeared not 
as an absolute origin independent of its historical background but as the 
continuation or transformation of something:
Naturally the outbreak of the theoretical attitude, like everything 
that develops historically, has its factual motivation in the concrete 
framework of historical occurrence. In this respect one must clarify, 
then, how thaumazein (wonder) could arise and become habitual, at 
first in individuals, out of the manner and the life-horizon of Greek 
human-ity in the seventh century, with its contact with the great 
and already highly cultivated nations of its surrounding world.54
52 Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 96.
53 In this regard, I believe that my interpretation supplements the reading of Klaus Held 
(e.g. 1998a, 1998b, 2002), who mostly discusses Husserl’s reading from the viewpoint of 
the theoretical attitude and the novel vocabulary of reason. We should acknowledge that 
many of the most important materials concerning the generative background of Greek 
philosophy – and the cultural transformations incepted by it – were published only in 1992 
with the volume 29 of Husserliana.
54 “Natürlich hat der Einbruch der theoretischen Einstellung, wie alles historisch Gewor-
dene, seine faktische Motivation im konkreten Zusammenhang geschichtlichen Gesche-
hens. Es gilt also in dieser Hinsicht, aufzuklären, wie aus der Art und dem Lebenshorizont 
des griechischen Menschentums im 7. Jahrhundert in seinem Verkehr mit den großen und 
schon hochkultivierten Nationen ihrer Umwelt jenes thaumazein sich einstellen und zu-
nächst in Einzelnen habituell werden konnte.” HuaVI: 331–332.
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In the following chapter, I will discuss the conditions for this transforma-
tion from the perspective of two ideas: territoriality and reason. It is my 
argument that in order to comprehend the overall cultural transformation 
triggered by the communal activity of philosophia, this activity needs to be 
viewed in regard to its generative and historical conditions. These condi-
tions reveal the significant role of the geo-historical transformations that Hus-
serl considered necessary (though not solely sufficient) for the emergence 
of the theoretical attitude.
3.2. On the Generative Origins of Theory: 
Territoriality and Reason
Greek philosophy, besides being the origin of a Europe currently in demise, was itself the product of a crisis. Those forms of think-ing we call philosophical – that began to emerge in the 6th cen-
tury BC forwards – emerged against the backdrop of a series of political, 
societal and religious transformations that substantially changed the cul-
tural landscape of the Greek city-states. Rapid economic development and 
the particular increase of maritime trade in the Aegean Sea and Northern 
Africa (Cyrenaica, Egypt) had led to growing tensions between the old 
aristocratic elites and the new class of wealthy merchants. The so-called 
constitutional reform of Solon in the early 6th century was an attempt to 
resolve these tensions – as well as to meet the demands of the ever more 
conscious peasantry – and through a set of transformations known as the 
democratic reforms, the growing divisions in Greek society were gradu-
ally given an institutionalized form. Moreover, by also conceding Athenian 
citizenship also to non-indigenous people (above all, traders), the Solon 
reforms made Athens the centre of commercial and cultural exchange.55 
  The cultural effects of this transformation varied widely. Close inter-
action between different city-states itself created new sensitivity toward 
different traditions and their beliefs and practices. As Deleuze and Guat-
55 See e.g. Andrews 1967: 197ff. Husserl, too, confirmed the “preparatory” character of 
trade-relations for the novel “spiritual stance” (Geisteserhaltung) – although he did not con-
cretely describe these relations in detail, see HuaXXIX: 42.
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tari argue, the city-states of Ancient Greece, especially Athens, seemed to 
be “at once near enough to and far enough away from the archaic eastern 
empires to be able to benefit from them without following their model”56 
– the Greeks were attracted to the foreign element without caving in to 
its magnetism. This appreciation of the foreign was evident, for instance, 
in the field of Greek historiography, which seemed to acknowledge a wide 
variety of traditions regardless of their familiarity. As the case of Herodo-
tus’ Histories shows us, in its 6th and 5th century BC usage, the Greek word 
historia was indifferent to the division between home and alien: it encom-
passed accounts both from domestic and from foreign traditions.57 Thus, 
Greek historiography, as it unfolded as the mediation between home and 
alien, relied on a specific self-distanciation from the absolute primacy of 
one’s own tradition. “I write what seems to me to be true”, says Hecataeus 
of Miletus in the first paragraph of his Genealogies (composed in the late 
6th century), “for the stories of the Greeks are manifold and seem to me 
absurd.”58  Hecataeus’ inclination was not, however, simply to ridicule the 
different myths, but to clarify their interconnections and analogical fea-
tures. By discussing the chronological order of different tales, he was one 
of the first to develop a systematic account of mythologies.59 
  From early on, this mediation between domestic and foreign was 
linked to the notion of theory. During the early Classical era – i.e., before 
the emergence of philosophy – the Greek concept of theōria stood primar-
ily for the specific civic practice of travelogue. In the practice of theōria, a 
particular citizen traveled abroad in order to give an account of events and 
occurrences in a foreign polis that had usually been hitherto unknown. As 
Andrea Nightingale has shown, these journeys were usually religious in 
character – varying from meetings with oracles to participation in reli-
gious festivals – and constituted official “eyewitness reports”.60 
56 Deleuze and Guattari 1984: 87
57 As Waldenfels correctly points out, the “alien other” (Gr. allotrios; Lat. alienum) or the 
“stranger” (Gr. xenon) were not central categories of Greek philosophical thought, i.e., they 
were not conceived as philosophical problems, but as categories belonging to the facticity 
of human existence. See Waldenfels 1997: 16–18. Cf. Held 1989b: 23; 2002: 90–91.
58 Hecataeus F 1 in Jacoby 1923.
59 See e.g. Graf 1993: 125.
60 Nightingale 2004: 3. Cf. Gadamer 1975: 117ff; Held 1989b: 23ff; 2002: 89.
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  First of all, it was characteristic of the idea of “theoretical insight” 
that it emphasized the importance of personal evidence over mere hear-
say: theoros (“the spectator”) was the one who had actually witnessed the 
events. Secondly, the peculiarly “theoretical” mode of vision denoted a 
rather broad notion of “seeing” that excluded the mere visual connotations 
of this notion. As Nightingale emphasizes, theory denotes a kind of “sacral-
ized vision” that, in the case of religious festivities, was also sensitive to 
the “hidden” cultural and social dimensions of the practices in question.61 
In this regard, theory acknowledged rather than dismissed the differences 
in understanding characteristically revealed by unfamiliar experiences. 
Thirdly, on the basis of the aforementioned insights, what the idea of the 
theoretical narrative seemed to imply was a kind of universal translatabil-
ity of particular cultural phenomena: the idea that although sacred events 
are restricted to a number of participants, they can also be made under-
standable for the excluded. This linked the notion of theory to a specific 
educational function which aimed to cultivate sensitivity toward particu-
lar traditions. (It is perhaps no coincidence that the first instantiation of 
philosophical theōria – Plato’s allegory of the cave in the books V–VII of 
The Republic – is in the form of a journey.)
  This intimate relationship between theory and the mediation between 
“home” and “alien” was also acknowledged by Husserl. In one of his later 
manuscripts, “Teleology in the History of Philosophy” (Teleologie in der 
Philosophiegeschichte), Husserl emphasized the centrality of the critique of 
mythology to the emergence of the theoretical attitude. “The Greeks were 
keen to despise the barbarians”, Husserl wrote, “the alien mythologies that 
signified such an important dimension of the practical environment in the 
alien as well as in the own people, and [they] considered them even as 
barbaric, stupid, or profoundly wrong.”62 However, even the mockery and 
ridicule that the Greeks leveled at foreign mythologies failed to remove 
the Greeks fascination for their similarities and analogous ways of see-
ing the world, “the same sun, the same moon, the same earth, the same 
61 Nightingale 2004: 35–37. 
62 “Der Grieche mag die Barbaren verachten, die ihm fremden Mythologien, die als My-
thologien in der Fremde wie in dem eigenen Volk eine so grosse Schichte der praktischen 
Umwelt bezeichnen, mögen ihm zunächst eben als barbarisch, als dumm, als grundver-
kehrt gelten”. (HuaXXIX: 387). According to a popular etymological consideration, the 
Greek word ‘barbaroi’ was derived from the seemingly incomprehensible speech of alien 
people (e.g. the Persians). See e.g. Waldenfels 1997: 22.
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sea etc.”63 Alongside the “territorial myths” characteristic of particular 
homeworlds – for instance, the tales of Philomela and Oedipus among 
the Greeks – there emerged a novel sensitivity towards “universal myths” 
that referred to universally shared features of the lifeworld such as the earth, 
the sky and the heavenly bodies.64 What Husserl confirmed here was ba-
sically the point that Aristotle advanced in the first book of Metaphysics 
that despite their differing perspectives and conceptual schemes, the early 
“philosophers of nature” – the Milesians, Eleatics, and Pythagoreans – had 
actually “spoken about the same matters”.65 They had addressed the same 
phenomena in a way that could be understood and critically examined by 
others.
  In another manuscript, entitled “Different Forms of Historicity” (Ver-
schiedene Formen der Historizität), Husserl delineated this process with the 
notion of demythologization (Entmythisierung).66 Through the acknowledg-
ment of the analogous character of universal mythical apperceptions, the 
mediation between individual homeworlds led to a series of “identity-
syntheses” that were able to endow the descriptions of the natural world 
with a specific relativity in regard to their common foundation: the sun 
could be called Helios, Ra, or even a “chariot drawn by fire-darting steeds” 
(as in Pindar’s Olympian Odes), but all of these descriptions referred to 
the same object. Through the “sublation” of national representations, the 
critique of mythology was able to foster what Husserl called the idea of 
“the first objective world” (die erste objektive Welt) – a world divested of the 
primacy of a particular homeworld.67 In his manuscripts from early of 
1930s, Husserl had already anticipated this idea by referring to the con-
stitution of the somewhat clumsy notion of “the” world (“die” Welt) on the 
basis of the encounter of homeworld and alienworld.68 Now, although the 
new idea of an “objective world” was only realized in terms of a “vague 
notion” – the “all-communal ground for all identifications” – it presented 
a challenge for the “naïve-natural historicity of human existence”, that is, 
63 Hua XXIX: 387.
64 HuaXXIX: 43–44.
65 Aristotle, Met. I.5, 987a10–11.
66 HuaXXIX: 41–46. See also HuaVI: 340; HuaXXVII: 189, 194ff.
67 HuaXXIX: 45.
68 HuaXV: 214–18. Husserl also speaks of the first objective “world-level” (Weltstufe), see 
HuaXV: 205.
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to the unquestioned naturalness of familiarity and strangeness.69 Through 
the encounter of particular traditions, no single tradition could acquire 
for itself the status of being an absolute foundation – the lifeworld could 
no longer be identified with a particular homeworld and its conceptuality. 
Instead, the praxis of theory had created a new craving for concepts able 
to acknowledge both our adhesion to a particular tradition as well as the 
“commonality” of the underlying world. 
  This transition, although it did not yet entail the emergence of philo-
sophical reason, had created a need for such concepts that could acknowl-
edge this essential embeddedness in a particular lifeworld. If, indeed, the 
lifeworld could appear as both universally shared and culturally unique, 
then this division could not be understood solely on the basis of the world-
ly objects themselves. Instead, it was to be comprehended from the per-
spective of the apprehending “mind”. Alongside what Husserl called the 
idea of a “national-traditional reason” there emerged a new craving for the 
idea of “pure reason […] through which the pure and absolutely objective 
world is first disclosed”.70 In other words, what the praxis of theory had 
introduced was a novel division or “split” in the concept of reason itself – 
a split whose genuine character was to become the core question of the 
philosophical enterprise. 
  Because Husserl’s own analysis seems only to operate on the level 
of conceptual distinctions, we might benefit from supplementary insights 
that flesh out the historical development in the notion of rationality. In 
historical analysis, the new sensitivity towards the manifold ways of ex-
periencing the world was reflected, above all, in a new conceptual frame-
work which aimed to differentiate between simple and complex forms of 
perception. As Bruno Snell argued in his classic work Die Entdeckung des 
Geistes (1975), the Homeric texts did not yet operate with the distinction 
between immediate and mediate world-disclosure, that is, between purely 
sensuous perception and discursive apperception.71 For the thinkers of the 
pre-Classical period, every form of world-disclosure was fundamentally a 
69 HuaXXIX: 45.
70 “Oder sie weckte die Vermöglichkeit der Verwandlung der national-traditionalen ”Ver-
nunft” (Vernunft in der Endlichkeit, in der Relativität) in die ”reine” Vernunft, die Ratio des 
irrelativ Unbedingten, durch die erst die reine und absolut objektive Welt entdeckt wird, 
oder die Objekte als Objekte an sich für uns Menschen da sind.” HuaXXIX: 347.
71 Snell 1975: 17ff.
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simple and immediate bodily process which did not contain the possibility 
of error. Indeed, this was also a notion that Aristotle ascribed to Empe-
docles in De anima.72 Thus the archaic view of perception was not able 
to articulate the idea that people would experience the world differently 
because of their particular cultural contexts. Secondly, what Snell also 
emphasizes is the idea that in texts from the Homeric period we do not 
really find any terms referring to a common mind, soul or consciousness 
universally shared by all human beings. The notions that these authors use 
to describe the peculiar intellectual features of man – thymos, nous, sōma, 
psychē – were all considered organic functions or bodily forces that take 
their peculiar effect on the human being, for instance, in the case of psychē, 
by developing the urge for self-preservation. These forces, however, did 
not embody any kind of substantial mode of existence apart from their 
peculiar assignment; rather, they were considered in purely functional 
terms. Instead, the idea of the soul as a form of substance, ousia, only 
emerged through Plato and Aristotle.73 
  According to Snell, Heraclitus was the first to articulate a concept of 
the “soul” (psychē) which substantially differed from the mere functional, 
bodily principle of an individual.74 At the very heart of this notion, Hera-
clitus placed the faculty of logos – a notion which in its pre-philosophical 
sense denoted a vast variety of ideas from “speech” to “computation”, “re-
lation” and “explanation”. However, Heraclitus was the first to articulate 
the notion of logos in connection to an idea of discursive reason that did 
not merely reflect or articulate given meanings or meaning-structures 
but constantly discloses being.Without this faculty of reason “in accordance 
with all things come to pass”75, the whole idea of reality as a meaningful 
whole would be inconceivable: everything that appears as something that 
makes sense does so because it is structured as comprehensible by some 
agent who lets things to appear. This idea is also reflected in the pre-phil-
osophical connotations of the verb legein, which was primarily used in the 
sense of agricultural gathering and preserving: as in the case of harvesting 
a crop, and also in the rational structuring of the world, a functioning 
72 Aristotle, De an. III, 3. 427b12-15
73 Plato, Phaedo 92d; Aristotle on psychē as a “secondary substance” (deutere ousia), see De an. 
II, 1. 412a19–22.
74 Snell 1975: 25ff.
75 Diels & Kranz 1951 (hereafter DK), 22 B1
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agent must be presupposed in order for meaningfulness to come about. 
  Now, as Heraclitus adds in another fragment, although logos is common 
to all men, “the many (hoi polloi) live as if they had a private understanding”76. 
Even though our ability to comprehend the reality around us is fundamen-
tally similar, in our disputes and varying interpretations we often fail to 
recognize this common ground. Indeed, different myths, languages and 
customs seem to become our “second nature”, in the sense that they often 
hinder us from living according to our joint “first nature”, which is com-
mon to all human beings. Furthermore, as Heraclitus puts it in another 
fragment, the correlate of this nature is nothing less than the common 
world as such: “The waking have one common world (kosmos), but the 
sleeping turn aside each into a world of his own”.77 Thus, the shared world 
has an ontological priority over the cultural-generative because it corre-
sponds with the true, “waking” character of human life. 
  It is perhaps no coincidence that Husserl so keenly adopted the meta-
phors of “the dawn” (Morgenrot) and “awakening” (Erwachen) to describe the 
peculiar character of the Greek inception and its meaning for the idea of 
Europe.78 Through the novel idea of universal reason, the Greek beginning 
denoted “a new stage in humanity (Menschlichkeit) and its rationality”79 – 
a new idea of universality resulting in the emergence of the theoretical-
scientific attitude. 
  We should avoid, however, presenting a too idealized picture of Greek 
anthropology. At least at the level of individual psychology, there were 
numerous attempts to restrict the universality of intellectual abilities – 
attempts that were based on highly questionable arguments and used for 
dubious political motives. In the writings of Aristotle, for one, barbar-
ians, slaves, women and children were all presented as lacking some sig-
nificant intellectual faculty or function in order to argue, for instance, for 
the naturalness of slavery or the exclusion of women from the political 
sphere.80 However, contrary to Hannah Arendt’s description of the repre-
sentation of the slaves of Greek city-states as beings without logos, these 
76 DK 22 B2.
77 DK 22 B89.
78 HuaVI: 273. See also HuaVI: 145–146. This connection between Heraclitus and phe-
nomenology has been put forward especially by Hart (1989: 154–158) and Held (2002: 
84ff.).
79 HuaVI: 338.
80 On the exclusion of women and slaves, see Pol. I.13 1260a11–13
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ethnocentric and misogynistic arguments never really touched the core 
of the Greek rationality.81 As Aristotle says, those who wish to exclude 
slaves from the common logos are simply wrong – for without logos, there 
would be no way of differentiating human beings from mere brutes.82 As 
Aristotle emphasized on several occasions, logos should not be understood 
as a mere common attribute (koinon) of human beings; rather, it is their 
defining characteristic (idion).83
  However, as Husserl argued elsewhere, the transition from the old 
mythological framework to philosophical co-operation was not as straight-
forward as it first appears. The critique of traditional mythology (or cos-
mology) that began during the 6th and 5th centuries BC did not directly 
lead to the emergence of the theoretical enterprise. Rather, it was medi-
ated by a peculiar negative backlash that was manifested in the skeptical 
practice of the sophists.84 As Richard Bett has argued, although the view 
of the sophists as diehard advocates of cultural relativism is perhaps an 
exaggeration – an exaggeration stemming from Protagoras being viewed 
the leading exponent of the movement85 – it is, nevertheless, clear that 
the advancement of scientific practice in the works of Plato and Aristotle 
emerged in clear opposition not simply to traditional mythology but to the 
unquestioned authority of “common beliefs” (doxai) in the life of Greek so-
ciety. This authority was supported by the crucial role that speech played 
in the life of the Greek polis: besides being the central medium of Greek 
politics (reflected in the democratic principles of “free speech”, parrhēsia 
and isēgoria), speech also governed the functioning of the legal system and 
the new “ethical” practices of teaching virtue and excellence.86 Although 
ridiculing particular traditions and their ambiguities was a central part 
of the sophists’ practice, they did not fail to recognize the very ambigu-
ity that is inherent in linguistic communication as such. On the contrary, 
sophism took advantage of this ambiguity for its own practical gain, for in-
81 See Arendt 1958: 27.
82 Arendt’s description is probably based on Pol. I 5 1254b20 in which Aristotle refuses 
to use the verb ehkein (“to possess”) to describe the relation between logos and the slaves. 
However, as 1260b5 shows, it is completely misplaced to describe slaves as beings without 
logos (aneu logou).
83 Pol. I, 2. 1053a 10; E. N. I, 13. 1102a30. See also Plato, Soph. 264a
84 Husserl on the significance of sophism, see HuaXXIX: 281, 388, 421. Cf. HuaVIII: 3ff; 
HuaXXV: 126ff.
85 Bett 1989.
86 Freeman 1996: 147ff.
— 262 —
. H   O  E
stance, for political or juridical persuasion. Thus, for the genuinely philo-
sophical attitude, the dimension of speech was not enough; it needed to be 
based upon an intellectual position which distanced itself from the practical 
interests of societal life and was not bound to the ambiguities and relativi-
ties of the natural language. In this way, Husserl claimed, sophism opened 
up a central path for understanding the relationship between being and 
consciousness.87
  In Husserl’s account, this distanciation emerged in the intellectual 
attitude of “wonder” (thaumazein), which represented the first genuinely 
non-practical attitude towards one’s particular homeworld.88 In this re-
spect, Husserl particularly aligned himself with Plato and Aristotle in their 
delineations of wonder as the origin (arkhē)89 of philosophy, “for the sake of 
which”90 the first philosophers began their quest. Husserl’s understanding 
of the emergence of wonder was in terms of a passive occurrence within 
experience, an involuntary change of attitude that encouraged a sense of 
“curiosity” (Neugier), which could break free from all practical life-inter-
ests.91 Despite its involuntary character, Husserl understood wonder as 
an essentially “productive” or “creative” stance; rather than being a feel-
ing of mere bewilderment, wonder seems to direct attention to those 
features that make something what it is. In wonder, one is not interested 
in the advantageous aspects of a particular object; rather, one seems to be 
enthralled by the things themselves (“Why is the sky blue?”, “What is this 
thing we call time?”). This is why Husserl also called wonder the “original 
theory”, for it naturally guides one’s interest towards the essential reasons, 
grounds and fundamental elements of the appearing reality. As Husserl 
put it in one of his unpublished lectures:
87 Cf. the manuscript F I 40/18b: “Die ungeheure historische Bedeutung dieses [sophisti-
sche] Skeptizismus liegt darin, dass zuerst in ihm Blickwendungen in jene von uns gesuchte 
neue Dimension, sagen wir die vernunftkritische, eine wesentliche Rolle spielen, dass 
er es zuerst war, der, wenn auch in sehr unvollkommener Form, die auf alle Erkenntnis 
und Wissenschaft wesentlich bezogenen Schwierigkeiten des Verhältnisses von Sein und 
Bewusstsein fühlbar machte.”
88 HuaVI: 328–329. See also references to manuscripts in HuaXXIX: 
89 “mala gar philosophou touto to pathos, to thaumazein: ou gar allē arkhē philosophias ē hautē”, 
Plato, Theaetetus, 155d.
90 “dia gar to thaumazein hoi anthrōpoi kai nun kai to prōton ērxanto philosophein, ex arkhēs men 
ta prokheira tōn atopōn thaumasantes” (Aristot. Met. I.982b11-14).
91 On two levels of theory, see HuaVI: 332. On thaumazein as the “pre-form” (Vorgestalt) of 
theoretical attitude, see HuaXXIX: 67.
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Certainly, we must differentiate between two levels of inspection: 
the wisdom, or to put it more accurately, the education (Bildung) 
that one acquires, for instance, by travelling with one’s eyes open 
– by looking, observing, and comparing – and the higher level of 
knowledge that one acquires through a thinking directed towards 
comprehension and explication. At the forefront of the history of 
philosophy and the history of humane science there stands Thales 
who philosophizes in a completely new sense (instead of Solon 
who “philosophizes” in the mere Herodotian sense of the word).92 
Taken from an experiential point of view, the emergence of the genuinely 
theoretical-scientific attitude characteristic of the philosophical enterprise 
signified, above all, a kind of entrenchment of wonder. Following his 
earlier characterizations of the phenomenological method, Husserl 
defined the theoretical observer as a “distinterested spectator” (unbeteiligten 
Zuschauer)93 – i.e., as someone who makes a virtue of detachment from the 
world of practical activity. Thus, based on the active “epoche of all natural 
praxis”94 – i.e., the “bracketing” of all considerations of usefulness and the 
cultural and mythical apperceptions of things – this theoretical attitude 
signified nothing less than the habituation of universal curiosity. Instead of 
merely dissecting the different analogies used by particular mythological 
constellations, this attitude unfolded as an insistence to “leave behind all 
naïve traditional commitments”95, that is, to do away with the inherited 
traditionality characteristic of pre-philosophical generativity.
  To explain the character of this habituation, Husserl called forth one of 
the central notions of his ethical theory – “vocation” (Beruf) – and insisted 
that the formation of the theoretical attitude be understood in terms of 
vocational life (Berufsleben).96 This insistence, which already appears in 
92 “Doch müssen wir hier zwei Stufen sichtlich unterscheiden: Diejenige Weisheit oder, 
wie wir besser sagen, die Bildung, die sich zum Beispiel der mit offenen Sinnen Reisende 
und immerfort Schauende, Betrachtende, Vergleichende erwirbt, und die höhere Erkennt-
nisstufe, die das auf Begreifen und Erklären gerichtete Denken gewinnt. Nicht jener im 
Sinne der herodotischen Rede „philosophierende“ Solon, sondern der in einem neuen Sinn 
philosophierende Thales steht an der Spitze der Geschichte der Philosophie und der Ge-
schichte der menschlichen Wissenschaft” Husserl, F I 40/13b
93 HuaVI: 328, 341. Cf. HuaVIII: 98.
94 HuaVI: 328.
95 HuaXXIX: 389.
96 HuaVI: 261ff. In his ethical writings of the early 1920s, Husserl had understood the 
emergence of vocation as a specific principle of self-regulation – one, which seeks to gov-
ern the life of a person according to certain values, goods or ends (e.g. HuaXXVII: 28ff.). 
In this respect, the idea of vocational life was to be distinguished from the mere blind 
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Husserl’s earliest texts on Greek philosophy, can be explained on two points. 
Firstly, by giving the notion of vocation a certain involuntary connotation 
by putting the idea of a “calling” (Ruf) at the heart of this concept, Husserl 
wanted to accentuate the almost fatalistic aspect of philosophical life, 
which is analogous to religious conversion. As Gadamer put it in Wahrheit 
und Methode: “Theoria is a true participation, not something active but 
something passive (pathos), namely being totally involved in and carried 
away by what one sees.”97 In a remark in a late manuscript, Husserl called 
this attraction the “demonism”98 of the philosophical vocation: philosophy, 
in its most fundamental experiential sense, is not something one chooses 
but something to which one is called. Secondly, it seems that by invoking 
the notion of vocation, Husserl wanted to indicate the fundamentally 
“reflexive” aspect of the theoretical attitude. Instead of being the result of 
mere striving towards the creation of objectivity, Husserl understood the 
emergence of the theoretical attitude in terms of a reflexive stance which is 
directed towards the pre-given horizon of one’s own homeworld, its presuppositions 
and habitualities. Thus, although theory emerged as an insistence on leaving 
behind all traditional commitments, it was accompanied by the conviction 
that this departure was not something that can be performed once and 
for all; instead, it can only be attained through a perpetual critique of the 
values and validities of one’s own tradition. 
  What this consideration reveals is that by framing the notion 
of the theoretical attitude in terms of vocation, Husserl wanted to 
undermine nothing less than the essentially practical underpinning of 
following of needs: by submitting oneself to more or less enduring principles, the human 
being was able to overcome the mere instinctual life of the animal guided by the satisfac-
tion of needs, to achieve a minimum definition of “freedom” against the mere compulsory 
behavior. In this context, Husserl’s purpose was of course to distinguish between different 
types of vocational life in order to arrive at a genuinely ethical mode of self-regulation, 
which he defined in terms of autonomity and renewal (see the part 4 of this work).
97 Gadamer 1975: 118. “Thus theory is not in the first instance a behavior whereby we 
control an object or put it at our disposal by explaining it. It has to do with a good of an-
other kind.” (Gadamer 1998: 31–32)
98 “Is vocation an empty word? Has any philosopher (in the original sense that can be un-
derstood on the basis of great philosophers) ever become a “genuine” philosopher without 
the demonism of having received such a vocation?” (“Ist Berufung ein leeres Wort? Ist je 
ein Philosoph – der urbildlichen Art, die an jedem grossen Philosophen in Evidenz nach-
zuverstehen ist, ein “echter” Philosoph je gewesen ohne die Dämonie der Berufenheit? 
HuaXXIX: 353. This point is also discussed by Luft 2004. 
— 265 —
3.2. On the Generative Origins of Theory
this attitude.99 Although the theoretical attitude emerged through the 
reflection of everyday practical concerns, it did not entail a complete 
estrangement from the sphere of praxis, of doing and willing, of pursuit 
and volition.100 Theory remained practical, first of all, in the sense that it 
necessarily emerged within the sphere of human action – as a peculiar 
renunciation of competing motives (for instance, a renunciation of 
what Aristotle called the life of pleasure and the political life).101 Thus 
instead of creating a world of its own, the theoretical attitude signified 
a change of attitude towards one’s own homeworld. Secondly, although 
the theoretical attitude signified a radical transition towards individual 
responsibility, it also ushered in a completely new kind of interpersonal 
co-operation. In order to understand the new idea of communal meaning-
constitution implied in the theoretical attitude – the idea of philosophy as 
an interpersonal activity – we need to look at it also from the perspective 
of characteristically “theoretical” insights and truths. This transition will 
help us to characterize the novel modes of generativity and historicity that 
were constitutive to the emergence of philosophy.
99 Here we find a clear analogy to Heidegger’s earliest philosophical courses on the defi-
nition of philosophy where he discusses his own project of factical life in regard to the 
“dismantling” of the primacy of the theoretical: “This primacy of the theoretical must be 
broken, but not in order to proclaim the primacy of the practical, and not in order to in-
troduce something that shows the problems from a new angle, but because the theoretical 
itself refers back to something pre-theoretical” (“Diese Vorherrschaft des Theoretischen 
muss gebrochen werden, zwar nicht in der Weise, dass man einen Primat des Praktischen 
proklamiert, und nicht deshalb, um nun mal etwas anderes zu bringen, was die Probleme 
von einer neue Seite zeigt, sondern weil das Theoretische selbst und als solcehs in ein 
Vortheoretische zurückweist.” Heidegger, GA 56/57: 59).
100 Historically speaking, the “unfortunate” separation of theory and practice – which I 
discussed in part 1.4 in connection to Husserl’s account of crisis – may be led back to 
the Stoic distinction between vita contemplativa and vita activa, which were renditions of 
Aristotle’s classification of different types of vocational lives in Politics (bios theōrētikos, bios 
apolaustikos, bios politikos) – although Aristotle himself did not find the spheres of theoria 
and praxis as mutually exclusive. (E.N. 1139a18–30). As Nightingale points out, Plato, for 
one, did not “oppose the contemplative to the practical life; rather he differentiates between 
the philosophical and the political life” (2004: 133ff.). For him, “the philosopher is perfectly 
willing, and indeed supremely able to act, but unless he finds himself in a true city, he acts 
privately rather than politically” (2004: 133–134).
101 On the threefold division between bios apolaustikos, bios politikos and bios theorētikos, see 
E.N. I.5. 1095bff.
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3.3 Community of  Theory and the Idea
of Rational Culture
In terms of historical development, the verb philosophein and the adjec-tive philosophos seem to have preceded the noun philosophia at least by a century. According to historical records, Pythagoras was the first to 
be generally known as a “lover of wisdom” (philosophos) – a definition that 
was analogically derived from other forms of personal devotion (such as 
a fondness for eating, philotrophia, or of wealth, philoplousia). It should 
be remembered that in the context of the 6th and 5th centuries BC, the 
scope of ‘wisdom’ (sophia) was not restricted to merely intellectual activ-
ity but comprised a wide variety of different types of “knowledge”, in-
cluding rhetoric and practical know-how. As Heraclitus confirmed, lov-
ers of wisdom (philosophous) “must be acquainted with very many things 
indeed”.102 This rather broad interest in the objects and events of the world 
was also something that Herodotus affirmed when attributing Solon’s love 
of wisdom to his theoretical interest (in the sense of travelling).103 Al-
though Pythagoras was able to assemble a group of pupils and successors, 
“philosophizing” in general primarily seemed to denote an individualistic 
attitude or character; although the paradigmatic form of the philosopher 
was perhaps more sharply realized in figures like Heraclitus, an “arrogant 
spirit”, as Diogenes Laertius put it, who “had learned everything from 
himself ”.104 Nevertheless, philosophizing seemed like a business of soli-
tary individuals, and following the example of Heraclitus – the man who 
scorned law-making for the sake of dice-playing – it turned its back on the 
public affairs of the polis.105 
  The emergence of philosophy as a form of interpersonal activity 
seems, above all, to have been related to the development of democracy 
that began in mainland Attica at the turn of 6th and 5th centuries BC. Par-
ticularly in the context of the Athenian polis, “wisdom” was now more and 
more attached to specific political virtues, and the activity of philosophiz-
ing found a new platform in verbal debate and punchy argumentation that 
102 DK 22 B35
103 Herodotus, Hist. 1.30–32.
104 Diogenes Laertius, D.L. IX.1.5
105 Diogenes Laertius, D.L. IX.1.3
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sought to examine the matters at stake from several perspectives. As we 
saw in the previous chapter, the kind of free debate that characterized 
the political arena – the arena which knew only equals – was dominated, 
above all, by the rhetorical practices of the sophist movements. For them, 
the ‘love of wisdom’ seemed to entail the educational task of enriching 
the rhetorical skill of the individual in order to enhance his mastery of 
verbal debate. The substantive form philosophia appeared for the first time 
among the pupils of Socrates – particularly Xenophon, Isocrates and Plato 
– at the beginning of the 4th century. It emerged in close connection to 
the sophist idea of education (paideia). For philosophy, however, this task 
was primarily about cultivation. As Plato put it in the Republic, while the 
inexperienced youth tends to misuse verbal debate as a form of childish 
play or competition (paidiē), the experienced know how to take advan-
tage of the apparent multitude of perspectives and use it as a means for 
the examination of truth.106 This ideal provided the basic motive for the 
emergence of philosophical schools, including Plato’s, whereby philoso-
phy gradually established a social and institutional framework. Through a 
common framework, theory was able to distance itself from mere travel-
ogue and acquire a stable base in the communal co-operation; instead of a 
mere intellectual attitude, philosophy became a common undertaking that 
could be manifested in specific cultural accomplishments that were able to 
be transmitted through tradition. 
  Although Husserl seldom referred to the historical genesis of philo-
sophical schools, he was by no means indifferent to the institutionalized 
form of philosophy. While he emphasized the significance of the critique 
of mythology to the emergence of the theoretical attitude, it was only 
through the “Platonic” drive toward communalization that this attitude 
became entrenched in a permanent cultural form.107 Through Plato, Hus-
106 Plato, Rep., 539 b-c.
107 HuaXXXV: 50–55. See also F I 40/34a where Husserl still excludes the theoretical 
motive from the teachings of Socrates: “Die wissenschaftliche Auswirkung der sokrati-
schen Impulse vollzieht sich durch den größten Schüler des Sokrates, durch Platon 
(427–347 BC). Von ihrem Urheber war die Methode der Definition, nämlich der klä-
renden Sinnes- und Wesensanalyse von begrifflichen Vorstellungen, die das Verhalten der 
Menschen bedeutungsvoll bestimmen, nur so weit geübt worden, als es sein Interesse für 
eine Erneuerung des Lebens im Geiste eines wahrhaft praktisch-vernünftigen Lebens es 
forderte. Ein Theoretiker war Sokrates nicht.” On the analogical mode of investigation 
characterizing the pre-Socratic philosophers, see HuaXXVII: 80–81. On the Platonic idea 
of logical science, see HuaXVII: 1ff.
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serl argued, the theoretical attitude acquired, in three steps, a new level of 
rigor in the form of consistent methodology. First, philosophy became an 
eidetic science which aimed to uncover those essential forms and structures 
of reality that determine the manifestation of all being. Second, through 
Plato’s work, philosophy became an essentially logical undertaking that 
sought to discover those principles and structures of cognition that regu-
late the formation of absolutely valid knowledge. Last, it was precisely 
through Plato that theory became a genuinely cultural project in the sense 
that it gave birth to a new idea of communal co-operation, a new “person-
ality of a higher order” and a novel doctrine of “social reason” that gave rise 
to political idealism. Thus, in its institutional form, philosophy opened up 
a completely new field of communality and historicity – the new idea of 
the generative constitution of meaning – which secured its continuity through 
the creation and transmission of philosophical truths:
But only in the Greeks do we have a universal (“cosmological”) 
life-interest in the essentially new form of a purely “theoretical” 
attitude, and this as a communal form in which this interest works 
itself out for internal reasons, being the corresponding, essentially 
new [community] of philosophers, of scientists (mathematicians, 
astronomers, etc.). These are the men who, not in isolation but 
with one another and for one another, i.e., in interpersonally bound 
communal work, strive for and produce theoria and nothing but 
theoria whose growth and constant perfection, with the broadening 
of the circle of coworkers and the succession of the generations 
of inquirers, is finally taken up into the will with the sense of an 
infinite and common task.108
Thus, the unique character of philosophical accomplishments was embed-
ded, first and foremost, in the new concept of ideality provided by the new 
theoretical attitude. As I already mentioned, Husserl’s reading of Plato 
centered on the idea of eidetic science – the science of pure and universal es-
108 “Aber nur bei den Griechen haben wir ein universales („kosmologisches”) Lebensin-
teresse in der wesentiich neuartigen Gestalt einer rein „theoretischen” Einstellung, und als 
Gemeinschaftsform, in der es sich aus inneren Gründen auswirkt, die entsprechende we-
sentlich neuartige der Philosophen, der Wissenschaftler (der Mathematiker, der Astrono-
men usw.). Es sind die Männer, die nicht vereinzelt sondern miteinander und füreinander, 
also in interpersonal verbundener Gemeinschaftsarbeit, Theoria und nichts als Theoria er-
streben und erwirken, deren Wachstum und stetige Vervollkommnung mit der Verbreitung 
des Kreises der Mitarbeitenden und der Abfolge der Forschergenerationen schließlich in 
den Willen aufgenommen wird mit dem Sinn einer unendlichen und allgemeinsamen Auf-
gabe.“ HuaVI: 326.
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sences (eidos) that endow reality with its intelligible form. From early on, 
Husserl opposed the schoolbook interpretation of Plato’s “Theory of Ideas” 
as a delineation of a separate region in the physical universe, the kind of 
“place beyond heaven” that Plato, with great use of metaphor, described in 
Phaedrus.109 Instead, Husserl wanted to liberate Platonic idealism from the 
“metaphysical presuppositions”110 that had been inherent from Aristotle to 
Nietzsche – presuppositions that presented Plato as a theorist of another 
world, blind to the binding force of manifest reality
  On this topic, Husserl derived particular benefit from Hermann Lo-
tze’s Logic (orig. 1874) which approached Platonic idealism not in terms 
of metaphysical objectivity but in terms of epistemic conditionality: ac-
cording to Lotze, Plato never really conceived of his ideas as separate enti-
ties or Aristotelian forms embedded in worldly realities; rather, they were 
epistemic principles that endowed the appearing reality its truthfulness 
and meaningfulness.111 Thus, according to Lotze, Plato understood the 
concept of eidos as a category of validity (Geltung) rather than one of being: 
instead of separate “things”, ideas were to be understood as fundamental 
prerequisites demarcating what is required for something to appear as real 
and true in the first place. The idea of a chair, for instance, was not to be 
conceived of in terms of the supratemporal archetype of a chair but as 
a collection of stipulations which allow us to consider a certain object a 
chair. Lotze claimed that because the Greek language lacked an expression 
for non-being Plato had to refer to these conditions by the term eidos.112
  As Husserl put it in his 1919/20 series of lectures, Plato’s theory of 
eidos was to be considered the first “discovery of the [domain of] a priori”113 
– the first unfolding of that field of ideal meanings which structure our 
actual experience by giving it an intelligible form. Recall that in the Logical 
Investigations (1900–01), Husserl had already discovered that the domain 
of ideal meanings pertained to a specific mode of perceptual givenness. In-
stead of “innate ideas” or “symbolic forms” embedded in natural language, 
109 Plato, Phaedr. 247c
110 Husserl, E&U: 411. See also HuaIII: 48ff.
111 Lotze 1887: 206ff.
112 “While Plato by thus describing the Ideas, takes security for their independent valid-
ity, he has at the same time abundantly provided against the confusion of the validity thus 
implied with that wholly distinct reality of Existence which could only be ascribed to a 
durable thing.” Lotze 1887: 216.
113 F I 40/58b
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ideal meanings were to be understood on the basis of a specific categori-
cal intuition (kategoriale Anschauung) which transcends mere sense data 
and presents objects and things as something.114 We do not merely sense a 
piece of paper and its qualities (for instance, its whiteness, coarseness) but 
we perceive it as white or coarse. From a phenomenological standpoint, 
as Husserl emphasized in Ideas, the concept of “a priori” was potentially 
misleading, for it seemed to refer to the idea of givenness prior to experi-
ence.115 All forms of ideality, Husserl claimed, have their foundation in the 
concrete experience of the lifeworld – to be more precise, in the associa-
tive functions of consciousness. It is the task and potential of philosophical 
reflection to present these idealities “purified” from their empirical con-
tingencies and variations. In this regard, the domain of phenomenological 
apriority was divided into the study of the universal structures of pure 
consciousness and a wide variety of “regional eidetics” delineating the dif-
ferent types and modalities of objective ideality.
  According to Husserl, we already discover this division in Plato. In 
addition to the “ontology of nature in itself ” – the description of ideal 
forms of nature – Platonic idealism delineated “the a priori methodol-
ogy of a possible knowledge of nature in itself ”116, that is, the description 
of those logical structures that endow the manifest reality its sense and 
validity. To put it in phenomenological terms, the philosophical eidos did 
not merely delineate the domain of being; it also delineated the domain 
evidence, in that it aimed to articulate those ideal structures of experience 
(or “givenness”) on the basis of which we regard something as true and 
valid. Nevertheless, it was also here that Plato’s discovery fell short. In 
Husserl’s view, what Plato (and the Greeks in general) “failed” to disclose 
was the essential relationship between those two domains of ideality – of 
nature and experience – and thus they were unable to articulate the idea 
of transcendental correlation. “Antiquity does not yet behold the great 
problem of subjectivity as the functioning-accomplishing subjectivity of 
consciousness,”117 Husserl wrote, and it was exactly for this reason that 
114 See e.g HuaXIX/2: 657.
115 HuaIII: 8–9. Already in this context, Husserl employed the notion of eidos to describe 
the phenomenological idea of eidetic givenness as distinct from the “Kantian” concept of 
ideality, described with the notion of Wesen. Cf. HuaXXVII: 13
116 HuaVI: 283.
117 “Das Altertum erschaut noch nicht das große Problem der Subjektivität als fungierend 
leistender Bewußtseinssubjektivität […]” HuaXXVII: 228.
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Platonic (or Aristotelian) idealism did not amount to a general theory of 
eidetic intuition.118 For this reason, instead of developing a general theory 
of the lifeworld as the universal correlate of experience, the Greek ontol-
ogy of nature unfolded as a form of cosmology, i.e., theoretical consider-
ation of the fundamental causes, origins or elements of manifest reality. 
  Be that as it may, the grandeur of Plato’s discovery surpassed the per-
haps necessary one-sidedness of his theory. Through the unfolding of the 
domain of ideas, Plato was able to approach the general question of the 
conditions of knowledge as such – the field of absolute norms that serve as 
the general index for all empirical truths:
Platonic idealism, through the fully conscious discovery of the 
“idea” and of approximation, opened up the path of logical think-
ing, the “logical” science, the rational science. Ideas were taken as 
archetypes in which everything singular participates more or less 
“ideally,” which everything approaches, which everything realizes 
more or less fully; the ideal truths belonging to the ideas were 
taken as the absolute norms for all empirical truths.119
According to Husserl, Plato’s archetypical notion of ideas was embed-
ded, above all, in mathematical and geometrical practices.120 As is often 
emphasized, for the Greeks of the Classical era, mathematics did not yet 
constitute a unified science; rather, it referred to a number investigations 
dealing with some of the fundamental and most permanent characteris-
tics of manifest reality.121 In addition to arithmetic and geometry – the 
sciences of quantity and the properties of space – the field of mathemat-
ics also included music, by dealing with harmonic ratios, and astronomy, 
118 As Husserl put it in Crisis, Descartes was the first to genuinely articulate the motive of 
transcendental correlation: “What the modern period calls the theory of the understand-
ing or of reason – in the pregnant sense “critique of reason,” transcendental problemat-
ics – has the roots of its meaning in the Cartesian Meditations. The ancient world was not 
acquainted with this sort of thing, since the Cartesian epoche and its ego were unknown.” 
HuaVI: 83.
119 “Der platonische Idealismus brach durch die voll bewußte Entdeckung der „Idee” und 
der Approximation die Bahn des logischen Denkens, der „logischen”  Wissenschaft, der ra-
tionalen. Ideen wurden gefaßt als Urbilder, an denen alles Singuläre Anteil hat, mehr oder 
minder “ideal” denen es sich annähert, die es mehr oder minder voll realisiert, die zu den 
Ideen gehörigen reinen Ideenwahrheiten als die absoluten Normen für alle empirischen 
Wahrheiten.” HuaVI: 291.
120 This point is discussed especially in F I 40/57ff. Cf. HuaVI: 18; HuaXXV: 132ff.
121 See e.g. Liddell & Scott, LSJ, 1072.
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which modeled unchangeable and eternal celestial motion.122 At least 
Plato and Xenophon identified these fields of investigation with philoso-
phy proper: since the mathematical sciences seemed to correspond with 
the general appreciation of constancy inherent to Greek ontology, they 
served as important clues for the problems of permanence and alteration 
posed by many of the pre-Socratic thinkers. As Plato put it in the Repub-
lic: “The qualities of number appear to lead to the apprehension of truth 
(alētheian)”, for the philosopher “must rise out of the region of genera-
tion and lay hold on substance (dia tēs ousias apteon).”123 Three seeds in the 
ground may turn into three beautiful flowers – what stays the same, in this 
regard, is the notion of “threeness” itself. 
  The mere “sameness” of numbers, however, was not yet enough to 
explain the crucial significance of mathematical ideality for the formation 
of philosophical ideas. In this regard, both Plato and Husserl emphasized 
the revolutionary character of “pure geometry”, which was to be distin-
guished from what was known as “applied” geometrical practices, such 
as land surveying. What made geometry pure in this respect, was that it 
employed notions that could be conceived of separately from any empiri-
cal particularities. For instance, when land surveyors speak of a “foot” or 
a “meter”, they are is speaking of a general notion that is basically the 
same in every instantce; however, this unit must be defined in regard to 
an empirical norm (whether the Doric foot, the prototype in Paris or 
the distance travelled by light through a vacuum in 1⁄229,792,458 of a 
second. Instead, when geometers speak of a ‘triangle’ – for instance, as 
being a closed figure consisting of three line segments with the sum of the 
interior angles being 180° – they are able to do so without reference to 
any particular (empirical) triangle.
  The reason the length of the hypotenuse in relation to other sides is 
always the same is not because it conforms to an empirical norm; rather, 
it can be defined on the basis of a purely ideal relation. Thus, by replacing 
vague definitions such as “greater”, “smaller”, “more”, “less”, geometrical 
idealization opened up the sphere of exact concepts and purely ideal ratios 
such as strict “equality” or exact “relation” (as in the case of the Pythago-
rean Theorem). In other words, the geometer was able to operate on a 
122 Aristotle, Met. III.997b
123 Plato, Rep. VII.525b
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level of inspection that was free of all ties to empirical reality and with 
concepts that could be defined on purely logical terms.124 
  To follow Husserl’s conceptual distinction in Erfahrung und Urteil, in 
contrast to the mere “bound idealities” of the pre-philosophical attitude 
– idealities that “carry reality with them and hence belong to the real 
world” – philosophy projected a completely new field of “free idealities” 
that could be conceived of without reference to individual objects.125 Thus 
philosophy “deterritorialized” not only the seemingly self-evident nature 
of one’s own homeworld but the notion of ideality in general. “Free ideali-
ties”, Husserl wrote, “are not bound to territory, rather, they have their 
territory in the totality of the universe and in every possible universe.”126 
For this reason it is understandable that Plato refused to locate ideali-
ties in the sphere of perception (aisthēsis) – for they are invisible (aides) 
– and argued that they could only be reached thourgh discursive cognition 
(dianoia).127 In contrast to the universal idealities of the mythical world-
view – divine forces that governed the whole universe – philosophical 
idealities represented a completely new type of universality that, as Hus-
serl put it in Ideas I, was “strict” and absolutely “unconditional”.128 In other 
words, they are omnispatial and omnitemporal, true and valid in all imag-
inable circumstances.
  Although mathematical-geometrical ideality provided the single most 
important paradigm for philosophical a priority, the scope of philosophical 
ideality was much wider. By taking its point of departure from the specific 
purity and exactness that characterized mathematical ideas, philosophy dis-
closed the field of absolute validities that provide the absolute norms for all 
particular truths. For Husserl, the “tremendous discovery” of Plato was that
124 HuaXXVII: 17ff.
125 Husserl, E&U: §65. See also HuaXXXIX: 298ff.
126 Ibid.
127 Plato, Phaedo 79a. However, it should be instantly acknowledged that the philosophi-
cal concept of eidos articulated by Plato was a result of a peculiar transformation of sense. 
Already the lifeworld of the pre-philosophical culture was embedded with spiritual struc-
tures that distinguished themselves from the simple reality of everyday objects. Herodotus 
tells a tale of Candaules of Lydia, who unashamedly proud of his wife’s appearance (eidos), 
invites his favorite bodyguard Gyges to take a look at her naked body. Gyges declines this 
wish on the grounds of his bashfulness, for “when a woman’s clothes come off, she dispens-
es with her modesty” – what sustains the eidos of Candaules’ wife is exactly that which goes 
beyond the simple perceptual act, the surplus of experience. See Herodotus, Hist. 1.8.
128 HuaIII: 18.
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[…] he beheld that the sense of arithmetic and geometric proposi-
tions required, that their concepts should be conceived in clear 
evidence as pure, supraempirical concepts. Then, what the con-
cepts expressed that there are ideas in completely similar sense as 
there are normative ideas in the ethical, practical or logical sphere. 
The scientific surveyor may draw his characters in the sand or on 
the blackboard, but when he speaks of lines, planes, circles, etc. 
speaks, he means from the start, when he understands himself an 
“exact”, a “pure” the exhibit in any experience and therefore can 
not be seen from her is.129
In addition to the pure and exact idealities that we find in geometry and 
logic, philosophy disclosed the field of absolute norms that encompassed 
the totality of the spiritual world – ideals that extend from the theoretical 
sphere to the practical and ethical. In this regard, philosophy revealed what 
Husserl called the all-encompassing “mathesis of spirit and of humanity”130, 
i.e., it was the investigation of those forms and relations of idealities that 
regulate the world of cultural objectivities, of community and its different 
forms of co-operation. Concepts such as “human being”, “state”, or even 
“friendship” were projected as pure, absolute ideas that could be grasped 
in their essential features – features that transcended their particular in-
stantiations. At the same time, however, those ideal forms transcended the 
mere status of a descriptive category by becoming normative principles of 
regulation delineating the “best possible” human being, state and friendship. 
This transition, which Hume later considered one of the most common 
fallacies of natural thought, was to become one of the most difficult and 
controversial problems of Husserl’s phenomenology.
  In his 1906/07 lectures on logic and epistemology, Husserl had al-
ready spoken of the idea of the “normative turn” (normative  Wendung) 
characteristic of logical propositions.131 What this notion entailed was the 
129 “Hier machte Platon eine gewaltige Ent deckung. Er erschaute, dass der Sinn der arith-
metischen und geometrischen Sätze dazu aufforderte, ihre Begriffe in nüchterner Evidenz 
als reine, überempirische Begriffe zu nehmen, und dass was die Begriffe dann ausdrückten, 
Ideen seien in einem ganz ähnlichen Sinne, wie sie sich als normative Ideen der ethisch-
praktischen oder der logischen Sphäre darbieten. Der wissenschaftliche Geometer mag 
seine Figuren in den Sand oder auf die Tafel zeichnen, aber wenn er von Geraden, Ebenen, 
Kreisen etc. spricht, so meint er von vornherein, wenn er sich selbst versteht, ein „Exak-
tes“, ein „Reines“, das in keiner Erfahrung aufzuweisen und daher auch nicht aus ihr zu 
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insight that theoretical knowledge had an essentially binding character: as 
soon as we become acquainted with certain logical propositions (e.g., a 
classical Aristotelian syllogism), they become normative in the sense that 
they begin to direct the practical activity of our thinking. In this regard, 
even deductive Aristotelian syllogisms are fundamentally practical. They 
do not merely describe the basic structures of reasoning or the natural 
language; rather, they prescribe the general conditions of “good” reasoning. 
  It was exactly this twofold relationship between the domains of theory 
and praxis that Husserl considered essential in Plato’s thought. Accord-
ing to Husserl, Plato did not conceive of theoretical and practical ide-
als as two distinct domains; instead, they were ultimately bound to one 
another under the guidance of the single idea of normativity. This insight, 
which is perhaps most visible in Plato’s dialogues of the so-called “middle 
period”, including Phaedrus, Symposium, and, above all, the Republic, was 
chiefly demonstrated by the central role given to the “idea of the good” 
(idea tou agathou) as the ultimate point of reference for all reality. As Plato 
put it in the sixth book of the Republic, “the objects of knowledge not only 
receive from the presence of the good their being known, but their very 
existence and essence (to einai kai to tēn ousian) is derived to them from 
it.” However, “the good itself is not essence but still transcends essence in 
dignity and surpassing power.”132 Thus, instead of a single essence, the idea 
of the good illuminates the whole universe of ideas and structures it into 
a normatively comprehensible totality.133 For this reason, theoretical ideas 
are also “good” and worth striving for – i.e., as comprehend them is to 
connect with the true and “waking” character of human rationality.
  What he considered as the key element of this Platonic legacy was 
the insistence that philosophical activity has a fundamentally practical un-
derpinning. Despite its rejection of the practical motives of the natural 
attitude, theoretical cognition – and the novel mode of ideality implied 
within it – was to be understood as nothing less than a “function of practi-
cal reason.”134 To put it conversely, all genuinely ethical striving necessar-
ily includes within itself the motive of theoretical knowledge, i.e., the 
striving to know and disclose the “best possible” in its absolutely binding 
132 Plato, Rep. 509b.
133 Here, the comparison to “sun” in Rep. 508a is of special importance. On the Platonic 
connection, see also Steinbock 1994: 454.
134 HuaVIII: 201.
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character. Furthermore, in this regard, Husserl emphasized that it was 
precisely the “intellect” that was “the servant of the will”.135 Even theoretical 
cognition can be fully appreciated in the total horizon of self-responsibili-
ty which ultimately provides the common foundation for both theoretical 
and practical cognition.
  Thus, despite this acknowledgement of the normative dimension of 
Plato’s philosophy, Husserl also attempted to articulate the “normative 
turn” from a less metaphysical angle. As Husserl emphasized in his lecture 
on ethics, ethical evaluation relies on its own type of evidence, which can-
not be simply returned to theoretical cognition (See also Ch. 1.4). Thus, 
it was the task of phenomenology to articulate itself in the form of a novel 
“synthesis of theory and praxis”136 – a synthesis that was to rectify the char-
acteristically modern (i.e., post-Galilean) division between “objective” 
theory and “subjective” praxis. (As I will argue in part 4, this rectification 
entailed a novel approach to the temporal aspects of this synthesis).
  Not all idealities, however, could be grasped in the manner of mathe-
matical idealities. In contrast to the exact idealities of geometry, arithmetics 
and logics, which could be grasped once and for all, the spiritual idealities 
characteristic of the lifeworld were essentially incomplete in character. 
The idea of a “human being” or a “state”, Husserl argued, was projected as 
a kind of limit-value or “ideal pole” that could only be approached gradu-
ally. For instance, the full sense of the idea of “human being” could only be 
approached through partial definitions, like “two-legged mammal” or “ra-
tional animal”; however, these definitions were to be understood merely 
as partial outlines of the complete idea or “essence” of a human being. 
As Husserl insisted, Plato did not merely claim his concept of theory to 
be the disclosure of a novel sphere of ideas; rather, it was “a completely 
new type of universal world-view, a world-philosophy that we have char-
acterized as teleological idealism.”137 Here, what Husserl means with the 
specific teleological structure of idealism is not that all beings naturally 
strive towards their ideal form (what we might call “Aristotelian” teleo-
135 Ibid.
136 HuaVI: 327.
137 “Es ist also nicht ein zufälliger, sondern not wendiger Zusammenhang, der sich in der 
historischen Tatsache ausspricht, dass Platon nicht nur der Entdecker der Idee <ist>, son-
dern in eins damit der Entdecker jenes neuen Typus universeller Weltanschauung, Weltphi-
losophie, den wir als teleologischen Idealismus bezeichnet haben.” F I 40/43a. My italics.
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logy). Rather, what this expression entails is that through the emergence 
pure idealities, philosophy was the first to disclose the field of perpetual 
meaning-creation in the pursuit of absolute ideals. Instead of merely be-
ing a multitude of particular conceptions (doxai), philosophy was able to 
institute a permanent framework for their accumulation and evaluation. 
This is what the Greeks called science, epistēmē (from the concepts epi and 
histemi, literally “to place upon”), the structural principle for the accretion 
of human knowledge in the form of axioms and propositions.138 
  Thus, from a generative perspective, the emergence of theoretical 
ideality brought about not only a new class of cultural objects but also a 
completely new horizon of production.  In contrast to the kinds of worldly 
practices where different projects and goals follow one another in tem-
poral succession – the raising of a child, the building of a pyramid or the 
appeasement of gods – the theoretical attitude gave birth to a class of ideal 
goals that can never be fully attained in concrete action. Conceived of as a 
universal task that deals with the totality of beings, philosophy discloses an 
area of pure idealities and infinite horizons where each every single truth 
is only given a relative status in respect to the complete task. Particu-
lar scientific truths were understood as a partial grasp of the all-embrac-
ing horizon, as a transitional phase on the way towards the full sense of 
epistēmē. The end of philosophy is something that can never be completely 
reached, for as Husserl says, the full sense of truth always functions as an 
“infinitely distant point”139 – as an ever retreating limit. Every philosophi-
cal system or conceptualization is a finite grasp of the full sense of being, 
“a more or less successful attempt to realize the guiding idea of the infinity 
and the totality of truths”.140 
Science, accordingly, signifies the idea of infinity of tasks, of which 
at any time a finite number have been disposed of and are retained as 
138 Although we are mostly familiar with the notion of axiom from mathematical context – 
especially from the Euclidean systematization of geometry – the Greek notion of scientific 
axiōma signified primarily a self-evident principle that can be discovered in all branches of 
investigation. Aristotle, for one, argued “all the demonstrative sciences employ axioms” 
Arist.Metaph.997a7, 1005b33 – although he also registers the more limited meaning.
139 HuaVI: 324.
140 “Die jeweils historisch wirkliche Philcsophie ist der mehr oder minder gelungene Ver-
such, die leitende Idee der Unendlichkeit und dabei sogar Allheit der Wahrheiten zu ver-
wirklichen.” HuaVI, 338. “Ultimately”, writes Husserl in The Origin of Geometry, “objective, 
absolutely firm knowledge of truth is an infinite idea.” HuaVI, 373. 
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persisting validities. These make up at the same time the fund of 
premises for an infinite horizon of tasks as the unity of one all-
encompassing task.141
Thus, we can observe how, from the perspective of generativity, the emer-
gence of scientific ideality signified a crucial transition in the transmission 
of cultural objectivities. In contrast to the typical objects of everyday life 
– tools, material goods, etc. – specifically theoretical or scientific accom-
plishments distinguished themselves, first of all, by their unique temporal-
ity. Unlike the accomplishments of everyday practices, the products of 
theory were not exhausted in the course of worldly time; rather, they 
were able to surpass the perishability of the real world. In other words, 
theory opened up a completely new level in the intergenerational consti-
tution of meaning which was able to remain unchanged despite the his-
torical and cultural circumstances, for the theoretical attitude “produces 
in any number of acts of production by one person or any number of 
persons something identically the same, identical in sense and validity.”142 
Historical periodization was no longer conceived of an obstacle to the 
identical transmission of sense, because the universal tradition of philoso-
phy was able to function as the absolute plane of perpetual creation of 
sense. This was what Husserl called the revolutionary effect of science and 
philosophy:
Scientific culture under the guidance of ideas of infinity means, 
then, a revolutionization [Revolutionierung] of the whole culture, 
a revolutionization in the very manner in which humanity creates 
culture.143
This revolution is perhaps best understood through Husserl’s repeated defi-
nition of philosophy as an “infinite task” (unendliche Aufgabe), a concept that 
141 “Wissenschaft bezeichnet also die Idee einer Unendlichkeit von Aufgaben, von denen 
jederzeit eine Endlichkeit schon erledigt und als bleibende Geltung aufbewahrt ist. Diese 
bildet zugleich den Fond von Prämissen für einen unendlichen Aufgabenhorizont als Ein-
heit einer allumgreifenden Aufgabe.” HuaVI, 323–324.HuaVI: 323–324. Buckley (1998) 
emphasizes also the significance of Husserl’s term in the University of Göttingen (1901–
1916) – where he worked with a number of mathematicians – for his idea of scientific 
community as a personality of a higher order.
142 HuaVI: 323.
143 “Wissenschaftliche Kultur unter Ideen der Unendlichkeit bedeutet also eine Revo-
lutionierung der gesamten Kultur, eine Revolutionierung in der ganzen Weise des Men-
schentums als kulturschaffenden.” HuaVI: 325. Translation modified. On this point see also 
Schuhmann 1988: 159ff.
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Husserl adopted from the neo-Kantians.144 Instead of a simple “doctrine” 
(Lehre) that could be passed on to new generations, philosophy introduced 
the idea of cultural accomplishment in the form of a formal project that 
could not be simply rendered in the form of substantive content. Philoso-
phy, which was itself born out of the relativization of all traditions, did 
not simply replace the traditionality of the pre-philosophical world by in-
stituting a new tradition; rather, it replaced the very idea of traditionality 
with teleological directedness, or, with a new “teleological sense” (Zwecksinn) 
which remains fundamentally identical despite historical variation.145 It 
found its basic inspiration not from common memory but from the collec-
tive commitment to the infinite task of philosophy – from the shared “love 
of ideas” (Ideenliebe) on the basis of the all-embracing horizon. Through the 
idealization of the category of telos, philosophy was able to embark upon 
a completely new type of cultural project which could be preserved un-
changed in the course of historical time. Unlike other branches of culture, 
such as art, literature, agriculture, that allow themselves to be classified 
according to their historical and territorial typicalities (Greek sculpture, 
modern literature etc.), philosophy produced a domain of creative work 
which was absolutely singular.146 Although the concrete development of 
philosophy changes the possibilities of philosophical thinking, our striving, 
as such, is fundamentally the same as that of Plato and Aristotle. 
  The intrinsic corollary of this singularity was of course the essential 
sharedness of philosophical accomplishments. Although theoretical insights 
can be classified according to their origin, as in the case of the Pythago-
rean Theorem, due to their purely ideal character, the products of theory 
cannot be possessed by anyone.147 Thus, it is understandable that when 
speaking about the arrangement of property in the ideal state of the Re-
public, Plato made Socrates quote the old proverb “friends (philoi) possess 
144 This connection is entertained already in the 1907 Ding und Raum lectures: neo-Kan-
tians employed this notion to emphasize the open character of the “noumenal” definitions 
of a being, i.e., the “thing in itself ”. See HuaXVI: 134. This connection has also been il-
lustrated by Gasché 2009: 354. On the later use of the “infinite task” as a defining fea-
ture of philosophy, see especially HuaVI, 72, 324, 336ff.; Hua VII: 3; HuaVIII: 216–217; 
HuaXXIX: 408, 421.
145 HuaXXIX: 34.
146 As Husserl further emphasized, whereas the sophist movements could still speak 
of philosophies in the plural, for the classical period no such thing was possible. See 
HuaXXIX: 281, 378ff.
147 I am excluding here the questions of contemporary patent legislation.
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everything in common”148 – or as he continued in Laws, the best possible 
state would indeed be that of “friends” (philoi) who have everything in 
common, so that “even things naturally private [would] become in a way 
communized.”149 In one of his Kaizo essays, Husserl actually described the 
philosophical community as fundamentally “communistic”.150 Theory, as a 
form of production, was not only critical towards all “imperialistic” con-
stellations based on a central will; it also revealed a field of accomplish-
ments that was common to all.151 
  Thus, we can see how philosophy, correlatively to the new horizon of 
production, also signified a fundamental transition in the idea of commu-
nity as such. Not only did the theoretical motive separate the idea ratio-
nality from its empirical contours, but it was also able to formulate a no-
tion of interpersonal association that was indifferent towards all particular 
divisions – ethnic, cultural, and political. To put it succinctly, philosophy 
idealized the very notion of community as such: it delineated an idea of a human 
collective that was independent of any particular group of people, be they 
“friend [or] enemy, Greek or barbarian, child of God’s people or child of 
God-hostile people.”152 This “supraspatial and supratemporal sociality”153 
of the scientific community gave rise to the completely new teleological 
idea of the universal community. Furthermore, it was universal in a new, 
emphatic sense: it was potentially inclusive of all rational beings, includ-
ing those who had yet to be born. In contrast to “political” communities, 
which relied on the difference between friend and enemy, the philosophi-
cal community knew only friends (philoi). Its defining characteristic was 
a fundamental openness towards not only towards all living human beings 
but also towards future generations:
Through individual personalities like Thales, there arises thus a new 
humanity: men who [live] the philosophical life, who create phi-
losophy in the manner of a vocation as a new sort of cultural con-
figuration. Understandably a correspondingly new sort of commu-
148 Plato, Rep. 424a1-2.
149 Plato, Laws, 739c.
150 HuaXXVII: 90, 377.
151 This makes understandable also Husserl’s critical remarks on capitalism – a worldview 
that prevents “the unselfish dedication (Hingabe) to pure ideas”. See Husserl’s letter to 
Arnold Metzger, HuaXXV: xxx.
152 “[…] aus jedem Kulturkreis, Freund und Feind, Grieche oder Barbar, Kind des Gottes-
volkes oder der Gott feindlichen Völker.” HuaXXVII: 77.
153 HuaXXIX: 395
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nalization arises. These ideal structures of theoria are concurrently 
lived through and taken over without any difficulty by others who 
reproduce the process of understanding and production. Without 
any difficulty they lead to cooperative work, mutual help through 
mutual critique. Even the outsiders, the non-philosophers, be-
come aware of this peculiar sort of activity. Through sympathetic 
understanding they either become philosophers themselves, or, if 
they are otherwise vocationally too occupied, they learn from phi-
losophers.154
Thus, the emergence of philosophy – viewed from the perspective of gen-
erativity and historicity – is best understood as a twofold critique of limits.155 
First of all, through the infinite horizon of pure idealities, philosophy gave 
birth to the insistence that the achievable limits of practical activity, which 
constantly defined the productive horizon of the pre-philosophical world, 
be transcended. In contrast to what Husserl called the “first historicity” 
(erste Historizität) that was characteristic of the pre-philosophical world, 
philosophy unfolded as “an advancing transformation in the form of a new 
type of historical development”, i.e., a unique form of “unlimited” his-
toricity which cannot be exhausted in the course of worldly time.156 By 
envisaging a domain of absolute ideals, philosophy was able to overcome 
the finite temporality of pre-philosophical praxis. Secondly, by articulat-
ing itself in the form of absolute ideas, philosophy strengthened the inher-
ent deconstruction of territorial limits already latent in the critique of 
154 “In vereinzelten Persönlichkeiten, wie Thales etc., erwächst damit ein neues Menschen-
tum; Menschen, die das philosophische Leben, Philosophie als eine neuartige Kulturgestalt 
berufsmäßig schaffen. Begreiflicherweise erwächst alsbald eine entsprechend neuartige 
Vergemeinschaftung. Diese idealen Gebilde der Theoria sind ohne weiteres im Nachver-
stehen und Nacherzeugen mitgelebt und mitübernommen. Ohne weiteres führen sie zum 
Miteinanderarbeiten, sich wechselseitig durch Kritik Helfen. Auch die Außenstehenden, 
die Nichtphilosophen, werden aufmerksam auf das sonderliche Tun und Treiben. Nachver-
stehend werden sie entweder nun selbst zu Philosophen oder, wenn sie sonst berufsmäßig 
zu sehr gebunden sind, zu Mitlernenden.” HuaVI: 332–333. Translation modified.
155 I am referring here to the twofold characterization of the concept of limit (peras) in 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics V.17 – which is also evident in many of the Indo-European lan-
guages. According to him, “limit” denotes “the furthest part of each thing and the first 
point outside which no part of a thing can be found,” but it can also mean “the end [telos] 
of each thing.” Thus limits do not confine only concrete boundaries (horos), but they also 
structure the purposeful character of natural entities and human activities for “the reason-
able man, at least, always acts for a purpose, and this is a limit; for the end is a limit” (Met. 
II, 994b14–16). See Miettinen 2010.
156 HuaVI: 323. On the notion of “first historicity” (erste Historizität), see HuaVI: 326, 
502ff.; HuaXXIX: 40–41. 
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mythology. Philosophy, inspired by the confrontation between home and 
alien, was able to provide the idea of the “first objective world”, standing 
free from myths and sable on the infinite horizon of ideal truths. Along-
side the ground of identification shared by all communities – the world 
of “universal earth ground” and sky – there emerged the novel idea of an 
“infinitely distant” cultural world.157 This world – the world of philosophi-
cal ideality – emerged as a unique form of generativity different in kind 
from the natural traditionality of cultures, a generativity that resisted all 
traditional demarcations between home and alien: 
Unlike all other cultural works, philosophy is not a movement of 
interest which is bound to the soil of the national tradition. Aliens, 
too, learn to understand it and generally take part in the immense 
cultural transformation which radiates out from philosophy. […] 
philosophy, which has grown up out of the universal critical attitude 
toward anything and everything pre-given in the tradition, is not 
inhibited in its spread by any national boundaries (Schranken).158
It is exactly here that we discover the key insight into the “absolute sense” 
of European universalism. Philosophy, through the infinite horizon of 
ideal truths, was able to articulate itself in the new forms of historicity 
and generativity. By understanding itself in regard to a horizon of produc-
tion which is absolutely singular, philosophy was able to project the idea 
of universal historicity – a temporal horizon which is absolutely singular 
and which is not exhausted in the course of worldly time. On the basis of 
the new idea of sharedness, philosophy gave rise to a novel form of ter-
ritorial universalism that was willing to overcome all generative divisions 
between home and alien, i.e., it was a movement that was willing to tran-
scend all cultural limits. To borrow a phrase coined by Novalis, philosophy 
was born out of a sense of homesickness, “the desire to be everywhere at 
home.”159 In Husserl’s view, it is exactly this desire that constitutes the core 
of the spiritual form of Europe.
157 HuaXXVII: 241. 
158 “Anders als alle anderen Kulturwerke ist sie keine an den Boden der nationalen Tra-
dition gebundene Interessenbewegung. Auch Fremd-Nationale lernen nachverstehen und 
nehmen überhaupt Anteil an der gewaltigen Kulturverwandlung, die von der Philosophie 
ausstrahlt. […] die Philosophie, aus universaler kritischer Einstellung gegen alle und 
jede traditionale Vorgegebenheit erwachsen, in ihrer Ausbreitung durch keine nationalen 
Schranken gehemmt ist.” (HuaVI: 333–35)
159 “Die Philosophie ist eigentlich Heimweh—Trieb überall zu Hause zu sein.” Novalis 
1993: 434 (fr. no. 857).
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  It should be emphasized that what Husserl described here as the birth 
of the philosophical “personality of a higher order” – the community of 
theory and its specific mode of generativity – was first and foremost an 
ideal. Husserl was well aware that the emergence of philosophical com-
munities did not instantly transform the cultural landscape of Greek city-
states – in reality, the ideal structures of theory were not adopted without 
difficulty nor did outsiders participate in the philosophical community 
with purely “sympathetic understanding”. Rather, as Husserl himself also 
admitted, the community of theory was subjected to all sorts of empiri-
cal obstacles, beginning with its clash with traditional religiosity and the 
suspicious attitude of political power. Philosophical communities were 
forced to do battle with “conservatives [who were] satisfied with tradition” 
– a battle that also extended to the sphere of political power.160 As the trial 
of Socrates and Plato’s unfortunate visit to Syracuse showed, philosophy 
was often painfully forced to retreat from the light of the day.
  Again, Husserl’s focus of interest was not so much on the concrete ob-
stacles or even persecutions that the philosophical community was forced 
to endure. What he was interested in (although this interest often needs to 
be read between the lines) was the general – or should we say “structural” 
– process of meaning-transformation that philosophy ushered in within 
the overall sphere of culture. In Husserl’s view, the “revolutionary de-
velopment” that philosophy triggered within the cultural sphere was not 
brought about merely by the growing expansion of the philosophical com-
munity; rather, the emergence of the philosophical community brought 
with it a kind of reformatory interest that was reflected in different spheres 
of culture. The theoretical attitude and its novel praxis, argued Husserl, 
also created a “human posture which immediately intervenes in the whole 
remainder of practical life with all its demands and ends, the ends of the 
historical tradition in which one is brought up and which receives its valid-
ity from this source.”161 Instead of a clearly identifiable causal relationship, 
the cultural significance of philosophy appeared in the form of gradual 
transitions in many of the key ideas and activities of the social-communal 
160 HuaVI: 335.
161 “[…] menschliche Haltung, die alsbald eingreift in das ganze übrige praktische Leben, 
mit allen seinen Forderungen und Zwecken, den Zwecken der historischen Tradition, in 
die man hineinerzogen ist und die von da her gelten.” HuaVI: 334. See also HuaXXIX: 
14.
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sphere. For instance, while philosophy did not simply replace religion or 
politics, it launched a series of processes that were also reflected in the 
extra-philosophical activities and practices. This is not to say that philoso-
phy simply “became political”; in fact, the political odysseys of philosophy 
produced less than flattering results. Rather, politics and religion themselves 
became philosophical: they acquired a new sense in accordance with the in-
finite task of philosophy.
The Greeks who, in consequence to the creation of philosophy in 
its pregnant (Platonic) sense, had planted a completely new form-
idea to the European culture, whereby it took upon the overall 
character of a rational culture out of scientific rationality – or that 
philosophical culture.162
This transformation was embedded, first of all, in the novel idea of shared 
responsibility that was characteristic of the philosophical “personality of a 
higher order”. In Husserl’s view, one of the key corollaries of Plato’s ideal-
ism was that it radicalized the Socratic principles of self-responsibility and 
theoretical vocation by turning them into essentially generative notions. 
Once we take seriously the new generative sense of meaning-constitution, 
the Socratic ideal of “life according to the best possible evidence” cannot 
remain a mere individual endeavor. Rather, the absolute accountability 
of the philosopher needs to be rearticulated in the social sphere: respon-
sibility needs to be understood as a common principle. In other words, 
insofar as the philosophical community lives for the perpetual creation of 
meaning according to the infinite horizon, philosophical responsibility, in 
its fullest sense, cannot be carried by the individual – since the mode of 
production that characterizes philosophical accomplishments is commu-
nal, the notions of autonomy and responsibility must also be rendered in 
an interpersonal form.163 As each and every participant is equally respon-
sible for the common project, philosophy cannot remain a mere individual 
162 “Die Griechen sind es, die in Konsequenz der Schöpfung der Philosophie in ihrem prä-
gnanten (Platonischen) Sinn der europäischen Kultur eine allgemeine neuartige Formidee 
eingepflanzt haben, wodurch sie den allgemeinen Formcharakter einer rationalen Kultur 
aus wissenschaftlicher Rationalität oder einer philosophischen Kultur annahm.” HuaXXVII: 
84. On the notion of a “philosophical culture“, see HuaVII: 203–207; HuaXXIX: 138.
163 See, for instance, Husserl’s emphatic statement in HuaXXVII: 241 (“Autonomie ist 
nicht Sache der vereinzelten Individuen, sondern, auf dem Wege über ihre Nation, der 
Menschheit.”).
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undertaking – it must be understood as the activity of a personality of a 
higher order. As Husserl put it in an appendix to Crisis:
It may be, here, that this ruling end [of philosophy and science] 
is ultimately a communal end, i.e., a personal life-task which is 
a partial task (if one can speak of a “part” in such a case) within 
a communal task, so that the individual personal undertaking of 
work functions concurrently, and consciously so for each of the 
participants, in a communal undertaking.164
This is not to say, however, that philosophy, and its novel idea of collec-
tive responsibility extending to the infinite horizon of future generations, 
simply did away with personal responsibility. Both Plato and Aristotle em-
phasized the essential individuality and self-sufficiency (Gr. autarkeia) of 
philosophical contemplation, which ultimately relies on a personal rela-
tionship with the domain of theoretical truth.165 Rather, as Husserl put it, 
the idea of collective responsibility was understood as the “higher level” 
of philosophical rationality, which, nevertheless, had its necessary founda-
tion in the responsibility of the individual. To put it in the language already 
employed in the second part of this work, this responsibility was to be 
understood as the genuine “concretization” of the first-person perspec-
tive. Furthermore, it was exactly through this fundamentally horizontal 
responsibility that philosophy was able to introduce a completely new “di-
vision of labor”, one, which relied on the essential interchangeability of 
particular responsibilities. What has been proved as true and valid, others 
can confirm as equally true and valid. Through this division, the philo-
sophical community is able to develop a responsibility of a higher order 
– a responsibility that is not merely “the sport of the individual” (Sport der 
Einzelperson) but which finds its genuine essence only in the overall hori-
zon of generativity.166
  The obverse of the shared responsibility of the philosophical com-
munity was of course the common task of culturally examining philo-
164 “Hierbei mag es sein, daß dieser regierende Zweck letztlich ein Gemeinschaftszweck 
ist, d.i. personale Lebensaufgabe, Teilaufgabe (wenn man da von Teil sprechen kann) einer 
Gemeinschaftsaufgabe ist, der einzelne personale Arbeitsbetrieb mitfungierend ist, und 
bewußtseinsmäßig, für jeden der „Teilhaber“ in einem Gemeinschaftsbetrieb.“ HuaVI: 
459. Cf. HuaXXIX: 393
165 See e.g. Aristotle, E.N. 1177a17ff.
166 HuaXXIX: 226.
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sophy’s own premises. Alongside the idea that philosophers should engage 
in a constant self-critique of their premises, the common horizon of the 
philosophical community broadened this principle by making it the social 
relation par excellance. Free critique, as Husserl emphasized, was not only 
a single element in the philosophical enterprise; rather, it was the single 
most important factor for constituting the peculiar unity of the philosoph-
ical community.167 What made the philosophical critique distinguishably 
“free” was that it relied, first of all, on the horizontal equality of the parties 
involved: while accession to philosophical ideas is solely dependent on the 
capacity for universal reason, no single party can claim to have natural ad-
vantage. In other words, philosophical critique is conducted free from the 
burden of tradition: philosophy is a pursuit in which every single human 
being is essentially equal. Furthermore, this critique is also free in terms 
of its scope, for it concerns “all life and all life-goals, all cultural products 
and systems that have already arisen out of the life of man”.168 It con-
cerns not only the present life-form but also that generative background 
of “presuppositions” which provides the present moment with its specific 
character. This is exactly what Husserl calls the “peculiar universality” of 
the critical stance of the philosophizing individual, i.e., “his resolve not 
to accept unquestioningly any pre-given opinion or tradition so that he 
can inquire, in respect to the whole traditionally pre-given universe, after 
what is true in itself, an ideality.”169 For philosophical culture, tradition as 
such carries no particular weight; it functions only as the implicit back-
ground of the critical task of philosophy. 
  This insight was also highlighted by the significant transformation that 
Greek philosophy brought about in the most essential social activity of hu-
man beings – language. In its pursuit of unattainable, pure idealities, phi-
losophy needed to admit that human communication, inextricably bound 
as it is to material contingency, can never fully exhaust the domain of these 
idealities. In other words, philosophy broke the simple union between 
things and words, a fact that was demonstrated by the emphasis that both 
167 HuaVI: 336.
168 “[…] der universalen Kritik alles Lebens und aller Lebensziele, aller aus dem Leben der 
Menschheit schon erwachsenen Kulturgebilde und Kultursysteme […].“ HuaVI: 329.
169 “[…] die eigentümliche Universalität der kritischen Haltung, die entschlossen ist, kei-
ne vorgegebene Meinung, keine Tradition fraglos hinzunehmen, um sogleich für das ganze 
traditionell vorgegebene Universum nach dem an sich Wahren, einer Idealität, zu fragen.“ 
HuaVI: 333.
— 287 —
3.3 Community of Theory and the Idea of Rational Culture
Plato and Aristotle placed on the symbolic character of (human) language. 
However, to say that language employs different written symbols does not 
merely entail that it functions through “signs”, or that it is always backed 
up by a certain material dimension of “speech” or “text”. What the Greek 
term symbolon underlined was also the idea that human expression relies 
on a certain contingency, that the relationship between a word and a thing 
is that of “throwing-together” (syn + ballein); i.e., it is fundamentally co-
incidental and context-bound. Words do not emerge naturally (fysei), but 
they have their origin in human sociality – a point that was confirmed 
by Aristotle’s On Interpretation, which argued that human logos derives its 
sense through common “social agreement” – kata synthēkēn – and not be-
cause it embodies a natural reference to reality (an argument ridiculed in 
Plato’s Cratylus).170 
  Thus, we can say that philosophy had a twofold relation to language. 
On the one hand, in its pursuit of pure idealities, philosophy needed to 
escape the social and material contingency of human logos – the “shad-
ows of the artificial objects” (tōn skeuastōn skias) of the cave, as Plato put 
it in the Republic.171 For this purpose, it found a safe haven in the fac-
ulty of nous, “pure intelligence”, free of all ties to the discursive struc-
tures of human cognition. For this reason, Plato considered nous the im-
mortal part of the soul, which, as opposed to our sense faculties, could 
grasp “self-subsisting ideas” in their existence.172 Aristotle, perhaps even 
more strongly, made nous the central faculty of his scientific method, 
the way of grasping the purely intuitive insights of manifest reality.173 
On the other hand, philosophy could not completely do away with lan-
guage, for it needed to return to the social sphere in order to make its 
discoveries understandable. Hence, for the philosopher, argues Plato, 
“words are the greatest instrument” (logoi de toutou malista organon), for it 
is only through linguistic communication that philosophy can execute its 
primary purpose in the communal sphere.174 For this reason, Plato even 
went so far as to call the philosopher a “lover of logos” (philologos), the 
170 Aristotle, De int. 16a9
171 Plato, Rep. 515c.
172 Plato, Tim. 51d.
173 See, e.g. Aristotle, E. N. VI, 2. 1139a18-29; E. N. VI, 11. 1143a35-b5
174 Plato, Rep. 582d.
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caretaker of that faculty which binds human beings to one another.175
  Of course, the ideas of free communication and critique were not yet 
enough to explain the transformatory process that philosophy triggered 
in the wider sphere of culture. Philosophy needed to acquire a medium 
to bridge the gap between the philosophical and non-philosophical com-
munity – a medium that would displace the seemingly self-evident culture 
of traditionality and also institute the new critical spirit of the theoretical 
attitude in other spheres of culture. For this purpose, philosophy utilized 
the central social practice for elevating human beings to the common life, 
i.e., the practice of education (Bildung). “[P]hilosophy spreads in a twofold 
manner,” Husserl wrote, “as a broadening vocational community of phi-
losophers and as the concurrently broadening community movement of 
education.”176 This movement, which both Plato and Aristotle called paid-
eia (“education”, but also “cultivation”), was seen as an integral part of the 
philosophical enterprise, without which philosophy would remain a mere 
esoteric practice. 
  Although both Plato and Aristotle took advantage of the pre-philo-
sophical paideia, philosophy did not simply replicate the existing institu-
tions of education; instead, it radically challenged some of their funda-
mental presuppositions. In contrast to the very crude idea of “education” 
as the transplantation of different views or cultural practices, philosophi-
cal paideia was to be understood, first and foremost, in connection with 
the theoretical attitude’s critical stance towards tradition.177 Instead of 
being a “technical” virtue characteristic of other forms of worldly prax-
is, education was understood, first of all, in connection to philosophi-
cal skepticism’s critical approach to tradition. Paideia became not only a 
matter of acquiring knowledge but also of renouncing it – it articulated 
itself in the new idea of personal autonomy characteristic of scientific evi-
dence. Moreover, instead of a simple doctrine, paideia was understood in 
connection to the idea of human capacities and their development. This 
sense – already present in the popular sophistical conception of paideia as 
the development of rhetorical-humanistic virtues (aretai) – was to cover 
175 Plato, Rep. 582e.
176 “So breitet sich die Philosophie in doppelter Weise aus, als sich weitende Berufsge-
meinschaft der Philosophen und als eine sich mitweitende Gemeinschaftsbewegung der 
Bildung.“ HuaVI: 333. Cf. HuaXXIX: 15.
177 This transformation is illuminated by Bremer 1989.
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a wide variety of human qualities from temperance to wisdom. What this 
transition entailed was that even philosophy, besides denoting a specific at-
titude, could be defined in terms of a specific “disposition” (what Aristotle 
called hexis) that could be developed and cultivated in the course of time.
  The principle of autonomy in regard to the received tradition implied 
in the Greek notion of paideia is clearly highlighted in the comprarison 
Plato makes in book III of the Republic between poorly and well educated 
cities. As Plato argues, it is a characteristic of a poorly educated city that it 
has to provide a great number of “courtrooms and dispensaries” (dikastēria 
te kai iatreia), because it shows that the norms of righteous behavior are 
not enforced by the individuals themselves.178 For Plato, the existence of 
“justice imported from others, who thus become your masters and judges” 
results precisely “from a lack of such qualities in oneself ”179 – i.e., external 
laws are the manifestation of a lack of justice in the individuals themselves. 
For this reason, paideia is realized through the specific internalization of the 
law: to be educated means that one is able to function as the judge of one’s 
own actions, to submit oneself to an external norm: “It is better for every-
one to be governed by the divine and the intelligent, preferably indwelling 
and his own, but in default of that imposed from without, in order that we 
all so far as possible may be akin and friendly because our governance and 
guidance are the same.”180
  In his series of lectures Einleitung in die Philosophie, Husserl uses the 
classic example of Plato’s Meno, in which Socrates seeks to demonstrate 
the a priori character of ideas by showing how a slave-boy can “easily” learn 
to double the size of a square by using mere geometrical deduction.181 As 
Socrates claims, this process does not involve “teaching, but only recol-
lection” (hos ou phēmi didachēn einai all’ anamnēsin).182 Socrates does not 
“pour” the information into the head of the slave-boy; he rather helps him 
to discover the truth for himself. “I do nothing but ask questions; I do not 
instruct,”183 says Socrates – a principle that we also find in Husserl’s own 
methodological considerations in the Crisis: “I seek not to instruct but only 
178 Plato, Rep. 405a.
179 Plato, Rep. 405b.
180 Plato, Rep. 590d.
181 F I 42/123aff.
182 Plato, Meno 82a.
183 Plato, Meno 84c.
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to lead, to point out and describe what I see.”184 If the true scope of phi-
losophy indeed consists of the domain of a priori ideas, then philosophical 
education cannot consist of the mere mediation of particular truths; rath-
er, it needs to be articulated in the form of self-examination. As Husserl 
puts it, understood from the philosophical perspective, true learning is 
the “art of remembrance”185 – a contemplation of what one already knows.186 
  To further expand on this insight, it may even be said that the Pla-
tonic concept of education took its point of departure from a certain kind 
of phenomenological epoché which suspends (or “brackets”) the belief in 
culturally inherited conceptions and dogmas. In Meno, Plato ends up in 
arguing that while the philosophical attitude may produce a state of be-
wilderment comparable to being stunned by a torpedo ray, this state is, 
nevertheless, productive. It guides one towards the discovery of a priori 
truths within oneself: “for now he will push on in the search [for truth] 
gladly, being aware that he lacks knowledge.”187 In this venture, Socrates 
and the slave-boy are on an equal footing: if the formation of a priori ideas 
relies on the universal faculty of reason, then there is no reason to argue 
for any kind of fundamental difference in respect to accessing the realm 
of ideas. 
  Presented merely from the perspective of the philosophizing indi-
vidual, the aforementioned argument may appear somewhat naïve. To say 
that philosophy is fundamentally neutral in regard to cultural and social 
divisions may lead us to forget that it is nevertheless exposed to these divi-
sions. From the perspective of society, the very emergence of this attitude 
is inextricably linked to the rise of the class of free individuals fortunate 
enough to enjoy the privileges of leisure. Leo Strauss may have been right 
in claiming that in Plato’s dialogues one rarely comes across an encounter 
between two equal locators – for instance, how could the slave-boy chal-
lenge Socrates in a spirit of free critique? – so that even the ideal state 
could not simply do away with societal differences.188 Although the philo-
sophical community relied on the fundamental equality of its members 
184 “Ich versuche zu führen, nicht zu belehren, nur aufzuweisen, zu beschreiben, was ich 
sehe.“ HuaVI: 17
185 F I 42/123b
186 This point is entertained in numerous dialogues. See esp. Rep. 514a, Seventh Letter, 
344d-e. On the distinction between paideia and tekhne, see Prot. 312b.
187 Plato, Meno 84b.
188 Strauss 1964: 55.
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– equality in terms of fundamental rational capabilities – its transition to 
the sphere of political life could not follow the same principle. As Husserl 
himself admitted, philosophy itself contained a “fateful internal division 
of the unity of people into the educated and the uneducated”189 – a divi-
sion that was to become the central point of departure for Greek political 
philosophy.
  In the following, I would like to interpret Husserl’s reading of the 
political significance of Greek philosophy as a reply to this problematic. 
Greek philosophy – originally the product of a “few exceptional persons” 
(Sonderlingen)190 – did not immediately transform the common framework 
of the Greek city-state. Rather, it needed to be articulated in the form of 
a cultural-societal project which was to endow the idea of philosophi-
cal rationality with an institutionalized form. Thus, instead of “letting the 
communal life go as it goes, and culture grow as it pleases”, philosophical 
praxis wanted to “ground itself in a culture of free reason and be led by 
it”.191 The intention was to articulate philosophy in the form of lasting 
accomplishments that corresponded with the open and infinite horizon 
of philosophy. The idea of an “ideally directed total society (ideal gerichtete 
Allsozietät)”192 which would reflect the political significance of universal-
ism was analyzed by Husserl in his reflections on the Platonic idea of the 
state. The Platonic ideal, which Husserl interpreted as the first instance of 
genuine social-ethical thinking, became the most important touchstone 
for his attempt to articulate the political dimension of the phenomeno-
logical enterprise. In the end, it also became a horizon which needed to 
be transcended for the sake of a normative ideal of communal existence 
that could genuinely incorporate the goal of infinite renewal. As we shall 




191 “Statt das Gemeinschaftsleben laufen zu lassen, wie es läuft, und Kultur werden, wach-
sen zu lassen, wie sie eben wächst, soll nun, und so will es die Menschheit in sich selbst, 
eine neue und wahre Kultur, eine Kultur aus reiner Vernunft, begründet und durchgefürt 
werden.“ HuaXXXV: 55.
192 HuaVI: 336. Cf. Brague 2009: 29.
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3.4. Philosophy and Political Universalism:
Politics of the Best Possible
Multiplicity is the condition of political life. Without the inextri-cable discrepancies and conflicts of interest that appear in the life of human beings, there would be no need for the domain 
which unfolds as the site of human diversity. For the Greeks, this domain 
was known by the name polis, the “state” or the “city-state”. In contrast to 
the mere material and territorial dimension of the city – in Greek, astu 
– polis was conceived in connection to human interests, as a field of dif-
ferent values, appreciations and goals.193 As Aristotle puts it in his Politics, 
a “polis is composed of people who differ in type (eidos) [...] [and] cannot 
be composed of people who are like one another”194 – from the beginning 
on, the fundamental question of Greek political thinking was how to cope 
not only with the quantitative multitude of human subjects but also with 
their qualitative differences (hence the word eidos). According to Hannah 
Arendt, the fundamental achievement of Greek politics was that it was 
able to pacify this ever imminent conflict by transferring it from the do-
main of straight power into speech, logos. Speech not only brings people 
together but it also lets their particular appearances to appear. This is what 
Aristotle meant as he coined the classical definition of human being as zōon 
logon echon – “the creature possessing speech” – with the idea of political 
animal (zōon politikon).195 Polis is what lets the essence of human being to 
come about.
  Accordingly, what the Greeks meant by “political” did not concern 
merely the relation between I and the other but the mediation of this rela-
tion through a third party. A political relation is something that is defined 
by a common background, for instance, a shared religious heritage or the 
image of citizenship. To engage in a political relation with other subjects 
193 It did not serve merely the needs of biological life, zōē, but life understood as the 
sphere of human interests, bios.
194 Aristotle, Pol. 1261a23–24. Cf. Plato’s Rep.: “And Adeimantus said, “But, perhaps, So-
crates, the former way is easier.” “It would not, by Zeus, be at all strange,” said I; “for now 
that you have mentioned it, it occurs to me myself that, to begin with, our several natures 
are not all alike but different. One man is naturally fitted for one task, and another for 
another. Don’t you think so?” “I do.”” (Rep. 370a–b).
195 Aristotle, Pol. I, 2. 1253a10. 
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means that one has to become a part of a culturally and historically defined 
nexus of meanings, which give this relation its specific form. This idea of 
pre-established framework as the condition of political space is implied 
also in the Greek notion of “law”, nomos, which referred to the idea of 
“delimitation” or “demarcation” (nemein) as the fundamental precondition 
of political life. It is particularly through law that I encounter the fellow 
human being as familiar or strange, equal or non-equal – for instance, as 
a citizen or slave, a Hellene or Barbarian. To reiterate Arendt’s argument, 
the Greeks conceived nomos as a pre-political category, which provided the 
general framework within which political action per se becomes possible. 
Rather than constituting the basic content of the political debate (as in 
the case of modern societies), laws were compared with the surrounding 
walls of polis, which endowed the individual participants with their basic 
immunity.196
  Husserl approached the relationship between philosophy and poli-
tics at least from two different angles. First of all, the cultural formation 
of philosophy emerged in a relation to a specific political context of the 
Greek city-states, which were not only hostile towards one another but 
also internally divided. Plato’s work was affected especially by the politi-
cal turmoil following the Peloponnesian War between Sparta and Athens, 
which had abolished the democratic regime of Athens and replaced it with 
the rule of the so-called Thirty Tyrants. Although the Spartan tyranny 
came into an end around the turn of the 5th and 4th century BC, the situ-
ation was not considerably better for philosophy: after being accused of 
impiety and corrupting the youth, Socrates was sentenced to death around 
399 BC by the democratic regime of Athens. Plato’s own political odyssey 
ended in a catastrophe: after an unfortunate confrontation with Dionysios 
I, the tyrant of Syracuse, Plato himself was sold into slavery and was saved 
only by his generous admirer. As Plato put it in the Republic, “for so cruel 
is the condition of the better sort [i.e. philosophers] in relation to the 
polis that there is no single thing like it in nature”197 – philosophy emerged 
against the backdrop of a highly explosive political context, whose general 
structure Husserl often sketched under the opposition of conservatism 
and progressivism:
196 Arendt 1958: 63–64.
197 Plato, Rep. 488a.
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Clearly this [the birth of philosophical community] leads not simply 
to a homogeneous transformation of the generally satisfactory 
life of the national state but probably to great internal schisms in 
which this life and the whole national culture suffer an upheaval. 
Those conservatives who are satisfied with the tradition and the 
philosophical men will fight each other, and the struggle will surely 
occur in the sphere of political power. The persecutions begin at 
the very beginnings of philosophy.198 
This idea of conflict provides us with the second constituent in the relation 
between philosophy and politics. Besides emerging within a particular so-
cietal context, philosophy also articulated itself in terms of a political project, 
which placed itself in opposition to the tradition. Indeed, had philosophy 
lacked this political dimension, there would have been no need for a con-
flict with the existing structures of power. Through the emergence of the 
theoretical attitude, philosophy delineated a novel idea of the polis and its 
respective societal institutions, more precisely, a new idea of the very con-
stitution of the political sphere.199 It did this, first of all, by relocating what 
I previously called the motive of “deterritorialization” (3.2) within the 
political domain: what philosophy criticized was exactly the very idea of 
delimitation as the constitutive principle of the polis. Secondly, by transfer-
ring the idea of “infinite task” (3.3) to the domain of the polis, philosophy 
opened up a new temporal horizon of the political sphere. What Husserl 
called a new form of “political historicity” (politische Geschichtlichkeit)200 
entailed a new relation to the tradition, but it was also able to nurture a 
novel idea on the future prospects of a political community – a new form 
of political utopianism. Together they contributed to the emergence of a 
distinctive set of normative ideals that concerned not only the individual, 
198 “Offenbar führt das nicht einfach zu einer homogenen Verwandlung des normalen, im 
ganzen befriedigenden staatlichnationalen Lebens, sondern mit Wahrscheinlichkeit zu gro-
ßen inneren Spaltungen, in denen dasselbe und das Ganze der nationalen Kultur in einen 
Umbruch hineingerät. Die in der Tradition konservativ Befriedigten und der philosophi-
sche Menschenkreis werden einander bekämpfen, und sicherlich wird der Kampf sich in 
der politischen Machtsphäre abspielen. Schon in den Anfängen der Philosophie beginnt die 
Verfolgung.“ HuaVI: 334–335.
199 To follow the distinction made by Claude Lefort, Husserl’s analyses moved on the level 
of le politique – the conditions of the political sphere, the way how society represents itself 
as a totality to itself – as distinct from the day-to-day affairs of la politique, common real 
politics. See Lefort 1989: 216. Cf. Depraz 1995: 3.
200 HuaXXIX: 15
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but the social body as a whole – hence, what they opened up was the do-
main of social ethics as a unique field of study.
  As I would like to argue, the single most important idea that Husserl 
ascribed to the political philosophy of the Greeks was the birth of political 
universalism. In accordance with the idea of universal reason and pure ide-
alities as the domain of universal truths, Greek philosophy formulated an 
ideal of universal communal existence that could be conceived free of any 
empirical constraints, for instance, without any reference to a particular 
group of people. By questioning the absolute authority of the city-state as 
the “natural” or “conventional” form of political organization, philosophy 
broke out of the immanence of the Greek political tradition, and laid out 
a novel idea of community that was critical towards all conventional at-
tempts to demarcate the political sphere in advance. Thus by releasing the 
political sphere from its empirical contours, philosophy was able to trig-
ger off a novel form of political idealism that distinguished itself from all 
typical day-to-day political projects. 
  As I already pointed out in the Introduction, Husserl designated the 
history of European universalism under the title of “spectacle of Europe-
anization” (Schauspiel der Europäisierung).201 What he meant by this enig-
matic term was the phenomenon we perhaps know better as the complex 
and multifaceted process of “globalization” – the dissolution of traditional 
national and ethnic borders through intellectual and commercial inter-
change. Although this development can be traced back to the third mil-
lennium BC, it is usually defined by referring to its “European” origins, 
that is, to the period of the so-called “archaic globalization” of the Hellenic 
era and the consecutive expansions of the Roman Empire and the Catho-
lic Church. In the late manuscript “Human Life in Historicity”, Husserl 
emphasized the expansionist strategy of the Roman Empire as the first 
concrete instantiation of Europeanization, which, as he concluded, was as 
much a “Hellenization through Hellenic philosophy”.202 In the context of 
Kaizo essays dealing with the religious history of Europe, a similar idea was 
illuminated through the Augustinian notion of civitas dei – conceived as the 
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no historian and his narrative was a rather conventional one, and it focused 
on the tripartite arche-teleology of Athens, Jerusalem and Rome. His in-
terest was, above all, in the general structure of this development, in what 
he called the motive of “rational internationality” (rational Internationalität) 
that unfolded in the course of European political history.204
  This is not to say, however, that we should simply adhere to Husserl’s 
description of political universalism as a form of “rational international-
ity”. From the Roman Empire to the Christian crusades, the overcoming 
of national and political borders has relied on an uneven balance of power, 
and it has led to the emergence of several other frontiers – ethnic, politi-
cal, and economical. Instead of “rational” intercultural exchange, we have 
witnessed the destructive leveling of many unique cultural features – and 
the emergence of a new monoculturalism: in the name of Western or Eu-
ropean universalism, it is often assumed that everyone should take on the 
path of universal human rights, liberal democracy, market economy, and 
so on. 
  As I would like to read it, however, Husserl’s idea of political univer-
salism was as much a promise as it was an existing history. In contrast to 
the violent and unilateral history of European universalism, this process 
hid within itself an “absolute sense” that was to be distinguished from its 
“historical non-sense” (cf. Introduction).205 In its “absolute sense”, Hus-
serl argued, Europeanization was a prospect of a political community that 
would go beyond the traditional ideas of nation and state, an idea of com-
munity inherently critical towards all pre-established limits of culture or 
ethnicity. Motivated by the generative transformation in the categories of 
“homeworld” and “alienworld”, philosophy aimed at articulating a novel 
idea of political communality that was inherently critical towards all natu-
ral divisions of familiarity and strangeness. For Husserl, the essential tran-
sitivity and contingency of these divisions was indeed the most important 
lesson of the political history of Europe:
Yet this essential difference between homeliness and alienness 
(Heimatlichkeit und Fremdheit), a fundamental category of all 
historicity which relativizes itself in many strata, cannot suffice. 
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way in accord with this category. We feel this precisely in our 
own Europe. There is something unique here that is recognized 
in us by all other human groups, too, something that, quite apart 
from all considerations of utility, becomes a motive for them to 
Europeanize themselves even in their unbroken will to spiritual 
self-preservation […].206
Husserl’s argument was of course a controversial one. However, it 
contained within itself an implicit critique towards one of the dominant 
theoretical frameworks of political philosophy of the Weimar period. This 
framework was articulated first by Carl Schmitt’s Das Begriff des Politischen 
(1927), which saw the division between “friend” and “enemy” as the primal 
constitutive principle of the political sphere – as the eternal, “a priori” 
order of the political domain (although the concrete enmity-image was 
to be conceived as transient).207 Husserl did not deny the constitutive 
significance of otherness in the political regard – the political history 
of Europe is also that of enmity-image so that what we understand with 
Europe varies whether it is defined in relation to Ottomans or Islamists 
(13th century onwards) or the new rising superpowers of the 21st century. 
What Husserl claimed was that what we discover in the political history 
of Europe, above all, in the philosophical attempts to rearticulate the 
conditions of political community – is the urge to rethink the constitutive 
significance of the other, to form a new relation to the category of alienness 
as such. Thus, to adhere to Schmitt’s conception on the a priori constitutive 
significance of the other is to strike at the roots of that tradition of political 
idealism, which has aimed at dismantling this difference as such.
  It should be noted here, however, that this reading of Husserl as a 
“universalist cosmopolitan” is somewhat selective in the sense that it takes 
Husserl’s mature views as the primal point of departure and disregards 
206 “Indessen dieser sich in vielen Stufen relativierende Wesensunterschied von Heimat-
lichkeit und Fremdheit, eine Grundkategorie aller Geschichtlichkeit, kann nicht genügen. 
Die historische Menschheit gliedert sich nicht in immerfort gleicher Weise gemäß dieser 
Kategorie. Wir erspüren das gerade an unserem Europa. Es liegt darin etwas Einzigartiges, 
das auch allen anderen Menschheitsgruppen an uns empfindlich ist als etwas, das, abgese-
hen von allen Erwägungen der Nützlichkeit, ein Motiv für sie wird, sich im ungebroche-
nen Willen zu geistiger Selbsterhaltung doch immer zu europäisieren [...].“ HuaVI: 320.
207 Schmitt 1987: 27. See also Waldenfels 1997: 45.
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some of his earlier views on the centrality of the nation-state. As Karl 
Schuhmann has shown in his Husserls Staatsphilosophie, for Husserl the 
state was a rather ambiguous notion that could be used in affirmative 
as well as pejorative sense. For instance, in a letter to Roman Ingarden 
in 1917, Husserl apologized for the hostile relations between Germany 
and Poland and attested that “sub specie aeterni both nations have an ideal 
right for existence.”208 In terms of political institutions, Husserl’s political 
reflections seemed to balance between Fichtean nationalism (especially 
during the First World War), Kantian republicanism (beginning of the 
1920s), and what almost seems like a mixture of Stoic cosmopolitanism 
and socialist internationalism: in Kaizo essays, the ideals of Übervolk and 
Übernation were introduced in connection to a “communistic unity of will” 
as distinct from unjust and unilateral imperialism.209 
  In the context of this work, however, I will restrict myself to Husserl’s 
encounter with the political dimension of Greek philosophy. I do this not 
in order to dismiss the varieties of European universalism, but in order 
to discuss what I consider as the most crucial philosophical questions in 
Husserl’s account of Europe in regard to the problems of social ontology.
  Again, the most important point of departure for Husserl’s 
interpretation on the political dimension of Greek philosophy was Plato. 
As I already indicated, from the beginning of the 1920s Husserl’s reading of 
Plato went through what I called a “genetic conversion” whereby the shift 
of focus moved from mere epistemological issues to questions concerning 
scientific practice at large, its character and teleological structure – but 
also questions of practical philosophy, of culture, communality and their 
normative ideals. Beginning from the period of Kaizo essays as well as 
the 1923 lecture course Erste Philosophie, Husserl began to credit Plato as 
the “establisher of the idea of social reason” who was the first to conceive 
“social ethics as the full and true ethics”210. Despite the occasional mythical 
guise of Plato’s social and communal philosophy, Husserl wanted to 
avoid the interpretation according to which the “personalistic” features 
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of community would only entail a metaphoric significance. “The Platonic 
analogy of community and individual should not be understood an 
inventive coincidence of natural thinking”, Husserl emphasized, “but as 
an expression of the common apperception mounting from the actuality 
of human existence.”211 At the beginning of 1930s, when Husserl was 
planning a larger book based on the lectures that were later published as 
Cartesian Meditations, he even entertained his own idea of philosopher’s 
engagement as the “phenomenological restitution of the Platonic theory 
of state”.212 
  Read against the lectures of ethics of 1920/24, it seems that this 
restitution was inseparable from Husserl’s conscious distanciation from 
the basic presuppositions of the modern liberal thought. Against the 
Hobbesian idea of politics founded on “war of all against all” – what Husserl 
called “the one-sided construction” of a purely “egoistically founded 
sociality”213 – Husserl still believed in the idea of “ethical politics”214 that 
would acknowledge the educative function political institutions as well 
the idea of state as the framework of moral elevation. Husserl wanted to 
restore the lost unity of political thought and virtue that had been lost by 
the modern tradition of political philosophy, most notably, the liberalist 
tradition. As I already pointed out in the first part of this work, what Galileo 
had done to nature by depriving it of its teleological character, liberalism 
had done the same in respect to the idea of human being: by naturalizing 
the human psyche, this tradition had evaded the possibility of a “teleology 
of reason” that would have delineated the possibility of human progress in 
history. For the liberal tradition, political institutions – above all, the state 
– remained primarily preventative measures for the avoidance of conflicts, 
what we might call a static idea of political sovereignty that gained its 
211 “Diese Analogie ist aber keineswegs ein geistreicher Einfall eines das natürliche Den-
ken hoch übersteigenden oder gar verstiegenen Philosophen, sondern ist nicht mehr als 
der Ausdruck einer alltäglichen, aus den Aktualitäten des menschlichen Lebens natürlich 
erwachsenden Apperzeption.“ HuaXXVII: 5.
212 “Der Philosoph als „transzendentaler Funktionär“ hat die Möglichkeit der höchsten 
Echtheit, seine Verpflichtung als Vorbild: phänomenologische Restitution des platonischen 
Staatsgedankens.” HuaXV: XL
213 HuaXXXVII: 49, 55ff.
214 HuaXV: 380.
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justification through the task of guardianship.215 Husserl did not contest 
the justification of state institutions – in this respect, as he told his son 
Gerhart, his phenomenology was completely apolitical216 – but aimed 
at developing a critical method of examination from the viewpoint of 
philosophical rationality. As Fink put it, phenomenology could not be 
used to defend the “humanitarian ideal of democracy” nor could be simply 
targeted against “the fascist doctrine attacking the idea of humanity”. “The 
whole setting of the problem”, wrote Fink, “leads into the other side of 
the political struggle, the battle for the philosophical meaning of human 
being.”217 
  How, then, did the theoretical attitude execute itself in the political 
sphere? The Greek political thought took its point of departure from 
the idea that a certain form of political rule cannot simply take its 
authority from the tradition, nor can it insist on the natural relation 
between a particular people and a form of governance. Instead, all forms 
of governance – democracy, aristocracy, monarchy, and so on – should 
be exposed to an all-embracing critique, which does not acknowledge 
tradition or convention as the authority of a particular political system. 
As Plato put it in the Republic, the philosophers “will take the polis and 
the characters of men, as they might a tablet, and first wipe it clean”, for 
“this would be their first point of difference from ordinary reformers, that 
they would refuse to take in hand either individual or state or to legislate 
before they either received a clean slate or themselves made it clean.”218 As 
a result of this peculiar political epoche, Plato articulated the principle of 
“presuppositionlessness” as the fundamental premise of political philosophy, 
thus releasing the idea of polis from all typical empirical contours. In other 
words, what Plato advocated was a notion of ideal politics, which was able 
to pose the question of good life and righteous governance free from the 
constraints of Realpolitik.
215 It was only Kant who in his essay on perpetual peace raised the possibility of situat-
ing the state to the overall framework of world-historical teleology: the state, for Kant, 
was the first safeguard of public law, but it was also the framework which made the idea 
of civitas gentium, the “world-state”. Despite their immense differences, Husserl accentu-
ated the alliance of Kantian and Greek political thinking in their insistence to locate the 
idea of political universalism in connection to an “all-embracing people” (Übervolk). See 
HuaXXVII: 58
216 See Husserl’s letter in Schuhmann 1988: 18–19.
217 This passage is quoted in HuaXXIX: xx 
218 Plato, Rep. 501a. 
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  This conflict between these two types of political discourse – the 
“ordinary” and the “philosophical” – became perceptible in the wake of 
the Classical era. In The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers, Diogenes 
Laertius tells a story about Anaxagoras, the first thinker who brought 
philosophy from Ionia to Athens, who was known of his devotion to 
natural philosophy while disregarding the day-to-day political affairs. Being 
accused of the negligence for politics and the lack of affection to his own 
county, Anaxagoras replied to his adversaries (according to Diogenes): 
“Be silent,” said he, “for I have the greatest affection for my coun-
try,” pointing up to heaven.219
What we find in these examples in the form of utmost political idealism is 
nothing less than the principle of self-responsibility relocated in the politi-
cal sphere. In contrast to what Plato calls the “ordinary reformers” who re-
alistically assess the implementability of political ideas in relation to exist-
ing conditions, philosophers start from the scratch: they need to construct 
their political ideals without any reference to a particular political doxa. 
For Husserl, it was exactly this feature that constituted the fundamental 
philosophical dimension of Greek political thinking. The imminent con-
sequence of the Platonic ideal of state, writes Husserl, was “that there is 
an absolute norm of reason not just for any polis, but for the whole of hu-
manity that stands in the unity of culture-creative communal relations.”220 
Against the political ethos of the Classical period, which accentuated the 
role of particular deities as the foundation of polis, the philosophical cri-
tique introduced an idea of universal justification that could be applied to 
the political domain as such – though in reality, its application was signifi-
cantly restricted. Nevertheless, what this transition laid out was basically 
the principle of autonomy as the foundation of the political sphere; an idea 
of polis as self-regulating domain which gives its own laws to itself. 
219 Diogenes Laertius D.L. II.7.ii
220 “Denn die naturgemäße Konsequenz seines entworfenen Staatsideals ist es, daß nicht 
nur für irgendeine Polis, sondern für die ganze in Einheit kulturschaffender Gemein-
schaftsbeziehungen stehende Menschheit eine absolute Norm der Vernunft bestehe, daß 
sie sich, wenn sie zu einer wahren und echten Menschheit werden soll, organisieren muß 
zu einer von autonomer Vernunft und der Vernunft in der objektivierten Form echter uni-
versaler Philosophie geleiteten Menschheit.” HuaXXVII: 87. As Depraz points out, Husserl 
also speaks of a “universal ethical epoche” (1995: 11, cf. HuaVIII: 319), which she reads in 
terms of an acquiring of a non-ideological standpoint for a political community.
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  Accordingly, the emergence of philosophy signified a transition from 
the mere natural origin of the polis to the idea of an actively instituted 
foundation. In accordance with the split between culture and tradition – 
philosophy as a creation of meaning free of the burden of the past – Hus-
serl conceived the Greek idea of political justification in terms of a transi-
tion from “natura to recta ratio” – from nature to “right reason”.221 The idea 
of recta ratio (sometimes translated as “pure reason”) was central especially 
to the intellectual tradition of Roman law, which linked the notion of nat-
ural law to the idea of universal rationality. “We must explain the nature 
of law”, argued Cicero in De legibus, “and that needs to be looked for in 
human nature”222 – and indeed the only “law” (lex) that philosophers must 
confine themselves into is that of recta ratio.223 As such, this notion can be 
traced back already to Nicomachean Ethics, where Aristotle defines “virtue” 
(aretē) not in terms of a natural quality, but a “disposition determined by 
the right reason (orthon logon)”224. What constitutes the ultimate authority 
of virtuous action is neither “tradition” nor simply “human nature”, but 
the common faculty of logos and its ability to decide on just and unjust 
behavior. The mere “voice” (fonē), says Aristotle elsewhere, “can indicate 
pain and pleasure”, but it is only logos that “is designed to indicate the ad-
vantageous and the harmful, and therefore also the right and the wrong.”225 
Logos, which for humans is the way to overcome the brute existence of 
animals, founds the philosophical idea of polis. 
  What this transition entailed was a series of transformations in the 
basic concepts of political and social sphere – what Husserl called a “re-
generation of people’s lives” (Umbildung des Volkslebens).226 By relocat-
ing the basic framework of political ontology from nature to reason, the 
221 “The natural law in original sense the mere legal practice, the traditionally acquired 
habit that is kathēkon [“appropriate behavior”] is transformed, or it places itself as a new 
kind of norm as opposite to the law which binds all human rationality – all people of all 
nations.” (“Es deutet sich an in der Verwandlung des Sinnes von natura zu recta ratio. Das 
natürliche Recht (z.B.) im ursprünglichen Sinne, die blosse Rechtssitte, das traditional 
Gewohnheitsmässige, das kathekon ist, verwandelt sich oder stellt sich als neuartige Norm 
gegenüber dem Recht, das <für> alle menschliche Vernunft – das für alle Menschen aller 
Nationen bindend <ist>.“ HuaXXIX: 15.
222 Cicero, De leg. I.17
223 Cicero, De leg. I.18
224 Aristotle E.N. 1144b28
225 Aristotle, Pol. I.1253a11–15
226 HuaXXIX: 16.
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Classical period witnessed a series of attempts to articulate anew many of 
the basic concepts of the political domain, including the concepts of “jus-
tice”, “equality”, the “division of power” etc. One of central disputes that 
emerged during this period concerned perhaps the most important (as 
well as the most controversial) concept of the political domain, that is, the 
concept of “people”. Especially through the critique of the early sophists, 
what was meant by “a people” could no longer be characterized simply in 
terms of a natural quality, but rather, as a way of relating to a common life-
world, a tradition. As the orator Isocrates put it in the work Panegyricuus:
And so far has our city distanced the rest of mankind in thought 
and in speech that her pupils have become the teachers of the rest 
of the world; and she has brought it about that the name Hellenes 
suggests no longer a race (genous) but discursive reasoning (di-
anoias), and that the title Hellenes is applied rather to those who 
share our culture (paideuseos, “education”) than to those who share 
a common nature (fyseos).227
What Isocrates argued was that what we mean by a people (e.g., the 
Hellenes) cannot be reduced back to a particular empirical attribute – 
race or a natural origin – but what we might designate as a “transcendental” 
feature, that is, the common faculty of dianoia, “discursive reasoning”. This 
is not to say, however, that all human beings would live in a universal 
political community; as Isocrates puts it, no man is a Hellene “by nature”, 
but only by becoming a part of the common “culture” or “civilization”, 
which serves as the foundation for the political domain. What this 
argument does is that it relativizes the relation between individual and 
community, and locates it in the domain of rationality and culture. To 
put it in Heraclitean terms: Greeks are not those who share a common 
bloodline, but those who share a common world.
  Here, I think, Husserl’s own historical narrative turned out to be 
somewhat ambiguous. To say that for the Greeks, the natural law was 
conceived as a universal category that “binds all human rationality, all 
people of all nations”228 is not simply wrong, however, it is not completely 
compatible with the philosophical ethos of the Classical period. As 
many prominent scholars have shown, the idea of universal rationality 
227 Isocrates, Panegyricuus fr. 50. Cf. Davis 1951: 131ff. 
228 HuaXXIX: 15
— 304 —
. H   O  E
as the foundation of political space was most prominent in the writings 
of the sophists; for Plato and Aristotle, the division between Hellenes 
and Barbarians (like that between men and women) was still conceived 
as a natural one.229 This stance explains why in Meno, Plato made the 
distinction between two types of wars (polemos): the intra-Greek one, 
that ought to be conducted with minimal force and damage, and the 
one against Barbarians that ought to result in complete annihilation.230 
In Politics, likewise, Aristotle conceived Barbarians as “natural slaves” 
who should be ruled by the Hellenes – thus dismissing the idea of natural 
freedom of individual subjects.231 To look for a developed theory on the 
universal foundation of a political community, we ought to look at the 
political writings of the Stoics and of Early Christianity – as I will argue in 
the last part of this work, Husserl’s ethical ideal of community is actually 
best understood as a rendition of Christian ideals.
  For Greek philosophy, however, nature (fysis) was by no means a 
simple category. Actually, the problematic relation between polis and 
fysis forms one of the key issues of their political thinking. Aristotle, for 
one, conceived the relation between “state” and “nature” in two opposite 
regards. In the first book of Politics, Aristotle argued that because the 
history of human civilization has been that of concentration to common 
settlements, “the city-state (polis) is a natural growth (fysei), and that man 
is by nature a political animal.” Therefore, a man without a city “is either 
low in the scale of humanity or above it,”232 that is, either an animal or 
God. However, because of the ineluctable multitude of personalities that 
characterizes all political communities, the unity of polis is really not an 
“outcome of nature” – and “what has been said to be the greatest good 
[i.e. the multitude of citizens] in states really destroys them.”233 In order to 
reconcile the multitude of citizens’ interests, polis needs to recur to power 
and coercion – it needs to institute a legal framework, which can protect 
the autonomy of individual citizens. The polis is, according to this account, 
both natural as well as artificial.
229 Cf. Schmitt & Vogt 2005: 194–196.
230 Plato, Meno 242a–c.
231 Aristotle, Pol. I. 1252b.
232 Aristotle, Pol. I. 1253a.
233 Aristotle, Pol. II. 1261b6.
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  It should be noted that the Greek understanding of nature – especially 
of human nature – differed significantly from our modern understanding. 
Nature was conceived not as a mechanistically structured field of causal 
relations but as a teleological process in which different entities strive for 
their own essence. As Aristotle put it, “nature is an end (telos), since that 
which each thing is when its growth is completed we speak of as being the 
nature of each thing, for instance of a man, a horse, a household”234. In this 
regard, fysis was simply just another name for the right “essence” (eidos) 
conceived as the full realization (energeia) of the inherent possibilities of 
a being. As a category of human existence, nature did not signify mere 
“facticity” or a life guided by drives and instincts but a teleological category 
in the light of which the whole existence of man ought to be regarded.235 
Nature was, above all, an ideal which provided the basic normative 
criteria for each thing, “the object for which a thing exists, its end, [its] 
chief good.”236
  In Plato’s own thinking, this ambiguous character of human nature 
came to serve as the central motive of his political philosophy – one, 
that was used to justify and eradicate the existence of political power. 
This contradictory pursuit can be enlightened by considering the difficult 
relation between human nature and law (nomos). As Plato put it in the 
Laws, “no man’s nature is naturally able both to perceive what is of benefit 
to the civic life of men and, perceiving it, to be alike able and willing to 
practice what is best” – we are, in our typical condition, self-seeking and 
prone to egocentrism. However, as he continues: 
Yet if ever there should arise a man competent by nature and by a 
birthright of divine grace to assume such an office, he would have 
no need of rulers over him; for no law or ordinance is mightier 
than knowledge, nor is it right for reason to be subject or in thrall 
234 Aristotle, Pol. I. 1252b33–35
235 The normative and teleological character of human existence comes forth also in the 
well-known passage of Nicomachean Ethics: “Nor ought we to obey those who enjoin that a 
man should have man’s thoughts and a mortal the thoughts of mortality, but we ought so 
far as possible to achieve immortality, and do all that man may to live in accordance with 
the highest thing in him; for though this be small in bulk, in power and value it far surpasses 
all the rest. […] That which is best and most pleasant for each creature is that which is 
proper to the nature of each; accordingly the life of the intellect is the best and the pleas-
antest life, for man, inasmuch as the intellect more than anything else is man; therefore this 
life will be the happiest”. E.N. 1177b31–1178a8
236 Aristotle, Phys. 1252b34–35.
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to anything, but to be lord of all things, if it is really true to its 
name and free in its inner nature. But at present such a nature 
exists nowhere at all, except in small degree; wherefore we must 
choose what is second best, namely, ordinance and law (taxin te kai 
nomon), which see and discern the general principle, but are unable 
to see every instance in detail.237
Political institutions are needed because the common man does not “nat-
urally” meet the teleological ideal of rationality as the self-responsible, 
autonomous application of the law. For this reason, the polis of mortals ac-
quires only the status of the “second best” (deuterōs […] pros to beltiston)238 
in comparison to the city-state of fully rational subjects who could basi-
cally do away with politics in the usual sense. In this case, there would be 
no need for coercion and law as forces that are external to the individual, 
for the principle of ordinance would be realized by each and every indi-
vidual personally. For Plato, the politics of the best possible as the com-
munal realization of (philosophical) rationality would entail, at the same 
time, the end of politics: a life of fully harmonious community.
  As I already pointed out, Husserl’s insistence in his return to Plato 
was motivated by the central role Plato gave to social ethics as the “genu-
ine” or “full” sense of ethics, or more generally, to normative ideals. What 
this formulation may suggest is that for Husserl, the great insight of Plato 
consisted of his “communitarian” ethos that could be read as opposite to 
the “individualistic” tradition of modern liberalism. However, this is not 
exactly what Husserl had in mind. For him, the genuine insight of Pla-
tonic ethics consisted neither of its individualistic nor its communitarian 
ethos, but rather, of their peculiar intertwinement. For Husserl, Plato was 
a thinker of the inextricable communion of individual and social ethics, that is, a 
philosopher of the individual-within-the-community. What Plato under-
stood was that without the social-communal dimension of ethics, all nor-
mativity remains fundamentally abstract, for it is only the community that 
can fully make possible the righteous behavior of the individual. This idea, 
however, is only possible through the vocational striving of the individual 
– the Socratic ideal – which is the fundament, though not the final truth, 
concerning the good life. As Husserl put it in one of his Kaizo essays, “all 
237 Plato, Laws, 875b–c.
238 Plato, Laws, 793a.
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genuine culture is possible only through a genuine culture of self and its 
norm-giving ethical framework”239 – however, as a mere individual praxis, 
it is bound to remain abstract.
  I was would like to argue, it is exactly the Greek notion of the “politi-
cal” that provides us the possibility of capturing Husserl’s insistence on the 
peculiar intertwinement of individual and social ethics. In Gorgias, Plato 
presents us with a striking comparison between two different “arts” (tech-
nai) through which a human being is nurtured – one concerning the body, 
the other the soul (psychē). While the body is trained through the practices 
of medicine and gymnastics, “the one, which has to do with the soul”, So-
crates says, “I call politics” (tēn men epi tē psychē politikēn kalō).240 Parallel 
to the “inner” and “outer” techniques of gymnastics and medicine, Socrates 
then goes on to divide the domain of politics into “legislation” (nomothe-
tikos) and “righteousness” (dikaiosynē): by making itself good laws, a polis 
can sustain itself in good form, and while confronting problems with its 
own health, it can resolve these only through just decisions.
  What is exceptionally striking here, however, is the clear link that 
Plato makes between the “care of the soul” and politics – a connection that 
has been extensively discussed by Jan Patočka.241 Rather than constituting 
two distinct domains, the philosophical attitude reveals itself as political 
through and through. Because the philosopher strives at viewing the world 
from the perspective of a “disinterested onlooker”, s/he is at least in prin-
ciple free of all particular interests and concerns. The social or communal 
aspect is thus implied within the philosopher’s gaze, the perspective of 
whosoever: this is what Socrates means as he claims that in his own time, 
he is the only one “involved in the true art of politics” (epikheirein tē hōs 
alēthōs politikē tekhnē).242 
  What about righteousness? Is it a public or a private virtue? Let us 
consider the second book of Republic where Plato first approaches the 
question of righteousness in terms of an individual attribute. While the 
“seat” of righteousness is to be originally located within the individual hu-
239 “Denn alle echte Kultur ist nur durch echte Selbstkultur und in ihrem normgebenden 
ethischen Rahmen möglich”. HuaXXVII: 42.
240 Plato, Gorgias, 464b.
241 See esp. Patočka 2002: 71ff.
242 Plato, Gorgias, 521d. A similar train of thought can be discovered in Aristotle’s Eudemian 
Ethics, where Aristotle makes a distinction between “true politicians” and people who are 
involved in politics. (E.E. 1216a23–27). 
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man being, this insight turns out to be abstract, for it fails to take into 
account the role of education in the formation of normative ideals. A good 
polis produces good and righteous citizens: for this reason, Plato proceeds 
to argue that dikaiosyne can actually exist in both “one man” as well as in the 
whole of polis.243 Actually, righteousness can only be studied through this 
correlation of the individual and the communal dimensions, by “examining 
them side by side and rubbing them against one another, as it were from 
the fire-sticks we may cause the spark of righteousness to flash forth”.244 
What we have in this poetic image of philosophical dialectics is basically 
the “paradox of subjectivity” conceived in ethical terms: we are, at the 
same time, beings-in-the-world and beings-for-the-world. While we ar-
rive at the ethical dimension of the communal life only through ourselves, 
we are constantly conditioned by the former – we are both the subject as 
well as the object of culture. The individual and community are, as Husserl 
puts it, “a priori indistinguishable”.245
  Another way of articulating this connection is to focus on the no-
tions of legislation and governance (politeia) in the IX book of the Republic. 
Here, the starting point was basically the same as that of the modern liber-
al tradition: that legislation and governance are needed in order to defend 
the basic immunity of citizens – the law is what Plato calls the “protec-
tor” (symmakhos) of all citizens.246 However, good governance is not to be 
located merely in the domain of political institutions, but also within the 
individual human being: the man of intelligence, says Socrates, will “keep 
his eyes fixed on the governance in his soul (pros tēn en hautō politeian), and 
taking care and watching lest he disturb anything there either by excess 
or deficiency of wealth.”247 In the best possible scenario, the righteous 
behavior is not imposed on the individual from the outside, but rather, 
it is lived as the coherence of one’s “inner politics”. As John Sallis puts it, 
the Platonic polis in the book IX, “is a city within man […] not primar-
ily in the sense that he [Socrates] has educated a ruler for the fatherland 
but rather in the sense that in and through his speech he has founded a city 
243 Plato, Rep. 368e
244 Plato, Rep. 435a
245 HuaXXVII: 6.
246 Plato, Rep. 590e. As Aristotle put it, the “rule of law” is better than that of a single 
person. See Pol. III.16.1287a
247 Plato, Rep. 591e.
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within Glaucon [Socrates’ interlocutor].”248 This city exists, Plato claims, 
only in the domain of logos and not on earth:
 “I understand,” he said; “you mean the city whose establishment 
we have described, the city whose home is in discourse (logoi); for 
I think that it can be found nowhere on earth.” “Well,” said I, “per-
haps there is a pattern of it laid up in heaven for him who wishes 
to contemplate it and so beholding to constitute himself its citizen. 
But it makes no difference whether it exists now or ever will come into being. 
The politics of this city only will be his and of none other.”249
Thus, the idea of good governance exists in two regards: first, it emerges 
within the political institutions as the result of a concrete political praxis 
that can be exposed to philosophical critique. Moreover, it also exists in 
each and every single human being as the ideal of rational life in general. 
“I believe in the revival of pure idealism thirsted by the youth”, Husserl 
wrote to Ingarden, “and I hope that it will be introduced into the rela-
tion of the inner and external politics of the practical reason.”250 This, for 
Husserl, constituted the genuine radicalism of Greek political ontology: 
righteousness can only flourish as the harmony of the two. 
  Accordingly, from the viewpoint of political ontology, the birth of 
philosophy nurtured what we might call the utopian motive of Greek po-
litical thinking – the determination of ethical and political life according 
to the unattainable idea of “perfect life”. As the idea of infinite horizon 
is acknowledged within the individual and the communal domains, their 
respective ideas of what it means to be “a good person” or “a good com-
munity” undergo a radical transformation.251 The prevailing humanity and 
society become understood as essentially incomplete formations with re-
gard to their ideal norms, that is, as something whose true meaning must 
be attained through constant critique and renewal. Like the full sense 
of knowledge, they become infinite ideas that can only be gradually ap-
248 Sallis 1986: 454.
249 Plato, Rep. 592a-b. My italics.
250 ”Ich glaube an den Aufschwung des reinen Idealismus, nach dem die Jugend lechzt, 
und hoffe, daß er in die Verhältnisse innerer und äußerer Politik praktische Vernunft hin-
einbringen werde”. Husserl 1968: 11.
251 As Socrates says to Phaedrus, one should attribute the title “wise” (sophos) only to 
God, whereas human beings are merely worthy of being referred to as “lovers of wisdom” 
(philosophos) in the sense of God-like spectators (Phaedrus, 278d). This idea is developed 
also by Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics, X.7 1177b31–1178a8.
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proached but never completely reached. In practical life, they become 
normatively binding ideas that obliges us to do “the best possible” both 
individually and collectively. 
  In concrete reality, however, politics is not merely about ideals – it is 
also a domain where the use of power is contested. If we take that the ideal 
of political community was formulated in connection to the teleological 
ideal of human existence striving towards perfection, what does it really 
mean in terms of political power? What kind of political constitution or 
division of power corresponds with the ideal politeia?
  To follow Klaus Held’s argument, it was perhaps the idea of democracy 
that constituted the most salient political legacy of the Greek ideal of uni-
versal rationality. This term, which can of course denote many different 
things, was first used during the 5th and 4th century BC to denote the po-
litical systems of some Greek city-states, most notably, Athens. In its most 
general form, democracy was a form of governance that, as Pericles tells 
us, granted the power in the hands of the many rather than the few.252 At 
least in the reflections of the great orators, the political principles of the 
city-states reflected the idea of the universal and egalitarian notion of rea-
son: the conviction that when it comes to public matters, every (free) man 
is essentially equal and entitled to address the matters at hand from his 
or her particular horizon. According to Held’s view, democracy founded 
itself on the “new world-openness characterized by the complementary 
relation of the unity of the world and the multiplicity of horizons, which 
is based upon inaugural philosophical-scientific thinking.”253 This plural-
istic equality, Held points out, was reflected in the two most important 
features of Greek democracy: isonomia, the equality before the law and 
isēgoria, the freedom of speech (sometimes referred to as parrhēsia). To-
gether they contributed to what Greeks considered the basic principle of 
political life, namely: eleuthereia – often translated as liberty, but means 
something like autonomy – the will to live according to one’s own con-
science.254
  We should not, however, present too idealized picture of the Greek 
political reality. Athens was no liberal democracy; it granted few basic 
252 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 2.34–2.46.
253 Held 2002: 94.
254 Pol. VI.2. 1317bff..
— 311 —
3.4. Philosophy and Political Universalism
human rights to its citizens, and it excluded both women and slaves from 
the status of citizenship and consequently, the deliberative processes of 
democratic order. “The power of the people” was a highly unstable system 
that in many occasions was guided by short-sighted “real politics”. This 
constitutes the basic weakness in Karl Popper’s argument concerning the 
totalitarian ethos of Greek political thinking: it is well arguable that the 
very motivation of Plato’s political philosophy was to nurture the spirit of 
free critique and “freedom of speech” – something that the allegedly dem-
ocratic Athens denied of Socrates as he was convicted on rejecting the gods 
as well as corrupting the youth.255 In its corrupted form, democracy was 
an adversary of universal logos, free discourse that was supposed to nur-
ture the very idea of politics as a sphere of constant rebirth and renewal.
  Still, Held’s argument on the imminent relation between scientific 
philosophy and democracy – albeit highly suggestive – seems to contradict 
with the explicitly anti-democratic ethos of Greek political philosophy. 
Both Plato and Aristotle neglected democracy as an inauthentic political 
form, because it seemed to lack a kind of inner coherence as well as a 
sense of purpose: what Plato criticized in the Republic as the democratic 
type of man was a person who spends his/her time on sporadic desires, 
“indulging the appetite of the day, wine-bibbing and abandoning himself 
to the lascivious pleasing of the flute, and again drinking only water and 
dieting; and at one time exercising his body, and sometimes idling and 
neglecting all things, and at another time seeming to occupy himself with 
philosophy.”256 Following Arendt’s view, the political philosophy of the 
Classical period was not able to tolerate the multiplicity of doxai as a polit-
ical category – the fundamental conflictuality of Greek political life – but 
had to suffocate it under the guidance of philosopher’s vision.257 By taking 
its point of departure from one truth rather than the multiplicity of opin-
ions, Greek political thought replaced “political action” by “governance”, 
which for Arendt, signified nothing less than the closure of the political 
space as such.
  The controversial solution to the problem of philosophical politeia, 
which became Husserl’s primary point of departure as well as the main 
255 Popper 1962: 87, passim.
256 Plato, Rep. 561c-d
257 Arendt 1958: 16ff.; 1993: 227ff.
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target of criticism, was provided by Plato’s Republic; first, in the form of 
tripartite theory of the soul and its corresponding theory of three classes 
(book IV), and secondly, in the allegories of The Ship (book VI) and The 
Cave (book VII), and lastly, in the mythological constellations referred 
to as “noble lies” (gennaion pseudos), i.e., the myth of the metals divid-
ing the souls of different classes (book III). What these theories aimed at 
was simply the basic thesis Plato presents in book V, namely, that in the 
genuinely ethical state “either philosophers become kings […] or those 
whom we now call our kings and rulers take to the pursuit of philosophy 
seriously and adequately.”258 This basic framework of body politic, which 
we discussed already in part 1 in relation to the idea of crisis, was used to 
answer the basic question of Plato’s political ontology, namely, the division 
between “the rulers and the ruled” (arkhousi te kai arkhontai).259 For Plato, 
this question resulted in the necessity of placing philosophy as the head 
of the state: so that as Plato puts it, it is actually nature which commands 
philosophy to “govern” (hēgemoneuein) the affairs of the polis.260 
  In Husserl’s later works, there are several passages that seem to mere-
ly corroborate Plato’s vision of the “hegemonic” and “archontic” role of 
philosophy. In Erste Philosophie, for instance, Husserl located Plato’s great 
insight to his vision according to which “science is called to acquire the 
role of hēgemonikon [the governing reason] of all communal life and there-
fore the whole of culture.”261 In the Vienna Lecture, the same idea was con-
firmed through philosophy’s role as the “archontic for the civilization as a 
whole.”262 The Platonic vision of body politic was completed in Husserl’s 
delineation of philosophers as the “operating brain” whose “healthy func-
tioning” was essential to the present-day European humanity.263 Thus in 
Arendt’s definition, Husserl would fall victim of the ultimate fallacy of 
Western political thinking: the closure of the political domain, the suf-
258 Plato, Rep. 473c–d. Cf. 499b: (“For this cause and foreseeing this, we then despite 
our fears declared under compulsion of the truth that neither city nor polity nor man 
either will ever be perfected until some chance compels this uncorrupted remnant of 
philosophers, who now bear the stigma of uselessness, to take charge of the state whether 
they wish it or not, and constrains the citizens to obey them, or else until by some divine 
inspiration a genuine passion for true philosophy takes possession.”)
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focation of its multiplicity under the guidance of the philosopher-king.
  Husserl’s conclusion, however, was more subtle. As Schuhmann and 
Held point out, within the Husserlian ideal of a body politic there is no 
place for a sovereign philosopher-king, for this would contradict with the 
very idea of rationality: we can never give up on our personal responsibili-
ty.264 Rather, it is exactly the ideas of self-critique and self-responsibility 
that ought to emanate from philosophy to other branches of culture. The ideal 
of a self-regulating and autonomous community is sometimes character-
ized by Husserl as that of a “healthy” (gesund) or vital (lebendig) culture, 
which we might read along with proverb mens sana in corpora sano. 265 If the 
essential “habitus of critique”266 that philosophy is supposed to nurture is 
lost, then it has grave consequences for the whole of body politic. Com-
munity “loses its head”: is no longer able to articulate those conditions on 
the basis of which a common purpose could be formed. For according to 
Husserl, philosophy was supposed to be the very caretaker of reason,
[…] the spiritual organ, in which the community establishes the 
consciousness of its true definition (its true self), and they are 
also called to be the organ for the reproduction of this consciousness 
among the “laypeople”.267 
The societal function of philosophy does not consist of informing indi-
viduals on “what to do” or “how to live”; rather, its task is that of motivation, 
the constant calling forth of critical self-inspection (cf. the Platonic logon 
didonai). This does not mean, however, that philosophy would execute its 
genuine task through coercion nor does it do away with political conflicts. 
As we saw in the beginning of this chapter, philosophy itself emerged as 
a result of a particular societal juxtaposition, which was no stranger to 
Husserl’s own phenomenological project. Husserl’s delineation of ratio-
nality was first and foremost a formal one, and it concerned primarily 
the conditions of justification on the basis of which a conflict of values, 
264 Schuhmann 1988: 141, 163ff.; Held 1989a: 154.
265 HuaVIII: 242, HuaXXVII: 4. See also discussion on Fichte and cultural sickness in 
HuaXXV: 282–284.
266 HuaXXVII: 64
267 The full quote: “Die Philosophen sind die berufenen Repräsentanten des Geistes der 
Vernunft, das geistige Organ, in dem die Gemeinschaft ursprünglich und fortdauernd zum 
Bewußtsein ihrer wahren Bestimmung (ihres wahren Selbst) kommt, und das berufene 
Organ für die Fortpflanzung dieses Bewußtseins in die Kreise der Laien.” (HuaXXVII: 
54)
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for instance, can manifest itself. Without even a minimal appreciation of 
a shared rationality (what Hegel called “recognition”) all political debate 
is doomed to remain mere rhetorical practice, persuasion or intimidation 
on emotional grounds.
  Let us return to the question of Europeanization. It seems that what 
Husserl understood as the “absolute sense” of this development, the ideal 
form of political universalism, was derived as a kind of analogy of the 
community of philosophers within the political domain. For him, the gen-
uine “vocation” of the European culture coincided with philosophy, the 
spiritual organ of humanity:
This means nothing less than that we grant to European culture 
[…] not just the highest position relative to all historical cultures 
but rather we see in it the first realization of an absolute norm of de-
velopment, one that is called to the task of revolutionizing all other 
cultures in the process of development.268
According to Derrida, Husserl’s later reflections on Europe have been 
defined by what he calls the “logic of exemplarity”: the privileged position 
of Europe among world-historical cultures as the good example. Although 
Derrida formulates his criticism in several of his works – from the early 
works on Husserl’s genesis to the later reflections on the state of Europe 
(L’autre cap) – the content of this criticism has remained the same in es-
sence: “Europe has always confused its image, its face […] with a heading 
for world civilization or human culture in general.”269 Against this logic, 
Derrida argues, “it is necessary to make ourselves the guardians of an idea 
of Europe, of a difference of Europe, but of a Europe that consists pre-
cisely in not closing itself off in its own identity and in advancing itself in 
an exemplary way toward what it is not, toward the other heading or the 
heading of the other.”270
  Derrida’s criticism, I believe, has its own justification. As I would 
like to argue, however, what characterized Husserl’s return to the Greek 
idea of political universalism was exactly his insistence to create a kind 
of counter-strategy to the modern tradition of substantial universalism. 
268 “Das meint nichts minderes, als daß wir der europäischen Kultur […] nicht nur die 
relativ höchste Stellung unter allen historischen Kulturen zubilligen, sondern daß wir in 
ihr die erste Verwirklichung einer absoluten Entwicklungsnorm sehen, die dazu berufen 
ist, jede andere sich entwickelnde Kultur zu revolutionieren.“ HuaXXVII: 73
269 Derrida 1992: 24
270 Derrida 1992: 29.
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Rather than presenting us what could be called a universalised particularism 
– the assumed universal applicability of certain particular dogmas as in the 
case of modern theories of natural law – the Greek universalism provided 
us with a counter-motive, namely, the de-absolutization of all particularisms 
pointing towards a non-substantial account of culture. What Husserl con-
sidered the key insight of Plato’s political considerations was exactly the 
idea that the “absolute norm” of cultural development cannot be derived 
from culture itself – European or non-European – rather, it was to be 
located in the structure of human rationality as such. This is not to say that 
what we mean by rational would be completely free from the constraints 
of culture, quite the contrary: reason is always defined in relation to a 
particular teleology or genealogy, endowing it with what Husserl called 
the “powers of historical reality”.271 As a teleological form, this idea of uni-
versalism derives its justification from the critique of all “exemplarities”, 
from the renouncement of the absolute authority of tradition.
  It is exactly here that the Greek political ontology comes at its lim-
its. Despite Husserl’s insistence on the teleological-idealist character of 
Greek political philosophy, what this tradition was unable to articulate 
was the concept of teleology as a genuine historical principle, caught be-
tween the transcendental dimension of all-embracing historicity and its 
empirical realization. What Plato and Aristotle still lacked was the motive 
of perpetual self-critique and renewal that ought to be introduced in or-
der to fully appreciate the dynamism of historical development. As I will 
argue in the last section of this work, this idea can only be enlightened by 
considering Husserl’s own analyses on historical teleology. As I will show 
in the last part of this work, the political utopianism implied in Husserl’s 
conception of teleology is best understood as a critical praxis targeted at 
the present moment, unveiling the latent crises of meaning constituted 
through the “historical” paradox of subjectivity – we are both the subject 
as well as the object of history.
271 HuaXXVII: 106
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t is a characteristically modern experience that what we understand 
by culture is not merely what is present or past but what is yet to 
come. Modernity signifies the twofold expansion of historical time, 
or, as I argued in the first part of this work, the very temporalization 
of history per se. For the modern age, history no longer denotes 
a mere account dealing with past events but the opening up of a new 
temporal consciousness, which understands the present moment on the 
basis of a twofold horizon of past and future. Above all, modernity is that 
period which, as Koselleck puts it, distinguishes between “experience” and 
“expectation”.1 What we understand by history can no longer be defined 
in terms of past facts but an eschatological expectation, which endows the 
present moment with its peculiar future horizon. 
  The target of this expectation, the eschaton, is of course reason itself. 
To say that modernity signifies the process through which reason breaks 
out of its theological shackles is of course true – however, it is likewise 
true that modernity needs history in order to secure the triumph of reason as 
its inevitable outcome. As Kant put it in his essay on the idea of universal 
history, because it is difficult to assume any kind of shared purpose in the 
“senseless course of human affairs”, the philosopher must set out to find “a 
history with a definite natural plan for creatures who have no plan of their 
own.”2 In other words, while the progress of reason does not necessarily 
1 On the distinction between “space of experience” (Erfahrungsraum) and “horizon of ex-
pectation” (Erwartungshorizont), see Koselleck 1983: 267–288.
2 “Es ist hier keine Auskunft für den Philosophen, als daß, da er bei Menschen und ihrem 
Spiele im Großen gar keine vernünftige eigene Absicht voraussetzen kann, er versuche, ob 
er nicht eine Naturabsicht in diesem widersinnigen Gange menschlicher Dinge entdecken 
könne; aus welcher von Geschöpfen, die ohne eigenen Plan verfahren, dennoch eine Ge-
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show itself in the common affairs of human beings, it must be discovered 
as the hidden logic of the world. This explains why Kant could speak of 
philosophers as the “secret agents” of world-history tracing the hidden telos 
of history behind the crust of empirical events, or, why Hegel could speak 
of “secret revolutions” preceding the actual and often violent revolutions 
of the political sphere.3
  As I argued in part 1.2, we are familiar with this idea by the name of 
historical teleology. Modernity is the epoch that understands itself from the 
viewpoint of an end, a telos, as the ever-closer imminence of this end. “If 
we give up this fundamental principle [of teleology],” writes Kant, “we 
no longer have a lawful but an aimless course of nature, and blind chance 
takes the place of the guiding thread of reason.”4 Without the idea of an 
end, all historical development and change appear as coincidental as the 
arbitrary events of nature: rain showers, the blowing of the wind, the 
collision of tectonic plates. At the same time, modernity evolves as the 
very struggle concerning “the end of history”, the concrete telos or eschaton 
of the world-historical teleology. From Kant’s cosmopolitan community to 
Hegel’s bourgeoisie state, from Marx’s communism to Fukuyama’s liberal-
democratic capitalism, the historical thinking of modernity has emerged 
as a conflict concerning the ending point of history, which would bring 
its progress to completion.5 Although these thinkers had fairly different 
views on the dialectic of history and where it would come to its end, they 
all agreed on one basic presupposition: history is on the side of reason 
and freedom, and their union will ultimately be secured through political 
institutions.
  It is well known, however, that a significant part of contemporary 
philosophy has taken a critical stance towards this idea. To follow Jean-
François Lyotard’s definition, what we mean by postmodern condition 
is exactly the situation where the grand narratives of history have lost 
their credibility – where the modern faith in historical progress has lost 
3 Hegel, GW 1: 203.
4 “Denn wenn wir von jenem Grundsatze abgehen, so haben wir nicht mehr eine gesetz-
mäßige, sondern eine zwecklos spielende Natur; und das trostlose Ungefähr tritt an die 
Stelle des Leitfadens der Vernunft.“ Kant, Akad.-A VIII: 18.
5 It should be noted that for Marx, the process of modernity, which would have ended in 
the demise of the capitalist market-economy was not to be conceived in terms of “end of 
history” but instead, as the end of prehistory. Despite this terminological variation, I take 
their teleological concepts as similar.
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its force.6 Although this incredulity towards grand narratives (or meta-
narratives) can be traced back already to Nietzsche’s denouncement 
of modernity (“Progress is just a modern idea, which is to say a false 
idea”7), it was not until the latter half of the twentieth-century that this 
idea really established itself as a significant constituent of our scientific 
worldview. From Nietzsche’s perspectivism to Derridean deconstruction, 
from Kuhn’s paradigm-shifts to Foucault’s genealogy, a significant part 
of contemporary philosophy has defined itself in contrast to the modern 
ideas of historical progress and universal teleology. Against the cumulative 
and linear idea of historical development – and the possibility of locating 
a common origin of different generative traditions – these stances have 
argued for the incommensurability of different cultural, historical, 
social, and scientific frameworks. The contemporary social sciences that 
have modeled themselves on the basis of natural sciences have likewise 
criticized the idea of human progress as relying on naïve assumptions 
of philosophical-political idealism – ideas that have failed to appreciate 
the unchangeable (and most often violent) character of human nature. 
Especially to those social scientists who have labeled themselves as political 
realists (or neo-realists), the idea of historical teleology has appeared 
outright speculative, and therefore unjustifiable. Following Carl Schmitt, 
our political realism thinks that “all genuine political theories presuppose 
man to be evil”8 – following E.H. Carr, it has treated “utopianism” as the 
only possible alternative of Machiavellianism.9
  These critiques, although they diverge from one another, seem to 
underline the basic physicalist assumption of our modern world-view, 
namely, that on the level of real being, change can only occur through 
causal mechanisms, and all talk about pre-established ends yields to a kind 
of metaphysical prejudice on the divine course of things. This is to say that 
for contemporary philosophical and scientific world-view, the only way to 
think teleology is to conceive it in terms of an “objective” state of affairs 
– a divine plan that somehow guides the course of the world. Teleology 
entails theology in the sense that it clings on to blind faith or expectation. 
It is exactly for this reason that both Walter Benjamin and Derrida found 
6 Lyotard 1979: 1ff.
7 See Ch. 1.2.
8  Schmitt 1987: 57, 61ff..
9  On the “exuberance of utopianism”, see Carr 2001: 10ff. 
— 320 —
. T, H, C
the language of “Messianism” to be so compelling while describing the 
fundamental presupposition of modern historical consciousness according 
to which we are constantly waiting to be saved from the injustices of this 
world. Although both of them recognized a certain emancipatory potential 
in this presupposition (i.e. a radical break is needed in order for freedom 
and justice to come about) and tried to reformulate this idea either as 
“weak Messianism”10 (Benjamin) or “Messianic without Messianism”11 
(Derrida), they seemed to leave the basic sense of teleology intact. 
  While I do not wish to simply denounce the often idiosyncratic 
language of post-modernism and post-structuralism, I believe it highlights 
some of the general difficulties in our relation to historical concepts.12 
To claim that we have exhausted the possibility of grand narratives, that 
we are giving up on Kantian–Hegelian idea of humanity’s development 
through reason, or, that we are renouncing the Marxist narrative 
concerning the universal expansion of capitalist market-economy – does 
this not also undermine the critical and reflexive potential of our present 
situation? To say that philosophical, political and societal critique on the 
basis of an all-encompassing, universal history is impossible seems to 
imply that we cannot really learn from history, or, that all learning fastens 
upon bad examples, and the best we can do is to replace a certain set 
of historical presuppositions with another. As Fredric Jameson asks in A 
Singular Modernity, is not the “end of grand narratives” itself another grand 
narrative?13 For as already Marx and Engles noted in The German Ideology, 
all dominating ideologies incorporate within themselves an “illusion of 
self-sufficiency”, by which they appear has “having no history”.14 It is the 
common feature of all dominating ideologies that they work towards 
the extinction of their own genesis, for instance, by blotting out the 
mechanisms of violence and oppression that have produced the existing 
societal conditions. For this reason, historical narratives are needed in 
order to escape the seeming constancy of the present moment – in order 
to show its dependency and relativity in regard to the past.
10 Benjamin 2002: 401ff.
11 Cf. Derrida 1994:180–181; 2008: 213ff. 
12 On the relation between phenomenological teleology and post-structuralism, see 
Steinbock 1998c.
13 Jameson 2002: 5.
14 Marx/Engels 1970: 47.
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  It is exactly here, I believe, that Husserlian phenomenology points 
towards a radically different possibility of thinking the ideas of teleology 
and progress. It is my argument that Husserl’s later analyses on generativity 
and historicity provide us with an idea of historical teleology, which not 
only resists the modern interpretation on the course of history, but which 
radically challenges the deterministic and unilineal implications of this 
notion. For Husserl, teleology was to be understood as a fundamentally 
critical device of philosophical reflection, which executes itself on the basis of 
what I would like to call a historical epoché, i.e., a specific “bracketing” of all 
particular commitments concerning the course of history. It was exactly 
this renewed understanding of historical teleology, which made possible 
an unprejudiced and undogmatic approach to historical development. 
Instead of arguing for the rationality and inevitability of history, this idea 
was to serve as the fundamental point of departure for a responsible and 
responsive idea of universalism. 
  In the first chapter of this part (4.1), I will start by discussing the 
implications of Husserl’s teleological-historical approach in regard 
to the problematic of Europe. As I will show, Husserl’s late emphasis 
on the inextricably historical character of phenomenology was to be 
understood in regard to a broadened notion of self-understanding and 
responsibility, motivated especially by the genetic dimension of meaning-
constitution. Against his earlier idea on the presuppositionlessness of 
phenomenological research, Husserl, in the late stage of his career, 
reformulated his position in order to acknowledge the necessary historical 
situatedness of his phenomenology. This led him to articulate a new idea 
on the fundamental connectedness of the historical and the systematic 
approaches. The historical-teleological reflections were to be conceived 
in connection to the idea of radical responsibility, which has its horizon 
in the totality of one’s historical preconceptions. In other words, this new 
historical reflection was to serve the “liberation” of the phenomenologist 
from the yoke of the present moment. By converting the idea of teleology 
into a category of historical reflection which necessarily proceeds from 
the present moment, Husserl extended the phenomenological epoché to 
concern the particular commitments of our historical consciousness, i.e., 
the particular narratives on the righteous or unjust character of historical 
development. 
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  Phenomenology, in this regard, remained committed to the modern 
idea of universal historical teleology. However, this teleology was to be 
divested of its empirical illusions. Teleology, according to this account, 
could only be articulated on the basis of the present moment, as a critical 
tool which constantly calls for a rearticulation of historical development 
on the basis of this presence. 
  As I will argue in the second chapter (4.2), it was exactly this renewed 
understanding of teleology that came to serve as the fundamental point 
of departure for Husserl’s account of the cultural transformations of 
philosophy – transformations of which Europe served as the primary 
example. Instead of arguing for the purely ideal or transcendental character 
of the spiritual history of Europe, Husserl articulated this idea with regard 
to a twofold division between transcendental and empirical genesis, as 
a specific transformation within the structure of the transcendental 
genesis. In accordance with the infinitely open horizon of philosophical 
undertaking, phenomenology opened up a novel idea of ethical reflection 
that realizes itself through the interplay between the two types of ideals, 
the absolute and the relative. Although Husserl emphasized the essentially 
relative character of ethical considerations – our acts and deeds are always 
in a necessary relation to our personal history and our acquired capacities 
– he nevertheless maintained that our ethical striving should execute itself 
on the basis of an all-encompassing horizon of absolute ideals. It is only 
on the basis of this inexhaustible absoluteness that we are able to discover 
the inevitable and necessary one-sidedness of our thinking. It is exactly 
this insight, I argue, that provides us with a novel understanding of the 
possibility of progress as a phenomenological category. Instead of denoting 
a category of being or history as such, progress was to be conceived as 
a category of the will or practical reason. Far from denoting any kind of 
“optimism” or “pessimism” on how things will turn out to be, the idea of 
progress was to point towards the essentially future-oriented character 
of teleological-historical reflections: a genuine progress is possible only 
on the basis of a universal horizon of historical development. Through 
this renewed understanding on the generative and historical implications 
of the phenomenological attitude, Husserl was able to point towards a 
radically intersubjective character of philosophy and genuine social 
ethics: philosophy, although it necessitates the absolute self-responsibility 
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of the individual, finds its genuine teleological essence only within the 
intergenerational process of meaning-constitution. Alongside with the 
past, philosophy was to be understood as a radical responsibility for the 
coming community: I must strive to make others free as well. 
  These ideas provide us with a transition to Husserl’s own normative 
ideal of community. As I will argue in chapter 4.3, Husserl aimed at 
articulating this ideal on the basis of his overall framework of generativity 
and historicity, i.e., as a necessarily intersubjective and temporal idea 
of communal co-operation, which necessarily involves a relation to 
the cultural-political institutions of a particular homeworld. Although 
Husserl’s reflections fluctuated between the state-oriented and non-statist 
approaches to the question of the ethical ideal, I believe his reflections are 
best understood in terms of a search for a proper criterion of legitimacy 
in regard to political institutions. Instead of fixing phenomenology into 
a particular conception of the political domain (e.g. a concept of state, 
justice), Husserl aimed at providing a novel idea of political reflection and 
renewal on the basis of the dialectic between absolute and relative ideals. 
Against the classical traditions of political idealism and realism, Husserl’s 
thinking provides us with a novel understanding of political imagination 
as an essentially transient and context-situated form of thinking – a 
“dynamic” utopianism.
  In chapter 4.4, I will focus on one of Husserl’s most ambiguous 
characterizations for his normative ideal of community: the community 
of love (Liebesgemeinschaft). It is my argument that with the help of this 
notion, Husserl formulated the most interesting and compelling solution 
to the problem of ethical universalism – a solution that aimed at the 
practical affirmation of the original “intertwining” of human subjects (as 
presented in part 2). Instead of merely founding itself on the “axiological 
asymmetry” characteristic of the development of generativity, the concept 
of love pointed towards a radical deconstruction of this asymmetry for 
the sake of an intersubjective co-existence and co-dependency. In this 
venture, I suggest, Husserl’s thinking actually went beyond the conceptual 
framework of Greek philosophy and its understanding of political idealism. 
Instead of the political universalism characteristic of Greek political 
thought – i.e., universal extent of political institutions – Husserl’s analyses 
are best understood in regard to a particular continuation of this thought, 
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the Pauline (or Christian) idea of universalism. Instead of defining itself 
in relation to the classical concepts of erōs or filia, I believe that Husserl’s 
idea of love is best understood in terms of Christian agapē, which, instead 
of sublating the difference between individual subjects, aimed at the 
affirmation of their unique identity-in-difference. 
  This enables us to account for the specific form of universalism 
that was on the horizon of Husserl’s reflections on Europe. Instead of 
an idea of a substantial or third-party universalism (e.g. human rights, 
political institutions), Husserl’s phenomenological considerations on the 
structure of transcendental intersubjectivity provide us with a renewed 
understanding of universalism as a fundamental calling of reason, one, 
which necessarily involves a critical and reflexive stance towards the 
generative traditions of individual cultures, both own as well as foreign. 
Instead of a position that could be acquired once and for all, this idea 
of universalism is understandable only as a perpetual movement – as an 
infinite task – which has its horizon in the open community of subjects.
4.1 Teleology and Liberation:
Phenomenology of Presuppositions
As we have already observed, the idea of historical teleology consti-tuted one of the central topics of Husserl’s reflections on Europe, and this at least in two senses. First, what linked Husserl to the 
overall tradition of modern philosophy was his insistence that the genuine 
understanding of culture needs to realize itself in a teleological form, that 
is, it needs to be made understandable through its development towards 
certain “ends” and “purposes”. As Husserl put it in one of his late texts, 
the whole cultural world is essentially tradition – a “passing forward” of 
different accomplishments in the course of worldly time – that is given 
to certain subjects at a certain period of time as an essentially incomplete 
formation.15 This incompleteness becomes manifest, first of all, on the lev-
el of givenness: tradition provides us with meanings that are at least par-
15 “Die gesamte Kulturwelt ist nach allen ihren Gestalten aus Tradition da.” (HuaVI: 366) 
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tially empty and call for their reactivation in lively intuition. Further, they 
are also incomplete in another sense, namely, as goals that point towards 
their future development. To put it more succinctly, culture is essentially 
inheritance: it appoints its subjects as heirs, as someone who are requested 
or obliged to carry on certain accomplishments, practices, values and so 
on. We can discover purpose in history not because it is guided by a divine 
plan but because the passing-forward of culture is itself purposeful, that 
is, teleological.
  Second, what Husserl considered the birth of the European humanity 
through the breakthrough of Greek philosophy was not to be conceived in 
terms of specific cultural accomplishments, but it also signified the birth 
of a new kind of teleological horizon. As I already indicated in the previous 
part of this work, Husserl delineated this horizon under the notion of 
infinite task. While opening up the sphere of ideal accomplishments free 
of any empirical contours, philosophy gave birth to a class of completely 
new goals that are always only partially achievable in concrete action. By 
operating as kinds of ideal poles, these goals opened up a wholly new 
domain of universal historicity that could not be exhausted in the course 
of worldly time. While the original site for this motive was the sphere of 
scientific truths, it was also articulated in social-communal terms: phi-
losophy delineated a new form of political idealism that does not merely 
resign to the clout of the present but aims at rearticulating the conditions 
of the ideal political domain. 
  Although several scholars have appreciated the critical pretension 
of Husserl’s late teleological-historical reflections, these reflections also 
have a reputation of being both monolithic as well as Eurocentric. Paul 
de Man, for one, has argued that while “Husserl was demonstrating the 
urgent philosophical necessity of putting the privileged European stand-
point into question,” he “remained himself entirely blind to this necessity, 
behaving in the most unphilosophical way possible at the very moment 
when he rightly understood the primacy of philosophical over empirical 
knowledge.”16 According to de Man, Husserl never questioned the pro-
gressive narrative of European history proceeding from Greco-Roman 
world to modernity, nor did he contest the belief in the “supremacy” of his 
16 de Man 1983: 16.
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own European standpoint.17 Instead, the historical reflections of Husserl 
served merely the purpose of justification of the present moment – i.e., 
the Hegelian idea according to which historical development is both ra-
tional and inevitable – and thus lacking a critical potential. However, if we 
seriously consider the basic motivation of Husserl’s teleological-historical 
standpoint, we may find the possibility of counter-criticism:
Here the point of departure is: we, who carry out the universal 
consideration of persons, drawing into it the universal consider-
ation of the surrounding world, etc., are ourselves human beings, 
Europeans. We ourselves have developed historically; as histori-
ans we ourselves create world history and world science in every 
sense, a historical cultural structure within the motivation of the 
European history in which we are situated. The world which is for 
us is itself a historical structure belonging to us, who are ourselves 
in our being a historical structure.18
Every spiritual shape exists essentially within a universal historical 
space or in a particular unity of historical time according to 
coexistence and succession, i.e., it has its history (Geschichte). 
So if we pursue the historical interconnections, beginning, as is 
necessary, with ourselves and our nation, the historical continuity 
leads us further and further from our nation to neighboring nations, 
and thus from nation to nation, from one time to the next.19
As Husserl emphasizes, the certain privilege that the European narrative 
employed in his historical reflections was not motivated by the superi-
ority of this historical current. Rather, because our present situation is 
17 “Why this geographical expansion should have chosen to stop,” de Man writes, “once 
and forever, at the Atlantic Ocean and at the Caucasus, Husserl does not say.” (de Man 
1983: 15).
18 „Hierbei der Ansatzpunkt: Wir, die wir universale personale Betrachtung durchführen, 
in sie universale Betrachtung der Umwelt etc. einbeziehen, sind selbst Menschen, eu-
ropäische Menschen, sind selbst historisch geworden, wir erzeugen selbst als Historiker 
Welthistorie und Weltwissenschaft jedes Sinnes, ein historisches Kulturgebilde in der Mo-
tivation der europäischen Geschichte, in der wir stehen. Die Welt, die für uns ist, ist selbst 
ein historisches Gebilde von uns, die wir selbst nach unserem Sein ein historisches Gebilde 
sind.“ HuaVI: 313.
19 “Jede geistige Gestalt steht wesensmäßig in einem universalen historischen Raum oder 
in einer besonderen Einheit historischer Zeit nach Koexistenz und Sukzession, sie hat ihre 
Geschichte. Gehen wir also den historischen Zusammenhängen nach, und, wie es notwen-
dig ist, von uns und unserer Nation aus, so führt uns die historische Kontinuität immer 
weiter von unserer zu Nachbarnationen und so von Nationen zu Nationen, von Zeiten zu 
Zeiten.“ HuaVI: 319. My italics.
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itself permeated by objectivities and accomplishments that have origi-
nated through the philosophical, cultural, and scientific tradition of the 
West – e.g., Greek philosophy, Judeo-Christian values, and the worldview 
of modern natural sciences – a genuinely responsible stance must take 
its point of departure not from the tradition of the alien but from our 
own preconceptions. Thus, teleology is not an “objective” state of affairs 
conceived from a third-person perspective, but it is essentially something 
that effectuates itself through the first-person perspective. We ourselves, 
as Husserl puts it, are “the bearers” of teleology “who take part in carry-
ing it out through our personal intentions.”20 In this regard, as Steinbock 
notes, Husserl’s idea of teleology can also be understood according to his 
recurring use of the term Stamm – i.e., stem, root, or genealogical lineage 
– referring not to an idea of absolute foundation but to the process of 
“origin-originating”, which transforms its character in different histori-
cal phases.21 The cultural present, as Husserl puts it, “implies” (impliziert) 
within itself the whole of the cultural past22 –teleology can only be ap-
proached from the perspective of the present. 
  For Husserl’s phenomenology, accordingly, teleology did not entail a 
mere descriptive sense but also a normative potency. To say that our his-
torical present is teleological means, first of all, that it is not absolute; it 
is a product of a certain generative development that endows the present 
moment with its unique character, its specific normativity. That we are 
beings, who have been handed down with a scientific worldview, a form of 
market economy and social welfare, or the possibilities of telecommunica-
tion, is not an ahistorical fact but a result of a certain historical process. 
Our possibilities of action are dependent on the past: in this respect, the 
teleological horizon was the fundamental premise of genuine social eth-
ics, which does not take the present state of affairs merely as something 
given, but as a result of a particular historical development. Present is only 
what it is on the basis of the past – but the present also has the tendency 
20 “[…] als ihre [die Teleologie] Träger, in unserer persönlichen Willentlichkeit ihre Mit-
vollzieher.“ HuaVI: 71. See also HuaIX: 254 where Husserl defines transcendental subjec-
tivity itself as “teleological through and through”.
21 See Steinbock 1995: 194ff.; 1998c: 160.
22 „[…] die gesamte Kulturgegenwart, als Totalität verstanden, „impliziert“ die gesamte 
Kulturvergangenheit in einer unbestimmten, aber strukturell bestimmten Allgemeinheit.“ 
HuaVI: 379.
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of concealing this dependency.23. It is an inherent tendency of cultural ob-
jectivity to disguise its own teleological history, to present itself as static, 
if not eternal, truth. This is also what Husserl means when in Crisis, he 
speaks of the “spell” (Bann) of present times24 – in order to break out from 
the presence-centeredness of the natural attitude, the seeming naturality 
of this presence must be challenged. 
  Philosophy, however, had a somewhat more complex relation to its 
historicity. Especially in Husserl’s early analyses, philosophy seemed to 
fall outside teleological considerations because of its essentially ahistorical 
character: it deals with a domain of truth that is fundamentally unchange-
able. As Husserl argued in his early text on philosophy as rigorous science, 
while the history of philosophy might work as an “inspiration” for philoso-
phers of the present, it does not really provide any concrete assistance 
in the strenuous work of systematic philosophical reflections. “It is not 
through philosophies that we become philosophers”, Husserl wrote – and 
the efforts of arriving to the genuine sense of philosophy via historical 
reflections lead to nothing but “hopeless efforts”.25 Because every philoso-
pher must take full responsibility of his or her own labor, the historicity 
of philosophy presents itself also as a hindrance, as a warehouse of false 
problems.
  In the existing Husserl-scholarship, the historical and the non-his-
torical accounts are most often discussed in terms of different “ways” or 
“paths” to phenomenology (or to reduction). According to Iso Kern, in 
Husserl’s works we can distinguish between three types of approaches: 
first, the Cartesian, which basically corresponds with the ego-centric 
transcendental analysis that begins with Ideas; second, the way through 
intentional psychology, which deals with the inherent structure of mental 
phenomena without any reference to physical reality; and thirdly, the way 
of ontology, which roughly corresponds with the way of lifeworld taken 
in Crisis (although according to Kern, Husserl takes this way already in 
his earlier writings such as The Idea of Phenomenology, 1907).26 As Kern 
23 See HuaMatVIII: 436. Cf. Ch 2.1
24 HuaVI: 59.
25 “Aber zu Philosophen werden wir nicht durch Philosophien. Am Historischen hängen-
bleiben, sich daran in historisch-kritischer Betätigung zu schaffen machen und in eklek-
tischer Verarbeitung oder in anachronistischer Renaissance philosophische Wissenschaft 
erreichen zu wollen: das gibt nur hoffnungslose Versuche.“ (HuaXXV: 61)
26 Kern 1977: 126ff.
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rightfully observes, Husserl’s last works represent a transition from the 
Cartesian way to that of ontology (or the lifeworld), which was motivated 
by Husserl’s need to tackle the critique on the implicit solipsism of the 
Cartesian way, as well as his insistence of providing a constitutive function 
to intersubjectivity. Without the ontological way, phenomenology seemed 
to be unable to answer questions concerning the objectivity of the world, 
but also the questions concerning its historical and cultural relativity. As 
Husserl put it in a late manuscript:
We shall see that this lifeworld is nothing but the historical world. 
From here, it becomes conceivable that a complete systematic in-
troduction into phenomenology begins and is to be carried through 
as a universal historical problem. If one introduces the epoché with-
out the historic framing, then the problem of the lifeworld, i.e., of 
universal history, remains unsolved. The introduction in Ideas does 
in fact retain its right, but I now consider the historical way to be 
more principal and systematic.27 
Why is the historical way more principal and systematic? Because it corre-
sponds with the idea of philosophy as a teleological notion. That philosophy 
develops also as a historical process whose absolute sense is never given in 
its totality; that philosophy, too, denotes an open horizon of development 
that can never be exhausted by a single description; that the sense of phi-
losophy lies in infinity – these characteristics point towards an idea of phi-
losophy whose genuine sense can only be worked out through a teleolog-
ical-historical reflection. Philosophy means responsibility of grounds – the 
grounds of experience, of knowledge, of the world – but this responsibili-
ty must always understand itself on the basis of the generative background 
of philosophy as a whole. “Philosophy,” wrote Husserl, “is nothing other 
than [rationalism] through and through.” But this rationalism, he argues, is 
“differentiated within itself according to the different stages of the move-
ment of intention and fulfillment; it is ratio in the constant movement 
27 “Wir werden sehen, dass diese Lebenswelt (allzeitlich genommen) nichts anderes ist 
als die historische Welt. Es ist von da aus fühlbar, dass eine vollständig systematische Ein-
leitung, die in die Phänomenologie (einführt), als ein universales historisches Problem 
anfangt und durchzuführen ist. Wenn man die Epoche einführt ohne die geschichtliche 
Thematik, so kommt das Problem der Lebenswelt bzw. der universalen Geschichte hinten 
nach. Die Einleitung der Ideen behält zwar ihr Recht, aber ich halte den geschichtlichen 
Weg jetzt für prinzipieller und systematischer.“ HuaXXIX: 426
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of self-elucidation (Selbsterhellung).”28 Descartes, Kant and Hegel reached 
towards the ultimate grounds each in their unique way, but they did so 
on the basis of their unique philosophical situations. In this regard, the 
“primal establishments” of modern philosophy (Descartes) or genuine 
transcendental philosophy (Kant) were actually what Husserl calls “novel 
establishments” (Neustiftungen), i.e., beginnings that are relative in regard 
to the original primal establishment of philosophy per se.29 The point of 
teleological reflection is exactly to uncover this historical logic of primal 
and secondary/novel establishments, which forms the genuine “inner his-
toricity” (Innengeschichtlichkeit) of philosophy.30 
  In Husserl’s late manuscripts, we find this transition expressed also 
in terms of novel relation to the idea of “presuppositions” (Voraussetzun-
gen). Recall that since the publication of Logical Investigations, Husserl had 
considered the principle of presuppositionlessness (Voraussetzungslosigkeit) 
as the fundamental and necessary point of departure of pure phenom-
enology.31 What Husserl meant by this concept was basically the idea that 
all of our epistemological concepts must derive their legitimacy straight 
from the experience in which they are given, and that we should resist all 
metaphysical assumptions and speculations concerning the true character 
of being and experience. Following the idea of the principle of principles 
(cf. Ch. 1.4), phenomenology was to be undogmatic: it was to turn its gaze 
away from not only the realist presuppositions of the natural attitude but 
also the traditionally sedimented problems of philosophy. 
  Here, Husserl’s later works took on a somewhat different direction. 
While he still held on to the idea of phenomenological reduction as the 
“bracketing” of the natural attitude, he began to treat the “historical pre-
suppositions” of philosophy as something that necessarily accompany the 
critical-reflexive position. “Without reflecting the totality of our precon-
ceptions”, Husserl wrote, “there is no philosophy, no science of the fi-
nal and genuine responsibility.”32 As the reflections concerning the Greek 
28 “So ist Philosophie nichts anderes als <Rationalismus>, durch und durch, aber nach 
den verschiedenen Stufen der Bewegung von Intention und Erfüllung in sich unterschiede-





32 “Ohne die Besinnung über die Totalitat der Voraussetzungen ist ja keine Philosophie - 
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philosophy had shown, both Plato and Aristotle conceived the birth of 
philosophy as something that is essentially tied with the reflexive stance 
towards the generative background of one’s present situation. Plato’s cri-
tique of myth as well as Aristotle’s comparative account of previous think-
ers pointed towards a “positive” account of historical presuppositions – we 
become philosophers not only by simply abstaining from the traditionally 
given conceptions, but by discovering their essential finitude and one-
sidedness. 
  Indeed, it seems that in Husserl’s later works, the early rigid division 
between the historical and the systematic begun to falter: as Husserl wrote 
in a late manuscript, to the over-all sense of transcendental phenomenol-
ogy “belongs the intertwining (Ineinander) of historical investigations and 
the systematic investigations they [the historical] motivate, arranged from 
the start according to that peculiar sort of reflexivity through which alone 
the selfreflection of the philosopher can function.”33 Nobody begins at a 
clean slate: we become philosophers by working out our historical pre-
suppositions.
  This idea makes understandable the claim Husserl makes in Crisis, 
namely, that the teleological reflections aim at liberation (Befreiung).34 
Instead of the “negative” idea of liberation of Husserl’s earlier works – 
freedom from historical presuppositions – Husserl’s later works pointed 
towards a “positive” concept of liberation through historical reflection. We 
become free in our thinking only by acquiring the greatest possible variety 
of different truths, approaches, and possible standpoints, which provide us 
with an insight into the “historical movement” of this world – its successes 
and failures, its necessary one-sidedness – in which philosophy unfolds as a 
keine Wissenschaft aus letzter und wirklicher Verantwortung da.“ HuaXXIX: 415. On the 
critique of “phenomenological reduction in the first volume of Ideas, see HuaXXIX: 399, 
424–426.
33 “Zu diesem ihrem Gesamtsinn gehört das Ineinander von historischer und durch sie 
motivierter systematischer Untersuchung, von vornherein angelegt in der eigentümlichen 
Reflexivität, in der sich die Selbstbesinnungdes Philosophen allein bewegen kann” (HuaVI: 
364, translation modified)
34 Cf. HuaVI: 60: “[…] our expositions are supposed to aid understanding only from the 
relative [perspective of our] position and that our expression of doubts, given in the criti-
cisms [of Galileo, etc.] (doubts which we, living in the present, now carrying out our re-
flections, do not conceal), has the methodical function of preparing ideas and methods 
which will gradually take shape in us as results of our reflection and will serve to liberate 
us (zu unserer Befreiung dienen sollen).” 
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common task.35 It is only through a comprehensive account of the past that 
one is able to surmount the compelling necessity of the present moment, 
namely, the idea that philosophical reflection always remains tied to the 
present moment, to the present conceptuality and its presuppositions. 
  We can perhaps now observe why Husserl’s idea of teleology distin-
guished itself, sharply and distinctively, from its Hegelian predecessor. As I 
argued in the first part of this work, for Hegel the teleological idea of cul-
ture was employed primarily in order to account for overarching rational-
ity of historical development. Through the idea of “cunning of reason” (List 
der Vernunft), Hegel was able to show how even the seemingly irrational or 
unjust deeds and events contribute to the necessary development of spirit 
and consequently to the progress of human freedom. As Hegel put it at the 
end of his lectures on world-history, “philosophy concerns itself only with 
the glory of the idea mirroring itself in the history of the world,”36 so that 
ultimately, the “transcendental” ideal of spirit and the “empirical” history 
of the world are reconciled. “This is the true Theodicy,” writes Hegel, “[…] 
that what has happened, and is happening every day, is not only not ‘with-
out God’, but is essentially his work.”37 Here, it is exactly the universal 
teleology of the world that justifies the present moment as the indispens-
able result of spirit’s progression. 
  It is my conviction that here the Husserlian teleology was based on a 
different approach. For Husserl, the teleological horizon of the past was 
not called upon in order to justify the present as a result of a necessary 
development, but instead, in order to demand a creative transformation on the 
present state of affairs. For Husserl, teleology became ultimately a critical 
requisite of philosophical thinking that does not merely confine itself to 
the present moment and its factical accomplishments but aims at show-
ing their necessary finitude and incompleteness in regard to the infinite 
horizon of philosophy. Teleological reflection is indispensable, because we 
are “not yet” at the end of history, or, to be more precise: because we con-
stantly think we are. 
  The phenomenological concept of teleology, accordingly, resists all 
forms of historical determinism. That certain ideas necessitate the exis-
tence of others – or that certain cultural objects can be created only on the 
35 HuaXXIX: 397.
36 Hegel 1988: 457.
37 Ibid.
— 333 —
. T, H, C
basis of certain material and intellectual conditions – means that the de-
velopment of culture adheres to a certain teleological pattern. It is exactly 
here that history has its own “a priori” – not in the sense of a pre-estab-
lished harmony but as necessary relations of foundation, that can only be 
discovered on the basis of those accomplishments that have been handed 
down to us. As Husserl emphasizes, this a priori is never a “novel” (Roman) 
but always an interpretation.38 Following the depiction of Gurnemanz in 
Wagner’s Parsifal – “Du siehst mein Sohn, Zum Raum wird hier die Zeit” – we 
can say that the objective of Husserl’s teleological-historical reflections 
was to open up a creative “space” of action through a thoughtful encounter 
with historical “time”. And like for Parsifal, for whom “the wound can be 
healed only spear that caused it”, the crisis of historical relativism can only 
be overcome by a radical reflection of our historical way of being. In order 
to understand this idea, we need to focus on Husserl’s distinction empiri-
cal and transcendental genesis.
4.2. Absolute and Relative Ideals:
A Phenomenology of Progress 
The interpretation according to which Husserl’s teleological-his-torical reflections present us with an uncritically Eurocentric ac-count of philosophical rationality has been suggested by several 
scholars, most importantly, by Jacques Derrida. Already in his early work 
on the idea of genesis in Husserl’s works (The Problem of Genesis in Husserl’s 
Philosophy, written in 1954; published in 1990), Derrida points towards a 
series of inconsistencies in Husserl’s teleological account of Europe that 
result from his highly problematic distinction between its transcendental 
and empirical genesis.39 While on a general level, Derrida praises Husserl 
for discovering the possibility of reconciling between the “objectivist” and 
“historicist” approaches to ideality – ideas can have a history, a genesis, but 
38 This idea was already anticipated in a 1934 manuscript: “Jeder Versuch, aufgrund der 
Verkettung literarisch dokumentierter Tatsachen eine Geistesgeschichte, eine Geschichte 
der Philosophie zu konstruieren, ist nicht ein „Roman“, sondern eine „Interpretation“, eine 
durch die Tatsächlichkeiten der Dokumentierung gebundene „Dichtung“.“ HuaXXIX: 47.
39 Derrida 2003: 145ff.
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this does not make them relative – Husserl’s insistence on the purely tran-
scendental (or “spiritual”) character of Europe’s genesis made him neglect 
the necessary empirical aspect of this development. If the eidos of Europe 
that delineates the infinite horizon of philosophy has only “one spiritual 
birthplace”, as Derrida reads Husserl, then it is necessary that this idea is 
somehow tied to this particular locality, the Hellenic world. If the birth of 
Greek philosophy signified the “primal institution” (Urstiftung) of the idea 
of Europe, how could Husserl claim to keep this institution free of any 
“real” empirical history? Thus for Husserl, Derrida concludes, “the idea of 
philosophy is thus reduced to a fact”40 – what looked like a transcendental 
idea of pure theoretical attitude, reveals itself as an outcome of a particu-
lar empirical situation.
  Derrida’s criticism was based on his interpretation of the contami-
nated (contaminé) character of transcendental concepts in The Problem of 
Genesis – an interpretation that became an important point of departure 
for his later works such as Voice and Phenomenon (published in 1967). Ac-
cording to him, Husserl’s insistence on locating a pure, transcendental 
account of genesis – a pure Urstiftung – was contradictory with the basic 
phenomenological insight on time-consciousness, namely, that the pres-
ent moment carries necessarily within itself a horizon of non-presence, 
of retention and protention. For Derrida, the very existence of genetic 
phenomenology had revealed the paradoxical nature of transcendental 
concepts, which were supposed to be at the same time “constitutive” and 
“constituted” – something that function as the condition for the appear-
ance of the world, but also something that appear in space and time. 
  In Derrida’s view, Husserl’s idea of the “spiritual geography” of Eu-
rope was problematic not only with regard to its own empirical con-
straints but it also gave birth to a rather odd division between European 
and non-European cultures. By singling out the theoretical attitude as the 
emergence of transcendental historicity in Greek philosophy, Husserl was 
inclined to split the very notion of humanity into two separate domains: 
the transcendental and the empirical, i.e., “the spiritual family of Europe” 
and the “families of an empirical type”.41 In Husserl’s analysis, Derrida 
argues, this division was basically equivalent with the distinction between 
40 Derrida 2003: 156.
41 Derrida 2003: 159.
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teleological and non-teleological cultures – cultures that have their unity 
through a single teleological horizon and cultures whose objectivities and 
accomplishments are bound merely by an analogical coherence. This Hus-
serlian hypothesis, as Derrida puts it, would be outright “laughable”.42 
However, for him this is the only possible way to understand Husserl’s 
controversial distinctions between the “immanent teleology” of Europe 
and the mere “empirical sociological types” of India and China that Hus-
serl seems to make in his late works, especially in the Crisis and its supple-
mentary texts. 
  However, as a careful textual analysis indicates, this is not exactly 
what Husserl had in mind. While it is true that Husserl approached the 
idea of Europe in connection to the notion of teleology, this is not to say 
that Husserl would have restricted the use of this notion exclusively to 
Europe. Derrida’s citation of Husserl’s “reworked text of the Vienna Lec-
ture” – “seule l’Europe a une «téléologie immanente»”43, “only Europe has an 
‘immanent teleology’” – is not actually taken from Husserl but from Paul 
Ricoeur’s article “Husserl and the Sense of History” (Husserl et le sens de 
l’histoire, 1949), and it is an erroneous translation of two passages of the 
Vienna Lecture.44 In this text, Husserl referred first to what he called “nur 
unserem Europa gleichsam eingeborene Teleologie”45 – a teleology that is born 
only within our Europe – and second, to the philosophical idea that is imma-
nent to European history: “Die der Geschichte Europas (des geistigen Europas) 
immanente philosophische Idee aufzuweisen, oder, was dasselbe ist, die ihr imma-
nente Teleologie […]”.46 As any diligent reader notes, what Husserl called 
“immanent teleology” was indeed something that he sees as specific to the 
development of European history, however, this is not to say anything of 
the application of the concept of teleology with regard to other cultures. 
Rather, Europe distinguishes itself from other cultures on the basis of the 
type or character of its teleology – on the basis of the infinite horizon, 
which characterizes some of its practices and accomplishments.
  Moreover, the reference to the “empirical sociological types” of India 
and China is inaccurate – and it is not to be found in the Vienna lecture. 
42 Derrida 2003: 157.
43 Ibid. 
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In the preface to the Crisis, Husserl does make a contrast between what he 
calls an “absolute idea” that may be discovered as a fundamental constitu-
ent of European humanity and “empirical anthropological types” of which 
“China” and “India” are given as examples.47 This distinction, which many 
commentators deal with outright indignation, should not to be read as a 
simple classification of cultures. As it is clear from the context, what Hus-
serl lays out here is a difference in method: while the teleological idea is 
something that can be approached from the perspective of inner historic-
ity – of the phenomenological, first-person perspective – anthropological 
typification can only amount to an objectivist account narrated from a 
third-person point of view. In the Vienna lecture, we find an explicit ref-
erence to “Indian historicity” (die indische Geschichtlichkeit) and its peculiar 
teleology, which we can grasp, at least partially, by empathizing with its 
peculiar accomplishments (such as writings, works of art, practices).48 As 
we already saw in connection to the generative background of Greek phi-
losophy (Ch. 3.2), Husserl conceived this empathizing activity not only as 
informative, but also as productive: for him, this critical encounter with the 
“alien” (fremde) became one of the central motives of cultural renewal and 
the specific universal attitude it motivates.49
  I am stressing the significance of Derrida’s early critique, not only of 
exegetical interest, but because it is reformulated in different ways in his 
later analyses of Husserl’s alleged Euro-centrism. In his essay “The Other 
Heading” (L’autre cap), for instance, Derrida distinguishes himself from 
what he calls the “arche-teleological” narrative of not only Husserl – but 
of Hegel, Valéry and Heidegger – a narrative that projects the “spiritual 
unity” of European humanity through a transcendental analysis of its arche 
and telos, beginning and end. This modernist narrative, as Derrida puts 
it, “dates from a moment when Europe sees itself on the horizon, that is 
to say, from its end […], from the imminence of its end”50 and as such it 
represents one of the most destructive traits of modern thought. Why? 
Because by projecting the fate of Europe in terms of an imminent end – 
the end of “history” (Hegel), of “philosophy” (Heidegger), of “European 
47 “Erst damit wäre entschieden, ob das europäische Menschentum eine absolute Idee 
in sich trägt und nicht ein bloß empirischer anthropologischer Typus ist wie China oder 
Indien […]“ HuaVI: 14.
48 HuaVI: 320.
49 On Indians as ”alien”, see HuaVI: 304, 320; HuaXXIX: 198.
50 Derrida 1992: 28.
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spirit” (Valéry) – it confines itself to a historical narrative that is at the 
same time monolithic and hermetic. To say that Europe proceeds from 
its beginning to its end is to look away not only from the “other headings” 
that ascend within this tradition, but also from “the heading of the other”. 
Accordingly, it closes off the possibility of relocating the ends of culture 
through an encounter with the other. 
  What Derrida seems to miss, first of all, is the very motivation that 
led Husserl to frame the problematic of Europe in terms of teleological 
development. As I showed in the first part of this work, Husserl’s late 
philosophy grew as a reply to the early twentieth-century debate on crisis, 
which delineated the future of Europe in terms of an irreversible demise. 
Philosophy could no longer think of alternatives, because it had given in 
to the naturalist and physicalist paradigm of the modern natural sciences. 
These currents, as I showed, had given up on the problem of development 
and teleology, and consequently, they were unable to pose questions on 
the ends and goals of a culture, or the possibility of progress. For Husserl, 
the teleological reflections were to be understood as the very counterten-
dency of the naturalist paradigm:
I mean that we feel (and in spite of all obscurity this feeling is 
probably legitimate) that an entelechy is inborn in our European 
civilization which holds sway throughout all the changing shapes 
of Europe and accords to them the sense of a development toward 
an ideal shape of life and being as an eternal pole. Not that this is a 
case of one of those well-known types of purposeful striving which 
give the organic beings their character in the physical realm; thus 
it is not something like a biological development from a seminal 
form through stages to maturity with succeeding ages and dying-
out. There is, for essential reasons, no zoology of peoples. They are 
spiritual unities; they do not have, and in particular the suprana-
tional unity of Europe does not have, a mature shape that hasever 
been reached or could be reached as a shape that is regularly re-
peated. Spiritual humanity has never been complete and never will 
be, and can never repeat itself.51
51 “Ich meine, wir fühlen es (und bei aller Unklarheit hat dieses Gefühl wohl sein Recht), 
da unserem europäischen Menschentum eine Entelechie eingeboren ist, die den europä-
ischen Gestaltenwandel durchherrscht und ihm den Sinn einer Entwicklung auf eine ideale 
Lebens- und Seinsgestalt als einen ewigen Pol verleiht. Nicht als ob es sich hier um eine der 
bekannten Zielstrebigkeiten handelte, die dem physischen Reich der organischen Wesen 
ihren Charakter geben, also um so etwas wie biologische Entwicklung von einer Keimge-
stalt in Stufen bis zur Reife mit nachfolgendem Altern und Absterben. Es gibt wesensmäßig 
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As Husserl puts it here, the telos that unfolds through the transcendental 
genesis of Europe is not something achievable; rather, it functions as the 
eternal pole which endows the particular history with its peculiar future 
horizon. It is exactly for this reason that the “spiritual teleology” of Europe 
resists all forms of natural determinism – for instance, that of biological 
development – but also the modern notion of history as something that 
is exhausted by a particular empirical telos. Here, contrary to what Der-
rida suggests, Husserl and Hegel stand again at opposite ends. Although it 
is debatable whether Hegel envisaged the end of history at his own time 
– whether Napoleon riding to Jena in 1806 really represented the spirit 
of world-history on a horseback – it seems clear that he could see no 
real alternatives for what he considered the empirical “mirror” of spirit’s 
progression: the egalitarian institutions of the modern nation-state. The 
absolute telos of history as the completion of spirit’s progression – univer-
sal freedom – was there at Hegel’s sight, and it had been given a concrete 
form; the end was imminent simply because he could not envisage any 
greater upheaval than that of the French revolution, which had confined 
itself to this promise of universal freedom. 
  Husserl did not contest the achievements and ideals of this develop-
ment – actually, at the outskirts of the First World War Husserl was still 
speaking of imminence of German victory in Fichtean-Hegelian terms as 
the triumph of spirit and the power of will, which “cannot be resisted by 
any force of the world like in 1813/14 [i.e., as Napoleon was defeated 
by the Prussian coalition in the so-called Befreiungskriege which ended the 
French occupation].”52 However, what Husserl came to realize was that 
even the modern nation-state was still only a partial, and in many respects 
unfounded realization of universal freedom. This deficiency was not due 
to the peculiar character of the modern state, but to the ineffable charac-
ter of the underlying ideal as such. The absolute ideal of humanity – ar-
ticulated first through the ideas of autonomy and self-responsibility – can-
not be realized by any empirical genesis, whether this is a polis, a nation 
keine Zoologie der Völker. Sie sind geistige Einheiten, sie haben, und insbesondere die 
Übernationalität Europa hat keine je erreichte und erreichbare reife Gestalt als Gestalt 
einer geregelten Wiederholung. Seelisches Menschentum ist nie fertig gewesen und wird 
es nie werden und kann sich nie wiederholen.“ HuaVI: 320.
52 “Es ist absolut sicher, daß wir siegen: Diesem Geist, dieser Willensgewalt, kann jetzt 
wie 1813/14 keine Macht der Welt widerstehen”, letter to Heinrich Husserl, quoted in 
HuaXXV: xxx
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or even a cosmopolitan community. Instead, the idea of transcendental 
genesis with its peculiar horizon of infinity was to be understood as a 
critical device through which the essential incompleteness of all empiri-
cal institutions can be illustrated. Thus, contrary to what Derrida claims, 
for Husserl the notion of teleology did not entail imminence of an end 
but rather its opposite: the constant deferment of “the end of history”.
  In a way, Husserl’s vision of the teleology of history was even more ide-
alist than that of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century philosophers but 
at the same time it was also more realist. Why more idealist? Because the 
historical reflections of the modern philosophers of history were still rely-
ing on the organic metaphors of “crisis” and “revolution” or on Hegelian 
theodicy that portrayed the advancement of human freedom as something 
natural and therefore necessary. In contrast to these ideas, Husserl insisted 
on the inalienably ideal character of this development, which should not 
model itself on the basis of the real world; teleology should not confine it-
self to the regularities of biological development nor should it rely on any 
kind of eschatological expectation concerning the outcome of history. 
  But it is exactly for this reason that one is able to have a more realist 
stance towards history. Modern philosophies of history, which had mod-
eled themselves on the basis of Christian eschatology, were born out of 
the promise according to which the conflicts and suffering of mankind 
turn out to be meaningful precisely because they are ultimately pacified 
by the full realization of human rationality. History makes sense, because 
it ultimately leads to just world. Here, Husserl’s “realism” was exactly his 
unwillingness to accept this inevitability as the underlying dialectical force 
of history. We should accept no a priori projections concerning the course 
of history, but instead, we should take history as it is – with all of its 
defects and injustices.53 History, like the natural sciences, should also be 
subsumed to the phenomenological epoché.
  However, it is exactly this fundamental realism that opened up the 
creative horizon of philosophical critique. Once we confine ourselves to 
the belief that, ultimately, history will not do the work for us and will not 
bring about the ideal human condition, we are obliged to take responsi-
53  As Husserl put it in a letter to Abbé Baudin, what he meant by the universal “teleology 
of reason” was to be distinguished from the typical religious formulations teleology that se-
cure the righteous and just character of the world. This letter is quoted in HuaXXIX: xv.
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bility for its future course. From this phenomenological perspective, phi-
losopher is not midwife of history; instead, s/he is the one who interrupts 
or suspends its seemingly natural course.54 What Husserl was against was 
exactly what Walter Benjamin later called the “theological” element in the 
teleology of modern philosophy of history – especially that of historical 
materialism – that is, the unwavering belief according to which, eventu-
ally, “history is on our side” (i.e., on the side of reason). This belief, for 
Benjamin, manifested itself especially in the false hopes the Social Demo-
cratic movement, which believed in the irresistible, though gradual prog-
ress and perfectibility of humankind. History, for Benjamin, can only be 
on the side of she who narrates it; therefore, the critique of the naïve idea 
of progress must begin with the critique of history proceeding through 
“homogenous, empty time”.55
  What connects Benjamin and Husserl in this regard is that they both 
recognized the imminent threat in the modern idea of historical crisis. 
Benjamin, like Husserl, had experienced the unstable period of the Wei-
mar Republic and understood that at least politically, crises are not mere 
objective facts but they are always also wanted. “The tradition of the op-
pressed teaches us,” wrote Benjamin, “that the ‘state of emergency’ in 
which we live is not the exception but the rule.” Thus, “we must attain 
to a concept of history that is in keeping with this insight.”56 Against the 
false state of emergency that is held up by the oppressors against the op-
pressed – a crisis that merely suffocates the alternative courses on the 
basis of the binding force of the present moment – the task of philosophy 
is to introduce a “real state of emergency” that releases the emancipatory 
power of the present moment (what Benjamin calls the Jetztzeit in distinc-
tion from Gegenwart). Husserl, likewise, wanted to distance himself from 
the false crisis of the early twentieth-century that merely concentrated on 
the present moment, and introduce a novel possibility of reading the crisis 
as an a priori category of historical development, which calls the ends and 
purposes of culture into question. 
  Here, I believe, we arrive at one of the most important insights con-
cerning Husserl’s reflections of Europe. Rather than simply representing 
54 This point is made by Steinbock 1994a: 458; 1998a: 196.
55 Benjamin 1992: 264.
56 Benjamin 1992: 257.
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the herald of progress – or, what Derrida called the “good example […] 
which incarnates in its purity the telos of all historicity”57– the problematic 
of Europe pointed towards a novel concept of historical development that 
radically challenged all conventional ideas on the advancement of human-
ity. This development, I would argue, was to be conceived neither cumu-
lative nor dialectical; instead, it unfolds through a peculiar interplay of 
the relative and absolute ideals, through the intertwining of the empirical 
and the transcendental aspects of historical development. Analogical to 
the idea of paradox of subjectivity, Husserl conceived history in terms of 
these two necessary and “reciprocal” aspects, neither of which should be 
understood in terms of deterministic development. History, as it is real-
ized through the striving of concrete human beings, is indeed something 
empirical – something that is localized in place and time – but its devel-
opment is not completely arbitrary. Through the teleological structure of 
transcendental genesis, history has its own a priori, not in the sense of 
predetermined causal relations, but in the sense of necessary relations of 
foundation, of co-existence and succession. In brief, the idea of transcen-
dental genesis means simply that there is a certain necessity in how things 
happened, but there is no necessity that they happened. 
  Let me clarify the argument. As I argued in previous sections, the 
most important reformulation of the concept of transcendental through 
genetic phenomenology concerned its relation to concept of necessity. 
Whereas Kant had still delineated the notion of transcendental in terms 
of “necessary” and “a priori” structures, Husserl argued that one could still 
speak of a priori, constitutive features without making them necessary. 
For instance, the faculty of language that makes possible the constitution 
of ideal meanings is not there at the moment of our birth (or during the 
first year of our lives), but this does not make it a mere psychological 
notion. Language opens up a new constitutive dimension of experience 
which makes possible what Husserl called the “empty intending” or the 
purely “signitive” intuition: a specific intentional relation that does not 
necessitate the presence of a thing, but that can still be intersubjectively 
shared. Despite their cultural and historical variations, this is the com-
mon feature of all human languages, that is, they allow the transmission 
of meaning in an inter-generational manner (although this meaning may 
57 Derrida 1989: 115.
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not be transmitted as identical). However, it was not a necessary develop-
ment that this faculty emerged in the life of homo sapiens 100,000 years ago 
(which is only one of the many approximations) – as it is no necessity that 
it emerges within our contemporaries. As we know from the cases of lan-
guage disorders (aphasia), linguistic faculties are something that can vary a 
great deal, or, as in some cases, they might be completely undeveloped. 
  The same concerns philosophy. As I argued in the third part of this 
work, Husserl conceived the birth of the philosophical attitude as essen-
tially tied to several pre-philosophical practices such as the deterritorial-
ization of traditional polis, the travelogues of theoria, the critique of myth, 
and the ethical skepticism of the sophists. While it is clear that none of 
these motives as such accounted for the birth of philosophia as communal 
activity, they all contributed to the emergence of the necessary condi-
tion through the philosophical attitude was made possible. Without the 
disempowerment (Entkräftung) of tradition promoted by these practices, 
the idea of radical self-responsibility would have remained undeveloped. 
This is not to say, however, that ideas of all-embracing self-responsibility 
or pure consideration of essences would have automatically followed the 
development of these pre-scientific practices – it is well possible that the 
(Protagorean) motive of ethical relativism would have only contributed to 
the frameworks of political discourse or rhetoric. Philosophy was possible 
on the basis of this generative transformation – and this transformation 
was indeed necessary element for this transformation – but it was by no 
means necessary that philosophy emerged at this historical stage. 
  Here we return to Derrida’s counterargument: How could Husserl 
still define the transcendentality of the philosophical attitude free of any 
empirical constraints? If Europe, through its origin, has this privilege to 
philosophy, what could the ideality and universality of the philosophical 
attitude mean? The answer can be provided only by considering the te-
leological aspect of philosophy. As a historical accomplishment, philoso-
phy realized itself through concrete practices such as the oral discourse 
of the public sphere (dialogue), writing, comparative critique of myths. 
As such, it was defined by several empirical practices and concrete goals. 
Without these practices, the idea of philosophy could have meant only an 
individualistic attitude, a personal contemplation of the necessary struc-
tures of reality. However, because philosophy was essentially a cultural 
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accomplishment, a communal-generative activity, it necessarily embodied 
a link to the empirical world. The ideality and universality of the philo-
sophical attitude were not something that could be attained once and for 
all; they could only be conceived as the horizon of the overall teleological 
development of philosophy. Philosophy wanted to be ideal and universal, 
but it was necessarily forced to articulate itself in regard to empirical con-
straints; it found itself as a rupture between the everyday reality of the 
common man and the infinite horizon of philosophical truths. 
  This essential rupture between the empirical and the ideal – the cave 
and the daylight (Plato), or, the mortal and the divine element of the soul 
(Aristotle) – was something that Husserl wanted to articulate in its teleo-
logical sense:
Here we must certainly distinguish between philosophy as a 
historical fact of a given time and philosophy as idea – the idea 
of an infinite task. Any philosophy that exists at a given historical 
time is a more or less successful attempt to realize the guiding 
idea of the infinity and at the same time even the totality of truths. 
Practical ideals, namely, ideals discerned as eternal poles of 
which one cannot lose sight throughout one’s whole life without 
compunction, without being untrue to oneself and thus becoming 
unhappy – are by no means always clearly and determinately 
discerned; they are anticipated in ambiguous generality.58
Thus, the horizon of infinity that was opened up by Greek philosophy with 
its universal historicity could only delineate this horizon of infinity through 
particular practical ideals. By doing so, the novel idea of transcendental 
attitude did not completely separate itself from the empirical; rather, it 
formed a new relation towards the latter, a relation that Husserl understood 
in terms of a conflict. As he put it elsewhere, the history of Europe had 
not been a simple triumph of universal reason through ever-closer 
approximations, but rather, it had been the “battle between awakened 
58 “‘Philosophie‘ – da müssen wir wohl scheiden Philosophie als historisches Faktum ei-
ner jeweiligen Zeit und Philosophie als Idee, Idee einer unendlichen Aufgabe. Die jeweils 
historisch wirkliche Philosophie ist der mehr oder minder gelungene Versuch, die leitende 
Idee der Unendlichkeit und dabei sogar Allheit der Wahrheiten zu verwirklichen. Prakti-
sche Ideale, nämlich erschaut als ewige Pole, von denen man in seinem ganzen Leben nicht 
abirren kann, ohne Reue, ohne sich untreu und damit unselig zu werden, sind in dieser 
Schau keineswegs schon klar und bestimmt, sie sind antizipiert in einer vieldeutigen Allge-
meinheit.“ HuaVI: 338. Translation modified.
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reason and the powers of historical reality”59 – a history of constant 
adhesions to particular norms and conceptual frameworks of specific 
historical situations. In other words, the transcendental genesis of Europe 
was at the same time an empirical one. What defined the transcendental 
history of Europe, however, was exactly its constant reflexivity towards 
the empirical.
  This constant tension between empirical and transcendental genesis, 
I argue, served as the fundamental motivation for Husserl’s own outline 
of historical development, introduced through the conceptual distinction 
between “relative” and “absolute” ideals. Although this dialectic of absolute 
and relative goals (Zwecke) was something that Husserl discussed from the 
beginning of the 1920s, it was only at the very last phase of his career 
that this division was discussed in connection to a consistent philosophical 
account of historical teleology – as something that was supposed to 
function as an alternative to the Hegelian idea of historical dialectic. That 
history realizes itself through the interplay of absolute and relative goals, 
and not the dialectical pattern of thesis, antithesis and synthesis provides a 
possibility of outlining an idea of historical development that recognizes, 
first of all, the active and transformatory role of the individual in regard 
to the constraints of culture. Moreover, this idea presents us with a 
conception of historical development without any illusions concerning its 
just character; progress is something that can only be willed on the basis 
of the present moment. Lastly, it argues for the essential ineffability of the 
normative ideal of humanity, which can only be realized by transcending 
the viewpoint of the atomic individual; reason and freedom belong 
together, but their genuine teleological sense can only be realized in the 
context of infinite generative development.
  Let me describe the emergence of this distinction in Husserl’s work. 
While discussing the teleological structure of human life in the context of 
individual ethics, Husserl distinguished between “absolute” and “relative” 
ideals of perfection (Vollkommenheitsideal).60 As the idea of autonomous 
self-responsibility emerges within the life of an individual, it gives way not 
only to an idea of rational behavior but to an ideal of person as the “true 
59 “Es geht durch die ganze ‘europäische’ Geschichte von ihrem Anfangen an dieser 
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and real self ”. This ideal, argues Husserl, can be conceived in two regards. 
First, it can be conceived as a relative ideal that denotes an existence that 
I can justify on the basis of those capabilities and conditions that have 
been given to me. This relative ideal, argues Husserl, provides us with the 
ethical imperative already formulated by Brentano, namely: “Do the best 
among the achievable!”61 From this relative or context-bound ideal there 
stands out what Husserl calls the absolute ideal of person: it denotes not 
only an existence based on acts that can be absolutely and completely 
justified but also the full realization and perfection of rational capabilities 
in whole. As such, this absolute ideal – which Husserl also names the “idea 
of God” – is of course essentially unattainable. Even more importantly, it 
can only be anticipated in an undefined generality, for our concrete idea 
of perfection is constituted on the basis of concrete human capacities or 
exemplary figures (of which the figure of Christ is given as example).62 
  Although Husserl’s ethical maxim comes close to the Kantian one, 
there is also a stark difference that separates these two from each other. 
Recall that for Kant, the categorical imperative delineated an idea of 
universal justification that would be bound to the indefinite repeatability 
of a certain act. For this reason, Kant could formulate his ethical maxim 
into the form of a universal imperative: “Act only according to that maxim 
whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal 
law.”63 This idea, however, did not say anything about the fundamental 
relativity of our historical, cultural and social situation: a single mother 
being compelled to strenuous shift work obviously has a different concept 
of human freedom than, for instance, a person who does not have to mind 
daily about the basic needs of material well-being. This discrepancy does 
not alter the grounds of ethical justification as such; by making visible 
the concrete obstacles and hindrances that necessarily constrain the 
realization of the absolute ideal, it reveals the essential embeddedness of 
all imperatives in human capacities. For this reason, Husserl formulated 
his relative ideal in terms of an imperative to strive at “best possible at a 
given moment” (das zur Zeit bestmögliche).64 The relativity of the ethical 
61 HuaXXVIII: 221.
62 See for instance, HuaXXVII: 100ff.
63 “[H]andle nur nach derjenigen Maxime, durch die du zugleich wollen kannst, daß sie ein 
allgemeines Gesetz werde.“ Kant, Akad.-A IV: 421.
64 HuaXXVII: 36
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criterion, however, does not entail simple relativism. Instead, it aims at 
showing the essentially finite character of human striving, the essential 
one-sidedness that characterizes our way of being. We can do our best 
only on the basis of those capabilities and faculties that we have acquired 
at a given time.
  However, if the relative ideal already prescribes the idea “best 
possible” human life, why make things more complicated by introducing 
the absolute ideal? The distinction between relative and absolute ideal 
is needed, because the relative ideals themselves have a tendency of 
becoming absolute. It belongs to the structure of human life that once we 
acquire ourselves certain goals and commit ourselves to them, these goals 
have a tendency of becoming a part of our abiding directedness to the 
world. They become habitual in the sense that we do not consider the basis 
of their justification. Here, the horizon of infinite perfectibility reminds us 
of our finitude – it reminds us of the dangers of premature satisfaction that 
arise from the particular successes. Again, Husserl breaks here with Kant: 
the ethical subject is never a mere empty pole – a formal transcendental 
principle – but a concrete, constituted subject with certain facilities and 
capabilities. This does not mean, however, that one should simply resign to 
those abilities s/he has acquired. The ethical subject is not only someone 
who carries the principle of justification within herself – someone who 
functions as the causa sui of his action – but also someone who is constantly 
call to develop as well as critically examine his or her own capabilities. 
Thus, what we have here is the paradox of subjectivity conceived in terms 
of practical reason: the ethically striving human being is both the subject as 
well as the object of his or her pretensions.65
  The distinction between relative and absolute ideal provides us with 
another approach to the “chief theme of all ethics”, namely, the motive of 
renewal.66 As I already pointed out in chapter 1.4, Husserl understood this 
idea as the necessary perquisite of the genuine sense of self-responsibility, 
which realizes itself not only according to the best possible evidence but 
on the basis of a critical reflection that is targeted towards one’s beliefs, 
pretensions, habits and capabilities. On the basis of the aforementioned 
65 “Er ist Subjekt und zugleich Objekt seines Strebens, das ins Unendliche werdende 
Werk, dessen Werkmeister er selbst ist.“ HuaXXVII: 37.
66 HuaXXVII: 20.
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reflections, we may observe why the idea of renewal makes fully sense 
only as a teleological notion: I can of course change my habits and goals 
from one to another, but without reflecting my previous life in its totality, 
I cannot reckon that these changes are a turn for the better (e.g., I may 
merely repeat a previously acquired pattern of behavior). In fact, I can 
never fully trust that any of my choices will ultimately turn out to be 
absolutely right. For this reason, Husserl emphasized that the idea of 
ethical renewal does not delineate the constant perfection of the ethical 
subject, but instead, this attitude can only be acknowledged as a form of 
self-elevation (Selbsterhöhung), which moves from “valuelessness to a lesser 
valuelessness”.67 Perfection is not to be attained in this world.
  This brings us back to the topic of crisis. As I argued in the first 
part, Husserl found the basic paradigm for his notion of crisis in the 
“loss of meaning” that characterizes the formation of sense in temporal 
development. A crisis of meaning takes place, when we fail to give intuitive 
founding for our beliefs, concepts, and values – when we discover that we 
had been living according to commitments we did not justify. This is why 
Derrida located Husserl’s basic sense of the crisis in the idea of “forgetting” 
or “covering over” (recouvrement) of transcendental subjectivity, which is 
the ultimate ground of all formation of sense.68 As Derrida maintained, in 
the Husserlian framework of generativity, a crisis of meaning could only 
be responded by reactivating the genesis and the origin of sense – as in the 
case of modern natural sciences, their crisis was to be overcome only by 
leading the basic concepts back to their evident foundation in the lifeworld. 
Husserl, according to Derrida, could still hold on to the idea of “complete 
presence” as the indispensable ideal of historical development. Although 
Derrida acknowledged Husserl’s strenuous efforts in understanding the 
general theory of crisis – i.e., how the virtuality of language constantly 
predisposes meaning to its emptying – Husserl still failed to grasp why 
these crises are actually “an inner necessity of history”, and not just an 
unhappy incident.69 
  As Husserl seems to suggest in few passages, the idea of crisis that 
accompanies the development of teleological ideals is indeed an inner 
67 HuaXXVII: 38.
68 Derrida 2003: 171.
69 Derrida 2003: 172. See Marrati 2005: 24.
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necessity of history, and it is something that cannot be overcome by simply 
reactivating the origin of a particular formation of sense. The crisis, 
understood as a category of teleological-historical development of sense 
and meaning, emerges only on the basis of relative ideals whose one-
sidedness and finitude can be acknowledged in retrospect. Although we 
might be able to return to the moment of their original instantiation 
and discover their intuitive justification, they may still turn out to be 
partial and unfounded. As Husserl put it in connection to the teleological 
development of philosophy:
It belongs to the essence of reason that the philosophers at first 
understand and labor at their task in an absolutely necessary one-
sided way. Actually there is nothing perverse in this, it is not an 
error. As we said, the straight and necessary path they must take 
allows them to see only one side of the task, at first without noticing 
that the whole infinite task of theoretically knowing the totality of 
what is has other sides as well.70 
As Husserl continues, “universal reflection” is motivated exactly through 
“obscurities” and “contradictions” that we discover by reflecting the to-
tal horizon of philosophy.71 We can perhaps now observe why Husserl, 
unlike Derrida seems to suggest, would consider crisis as a productive 
category of historical development, and not just something that accom-
panies the development of sense.72 Following Philip J. Buckley, it can be 
argued that in this Husserlian account, the “mistakes of the tradition can 
be viewed not solely as mistakes, but also as moments leading towards 
the revelation of truth.”73 We approach the universal perspective only by 
constantly colliding with the one-sided interpretations, with the finitude 
of our own perspective. Thus Buckley, following Rudolf Bernet, raises the 
70 “Es gehört zum Wesen der Vernunft, daß die Philosophen ihre unendliche Aufgabe 
zunächst nur in einer absolut notwendigen Einseitigkeit verstehen und bearbeiten können. 
Darin liegt an sich keine Verkehrtheit, kein Irrtum, sondern, wie gesagt, der für sie gerade 
und notwendige Weg läßt sie erst eine Seite der Aufgabe ergreifen, zunächst ohne zu mer-
ken, daß die ganze unendliche Aufgabe, die Allheit des Seienden theoretisch zu erkennen, 
noch andere Seiten hat.“ HuaVI: 338–339.
71 “Meldet sich in Unklarheiten und Widersprüchen die Unzulänglichkeit, so motiviert 
dies einen Ansatz für eine universale Besinnung.“ HuaVI: 339.
72 For this reason, Husserl claims, the “philosophical generativity loses from time to time 
the power of living procreation (verliert die Kraft lebendiger Fortpflanzung)” HuaVI: 488.
73 Buckley 1992: 125.
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question whether Husserl’s teleological narrative is best understood in 
terms of a felix culpa, a “felicitous mistake” that derives its fundamental 
sense from the original sin of Adam. For the Christian narrative, the Fall 
resulted not from God’s pre-established plan but from the freedom of the 
individual, whereby it was by no means necessary; however, it was only 
on the basis of this Fall that mankind was set on the strenuous path to 
salvation that was brought to its end by Christ. Likewise, the emergence 
of transcendental phenomenology was only possible through the crisis of 
naturalism and physicalism, which were by no means necessary, but which 
resulted from the unclarities of the modern philosophy (especially the 
question of transcendental). It was exactly for this reason that Husserl 
linked the novel possibility of cultural self-reflection to the “breakdown-
situation of our time” (“Zusammenbruchs”-Situation unserer Zeit).74
  The problem of felix culpa is that it still seems to define itself in re-
gard to a pre-given understanding of history as something fundamentally 
righteous (as in the case of Christian eschatology). That all “mistakes” are 
legitimized by the teleological progress “leading towards the revelation 
of truth” comes very close to Kant’s “divine providence” or the Hegelian 
Theodicy which ultimately reveal the hidden rationality of the historical 
irrationalities.75 While it is evident that although we can and ought to learn 
from the “mistakes” of history – the unfounded or one-sided interpre-
tations that announce themselves as historical breakdowns – we should 
to be careful in simply justifying them in the name of progress. There is 
something suspicious in the application of the logic of felix culpa to Stalin’s 
purges, the Holocaust, or, the over-consumption of the earth’s natural 
resources during the twentieth century. These events can, undoubtedly, 
motivate new reflections that lead to a broader notion of responsibility, 
but it would be suspect to understand them as processes leading towards 
the revelation of truth. Or, to put it more succinctly, perhaps we ought 
to consider these events as the emergence of a new “truth of humanity” 
– a truth that was made possible by the techno-economical/bureaucratic 
nihilism of the twentieth century, or, the mass-consumption of the indus-
trialized globalization. This means that philosophy, in its venture to under-
stand the transcendental genesis of human history, ought not to consider 
74 HuaVI: 58.
75 On the idea of “providence” (Vorsehung), see Kant Akad.-A VIII: 361.
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all “novel establishments” as improvements or elevated approximations of 
the original establishment.
  But if we cannot discover providence in history – if, as Nietzsche put 
it, we discover only decadence instead of progress76 – what can really mo-
tivate the teleological point of view? “What can bind us to our goal?” Hus-
serl asks in a late manuscript:
Is it only the foolhardiness of striving toward a goal which is beau-
tiful but only vaguely possible, one which is not definitely impos-
sible but still, in the end, imaginary, one which gradually, after the 
experience of millennia, finally begins to bear a very great induc-
tive probability of being unattainable? Or does what appears from 
the outside to be a failure, and on the whole actually is one, bring 
with it a certain evidence of practical possibility and necessity, as 
the evidence of an imperfect, one-sided, partial success, but still a 
success in this failure?77 
It is exactly in this text (Denial of Scientific Philosophy, Bestreitung der wissen-
schaftlichen Philosophie, Appendix XXVIII of Krisis) that we find one of the 
few original formulations of Husserl’s own historical method. If, as Hus-
serl seems to think, our historical reflections (Besinnungen) do not allow 
us to view the development of the world in terms of a Kantian Roman der 
Geschichte or Hegelian “triumph of spirit”, what form can they take? Here, 
Husserl provides his answer by evoking the concept of Dichtung, “poetic 
invention” – a creative interpretation that takes the present moment as its 
necessary point of departure.78 Now, while it is clear that the past philoso-
phers have not agreed upon the task of philosophy – its methods, basic 
concepts, metaphysical predicaments, or goals – this does not mean that 
we could not view this history in terms of a common intention. Rather, it 
is the necessary task of a philosopher who takes upon the task of historical 
reflection to view the past from the viewpoint of a unitary telos. We must 
view the thinkers of the past as if they had been contributing to a common 
76 “Nothing avails: one must go forward — step by step further into decadence (that 
is my definition of modern “progress”). “Es hilft nichts: man muss vorwärts, will sagen 
Schritt für Schritt weiter in der décadence ( — dies meine Definition des modernen „Fort-
schritts“ …).“ KSA 6.144.
77 Or, as Husserl asks in the preface to Crisis: “Can we live in this world, where historical 
occurrence is nothing but an unending concatenation of illusory progress and bitter disap-
pointment?” HuaVI: 4–5. This passage is also translated and quoted in Hart 1989: 166.
78 HuaVI: 512–513. 
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task, for it is only this way that their work can be reconciled in the over-all 
teleological horizon of philosophy. 79 This Dichtung of history, writes Hus-
serl, “has not and does not remain fixed”80, but it must be performed anew 
in each historical situation. We are, as James Hart puts it, “commissioned 
to tell the story better.”81 This simply means that each philosopher (and 
each generation) must take responsibility of their teleological interpreta-
tions, and by doing so, they need to go against the common narratives of 
the tradition – they need to excise the illusions of inevitable progress and 
decline. 
  This leads us to the fundamental insight concerning the phenomeno-
logical idea of progress. In one of his E-manuscripts entitled “Teleology”, 
Husserl argues for the active role of individual human beings in projecting 
themselves as teleological beings. As the idea of infinite perfection be-
comes a part of our intentional directedness to the world, it gives way not 
only to the will to live according to the best possible justification but also 
to the “will to live according to the idea of progress”.82 Far from denoting 
any kind of optimism on how things will turn out to be, this will to prog-
ress realizes itself merely in the perpetual will of renewal, which takes the 
total teleological horizon of one’s life as its point of departure. In other 
words, progress, in this phenomenological sense, is not a category of being 
but of practical reason.83 Progress is not something that exists in the world, 
but instead, it is something that I can realize as a teleological being – as a 
being who can reflectively grasp my previous life in its totality. This is what 
Husserl means when he says that strictly speaking, human life cannot be 
rational, but it can only become rational.84 This possibility, however, does not 
guarantee happiness or salvation, nor does it necessarily provide an abid-
ing gratification – my choices may turn out to be unjustified, or simply 
wrong. Thus, following Fichte (and perhaps echoing Aristotle), Husserl 
79 HuaVI: 513; see also HuaXXIX: 397.
80 HuaVI: 513.
81 Hart 1992a: 291.
82 “[…] im Willen, gemäss der Idee des Progressus leben zu wollen[.]” HuaXV: 379. See 
also HuaVIII: 14–15.
83 “Aber die absolute Teleologie ist nicht ein Zug der vorgegebenen Welt als solcher, ist nie 
etwas „schon Seiendes “ und im schon Seienden der Weltlichkeit vorgezeichnete, abhebba-
re, als Form induktiver Zukunft notwendige Strukturform” (HuaMatVIII: 433–434).
84 “Ein Mensch, ein Menschenleben kann nicht vernünftig sein, sondern nur vernünftig 
werden, und es kann nur vernünftig werden, es sei denn im Werden nach oder unter dem 
bewußt gewordenen kategorischen Imperativ.” HuaXXVII: 119.
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could find the seed of “blessedness” (Seligkeit) only in the striving towards 
good.85 
  As Anthony Steinbock has shown, Husserl’s later works mark a transi-
tion to the generative or communal-historical aspects of rational life, and 
this especially in an ethical regard. “Living according to an ethical self-
regulation is not fully ethical”, writes Steinbock, “because it is still based 
on the contemporary individual, on a ‘self’.”86 According to him, what this 
perspective lacks is the “generative dimension as communal and historical” 
– I am not responsible merely for my own beliefs and actions, but of the 
whole inherited tradition while being a part of a certain historical-com-
munal nexus of meaning. According to this view, Husserl presents us with 
an idea of ethical responsibility that goes beyond the individual person as 
someone who lives or behaves so and so. It extends the notion of respon-
sibility to concern also those sedimentations of meaning (for instance, the 
modern natural sciences) that we have inherited as being a part of a cer-
tain generative context.87
  While I agree with Steinbock, I would like to suggest that Husserl’s 
conclusion can be taken a step further. To say that social ethics – with its 
generative dimension – constitutes the full and genuine sense of ethics 
does not merely entail the distention of my personal self-responsibility 
to encompass inherited sedimentations of meaning. It also entails a reach 
beyond the life of the individual: an ethics of generations. For if we truly take 
seriously the idea of the teleological character of reason, which unfolds 
in the perpetual development of generations bound by the infinite task, it 
seems that the full sense of ethical responsibility cannot be realized solely 
in the lifespan of the atomic individual. Rather, it is only through the life 
of the others that my life and my will is able to project a genuine horizon 
of infinite development. In other words, it is only the transcendental in-
85 See especially HuaXXV: 285–287. Cf. HuaVIII: 16; HuaXXVII: 35.
86 Steinbock 1995: 204.
87 This idea is expressed quite clearly, for instance, in the introduction to the teleological-
historical manner of investigation in the paragraph 15 of the Crisis: “If he is to be one who 
thinks for himself, an autonomous philosopher with the will to liberate himself from all 
prejudices, he must have the insight that all the things he takes for granted are prejudices, 
that all prejudices are obscurities arising out of a sedimentation of tradition [...].” (“Selbst-
denker sein, autonomer Philosoph im Willen zur Befreiung von allen Vorurteilen, fordert 
von ihm die Einsicht, daß alle seine Selbstverständlichkeiten Vorurteile sind, daß alle Vorur-
teile Unklarheiten aus einer traditionalen Sedimentierung sind […].“ HuaVI: 72).
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tersubjectivity that can truly function as the concrete subject (Cf. Ch. 2.2) 
of ethical self-responsibility – a subject in which the play of relative ideals 
within the scope of infinite task can become a reality.
  Thus, alongside with the genetic implications of the ethical imperative 
– I must understand my action according to the total horizon of my life – 
we can point towards the even more radical, generative distention of ethical 
life. “It belongs to the categorical imperative of the individual subject,” 
Husserl writes in a manuscript, “that it must strive towards this higher 
form of community and this higher form of individual existence and indi-
vidual life as a functionary of an ethical community.”88 For it is only within 
the life of a community that the motive of perpetual renewal – the hori-
zon of the infinite task – can become a genuine reality; community is that 
entity which stands, so to speak, between the finite horizon of the human 
being and the absolute, all-embracing gaze of God. Community is, to put 
it simple, infinity on earth. Husserl writes:
In the community with others, I have the endless horizon of pro-
ductive activity, at least an empirically endless. I do not know how 
the world will stand ultimately, I do not know whether it will or 
must always be the same. I do not know, and we do not know 
whether a sudden world-catastrophe will make end of all striving. 
I know empirically that I will die, that my personal work and ac-
complishing will come to an end, [and] that my personal happiness 
which is given to me in success, is a passing fact. As being in human 
love, I find consolidation in the thought that my action is a part of 
a chain of action, which continues through the chain of generations 
in the context of an endless worldly reality, and that its value (sein 
Gutes) benefits others and is improved, increased and extended by 
them, benefitting also the forthcoming generations. The horizon 
is so wide and open, that I certainly have a relative satisfaction ac-
cording to the possibility, that this horizon may also be finite. But I 
know nothing about it. This is something that my satisfaction does 
allow itself to grow complete. Would I believe beforehand in the 
finitude of the continuity of generations, it would not abolish my 
ethical striving, but I would have to value the world as being im-
perfect, though not as worthless, because it contains values that are 
88 “Es gehört zum kategorischen Imperativ des einzelnen Subjekts, diese höhere Gemein-
schaftsform und diese höhere Form des Einzelseins und Einzellebens als Funktionär einer 
ethischen Gemeinschaft zu erstreben“. Husserl, WL: 220. 
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also developed; however, against the necessary ideal of improve-
ment in infinitum, it has an infinite insufficiency.89
The “worth” of this world is not merely in the value it contains; it is, above 
all, in the possibility of development and progress which are made pos-
sible on the basis of the teleology of reason. It is only through others who 
continue my accomplishments by taking them up, or, by forming a critical 
relation to them, that my existence is able to situate itself within a genuine 
horizon of infinity. Thus, generativity is a necessary condition of a genuine 
ethical stance not merely in terms of a received background of sense and 
meaning but even more importantly, as that future horizon of possible de-
velopment in which the “self-elucidation of reason” can become a reality.90 
I must strive to make the others free as well. Or, as Simone de Beauvoir 
later put it in her Ethics of Ambiguity: “It is only by prolonging itself through 
the freedom of others that [my freedom] manages to surpass death itself 
and to realize itself as an indefinite unity.”91 I know that I will die, but I 
also know that my resolutions and projects have the possibility of reaching 
beyond my finitude.
  This horizon of infinity, however, is not given to me in full apodictic 
certainty – rather, it is only anticipated on the basis of the teleological ho-
89 “Ich habe in Gemeinschaft mit den anderen einen endlosen Horizont fruchtbaren Wir-
kens, freilich einen empirisch unendlichen. Ich weiß nicht, wie es mit der Welt letztlich 
steht, ich weiß nicht, ob das immer so sein wird und so sein muss Ich weiß nicht und wir 
wissen nicht, ob nicht plötzlich eine Weltkatastrophe all dem Streben ein Ende machen 
wird. Ich weiß empirisch, dass ich sterben werde, dass meine persönliche Arbeit und Lei-
stung ein Ende haben wird, mein persönliches Glück, wenn es mir im Erfolg zuteilwird, 
ein vorfibergehendes Faktum ist. Aber ich getröste mich leicht, wenn ich menschenlie-
bend bin, im Gedanken, dass mein Wirken Glied einer Kette des Wirkens ist, das durch 
die Kette der Generationen im Rahmen der endlosen Weltwirklichkeit fortreicht, und 
dass sein Gutes anderen zugutekommt und durch sie gebessert, erhöht, erweitert, wie-
der den nachkommenden Generationen <zugutekommt>. Der Horizont ist ein so weiter 
und offener, dass ich eine gewisse relative Zufriedenheit noch habe auch angesichts der 
Möglichkeit, dass dieser Horizont vielleicht nur ein endlicher ist. Aber ich weiß darüber 
nichts. Das ist etwas, was meine Zufriedenheit nicht vollkommen werden lässt. Glaube 
ich im Voraus an die Endlichkeit der Kontinuität der Generationen, so hebt das nicht mein 
ethisches Streben auf, aber ich muss dann die Welt als unvollkommen werten. Nicht als 
wertlos, denn sie birgt Werte und noch sich steigerde Werte, aber sie hat gegenüber dem 
notwendigen Ideal einer Steigerung in infinitum einen unendlichen Mangel.“ Husserl, WL 
229–230. 
90 Or, as Husserl seems to suggest in one of his Kaizo essays, the idea of a genuine rational 
humanity presents itself as a communal imperative (Gemeinschaftsimperativ) that “incorpo-
rates” the individual imperative within itself. HuaXXVII: 118
91 Beauvoir 1994: 32. 
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rizon of life itself. The chain of actions reaching towards the infinite can-
not be presupposed; it cannot be posited as being. Instead, it can only be 
projected; it can only be willed. Or, perhaps most importantly, we must 
ask whether this ideal can also be promoted in the world? Can I, through 
my thinking and acting, promote the realization of universal freedom and 
self-responsibility? This question leads us to the reinterpretation of the 
political dimension of Husserl’s phenomenology.
4.3 Infinite Teleology and the Utopian Motive
For the Western tradition of political philosophy, the problem of le-gitimacy constitutes perhaps the single most important point of de-parture. From Plato to Hegel, and from Hobbes to Schmitt, it has 
been the guiding premise of this tradition that in order to become a part 
of a political community, one needs to give away a part of one’s autonomy 
and submit oneself to the will of a higher entity, the political sovereignty. 
This submission of the will is of course true for most of our social rela-
tions – beginning with the relation between the parent and the child – 
however, in the political domain this renouncement is never simply justi-
fied on the basis of a natural relation.92 While it is true that Plato treated 
his ideal polis as founded “according to nature” (kata physin), it could not 
uphold itself without the assistance of nature’s fundamental antithesis, no-
mos, i.e., “law” or “custom”.93 Accordingly, the guiding question of Western 
political philosophy has been how to justify a form of political sovereignty 
with its respective institutional framework – how to legitimize the divi-
sion between the ruler and the ruled. Especially for modern philosophy, 
this justification has been implemented according to three different ele-
ments: the authority of the sovereign (the ruler), state institutions with 
their disciplinary measures, and the legal framework that constitutes the 
92 See e.g. Hobbes’ distinction between political and private in Leviathan, chapter XXII: 
“Of systems subordinate, some are political, and some private. Political (otherwise called 
bodies politic and persons in law) are those which are made by authority from the sov-
ereign power of the Commonwealth. Private are those which are constituted by subjects 
amongst themselves, or by authority from a stranger.” Hobbes 1996: 149.
93 Plato, Rep. 428e
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basic domain of action. For this reason, the main vocabulary of this tra-
dition has consisted of different modes of political sovereignty (such as 
the “eternal” auctoritas and the temporal potestas), its different platforms 
(including the Greek polis, the modern nation-state, and different forms 
of supranational totalities), as well as the different types of law (interna-
tional, constitutional, criminal etc.). 
  As many critics have noted, however, as a price of this development 
has been that we have perhaps failed to appreciate the very founding mo-
tive of political theory since Aristotle, namely, the perception according 
to which multiplicity is the constitutive feature of the body politic. As 
theorists such as Arendt, Rancière, Deleuze, and Laclau have emphasized, 
the Western tradition of political philosophy has not fully appreciated the 
multiformity and diversity of societal reality, but has treated these as hin-
drances with respect to a more uniform communal life. For most of our 
political visions, disagreements and conflicts that take place within the po-
litical domain have been something that we ought to get rid of: following 
Augustine’s Confessions, we have perhaps come to consider a divided will as 
essentially impotent in comparison to a unanimous will. For this reason, 
as Foucault has argued, the Western political theory has been dominated 
by topics of sovereignty, governmentality and discipline; its basic question 
has been how to administer and control the diversity of societal existence. 
As he writes, we are still in need of a political philosophy that would not 
be centered on the problem of sovereignty, and consequently, of law and 
prohibition: “We need to cut off the king’s head: in political theory that 
has still to be done.”94 
  This cutting off, I argue, was also in the horizon of Husserl’s phe-
nomenological project. Through his reflections on social ethics and the 
teleological character of reason, Husserl wanted to question some of the 
central presuppositions of the political thinking of modernity – presuppo-
sitions that were defining the liberal tradition as well as its counterparts, 
the Kantian, Hegelian, and Marxist traditions. These presuppositions, I 
argue, related to at least three central features of our political tradition: 
the indispensability of the statist framework, the “utopian” dimension of 
modern political idealism, and the idea of political universalism. Although 
Husserl’s personal relation to the political implications of phenomenology 
94 Foucault, 1980: 121.
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was somewhat hesitant, I believe that his reflections point towards a novel 
understanding of political idealism, which, as in the case of individual eth-
ics, would take its point of departure not from a pre-established ideal 
of conduct, but from the dialectical relation of “relative” and “absolute” 
ideals. Political thinking, in this phenomenological sense, ought to create 
relative ideals on the basis of contemporary situation and its possibilities; 
at the same time, it should understand itself in relation to the absolute 
ideal of the best possible community. In other words, political thinking 
should be utopian – but it should also beware of taking a particular utopia 
as the absolute and final form of righteous community.95
  This dialectic, I argue, provides the basic model for a renewed under-
standing of universalism. As I argued in the previous part of this work, 
Husserl’s understanding of the universalist motive of Greek philosophy 
was founded on the essentially pluralistic foundation of this idea, namely, 
on the perception according to which the cultural objectivities of indi-
vidual homeworlds all referred back to their common foundation in the 
universal lifeworld (or earth-ground). This process of mediation, with the 
emergence of new idealities that were to be understood apart from the 
contingencies of natural language, introduced a new idea of communal 
co-operation that defined itself in regard to an infinitely open horizon of 
creation and production. Instead of a position that can be attained once 
and for all, universalism was to be acknowledged in terms of an infinite 
task that constantly calls forth a critical self-inspection in regard to the 
acquired tradition. Understood in its generative implications, this idea 
was to promote an idea of rational justification, which not only binds all 
rational subjects regardless of individual traditions and their particulari-
ties, but which promotes the idea of communal co-operation and personal 
self-responsibility beyond the division of home and alien.
  This movement had also political implications. As I argued in part 3.4, 
philosophy, which grew out of the mutual co-operation of few “excep-
tional individuals”, did not restrict its scope merely to the basic categories 
of reality, the essence of being and nature. It also brought within itself a 
transformation in the basic categories of social and political existence – “a 
revolutionization of the whole culture”96. Through the “political” reflections 
95 On the “utopian” dimension of Husserl’s historical philosophy, see Hart 1989: 164ff.
96 HuaVI: 325.
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of the Classical authors, philosophy aimed at formulating the notion of an 
ideal polis, which would gain its legitimacy independent of any concrete 
political reality. This ideal aimed at a broader understanding of the funda-
mental principle of philosophy – the uncompromising self-responsibility 
of the human individual – and how this could be given a concrete plat-
form in the body politic. For philosophy, polis became the site in which 
philosophical rationality becomes communal and historical – the site in 
which philosophy takes upon itself an abiding cultural form in the course 
of generations. 
  However, the communal praxis of philosophy defined itself also in a 
critical relation towards the political domain. For the Greeks, polis was not 
conceived merely as a domain of co-operation but also of exclusion – a 
particular political unit (such as Athens) understood itself essentially in 
relation to its outside (Sparta, Persia etc.). A political community without 
borders was basically inconceivable, although these borders were not nec-
essarily given a clear territorial outline as in the case of modern nation-
states.97 As Carl Schmitt put it in his The Nomos of the Earth (Nomos der 
Erde), it is actually possible to conceive “land-appropriation” (Landnahme) 
as the primal act of political institutions (what Schmitt calls “law” in gen-
eral) – something which is able to spatialize the distinction between friend 
and enemy.98 Philosophy, motivated by what Husserl called the disempow-
erment (Entkräftung) of particular traditions, gave birth to the insistence 
to overcome all “natural” divisions between “familiar” and “strange”, that 
is, to abstract from all traditionally given limits of homeworld and alien-
world. Although several philosophers of the Classical era still confined 
themselves to traditional divisions between the “autochthonous” Greeks 
and the slave-like Barbarians (barbaroi), the division between familiar and 
strange could no longer be defined solely on natural terms, but in terms 
of different “laws”, “customs”, “mentalities”, and so on. Especially from the 
Hellenistic period onwards, the traditional notion of polis turned out to 
be insufficient in delineating the new political ideals of universal philoso-
phy. Polis became a hindrance in the sense that it upholds those structures 
which prevent human beings from relating to the one world, and which 
separates them from one another on seemingly “natural” grounds. “If the 
97 Polignac 1995: 9. 
98 Schmitt 1997: 17. 
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intellectual capacity is common to all,” Marcus Aurelius reasoned in his 
Meditations, “common too is the reason, which makes us rational beings”: 
If so, we share reason which tells us what should and should not 
happen in common. If so, the law is common. If so, we are citizens. 
If so, we are fellow members of a republic. If so, the cosmos is like 
a city – for in what other single polity can the whole human race 
belong in common?99
Despite the relative success of Hellenistic cosmopolitanism, the problem of 
exclusion remained an essential feature of the succeeding tradition. The 
two most important civilizational movements that emerged on the basis 
of the Greek intellectual heritage – Christianity and Islam – defined them-
selves in clear relation to the division between home and alien. Augustine 
divided the human race according to two “societies of human beings”, the 
Christian and the non-Christian, “one of which is predestined to reign 
with God for all eternity, the other doomed to undergo eternal punish-
ment with the devil.”100 Correspondingly, the Islamic tradition conceived 
the world as split into two regions, the “House of Islam” (Dar-al-Islam) 
and the “House of war” (Dar al-Harb). The modern nation-states merely 
succeeded better in what had been the original inclination of these move-
ments, that is, to substantiate the essential connection between cultural, 
political, and territorial limits.
  Although Husserl characterized his own philosophical work as “com-
pletely apolitical”101, the somewhat ambiguous relation of phenomenology 
to the political domain was something that characterized his work until 
the very last stage. In terms of method, phenomenology remained essen-
tially as an individual undertaking in the sense that it could only be carried 
through by the radical self-responsibility of the phenomenologist; how-
ever, as a mere project of the self, phenomenology was doomed to remain 
an abstract endeavor. As I argued in the previous chapter, the teleological 
dimension of philosophical undertaking had revealed the necessity of ren-
dering the idea of self-responsibility into a generative notion, something 
that realizes itself in the perpetual course of generations through critique 
and renewal. The principle of philosophical rationality was to be given 
99  Marcus Aurelius, Med. IV.4
100 Augustine, De civ. XV.i
101 This letter dates to 1935, and it is quoted in Schuhmann 1988: 18–19. 
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both a communal as well as a historical form that would have secured its 
continuation within the infinite horizon of humankind. Thus we can ask: 
If Husserl’s ultimate motivation was to delineate the normative ideal of a 
community, how could this idea be conceived apart from the political do-
main? How could it be implemented apart from political or institutional 
transformations?
  Perhaps Husserl’s own self-image of himself as an apolitical thinker 
reveals something about the general understanding of politics within 
contemporary times. In Husserl’s own time, as today, the notion of the 
“political” refers first and foremost to concrete societal and institutional 
practices and conventions: the political relevance of an idea relies on its 
capability to concretely shape the practices and institutions of existing 
societal reality. As Hermann Heller, one of the leading political theorists 
of the Weimar era (and a contemporary of Husserl’s) put it in his Sozial-
ismus und Nation, “according to its goals, all politics is politics of the state 
(Staatspolitik)” because it has to channel its interests through governmen-
tal “law” and “institutions of power” (Machtapparat).102 Politics equals with 
governmentality and it deals with the institutions of the state. Phenom-
enology, which was supposed to nurture the motive of individual auton-
omy and self-responsibility, could not execute this task by resorting to 
the traditional understanding of politics as subordination to the sovereign; 
instead, it needed to rethink the foundation of political institutions in align 
with the idea of universal self-responsibility.
  Moreover, for modern philosophy the very idea of political philoso-
phy with normative implications seems suspect. As Leo Strauss has put 
it, we have come to consider political philosophy in the classical sense 
as something outdated, something that can only be replaced by political 
science in the sense of value-free investigation of societal phenomena, 
or correspondingly, by the concept of ideology.103 According to the latter 
stance, a political philosophy with normative implications is impossible, 
because even the basic categories and concepts of the political domain 
are “contested” or “biased”, that is, they serve the interests of a particular 
interest, class, or advocacy group. A “transcendental” or “eidetic” study 
of political ideals would thus cave in to the fundamental “ideological” fal-
102 Heller 1931: 72.
103 Strauss 1964: 6ff.
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lacy, that is, the de-politization of the political phenomena (for instance, the 
existing structures of power) by presenting them as something perennial 
and unchangeable. Hence, the key problem was: how to promote a phe-
nomenological social philosophy with normative implications that would 
be free of any particular ideological commitments?
The Problem of State
In search of the “political” dimension of Husserl’s phenomenology, many 
commentators have taken their point of departure from the occasional 
remarks concerning idea of the state (Staat).104 As I already pointed out in 
the previous parts of the work, Husserl’s relation to this idea was basically 
twofold – although Husserl considered the state as a natural platform of 
human sociality, he nevertheless acknowledged a certain active element in 
its foundation. The state was, as Husserl put it, the indispensable frame-
work of human community, something that arises naturally from the in-
teraction of human individuals (“ein Staat erwachsend aus einer natürlichen 
Abstammungsgemeinschaft”).105 On the other hand, he discussed the also in 
terms of an “artificial” (künstlich) creation, which is upheld by political 
institutions, norms, and organizations of power. This duality was reflected 
also in other distinctions: Although the statist institutions provided the 
basic platform for the emergence of the “will of the state” (Staatswille), 
which is able to constitute the unity of a “personality of a higher order”106 
– the state fulfills its task also through the “subordination of [individual] 
wills” through power.107 Moreover, Husserl conceived the state both as a 
domain “rights” (Rechte) as well as “duties” (Pflichte), and it seems that Hus-
serl’s descriptions of the state did not amount to a univocally “positive” or 
“negative” account; the state serves many purposes.108
  However, from the viewpoint of the teleological development of cul-
ture, the state acquired for itself a central function. In few of his manu-
scripts, Husserl conceived the “state” as the very condition of a communal-
104 This is true of especially Karl Schuhmann’s work (1988), but the statist perspective is 




108 This point is emphasized especially by Schuhmann 1998: 15ff.
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generative historicity – “the necessarily first and abiding theme for the 
writing of history.”109 It is only within a lasting framework of communal 
interaction that human culture can acquire for itself a generative continu-
ity. Here, the notion of “state” was to be understood as a general concept, 
in a broader sense than a mere polis or “nation-state”. A family, for in-
stance, can of course renew itself on the course of generations, but it can-
not replace its members in a similar way than a state with abiding consti-
tutions and institutions (if the president dies, a new one has to be elected 
etc.).110 However, it is also through “state” that a particular homeworld 
is established as a fixed totality, which separates itself from the alien as a 
distinct “cultural territory” (Kulturterritorium). For a nomadic people, the 
division between familiar and strange is essentially a transitory structure, 
but for a state it is turned into a geographical distinction: the homeworld 
is appropriated as a fixed “geo-historical horizon”.111 
  Thus, we encounter a central problem in the relation between phi-
losophy and state: If the birth of philosophy signified a “revolution” in the 
manner of how humankind creates culture in the generative context, it 
seems clear that it needed to presuppose the statist framework in order 
to realize itself. Further, if philosophy was to bring about the normative 
ideal of culture which abstains from all divisions between home and alien, 
how could it still hold on to the statist framework which upholds these 
distinctions? If philosophy was to bring about the idea of a personality of 
a higher order with a common purpose, how could it do this without the 
subordination of individual wills? This is a question that has been raised, 
for instance, by James G. Hart in his The Person and the Common Life:
From the point of view of a “pure consideration of essences” as well 
as from that of concrete factual possibilities […] Husserl raises a 
series of fundamental issues: To what extent is the communitar-
ian ideal to be realized through “the authority of free reason and 
through the rank of scholars and […] universal education founded 
in a community of wills?” Does such a community need an “impe-
rial community” in the form of an organization of power, an in-
stitution of domination and servitude, which as centralizing force 
109 “Der Staat ist das erste Thema der universalen Geschichtsschreibung […].” HuaXV: 
409. See also Hart 1992a: 377–386.
110 ”Stirbt der Beamte, so wird ein anderer ernannt“ HuaXIII: 102.
111 HuaXV: 206; HuaXV: 411
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binds all the wills into itself and arranges the life of each person 
in terms of prescribed limits and functions within which each is 
free to choose. Thus, the basic theoretical issue is whether it is an 
essential human possibility to form a community of life which ap-
proximates the ideal of an ethical community of will […] through 
autonomous free reason and rational action or whether the human 
communities require the means of an imperium, a state?112
In the context of Kaizo essays, Husserl provides us with some answers 
to these questions. Against his earlier reflections on the “eternal justifica-
tion” of (the European) nation-states, Husserl raised the critical question 
of the necessity for a “gradual dismantling of the state organizations of 
power” (allmählicher Abbau der staatlichen Machtorganisation)113 that would 
follow the demand of a universal self-responsibility: in a world in which 
human beings are forced to make themselves comply with the authority 
of a sovereign power – and in which human beings are dissociated from 
each other on cultural, racial, or other grounds – the ethical ideal of a uni-
versal and autonomous community cannot realize itself. Although Husserl 
raised the possibility of “supranation” (Übernation) and “suprastate” (Über-
staat) that would function as the “material” equivalents of the ethical ideal 
of universal humanity, his idea of a universally encompassing community 
(Allgemeinschaft) stood in constant tension with the horizon of the state 
(Staatshorizont) with its coercive means.114 
  As Hart is right to emphasize, the political alternatives of phenom-
enology do not reside merely in the statist and non-statist alternatives 
– the existence or non-existence of a state – but even more importantly, 
in its mode or type. If we take that a necessary condition of a “just” political 
institution would be one which corresponds with the idea of an autono-
mous individual as well as the collective horizon of the community, we are 
still left with a number of concrete organizations and practices – human 
rights, parliamentarism, participatory democracy etc. – through which 
these ideas could be realized. As Hart emphasizes, with regard to the rep-
resentational model of modern democratic nation-states, often charac-
terized by a strong political elite and a top-down governmentality (what 
Husserl calls the “imperialist organized will” or “central will”), Husserl’s 
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delineation of the ideal community ought to be understood in terms of 
a “communist unity of wills”, which constantly negotiates the common 
will of the collective.115 Instead of subordination, this type of community 
would found itself on voluntary consent – instead of the aspirations of iso-
lated individuals, its decisions would be guided by the common aspiration 
of the “community of will”. 
  As I argued in the previous part of this work, Husserl credited Plato 
for articulating the necessary “archontic” or “hegemonic” role of philoso-
phy in regard to the political domain.116 For Plato, this role was to be 
executed through the “conjunction (sympestē) of […] political power and 
philosophic intelligence”117 so that either philosophers become rulers, or 
that rulers begin to take seriously the pursuit of philosophy. Here, Hus-
serl’s conclusion was more subtle. Although the phenomenologist was 
called for the “guidance of humanity” (Unterweisung der Menschheit berufen), 
this did not entail the conflation of philosophical and political power: the 
philosopher is the “functionary” (Funktionär) or “spiritual organ” of human-
ity, which promotes the realization of autonomy and self-responsibility 
within the overall domain of culture. Philosophy ought to promote the 
idea of a “community of will” (Willesgemeinschaft) which would not be cen-
tered on a governing “central will” but that would realize itself through the 
critical reflexivity of individual vocations. 
  In this regard, Husserl’s phenomenology seemed to go beyond the 
traditional understanding of political philosophy as a domain of sover-
eignty. The ethical reformers Husserl most appreciated were not political 
revolutionaries in the traditional sense: instead of Hegel’s world-historical 
figures (like Julius Caesar, Naopleon etc.), Husserl’s appreciation was tar-
geted to persons such as Jesus, Buddha, or even George Bernhard Shaw, 
who all emphasized the self-reflexive capabilities of the human individual 
as the basis of political and social transformation.118 Political and societal 
institutions can and must change, but this transformation must be equaled 
by individual development. 
115 HuaXXVII: 52–53. On this point, see also Hart 1992a: 384; Buckley 1998: 41; Dono-
hoe 2004: 140.
116 HuaVII: 14.
117 Plato, Rep. 473d.
118 See esp. HuaXXVII: 122–126. Cf. Depraz 2000.
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  In this regard, the most important political defect of modern natural-
istic psychology – most evident in the tradition of atomic liberalism – was 
its inability to account for the idea of human development through the 
critical and reflexive capabilities of the human individual. As John Dewey 
once put it, the underlying philosophy and psychology of early liberalist 
tradition took its point of departure from “a conception of individuality as 
something ready-made, already possessed, and needing only the removal 
of certain legal restrictions to come into full play.”119 Accordingly, the great 
challenge of Husserl’s phenomenology was to challenge not only the im-
minent threat naturalistic psychology with regard to the idea of individual 
responsibility, but with regard to its political implications. If we take that 
human being is essentially incapable of developing, then our political in-
stitutions necessarily take the role of governing the existing tendencies. 
However, if we subscribe to the idea that moral development is possible, 
then it seems that our political institutions can acquire for themselves a 
radically different function – that of securing the development of the hu-
man individual. According to this view, we need proper systems of educa-
tion, human rights, social planning etc. exactly because they make possible 
the idea of individual transformation. I will return to this point in the last 
section of this chapter.
  The idea of human transformation constitutes one of the unique char-
acteristics of Husserl’s “political idealism”. As I would argue, this idealism 
was not restricted merely to the idea of “best possible” institutions, the 
problem of state and its legitimacy; instead, these questions constituted 
only a regional problem of the political domain. In addition to the statist 
and “static” questions of political ontology, Husserl’s teleological reflec-
tions pointed towards a radical dynamic account of political idealism, one, 
that was to comply with the idea of individual and social development on 
the basis of the open and infinite horizon of philosophical truth. The very 
defect of our Western tradition of political philosophy was that it had been 
unable to conceive the political domain as something that needs to allow 
change and transformation to take place.
  Already in the context of the Kaizo pointed out that the “ethical idea 
of community” (ethische Gemeinschaftsidee) – a community that is “abso-
119 Dewey 1987: 30.
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lutely valuable”120 – ought to be understood as a “developmental system” 
(Werdenssystem).121 Thus, instead of a predelineated ideal, this community 
was to be understood as the social counterpart of the ethical human being 
– living according to the idea of renewal – that finds its genuine essence 
only through a critical relation towards the acquired habitualities and ca-
pacities. In an appendix to the lecture course on Erste Philosophie (written 
in 1924), this idea is expressed in its full clarity:
It belongs to the idea of an absolutely valuable community, that it 
cannot be realized a priori in a static manner, but only through a 
valuable becoming towards the infinite. [This is to say] that these two 
related ideas belong a priori together: the infinite pole-idea of abso-
lutely realizable value – the value of a community that constantly 
actuates itself in a thorough and absolutely rational manner – and 
the idea of an infinite progress of perfection that corresponds with 
it. So, it is to be understood that both of these correlative ideas 
must be realized in the rational community of the highest form of 
becoming, that is, in the community that not only lives in a rational 
manner, but which has the absolute, best possible form of develop-
ment against the absolute static idea.122
As Husserl emphasizes, the “static” question on the righteous form of 
community constitutes only a partial problem of the idea of an absolutely 
valuable community. As in the case of individual ethics, the mere idea of 
ethical justification in terms of a universal imperative fails to appreciate 
the dynamic-genetic character of human life – that our capabilities of re-
flection are always bound by the concrete historical and social circum-
stances – so it is with the idea of community. Our societal-political reflec-
tion needs to take its point of departure from a critical reflection targeted 
towards existing institutions, norms, and practices; at the same time, it 
120 HuaXXVII: 53.
121 HuaXXVII: 55.
122 “Gehört zur Idee einer absolut wertvollen Gemeinschaft aber dies, daß sie a priori 
nicht statisch verwirklicht sein kann, sondern nur ins Unendliche wertvoller Werden kann, 
oder gehören vielmehr a priori zwei aufeinander bezogene Ideen hier zusammen: die im 
Unendlichen liegende Polidee absolut verwirklichten Wertes - des Wertes einer durchgän-
gig und absolut vernünftig sich ständig betätigenden Gemeinschaft - und die Idee eines 
unendlichen Progressus der Vervollkommnung gegen diese Idee, so ist einzusehen, daß 
diese korrelativen Ideen beide in einer vernünftigen Gemeinschaft höchster Werdensform 
verwirklicht sein müßten, nämlich einer Gemeinschaft, die zwar nicht absolut vernünftig 
lebt, aber die absolute bestmögliche Entwicklungsform gegen die absolute statische Idee 
hin hat.” HuaVIII: 200
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must acknowledge their essentially finite and one-sided character with 
regard to the absolute ideal of a completely rational community. “True hu-
manity”, writes Husserl, “requires a perpetual struggle against sinking into 
the lazy nest of conventionality or, what is essentially the same, living in 
lazy reason instead of living a life of authentic originality [of evidence].”123 
Hence, although the “absolutely valuable” community ought to be under-
stood as an infinite “pole-idea”, this does not make it completely unreach-
able. The absolute ideal can be realized within this world, though not as 
a static ideal but as a temporal process. This is to say, that the normative 
ideal relies essentially on transformation and generation in the “infinity of 
generations being renewed in the spirit of ideas”.124 
  Ever since the emergence of political philosophy in the tradition of 
European-Occidental thought, the ideas of change and transformation 
have appeared problematic. Even though the idea of transformation was 
the key premise of political philosophy – that human communities do not 
exist “naturally”, but they can be reconstituted on the basis of rational 
insight – it seems that the political ideals themselves were conceived as 
immune to change and transformation. As I argued in part 3, Plato based 
his societal reforms on a political epoché that refused to take cue on the 
existing political reality – however, he based his “figure of governance” 
(schēma tēs politeias) on the heavenly model of ideal polis, a model that 
was eternal and immovable.125 After returning to the cave of everyday ex-
istence, the primary task of philosopher was to implement this immov-
able ideal to existing political reality. Once established, the order of the 
ideal polis was to be secured and protected against transformation. This 
is why Plato came up with the “noble lie” of the different metals of the 
soul as the foundation of societal order: because the original condition of 
the human being consists of being of a certain natural type (gold, silver, 
iron, brass), which needs to be protected against diffusion, the societal 
order of different classes needs to be kept intact.126 For Plato, this demand 
concerned especially the ruling class, i.e., the philosophers. Because “in 
123 “[…] wahres Menschendasein fordert den ewigen Kampf gegen das Versinken in das 
Faulbett der Konventionalität oder, was im Wesen dasselbe, Leben in der faulen Vernunft 
statt eines Lebens aus echter Ursprünglichkeit […]“ HuaXIV: 231. See Hart 1992a: 409.
124 HuaVI: 322.
125 Rep. 592b. See also Timaeus 30c-34c.
126 Rep. 415a-c. 
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every form of government change (metaballei) takes its start from the rul-
ing class itself ”127, the community of philosophers was to be kept intact of 
foreign influences.
  To follow Hannah Arendt’s argument, the political philosophy of the 
West has perhaps not fully acknowledged the possibility of genuine ac-
tion.128 Transformations that proceed without a predetermined telos are 
frightful, and they do not seem to equal to the model of divine reason. As 
Aristotle put it, “in all places there is only one form of government that 
is natural, namely, the best form”129 – and that despite the differences of 
culture and level of civilization that prevail between individual societies, 
all would find their contentment in this singular ideal. Philosophy is afraid 
of beginnings without an established direction, and for this reason, also 
the Greek political philosophy replaced action with control and gover-
nance: the genuine politician is the one who can rise beyond appearances 
and changing situation; the one who sees what everyone needs and craves 
in his or her life. 
  This fear of change is perhaps most evident in the tradition of politi-
cal utopianism. Since Thomas More’s Utopia (originally published in 1515), 
it has been an inherent feature of Western utopian literature that it has 
often placed the ideal community outside the civilized world, that is, out-
side history as such. As in the case of More’s island of Utopia or Jonathan 
Swift’s Gullivers Travels (originally published in 1726), the ideal society is 
discovered as a lucky mistake of a fortunate traveler. Because the target 
of these fantasies resides outside temporal development as such – nobody 
knows how they arrived at their current condition – they are also im-
mune to transformation. The ideals do not develop, they do not change; 
instead, their invariance must be secured through geographical isolation 
(e.g. islands) or even material transmutation. As several dystopian novel-
ists (Huxley, Orwell) have pointed out, eugenics is indeed the material 
counterpart of political idealism – nothing new shall be born.130 
127 Rep. 545d.
128 See e.g. Arendt 1958: 175ff. “The substitution of making for acting and the concomi-
tant degradation of politics into a means to obtain an allegedly “higher” end [...] in the 
modern age the productivity and progress of society is as old as the tradition of political 
philosophy.” (Arendt 1958: 229).
129 Nic. Eth. 1135a4-5
130 Of course, ever since the publication of Louis-Sébastian Mercier’s L’An 2440 (The  Year 
2440, published in 1770) the utopian tradition of the West has ascribed to the modern 
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  It is exactly here, I believe, that Husserl’s phenomenology provides a 
radical counter-strategy to the classical understanding of political ideal-
ism. To say that the normative ideal of a community can be understood 
as a “valuable becoming towards the infinite […] as the infinite pole-idea 
of absolutely realizable value” means that the ideal cannot be understood 
in terms of a particular political form – a Platonic schēma, Aristotelian 
“natural” form, Kantian cosmopolitan community etc. – which univocally 
delineates the best type of governance. As in the case of individual eth-
ics, the ideal can only be anticipated in an undefined generality, for our 
understanding of the “best possible” is always constituted on the basis of a 
relative situation and its possibilities. From the Husserlian point of view, 
what the traditional political philosophy has lacked is exactly the distinc-
tion between “relative” and “absolute” ideals of perfection. Instead, it has 
always absolutized a particular relative form, an idea of polis or a nation-
state, or a particular relation of production. However, these two ideals 
need to be kept apart: as equal to the absolute ideals of best possible world 
and best possible humanity there are the factical ideals of this world and 
the factically determined goals.131 
  To think politically means that one takes responsibility for the factical 
ideals of this world – of concrete political institutions, societal practices, 
relations of production etc. But it also means taking responsibility for the 
generative context of individual homeworlds with their unique charac-
teristics. This is what Husserl, in his lectures on Fichte, means with the 
idea of “the noble politician who finds his blessedness by working on the 
preservation and formation of the order of an ideal community in ac-
cord with the particular ideas which are normative for this community.”132 
teleological concept of history, according to which the ideal is found at the end of (pro-
gressive) human history. However, even the “temporal utopias” (to use the classification of 
Karl Mannheim) of modern times have often found a way to protect themselves against 
transformation. In the case of Mercier’s utopia, the radically progressive character of the 
ideal society was secured by eradicating most of its written historical heritage, which was 
deemed as useless and immoral. One can clearly observe the basic idea: the good must 
equal with natural and atemporal. Or, as in the case of the first American utopian novel 
Equality; or, A History of Lithconia (which appeared in 1837 by an anonymous author, prob-
ably John Lithgow) which granted the political power in the hands old-age pensioners in 
order to protect itself against new openings.
131 HuaXXXVII: 320.
132 “Endlich auch der edle Politiker, der seine Seligkeit dann findet, an der Ordnung so-
zialer Gemeinschaft nach den für sie maßgebenden besonderen Idealen erhaltend und ge-
staltend zu arbeiten […]“ HuaXXV: 289. 
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Thus, the genuine politician must be guided by the idea of best possible 
community; however, s/he must be equipped with the reflexivity towards 
the peculiar characteristics of his or her homeworld (its specific norms 
and practices). This does not entail that these norms and practices should 
be simply preserved in the name of conservatism; rather, it puts forward 
an imperative to take a critical and reflexive stance towards the particular 
institutions of a particular homeworld. Political thinking may be inspired 
by absolute ideals; but it operates on the level of relative idals, of concrete 
practices,institutions, norms, rights, duties, and so on.133 
133 In his 1978–79 Collège de France lecture course The Birth of Biopolitics, Foucault points 
towards an interesting connection between Husserl and the early German neo-liberalist 
economic theory, especially the representatives of the so-called Freiburg School of Na-
tional Economy (Freiburger Schule der Nationalökonomie). (See especially the “Lecture Five” 
of the series in Foucault 2008: 101–121). This school, represented by economists such as 
Wilhelm Röpke and Walter Eucken (the son of philosopher Rudolf Eucken, a friend of 
Husserl’s), promoted what was then called the economic policy of ordoliberalism, i.e. the 
idea of free market-economy secured by state institutions. This policy, as it was discussed 
and promoted since the beginning of the 1930s onwards, was of course in clear contradic-
tion with the economic planning of the National Socialist movement, which relied heavily 
on “Keynesian” economic policies, e.g. heavy government spending (i.e. resuscitation), 
price control, nationalization of businesses, and so on. Although the success of ordoliber-
alism was rather minor during the Nazi Regime – Röpke, for one, was forced into exile 
in 1933 – it served as an important influence for the so-called Austrian School of neo-
liberalism, represented by Carl Menger, Ludwig von Mises ja Friedrich Hayek. As Fou-
cault points out, both Röpke and Eucken were influenced by Husserl’s phenomenological 
method, and employed it to promote their idea of laissez-faire economic policies. Whereas 
the liberalism of eighteenth and nineteenth centuries took their point of departure from 
the existing institutions of market-economy – of exchange and competition – and tried to 
deduce the principles of free capitalism from these institutions, the ordoliberalists treated 
this deduction as an example of what Foucault calls “naïve naturalism”. Instead, and here 
Foucault detects the influence of Husserl, they aimed at arriving at their ideal through an 
“eidetic reduction”, i.e. by abstaining from the concrete features of established economies. 
Ordoliberalism treated competition and exchange not as natural categories of human in-
teraction, but as normative ideals of economic rationalism, which can and ought to be 
imposed against the “natural” state of economic interchange. 
  As Foucault explains: “For what in fact is competition? It is absolutely not a given of 
nature. The game, mechanisms, and effects of competition which we identify and enhance 
are not at all natural phenomena; competition is not the result of a natural interplay of 
appetites, instincts, behavior, and so on. In reality, the effects of competition ate due only 
to the essence that characterizes and constitutes it. The beneficial effects of competition 
are not due to a pre-existing nature, to a natural given that it brings with it. They are due 
to a formal privilege. Competition is an essence. Competition is an eidos. Competition is a 
principle of formalization. Competition has an internal logic; it has its own structure. [...] 
Just as for Husserl a formal structure is only given to intuition under certain conditions, 
in the same way competition as an essential economic logic will only appear and-produce 
its effects under certain conditions which have to be carefully and artificially constructed. 
[...] Competition is therefore an historical objective of governmental art and not a natural 
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  In terms of political development, relative goals and ideals are at the 
same time necessary and dangerous. They are necessary, first of all, in or-
der to bring change – cultural, social, and economic – into the world. 
Without concrete transformations in the common world of human beings 
(e.g. practices, institutions) the absolute ideal of reason remains an empty 
idea. Once appropriated, however, these relative accomplishments have a 
tendency of becoming absolute. Take for instance, the example of Euro-
pean/Western nation-states. From the viewpoint of collective decision-
making, the nation-states are still perhaps the most important domains for 
the formation of a general will. Although bound by several supranational 
treatises, it is the nation-states that can implement legislative measures 
that control the distribution of material resources, or, that can make a 
difference in regard to environmental issues. This is not to say, however, 
that these factors would constitute the actual justification of nation-states. 
Throughout their history – and we feel this especially in today’s Europe 
– the justification of nation-states is essentially bound to the emotive en-
ticement of nationalism, which upholds itself through a series of cultural 
and political symbols, concepts and practices, which are often taken over 
uncritically. Nation equals with a more or less homogenous people, often 
conceived in ethnic (or “cultural”) terms. What we perhaps feel today is 
that the affective allure of nationalism – what Husserl would definitely 
given that must be respected.” (Foucault 2008: 120.) Although Foucault merely entertains 
this connection, he treats it as an example of the idea of the all-embracing biopolitical gov-
ernance, which is characteristic of the unfolding of the 20th century politics. In this regard, 
phenomenology would contribute to what Foucault considers as the basic fallacy of the 
liberal (and especially neoliberal) economism of the 20th century, the application of a ra-
tional ideal of governance that can merely be implemented into the existing reality without 
considering the structural imbalances of the societal order, for instance, what Marx called 
the original accumulation of capital. The existing societal reality is always that of imbalance 
of resources – as Cervantes put it, a world of Have’s and Havent’s – but we think we can do 
away with this discrepancy by implementing a model of equal competition and exchange. 
  However, as we have seen, this is not at all what Husserl had in mind. Although his po-
litical philosophy amounted to a peculiar form of idealism, which does not merely reside 
in the existing reality of human communities, this did not entail a dismissal of the original 
discrepancies of possibilities that prevail within particular societies. (Cf. HuaXXVII: 10).
What Foucault fails to accentuate is that Husserl did not arrive at his normative ideal 
through eidetic reduction that could be accomplished once and for all; instead, the abso-
lute ideal is fundamentally an open task, which can be approached only from a particular 
relative situation. As an eidos of communal life, the best possible must remain inexact, 
incomplete, for phenomenology discovers it’s the normative ideal of community only as 
a perpetual process.
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call “secondary sensuality” (sekundäre Sinnlichkeit)134 – hinders the creative 
potential of our political thinking, which should respond more acutely 
to the problems of the globalized world: mass migration, statelessness, 
the exploitation of cheap labor force. For many, the nation-states are still 
the absolute and only possible framework for a political community, and 
because of their allure, we lack the vision to develop institutions and prac-
tices that would promote the idea of common responsibility beyond the 
limits of individual nations. Is not the current crisis of universal political 
institutions – international law, criminal courts – at least partially due to 
the absolutization of the idea of the nation-state?
  Speaking from this Husserlian perspective, the political relevance of 
philosophy could be conceived in two regards. First, philosophy should 
be utopian, but only in the sense of necessary idealism: instead of merely 
resigning with the existing institutions of power, it should take its point 
of departure from the idea of best possible community. This means that 
philosophy should be active as well as creative in its insistence to origi-
nate new practices and institutions that could promote the realization of 
the universal self-responsibility. But even more importantly, philosophy 
should constantly remind us of the finitude and one-sidedness of our rela-
tive ideals. Following Jean Baudrillard, philosophy should be critical to-
wards “achieved utopias”135 – it should prevent us from taking the existing 
political institutions as the only possible alternative. This entails that our 
political thinking should always situate itself within the horizon of infinite 
development: it should conceive the absolute ideal, not in terms of a Pla-
tonic schema or Hegelian telos, but in terms of interplay between absolute 
and relative ideals. Our utopian thinking, I suggest, should be fundamen-
tally dynamic instead of static.
  Here, interestingly, we find the antecedent of this idea in Marx’s 
works. Although the traditional understanding of Marx’s political think-
ing points towards a “substantial” definition of communism – beginning 
with the “short-term” demands of abolition of land-property and inheri-
tance, the centralization of credit, national infrastructure and the means 
of production in The Communist Manifesto – we may also discover another 
current that delineates another kind of definition. In The German Ideology 
134 HuaXXVII: 110.
135 Baudrillard 1988: 73ff.
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Marx points towards an understanding of communism, not as an “ideal” or 
“state of affairs”, but as “an actual movement which abolishes the present 
state of affairs.”136 What he means is that the “utopian” element of com-
munism can only be understood as a critical transformation of the present 
moment, which realistically delineates its possible horizons of transfor-
mation. It represents a critical alternative to the early utopian socialism, 
for which, to follow the ideas of Charles Fourier (1772–1837), even the 
sea would lost its salt and turn into pink lemonade.137 “From the moment 
the working-men class movement became real,” Marx writes in The Civil 
War in France, “the phantastic utopias evanesced, not because the working 
class had given up the end aimed at by these Utopists, but because they 
had found the real means to realize them.” Thus, the fixed utopias were 
replaced by a “real insight into the historic conditions of the movement.”138 
As Marx put it in another essay:
They have no ready-made utopias to introduce par decret du peuple. 
They know that in order to work out their own emancipation and 
along with it that higher form to which present society is irre-
sistibly tending by its own economical agencies, they will have to 
pass through long struggles, through a series of historic processes, 
transforming circumstances and men. They have no ideals to real-
ize, but to set free the elements of the new society with which old 
collapsing bourgeois society itself is pregnant.139
Here, I believe, Marx’s insight is conversant with Husserl’s position: uto-
pias can only be delineated as the critique of the present moment. The 
utopia should not be fixed, for nobody really knows how the world will 
look like after the overturning of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. What 
we know, however, is that we cannot live in a world that is fundamen-
tally immoral and without justification; therefore, the mere idea of change 
is the necessary point of departure for utopian consciousness. We find a 
similar train of thought in Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex (1949), 
which alerts from delineating the essence of sexual difference on the basis 
of existing structures of power that are founded on one-sided subordina-
tion. “When we abolish the slavery of half of humanity, together with the 
whole system of hypocrisy that it implies,” she writes, “then the division 
136 Marx and Engels 1970: 57.
137 Beecher 1986: 485.
138 See also Wood 2004: 54.
139 Marx 1994: 308.
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of humanity will reveal its genuine significance and the human couple will 
find its true form.”140 The utopia of the genuine equality of sexes cannot 
be predelineated in its overarching sense, for our idea of what it means 
to be a man or a woman is defined by the existing relations of power. For 
this reason, the utopia can only be anticipated in its formality – it must be 
understood as the critique of the present moment.
  While I believe that the Husserlian understanding of political philoso-
phy deserves to be called idealism, this is not to say that it would com-
pletely distinguish itself from the material world. As I pointed out in the 
previous section, Husserl conceived the horizon of infinite development 
not only as something which unfolds in the experience of the human indi-
vidual but as something which is realized by the generative development 
of the community. This entails that I am responsible not only for my own 
actions but also for that generative horizon which makes possible the con-
tinuity and renewal of human culture. This generative horizon, however, 
is not sustained by mere ideas – it also rests essentially on material condi-
tions. To follow Hannah Arendt’s argument, the political community is 
sustained, first of all, by natality, which endows the community the ability 
to produce new members that can sustain the human culture through la-
bor, work, and action. Natality, Arendt writes, “is the central category of 
political thought”141 not only because it provides the material conditions 
for the continuation of the common life but because it represents the ba-
sic character of human life as political, that is, as free to begin its projects 
within the historically and culturally specific situation. 
  Moreover, the horizon of human development is sustained also by the 
material conditions of the lifeworld, which, as we have come to learn, are 
also finite and insecure. For instance, the question of the vulnerability of 
our natural environment (climate change, finitude of natural resources 
etc.) was neither in Marx’s nor in Husserl’s scope, but it definitely is in our 
horizon – and painstakingly so. What we have come to realize is that with-
out certain changes in our relation to the environing world, the horizon 
of infinite development will no longer in front of us. This entails that we 
need to take a renewed stance towards the very condition of our common 
life: the earth. 
140 Beauvoir 1968: 731. 
141 Arendt 1958: 9.
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Universalism: dynamism, pluralism, openness
Let us return to the question of universalism. As I have argued throughout 
this work, Husserl’s interest in the problematic of Europe was not moti-
vated solely by the fate of a particular continent or a civilization but by 
the promise of an idea – an idea of a universal, rational culture. Philoso-
phy, which founded itself on a peculiar relativization of individual home-
worlds and their generative traditions, aimed at extending the ideas of 
self-responsibility and autonomy beyond all traditionally given boundar-
ies of home and alien. By uncovering the common Allwelt that lies at the 
foundation of individual traditions, philosophy gave way to a completely 
new idea of cultural criticism – one, that aimed at showing the necessarily 
one-sided character of cultural accomplishments. Although this idea real-
ized itself primarily in the form of theoretical co-operation, that of “work-
ing with one another and for one another, offering one another helpful 
criticism,”142 its scope was not restricted merely to this. As Husserl put it 
in another manuscript, it is actually possible to consider the Roman Em-
pire as the first concrete instantiation of the idea of Europe – an instantia-
tion that was the first to genuinely transfer the motive of universalism into 
the domain of political historicity.143 
  However, as many scholars have noted, it is exactly here that Husserl’s 
analyses turned out to be inadequate. Despite his good intentions, Husserl 
did not fully acknowledge the problematic nature of the ethical and politi-
cal implications of universal philosophy; instead, Husserl was careless in 
his remarks concerning the self-evident “normative appeal” of the Europe-
an culture, or, what he once called the spectacle of Europeanization.144 As 
Steinbock argues, although Husserl’s generative phenomenology allowed 
142 HuaVI: 334.
143 HuaXXIX: 15ff.
144 See Introduction. Cf. HuaVI: 320: “[In our Europe] there is something unique here 
that is recognized in us by all other human groups, too, something that, quite apart from 
all considerations of utility, becomes a motive for them to Europeanize themselves even in 
their unbroken will to spiritual self-preservation; whereas we, if we understand ourselves 
properly, would never Indianize ourselves, for example.” (“Es [an unserem Europa] liegt 
darin etwas Einzigartiges, das auch allen anderen Menschheitsgruppen an uns empfindlich 
ist als etwas, das, abgesehen von allen Erwägungen der Nützlichkeit, ein Motiv für sie 
wird, sich im ungebrochenen Willen zu geistiger Selbsterhaltung doch immer zu euro-
päisieren, während wir, wenn wir uns recht verstehen, uns zum Beispiel nie indianisieren 
werden.“
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for non-foundational reading of the home and alien (they are “co-consti-
tutive”), his idea of liminal transgression served as an implicit justification 
to European expansionism. According to Steinbock, Husserl tended “to 
expand an immanent ethical reform of this [European] homeworld to an 
all-encompassing world, ‘one humanity,’ ‘one normality,’ and hence to a 
ubiquitous homeworld.”145 What this approach failed to appreciate was the 
inherent “axiological asymmetry” of the home and the alien, the essential 
irreversibility of their perspectives. Thus, Husserl’s insistence of creating 
a universal ethical humanity would actually entail the “destruction of gen-
erativity, of the becoming of homeworld/alienworld.”146 This critique is 
also echoed in Derrida’s analysis of Husserl’s interpretation of philosophy 
as a “universal project of a will to deracination” – a project that aimed at 
“liberating itself, from the start, from its linguistic, territorial, ethnic and 
cultural limitations.”147 
  For Steinbock as well as for Derrida, these reflections are not merely 
of exegetical interest. Instead, they contain the justification for one of 
the most destructive developments of our contemporary globalization, 
the destruction of unique particular cultures through the dismantling of 
limits. As Steinbock puts it, “[l]imits themselves are ostensibly razed in 
an effort to create a nondominating, nonintimidating, nonhierarchical, 
noncompetitive, equal, interchangeable, in short a so-called non-limiting 
situation [...] a world sans frontières.”148 Although the ethical intentions be-
hind this development may be seen as something we should endorse, as a 
result we have also failed to appreciate the specificity of particular home-
worlds and their unique traditions. As Steinbock concludes, our politi-
cally correct dictum does not allow us to no longer speak of “aliens” or 
“foreigners” but of “internationals”, which seems to suggest that the per-
145 Steinbock 1995: 207.
146 Steinbock 1995: 207. As Steinbock is right to emphasize, Husserl’s various analyses 
provide us with also different readings on the relation between home and alien. Against the 
crude and one-sided process of “occupation” (Besetzung), Husserl speaks of the possibility 
of “transgression” (Überschreitung), which would not aim at the destruction of limits, but 
their appropriation in mutual understanding. Unlike violence, that represents the outright 
denying or occluding of “limit-claims” through hierarchical domination or what Steinbock 
calls the “logic of dissimulation”, a transgressive experience would be essentially respon-
sive to these limits. (1995: 249).
147 Derrida and Roudinesco 2004: 18.
148 Steinbock 1995: 252.
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spectives of home and alien have become essentially interchangeable.149 
  While I find this analysis suggestive, I believe it is necessary to reflect 
upon it in regard to two different perspectives – that of contemporary 
globalization, and that of Husserl’s own generative phenomenology. While 
it is true that through the development of contemporary world-system, 
we have experienced the dissolution of several cultural or national fron-
tiers, we are also constantly establishing new ones. To follow Marx’s ex-
pression in Grundrisse, instead of “sacred limits” the contemporary world 
of capitalist market-economy knows mostly “barriers” which it seeks to 
overcome150 – this is because capital, as the universal medium of human 
interaction, strives towards the universal development of the forces of 
production. In order to uphold itself, however, the universalistic tendency 
of capitalist market-economy cannot give up on all barriers. If the Chi-
nese, Indian, or Vietnamese workers were provided with the same norms 
and standards of salary or labor-safety as in the Western world, the struc-
tural asymmetry that is the central motor of capitalist expansionism and 
thus, the production of surplus-value, would disappear. All in all, global 
market-economy does not do away with cultural differences, but it em-
ploys them in order to create different experiences of exoticism, which 
are then more or less successfully capitalized. What I find philosophically 
most interesting is that this structural asymmetry, which is sustained es-
pecially through national limits, is not merely a matter of economic in-
equality; it is upheld by all kinds of beliefs on the normative specificity 
of particular cultures. We encounter this thought in arguments according 
to which Islam and democracy are essentially “incompatible”, or, that the 
promotion of women’s rights in certain parts of Africa would be the viola-
tion of their uniqueness of certain traditions. In some cases, it is exactly 
limits that hinder the formation of a uniquely responsible stance, which 
would acknowledge the unquestioned value of the individual.
  What these problems seem to call for is indeed a rethinking of the very 
idea of ethical and political universalism. While I agree with Steinbock that 
this idea of responsible universalism should not take its point of departure 
from the mere dismantling of the difference between home and alien – a 
world sans frontiers – we should also resist the contemporary tendency to 
149 Ibid.
150 Marx 1993: 408. Cf. Introduction.
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fetishize cultural limits for the sake of an irreconcilable asymmetry. That 
cultural traditions are unique and asymmetrical can be used as a justifica-
tion for tolerance as well as inequality; limits can serve the purpose of 
both altruism as well as negligent laissez-faire. Therefore, this asymmetry 
– although it is the necessary starting-point of a responsive stance – should 
not be attested as the outcome of philosophical universalism.
  Accordingly, from a philosophical-political point of view, I believe 
that a more responsive and responsible idea of universalism calls for at 
least two things. First, I believe we ought to have a broader and more 
dynamic view of the very process of limit-constitution, i.e., how different 
cultural, national, and political borders are formed, what is their relation, 
and whose interests do they serve. Following Husserl, we should treat 
limit-constitution as a fundamental characteristic of human experience; 
however, we should also appreciate the different underpinnings of existing 
limits. As we become a part of a cultural heritage, we also become a part 
of a shared cultural territory whose limits and borders are manifold and 
dynamic. Although these limits have the original intention of delineating 
the sphere of familiarity, not all limits retain this task. The national limits 
of today’s world, for instance, demarcate and control rather strictly the 
possibilities of mobility, and not the sphere of familiarity. While I agree 
with philosophers such as Habermas for whom “any political community 
that wants to understand itself as a democracy must at least distinguish be-
tween members and non-members,”151 there are no necessary grounds to 
fix oneself to a particular conception of this division (ethnic or national). 
We should draw no straightforward ethical or political conclusions from 
the existence of cultural limits – quite the contrary. As Étienne Balibar 
has argued, because the control of limits constitutes one of the key areas 
of national sovereignty, we ought to treat these limits as institutions that 
can be brought into democratic deliberation.152 Political thinking, I sug-
gest, should begin not with the mere recognition of limits but with their 
critique.
  Second, against the contemporary understanding of political univer-
salism, which most often takes its point of departure from the propagation 
of particular norms and practices – such as the Western conception of 
151 Habermas 2001: 107.
152 Balibar 2004: 108.
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human rights, democratic institutions, or capitalist economy – I believe 
we ought to invent new concepts and incentives that would acknowledge 
the multiplicity of normative frameworks, and found their universality-
claims upon this acknowledgement. For this reason, I believe we ought 
to go beyond the traditional understanding of universalism as a substantial 
notion that is always bound to the particular norms and validities of a par-
ticular homeworld. Instead, we ought to take our point of departure from 
the idea of universalism as an essentially open principle, which primarily 
points towards a space of encounter for particular normative frameworks. 
Understood this way, a universalistic stance would be something which 
cannot delineate the “universal” in advance; rather, following Judith But-
ler, this approach would “underscore the very category of the ‘universal’ 
as a site of insistent contest and resignification.”153 It would treat univer-
salism as an essentially formal notion, as a task rather than a doctrine. In 
this respect, the other would represent not the “limit” of a particular uni-
versality, but instead, otherness as such would constantly function as the 
necessary prerequisite of a universalistic position. 
  Husserl himself did entertain this idea of a reciprocal universalism 
at least in a couple of short essays from the mid-1920s, in which he dis-
cussed a German translation of Buddhist scriptures and compared these to 
Socratic ideals.154 According to him, Buddha’s texts portrayed an attitude 
towards the world that could be seen as “totally opposite” to ours. For 
anyone who has not grown into the Indian religious culture, this system of 
references is as such radically alien. However, transformed to philosophi-
cal descriptions of the religious-ethical life, these texts can be seen as an 
“unquestioned possibility” for the European culture. Through its motive of 
world-renouncement (Weltentsagung) and the demand for self-responsibil-
ity, argues Husserl, the Buddhist tradition is indeed comparable with “the 
highest formations of the philosophical and religious spirit of our Euro-
pean culture”155 – something that can contribute to the “ethical, religious 
and philosophical renewal of our culture”156. 
153 Butler 1995: 40. See also Holenstein 1998: 242.
154 The first of these texts “Über die Reden Gotamo Buddhos” (written in 1925) is avail-
able in HuaXXVII, 125–126. The second and longer one “Sokrates–Buddha” (1926) has 
been edited by Sebastian Luft and published in Husserl Studies 26 (2010).
155 ” Nur mit den höchsten Gestaltungen des philosophischen und religiösen Geistes unse-
rer europäischen Kultur kann der Buddhismus parallelisiert werden.“ HuaXXVII: 126.
156 ”[…] der an der ethischen, religiösen, philosophischen Erneuerung unserer Kultur 
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  What Husserl seemed to be suggesting is that not only do these texts 
give us information about a foreign culture and its system of reference, 
but they disclose a novel possibility of an intellectual attitude unarticu-
lated in our European-Occidental tradition. Against the “rationalism” of 
Greek philosophy, which sought for a transcendent point of reference to 
all reality – manifested in two formulations of absolute and self-sufficient 
being, Plato’s ideas of Aristotle’s idea of God – the Indian thought pro-
fesses the transient, “irrational” character of the world of appearances. 
The Indian way, argues Husserl, resembles the Greek model in its urge 
to surmount the mundane reality of appearances; however, its approach is 
straightforwardly “transcendental”157 in the sense that it holds subjectivity 
as the ground of all meaningfulness. The Indian religiosity represents a 
kind of “atheistic theology”, which does not do away with the meaningless-
ness of existence – it sanctifies the idea of samsāra, the cycle of suffering 
and rebirth that concerns each entity – and thus it avoids all questions of 
teleological development. However, it is exactly by delineating the pos-
sibility of a non-theoretical transcendental philosophy, the Buddhist think-
ing provides the possibility of a positive crisis for the present-day European 
humanity – one that might help us to acknowledge the essentially practical 
foundation of theoretical attitude. 
  As Merleau-Ponty has put it, it was exactly this opening towards the 
alien that served as the guiding presupposition of Husserl’s late reflections 
on Europe:
Certainly nothing was more foreign to Husserl than a European 
chauvinism. For him European knowledge would maintain its val-
ue only by becoming capable of understanding what is not itself. 
What is new in the later writings is that to think philosophically, to 
be a philosopher, is no longer to leap from existence to essence, to 
depart from facticity in order to depart from facticity in order to 
join the idea. To think philosophically, to be a philosopher – in rela-
tion to the past, for example – is to understand this past through 
the internal link between it and us.158 
These reflections provide us with the possibility of articulating the idea 
of universalism on the basis of Husserlian generativity. It is my convic-
Anteil nimmt.“ Ibid.
157 Husserl, SB 16.
158 Merleau-Ponty 1964: 89.
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tion that Husserl – through his reflections on Europe, its historicity and 
generativity – pointed towards a radically renewed understanding of a 
universal culture, whose novelty can be formulated through three differ-
ent features:
Formal1. . Instead of the substantial approach to universalism char-
acteristic of modern interpretation of this notion, Husserl’s re-
flections on Europe provide us with an inextricably formal char-
acterization of the universal culture. Instead of defining itself in 
regard to a particular set of universal norms, values or beliefs, 
this idea of universalism can only be acknowledged in terms of 
non-substantial undertaking, i.e., as a common task.
Pluralistic2. . Instead taking its point of departure from the norma-
tive framework of a particular homeworld, Husserl’s idea of a re-
sponsible universalism entails a necessary relation to a manifold 
of subjects, their unique homeworlds and traditions. The shared 
world as the horizon of horizons can only be discovered on the 
basis of this plurality.159 
Open to rearticulation3. . In accordance with the infinitely open ho-
rizon of production characteristic of philosophical ideality, it is 
necessary that we understand the universal as fundamentally in-
complete. Whatever practices, accomplishments or institutions 
we may promote in the name of universalism, we must always 
accompany this promotion with the awareness of the essentially 
inexhaustible horizon of possible development.
Philosophical reflection, accordingly, does not guarantee universality. 
However, it provides the means through which our critical attitude can 
become even more critical – the instrument which, by making learning and 
development possible, turns our adhesion to the empirical into a virtue. 
Thus philosophy, for Husserl, is universal in its pretension to become universal.
  In the last chapter of this work, I bring this idea of universalism 
together with the most radical, and at the same time, most ambiguous 
characterization of Husserl’s normative ideal of community: the community 
of love (Liebesgemeinschaft). It is my argument that this idea, by pointing 
159 Following Waldenfels, it is possible here to speak of “universalizations” in plural 
(Waldenfels 1997: 83).
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towards the ethical implications of the essential intertwinedness of human 
subjects (Cf. Ch. 2.2), provides us with the most compelling philosophical 
solution to the problematic of universalism and generativity. 
4.4 Rethinking Universalism
on the Basis of Husserlian Phenomenology:
Liebesgemeinschaft and Generativity
It is true that Marx tells us that history does not walk on its 
head, but it is also true that it does not think with its feet. 
Or we should say rather that it is neither its ‘head’ nor its 
‘feet’ that we have to worry about, but its ‘body’. – Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty160 
The concept of love holds a central position in the tradition of West-ern philosophy, not merely as a systematic topic, but as a general methodological notion. In Symposion, Socrates claimed that the 
only thing he knew something about was “the art of love (ta erōtika)”161, 
which was supposed to elevate him to the domain of eternal ideas – in 
Cratylus, Plato even entertained the idea that love (erōs) and “questioning” 
(erotan) are of the same origin.162 According to Aristotle, no community 
could exist without the motive of philia, friendship or social sympathy, 
so that even philosophical community flourished because of the affective 
bond between its members.163 For modern philosophy, love is no stranger 
either. Especially with Fichte and Hegel, there begins a tradition which 
emphasizes love as a necessary constituent of one’s personal identity and 
freedom, a relation which both vivifies the life of the individual self as well 
as preserves and cherishes the individuality of the fellow human being.164 
This tradition, which treats love as a solution to the conflict of individual 
wills was later picked up by Max Scheler, Jean-Paul Sartre, and many oth-
ers.165 
160 Merleau-Ponty 1962: xix.
161 Symp. 177d.
162 Cratylus, 398c-e.
163 Pol. IV.11 1295b24ff.
164 “[…] das Leben ist Liebe, und die ganze Form und Kraft des Lebens besteht in der 
Liebe und entsteht aus der Liebe”. Fichte 2001: 11. 
165 In the succeeding tradition of Continental philosophy, the philosophical underpinnings 
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  For Husserl’s phenomenology as well, the concept of love played an 
important role both as a personal as well as social phenomenon. Although 
several scholars have discussed to the concept of love (Liebe) in Husserl’s 
ethical writings, there seems to be very little consensus on its role in the 
overall project of phenomenology, nor the motivations behind its usage. 
Ullrich Melle has paid attention to the fact that whereas the published 
works of Husserl are mostly focused on a “rational-based” approach to 
ethical questions – the questions of values, their evidence, and the general 
structures of practical reason – discussions of love are mainly found in 
the manuscripts.166 According to Melle’s interpretation, this should not 
prevent us from ascribing love an important practical role in Husserl’s 
ethics: instead, these reflections reveal the essential limitations of the early 
axiological-rational approach to ethics, which Husserl came to consider 
“too formal, too universalist, too objectivist, and too calculating.”167 The 
problematic of love came to complement the cases in which the strictly 
rational model of ethical deliberation (such as the “law of absorption”) 
seemed to prove inadequate, or, where the mere sense of duty failed to 
explain the motives of ethical behavior. This concerned especially our rela-
tion to other persons, whose value, Husserl argued, cannot be ultimately 
decided apart from the affective bonds that we develop towards them – an 
insight that entailed a clear separation from the Kantian idea of formal 
imperative as the foundation of ethics.
  For this reason, several commentators have connected Husserl’s dis-
course on love to his theory of empathy. James Mensch, for one, treats 
love as a higher form of empathy, which not only recognizes the other-
ness of the fellow human being, but affirms it as something that calls for 
cultivation: “his life, his existence, as if were mine”.168 Peter Hadreas, in 
his turn, discusses Husserl’s idea of personal love as a dynamic notion, 
which has its experiential foundation in the primordial (pre-emphatic) 
“contact” with the other. According to his detailed account, love must be 
understood in connection with Husserl’s complex notion of Nachverstehen, 
“emphatic understanding” – or, as Hadreas translates it, “understanding-
of love have been of interest to many prominent scholars, including Luce Irigaray, Michele 
Le Doeuff, and Jean-Luc Nancy.
166 Melle 2002: 247.
167 Melle 2007: 12.
168 Mensch 1988: 383–384.
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following-after-another” – which acknowledges the non-objective and 
singular character of the other.169 The uniqueness of the other that one ex-
periences in love cannot be predelineated in terms of objective categories, 
but rather, the beloved other transcends all “objective” attributes. This is 
also what Max Scheler meant when arguing that love expresses a specific 
relation to the other in his or her individuality.170
  It should be noted, however, that the applications of love in Husserl’s 
body of work are manifold. At times, Husserl seems to talk about it in a 
somewhat “Platonic” sense of philosophia as love of knowledge or wisdom, 
for instance, as a “love of ideas” (Ideenliebe) or “pure love for objective 
knowledge” (reinen Liebe zur sachlichen Erkenntnis).171 At other occasions, as 
Hiroshi Goto has pointed out, love resembles a kind of Aristotelian virtue, 
which is able to foster the sense of belonging-together of a community.172 
In several occasions, Husserl resorts to the Kantian notion of “the love 
of neighbor” (Nächstenliebe), which refers to the idea of love as an active-
practical notion in distinction from the mere “pathological” (i.e. emotion-
al) love. According to this idea, love does not merely exist between indi-
vidual subjects, but it announces itself an essential imperative of practical 
reason, as something that we ought to exercise in relation to our fellow 
human beings. In Husserl’s lectures on Fichte, love plays a crucial role 
in explaining the teleological structure of human comportment, i.e., the 
will to become the best possible human being. According to this account, 
self-love is the condition for all genuine forms of human comportment, 
including the love for the other. Lastly, love is discussed in connection to 
the Hegelian relation between Master and Slave, as the overcoming of all 
relations of power and domination.173 
  One of the most lucid definitions of love as an ethical notion was 
provided by Husserl in his 1920/24 lecture course on ethics. Here, the 
concept of Liebe (and especially Nächstenliebe) was introduced as the guid-
169 Hadreas 2007: 17–22.
170 Cf. Scheler 1973: 163. These insights go well hand in hand with Husserl’s insistence 
that the other given in empathy is not a mere analogue of me, but rather, as essentially 
other. See for instance, HuaI: 153; HuaIV: 375.
171 On eros and Liebe, see HuaXXVII: 84, 101.
172 Hiroshi Goto has emphasized the influence of the Aristotelian filia (“love” or “friend-
ship”) and its teleological connotations for Husserl’s account of love, which he reads as an 
explicitly interpersonal relation (Goto 2004: 275).
173 HuaXV: 406n1
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ing motive of a special domain of ethics, the domain of “moral philosophy” 
(Moralphilosophie). Whereas Husserl conceived “ethics” as dealing with the 
general, a priori structures of practical acts (Tätigkeiten) and goals (Zwecke), 
the domain of moral philosophy was primarily confined to the “material” 
dimension of practical acts, most importantly, the relations between in-
dividual subjects.174 Already in his earlier lecture courses Husserl’s had 
emphasized that while formal axiology could be conceived to be the one 
of the most fundamental parts of an a priori account of ethics, the mere 
structural analysis of value could not explain why we consider certain 
goals or possibilities of action as absolutely binding. Accordingly, without 
this “material a priori” there would be “no types and families of objects 
that carried a priori predicates of values”, and “there would be no support 
for the idea of an objectively pre-established preferability and for the idea 
of a best.”175 In other words, the distinction between material and formal 
axiology was needed in order to overcome the historical opposition be-
tween moral emotivism (Gefühlsmoral) and rationalism (Verstandesmoral): 
ethical consideration, although it acquires for itself the form of rational 
deliberation, has its ultimate foundation in the affective bonds between 
human subjects.176 
  The idea that the concept of love is important in regard to Husserl’s 
social ethics gains some evidence on the basis of this analysis. As Melle and 
Henning Peucker point out, this transition from axiology to moral phi-
losophy should also be read as a shift from a individual-oriented approach 
to a more dynamic and social view of ethics.177 An ethical life cannot be 
assessed merely in terms of the capability of the individual to live a ratio-
nally justifiable life in terms of subjective insights, but we must also take 
into account the relational character of human existence as such. The oth-
ers are not just there in my field of action as simply other agents, but as 
someone who present me with a duty or an invitation to take a responsive 
174 HuaXXXVII: 10ff. See also HuaXXVIII: 414.
175 HuaXXVIII: 139. See Melle 2002: 236.
176 However, whereas the earlier reflections were still bound to the absolute demand of 
value-objectivity, which overcomes the mere emotional bond, the later analyses of love 
pointed towards another kind of understanding of ethical obligation. As Moritz Geiger 
noted to Husserl, it would be indeed strange to demand a mother to justify her love for 
the child in terms of objective good – instead, the value of the child is lived affectively and 
straightforwardly in the act of personal love. Melle 2002: 238–244.
177 See Peucker’s introduction in HuaXXXVII: xxi. Cf. Melle 2002: 239.
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stance towards them. This responsiveness characterizes the earliest rela-
tions of our individual life (e.g. a child’s relation to parent), but it does 
not restrict itself to these. Love extends from the deepest motivations of 
our intentional life to the highest goals of our communal existence, giving 
the fundamental sense to the overarching teleology of humanity as such. 
“In a genuine sense,” as Husserl put it, “love is one of the main problems 
of phenomenology, though not in its abstract unity of singularity, but as 
a universal problem.”178 Love is not a mere relation that prevails between 
two individual subjects; it is the vivifying force of ethical humanity on its 
way to a more genuine and responsible form of existence. 
  In this last chapter, I will interpret Husserl’s discourse on the “com-
munity of love” (Liebesgemeinschaft) as an answer to the problem of the 
teleological ideal of humanity, and consequently, to the problem of ethical 
universalism. I argue that it was through this idea that Husserl formulated 
the most interesting and compelling solution to the problem of the nor-
mative ideal of community, especially in regard to the generative problem 
of axiological asymmetry.179 Instead of satisfying itself in the generative 
asymmetry characteristic of the development of individual traditions, 
love, I argue, pointed towards a more dynamic interpretation of this asym-
metry – one, which would have corresponded with the inextricably open 
horizon of philosophical reason.
  As far as I know, no commentator has interpreted Husserl’s idea of 
love in connection to the problem of universalism. This is perhaps no sur-
prise considering the somewhat personalistic tenor of this notion – love 
seems too intimate – or the fact that in Husserl’s later texts on Europe the 
discourse of love is almost completely absent. This should not prevent us 
from treating it as an alternative discourse to the “theoretical expansion-
178 “Die Liebe im echten Sinne ist eines der Hauptprobleme der Phänomenologie, und das 
nicht in der abstrakten Einzelheit uns Vereinzelung, sondern als universales Problem“ Ms. 
E III 2/36b. Quoted in Schuhmann 1988: 78.
179 What many scholars fail to notice, however, is that the most probable source of Hus-
serl’s notion of the “community of love” was Max Scheler. Although Husserl never re-
ally explicitly verifies this connection, it seems evident that the significant influence that 
Scheler had on Husserl’s personalist ethics, extended also to the concept of love and its 
respective communal form. The notion of Liebesgemeinschaft appeared already in Scheler’s 
Formalismus in der Ethik, and it was treated as one of the “pure” forms of community along-
side the, “community of law” (Rechtsgemeinschaft), cultural community (Kulturgemeinschaft) 
as well as the “community of life” (Lebensgemeinschaft) and its parallel institutional form, the 
state (Scheler 1980: 126). Scheler linked the idea of Liebesgemeinschaft to a particular form 
of human community, the church, and separated it clearly from state and culture.
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ism” of the philosophical community – a discourse which took its point of 
departure from the unlimited sharedness and repeatability of theoretical 
truths. It is my conviction that the notion of love provides us with the ul-
timate philosophical foundation for the realization of a genuinely reciprocal 
universalism, that is, a universalism founded on the essential multiformity 
of human reality. 
  There are, of course, good reasons to consider the community of love 
as an unrealistic, deficient, and even naive solution to the political prob-
lems of globalized world. In times of huge structural imbalances of the 
global world-system – the one-sided exploitation of natural resources, the 
growing gap between rich and poor – the idea that we ought to “love each 
other” may appear as negligent or simply arrogant. As Janet Donohoe has 
put it, Husserl’s Liebesgemeinschaft does seem “idealistic sounding”180. By no 
means am I suggesting love in a personalistic (or “romantic”) sense as an 
answer to these problems. However, I believe that this idealism expresses 
something crucial in regard to the ethical and political dimension of phe-
nomenology and philosophy in general. Philosophy, for Husserl, was es-
sentially an “idealistic” undertaking in the sense that it aims at creating 
ideals through which the concrete affairs of this world can be assessed 
and transformed. Ideals are both the ultimate goals through which our 
life gains itself a teleological structure, but they also function as critical 
devices through which the particularities and contingencies of the existing 
social and political reality can be brought into light. Ideals are indispens-
able not in spite of but exactly because they are unattainable.
  As I already pointed out, Husserl distanced himself from the political 
philosophy of modernity, which sought the telos of communal life in a par-
ticular societal model or political institution.181 This is also confirmed by 
John Drummond, who claims that “Husserl, unlike, say Aristotle or Hegel, 
does not believe that the community qua political is the telos or fulfillment 
180 Donohoe 2004: 144.
181 Here, my reading differs from that of Natalie Depraz who argues for the essential 
connection between the social and political aspects of phenomenology: “A political phe-
nomenology is not then a phenomenology of a regional object described as political, but 
an originally political because an originally communal one” (Depraz 1995: 7). As I see it, 
Husserl’s understanding of the political referred to the institutionalized forms of human 
communality (i.e. permanent framework of generativity in the divisions between home 
and alien), and as such, it was to be distinguished from the fundamental intertwining of 
human intersubjectivity.
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of all social groupings […] he reserves that privilege for the authentic 
moral community, the ‘community of love’ as he sometimes calls it.”182 
Although I agree with Drummond’s analysis on the essential inadequacy of 
the political community, I believe that the distinction between the authen-
tic moral community (community of love) and the political community 
should not be conceived as a distinction between two alternative goals – 
as if humanity could set itself on the path of love instead of nation-states. 
Instead, the “moral” and the “political” ought to be understood in terms of 
two discourses – the absolute and relative – which are both necessary for 
the realization of the ethical dimension of philosophy.183 
  Husserl’s philosophy, as I argued, presents us with a form of utopian 
thinking which calls for the best possible on the basis of a particular histor-
ical situation, but which must also situate itself with regard to an infinite 
horizon of development. In order to do so, however, it must conceive the 
absolute ideal as essentially ineffable, as something which cannot be pre-
delineated in its totality – the concrete utopia must be dynamic, not static. 
We should read the “community of love” as the delineation of this infinite 
horizon of human development, which presents us with an imperative to 
take a critical relation to the existing structures and institutions of the 
political reality.
  In search for the antecedents of Husserl’s idea of a universal commu-
nity, I suggest that we ought to surpass the framework of Greek political 
philosophy, and turn towards a specific intellectual framework ascending 
from it, namely, the Christian. What interests us in this connection is the 
philosophical and conceptual shift of position that the Christian experi-
ence represents in regard to the political philosophy of the Greeks. It was 
exactly the Christian experience, I argue, that was the first to elucidate the 
concrete discrepancy that prevails between the absolute ideal of humanity 
and its empirical counterpart, the political community. Unlike for Greek 
political thought, for Christian experience this relation between the ideal 
and the concrete was to be understood not in terms of implementation 
but in terms of a concrete struggle, which acquires for itself the form of an 
infinite horizon of future development. This entails that the ethical ideal 
182 Drummond 2000: 41–42.
183 As I argued in the previous sections of this part, the Husserlian idea of political phi-
losophy should be seen in the light of his general idea of historical teleology, which unfolds 
through the dynamic of absolute and relative ideals.
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cannot be realized by merely shaping the political reality according to it, 
but rather, it must be introduced through radically different concepts than 
the political reality. As Husserl put it in a manuscript, we find this renew-
ing potential in the figures of Jesus and St. Paul:
Of Christ I have the archetypical idea of a divine man, of Paul the 
idea of the noblest and godly evangelist, a man that struggles and 
broods in this struggle. [Paul is] a seeker, striving to bring himself 
and others believing in Christ to clarity and pure life, to find the 
corresponding norms in their concrete daily activities.184
What we find in the figure of Paul is the motive of perpetual renewal that 
was still lacking from political philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. This re-
newal must be targeted towards the existing societal and political real-
ity with their norms and institutions, but it must be prefaced within the 
individual itself. This means that a genuinely universalistic stance cannot 
be introduced solely through institutional reforms, but it must be cor-
responded with the idea of human development, which takes a critical 
relation to the acquired personality or identity. 
  Correspondingly, in search of the right approach to Husserl’s com-
munity of love, I believe we ought to turn neither to the Platonic erōs nor 
the Aristotelian filia, but instead, the Christian agapē expressed especially 
in the Gospels and the letters of St. Paul. I believe it was only the Christian 
experience that was able to express the essential discrepancy that prevails 
between the interpersonal and cultural/objective structures of universal-
ism – the substantial and formal definitions of universalism – that was 
articulated by Paul in his strict separation of the idea of law (nomos) from 
that of love. Moreover, whereas for Plato and Aristotle love was supposed 
to nurture the belonging-together of a communion of philosophers or 
a circle of friends, the Christian notion of agapē presented a demand to 
transcend all traditionally given boundaries of the familiar and the strange, 
of home and alien, friend and enemy. We find this exhortation already 
in the classic exhortation to “love your enemies […] do good to those 
hating you”185, but it was especially through Paul that this principle was 
184 “Von Christus habe ich eine urbildliche Idee eines „Gott-Menschen”, von Paulus die 
Idee eines edelsten gotterfüllten Predigers und eines ringenden und im Ringen grübeln-
den Menschen, eines Suchers, strebend sich und anderen Christus Gläubigen zur Klarheit 
und zum reinen Leben zu helfen, in seinen konkreten Tagesforderungen die entsprechen-
den Normen zu finden usw.“ HuaXXVII: 101.
185 Matt. 5:44.
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understood in terms of an existential conversion, or, to put it in Hus-
serlian terms, as a change of attitude. What Paul understood was that the 
genuinely universalistic position does not necessitate merely a changed 
relation to other people but it entails a critical relation to those particular 
identities that confine us to a certain position. A just ethical attitude – an 
attitude which is also universal through and through – cannot be intro-
duced solely through institutional reforms (e.g. universal human rights) 
but it must be grounded in the transformation of the human individual. 
As Husserl argued:
The Christian love is first of all unavoidably pure love. But it is 
connected with the quest (which is necessarily motivated by love), 
to become the biggest possible community of love. Thus, [it is] a 
striving to “set” the people in relation with one another, to open up 
to them, and to open up for themselves.186 
This transition, however, should also be assessed in its “political” con-
clusions. By evoking the idea of universal community founded on love, 
Paul transferred the question of the normative ideal of community from 
the categories of righteous governance (politeia) and law (nomos) to in-
terpersonal relations. This transformation, I argue, was also reflected in 
the fundamentally apolitical interest of Husserl’s own position. What Paul 
delineated was an idea of communal existence that would have not been 
based on the exclusion of the other (i.e. the strange), but instead, on the 
perpetual relativization of the home/alien distinction. This does not entail 
that we ought to give up on our political institutions and laws; instead, 
it presents us with a political discourse as something that ought to be as-
sessed in the light of moral discourse.
  My argument is based on three different points:
For Husserl as for Christian experience (Paul), love expresses 1. 
the explicitly apolitical character of the absolute ideal of human-
kind. This ideal is not implemented merely through institutional 
transformations, but it must be founded on the idea of human 
development.
186  “Die Christliche Liebe ist zunächst notgedrungen bloss Liebe. Aber sie ist verbunden 
mit dem Streben (das notwendig von der Liebe her motiviert ist), in möglichst grossem 
Umfange zur Liebesgemeinschaft zu werden. Also Streben, zu den Menschen in „Beziehung 
zu treten”, sich ihnen zu eröffnen und sie für sich zu erschliessen etc.“ HuaXIV: 175.
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Love, for both, is about discovering the essential 2. relationality of 
human existence. It is defined by a critical stance towards the 
generative-political antithesis of home and alien; however, it 
aims at locating this tension at the heart of subjectivity.
Ultimately, love is the intersubjective equivalent of the philo-3. 
sophical horizon of infinite teleology.
In the third part of the work, we already touched upon the question of the 
universal aspects of Christian faith, particularly, the question of Catholi-
cism. Already at its very early stages, Catholicism was associated with the 
notion of orthodoxos – orthodoxy, or literally “true opinion” – that dis-
tinguished itself from what was called the “bad faith” of hereticism: most 
importantly, from the teachings of Arius (256–336 AD), a Christian Pres-
byterian who argued against the dominant Trinitarian dogma and empha-
sized the ontological distinction between God and Christ, but also several 
Gnostic groups that relied on different written sources than the Council. 
Even though Augustine argued that Catholicism was able to provide what 
he called the via universalis (universal road) to eternal life, his work on 
the universal community of Christians was titled as De Civitate Dei contra 
Paganos, i.e., the City of God against the pagans.187 Thus on the one hand, 
Catholicism stood for the unification of Christian congregations under 
single ecclesiastical and political jurisdiction; on the other, it was used to 
separate the official, orthodox doctrine from that of the heretics. For the 
Church, Christian universalism had become a political strategy, and cor-
respondingly, a medium of exclusion.
  However, there are good reasons to claim that the Catholic doctrine 
lost a crucial aspect of the Early Christian universalism, which took its 
point of departure from the idea of evangelization. Perhaps the most fa-
mous passage that is mentioned in connection to Christian universalism is 
the one delivered us by Matthew: “Go you therefore, and teach all nations, 
baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy 
Ghost”188. This exhortation – known to us as the Great Commission – was 
originally given only to the Eleven Apostles, although the later commen-
tators have been willing to interpret it as an imperative for the whole 
Christian community. Although this passage and its modifications (Mark 
187 Augustine, De civ.
188 Matt. 28:19–20.
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16:14–18, Luke 24:44–49, Acts 1:4–8, and John 20:19–23) are often 
presented in a negative light – especially in connection to the later Cru-
sades – the text includes no reference to the use of power or violence as a 
means of conversion. For the basic framework of the early evangelization 
was that of “righteous” (Gr. eu) “message delivery” (Gr. aggeleō): persuasion, 
not coercion.189 This message delivery was not confined to a particular 
ethnic, national, or cultural people; instead, it took its point of departure 
from the transient character of individual identities. At least according to 
Matthew’s description, the primary framework of “conversion” (strefō) is 
that of becoming a child (“Who shall humble himself as this little child, the 
same is greatest in the kingdom of heaven”190); not merely in the sense of 
returning to moral innocence, but in the sense of revoking the culturally 
inherited conceptions, values and validities. 
  This evidently apolitical undertone is present in the earliest docu-
ments of the New Testament, the letters of St. Paul. Paul understood his 
basic task as the proclamation of the “God’s secret wisdom”, that of uni-
versal salvation (sōteria) through faith (pistis) – a secret which had been 
revealed to the world through the death of Christ. This secret, however, 
could not be expressed in terms of “wisdom of this world or of the rulers 
of this world”191; instead, from the viewpoint of governing authorities this 
revelation appeared as an “affront” (skandalon) or “foolishness” (mōria).192 
Why is this? Against the Greek “wisdom” (sofia) which searched for the 
ultimate grounds of the appearing reality as well as the Judean quest for 
“signs” (sēmeion) of miracle, the Christian revelation could not be compre-
hended through “words” (logoi) or “sight” (blepō). The forthcoming king-
dom of God could only be apprehended in terms of “power” (dynamis), as 
189 And of course, the early Christian universalism – like Greek politics – celebrated the 
idea of rebirth as one of its basic tenets. As Charles Freeman has pointed out, especially 
“Matthew […] presents Jesus as spearheading a Jewish renewal, even if it is one that has 
not been recognized by his own people” – a point that is supported by the recurring use 
of “rabbi” as a description for Jesus in the Gospels. The exhortation of Jesus in Mark 1:15 
“thinking after”, metanoein – what, for instance, the King James translation calls “repen-
tance” – should be read in the context of Hellenic Greek, in which it meant most often a 
“changing one’s way of life” or “adoption of another view”, or simply: renewal. See Free-
man 2002: 91; Rossbach 1999: 39. See also Ef. 4:23 in which Paul uses the corresponding 
exhortation for renewal, ananeō.
190 Matt. 18:4.
191 1. Cor. 2:6
192 1. Cor 1:18.
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a transition that effectuates itself by the means of “spirit” (pneuma) – “love, 
joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness, and self-
control.”193 This did not prevent Paul from arguing that “every person must 
be subject to the governing authorities”194 – despite the revelation, the 
political institutions were to be left basically intact. Paul did not under-
stand himself as a political revolutionary or a competitor of the Roman 
emperor; instead, the revolution promoted by Christianity was to be real-
ized on a wholly another level.
  Despite the seemingly apolitical undertone, in the recent decades 
there has been several scholarly works that read Paul as an explicitly po-
litical thinker. Beginning with Jacob Taubes’ The Political Theology of St. Paul 
(Die politische Theologie des Paulus, based on his 1987 seminars, published 
in 1993), philosophers such as Giorgio Agamben, Alan Badiou, and Slavoj 
Žižek have discussed the works of Paul from a social and political perspec-
tive. According to Taubes’ thesis, the Pauline revolution did not point to-
wards an otherworldly paradise, but as already Feuerbach had maintained, 
to the establishment of “the Kingdom of Heaven here on earth.” For this 
reason, argues Taubes, we ought to read Paul’s work in relation to two 
competing frameworks of political thinking: the imperium of Rome and 
the ethnic unity of the Jewish people.195 Indeed, Paul’s insistence to avoid 
the traditional notions of polis, ethnos and imperium as well as his fierce cri-
tique of the Jewish law (nomos) can be read against this background. What 
Taubes does not emphasize, however, is that the categories of polis and 
nomos constituted the basic framework of Greek political philosophy, and 
that Paul’s decision to resort to the notion of “congregation” (ecclēsia) as 
the model for the universal community might as well be read against, and 
not in favor of Hellenistic cosmopolitanism (Ch. 3.4). Although Paul retained 
also the traditional sense of ecclēsia in the sense of particular congrega-
tions, he also employed this notion in a transferred sense to describe the 
universal community of Christians: “He put all things in subjection under 
his feet, and gave him to be head over all things for the congregation, 
which is his body, the fullness of him who fills all in all.”196 
193 Gal. 5:22.
194 Rom. 13:1.
195 Taubes 2004: 117.
196 Ef. 1:22-23.
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  Let us first focus on the concept of law (nomos). As I argued in the pre-
vious part of the work, this notion functioned as one of the central catego-
ries of the Greek political thinking, which referred to the “constructed” 
character of the political order. Although the scope of this concept in-
cluded also the typical sense of “legislation” that protects individual human 
beings from the despotism of others, the concept of nomos was also under-
stood in a broader context, as a pre-political category which constitutes 
the domain of societal and political order before any concrete legislation. 
Law (nomos) is what “delimits” (nemein) the political space by identifying 
the political subject (for instance, the “free, rational Athenian male”), and 
by excluding those who do not fit the criteria (foreigners, women, slaves 
etc.). Plato discovered his own view of political sovereignty through the 
best possible realization of this norm – the philosophers – which then set 
the standard for the remaining classes of society. Governance, politeia, was 
then required to keep these classes in their proper position; at the end, 
politics is about maintaining the societal order.
  Paul’s critique of the idea of governance, which stood at the center 
of Greco-Roman system of government, is highlighted by the fact that 
the notion of politeia appears in his letters only once.197 His ferocious at-
tack against the category of law was motivated, first of all, by the prom-
ise of universal salvation, which could not be attained through “works” 
(ergon), but only faith: “No human being will be justified in God’s sight 
by means of the works prescribed by the law”198. However, Paul did not 
criticize merely the idea of salvation through human activity, but the very 
idea of delimitation as the fundamental premise of political communities. 
Law does not merely divide the field of human action into forbidden and 
permissible deeds; law creates the “communal” or “political” subject per 
se. By ascribing to the normative framework of a particular community, 
I become a member of that community, but I also acquire for myself a 
conception of my “homecomrades”. To put it in Husserlian terms, “law” is 
the basic principle of generativity, which prescribes the normative founda-
tion of a particular community. In this regard, the relation that I have to 
the other through law is either pardoning or adjudging; I am compelled 
to accept or refuse the other. Through law I encounter the fellow human 
197 Ef. 2:12.
198 Rom. 3:20, cf. 9:32.
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being as either predictable or mystified, as something that I can or cannot 
govern.199 
  In order to account for the idea of human existence as being torn be-
tween the universal and the particular aspects, Paul invoked a distinction 
between the “inner” (esō) and “outer” (exō) human being.200 As I become a 
part of a certain tradition with its specific normative framework, I develop 
myself an abiding personal form or tendency, which defines my directed-
ness towards the world. In Husserl’s terms, these tendencies become a 
part of my habituated personality, which most often justifies itself on the 
basis of convention or affective allure. This is what Paul means by “outer 
man”: I begin to act as it is appropriate for certain identity position; I be-
gin to want what is appropriate for my homeworld.
  Thus, the imminent consequence of the “end (telos) of the law”201 that 
had been introduced to the world through Christ was the concrete ex-
hortation to do away with the generative distances that separate human 
beings from each other. Therefore, as Paul claimed, “there is no difference 
between Jew and Greek”202 – a genuinely universalistic stance must un-
derstand itself in a critical relation to the very category of identity as such. 
Instead of a universal community which founds itself on law – on delimita-
tion and exclusion – a genuinely universalistic community must radically 
rethink this fundamental premise of all political communities. 
  This does not mean, however, that we could simply deny the immense 
generative distances that prevail between different homeworlds. We can-
not simply do away with all the “habituated” characteristics of our per-
sonal life; however, we can change our attitude towards them. This is, I 
argue, what Paul means when he says that through Christ, “we have been 
199 As Jacob Taubes and Alain Badiou have shown in their readings of St. Paul, this is exactly 
how his critique of the category of law (nomos) ought to be understood – not as a critique of 
legislative praxis as such, but as the critique of the principle of separation, which “divides” 
(nemein) the domain of communal existence into particular identities, what Badiou calls 
“subjective dispositions” (Badiou 2003: 47). It is exactly through the category of law that I 
encounter the other as a representative of a particular normative framework, a particular 
“homeworld” – as Greek or barbarian, as Roman or Jew.
200 See, for instance, 2. Cor. 4:16; Ef. 3:16. This outer man, Paul argues, has its antithesis 
in the “inner” man – a concept whose meaning Paul leaves somewhat ambiguous. While it 
might be the case that Paul had in mind the Platonic idea of “the man within”, which ap-
pears only once in the Republic as a metaphor for the rational part of the soul, it seems clear 
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discharged from the law”203. This exemption, of which Paul employs the 
verb kataergō, does not mean simple extermination of the law. As Giorgio 
Agamben has shown in detail, this verb ought to be understood in terms 
of the inactivation of law, its rendering inoperative.204 Since my existence, 
for instance, is completely defined by norms, beliefs and valuations that 
are characteristic of a European living in the 21st century, I cannot simply 
do away with this “identity”. However, I can resist the tendency of taking 
this particular normative framework as the absolute point of departure for 
my ethical stance. 
  Is this not exactly what Husserl means by “bracketing”? As Husserl 
emphasized on several occasions, the phenomenological epoché which ab-
stains from the existence-claims of the natural attitude, does not “destroy” 
the world (or the generative history it contains), but rather, it sets its 
validity aside. As I argued previously in this work, this was exactly the 
stance of philosophy in regard to myth: philosophy did not “destroy” the 
common narratives, but it employed them in order to show their common 
origin in the shared lifeworld. What Paul simply did was that he radical-
ized this motive by taking it into the very heart of human subjectivity as 
such. For him, the problem was not simply in the ludicrous beliefs of our 
ancestors or those of other people, but in the essential tendency of human 
subjectivity to find contentment in a factitious personality. Therefore, a 
genuinely universalistic stance must incorporate within itself a motive of 
self-critique.
  It is exactly here that we discover the topic of renewal. “If indeed our 
outward man is being decayed,” writes Paul, “yet the inward man is be-
ing renewed day by day.”205 What Paul understood was that since my ad-
herence to a particular normative framework (a law or custom) has the 
tendency of becoming a habitual character of my personal existence, we 
must constantly struggle against this tendency: “Be not conformed to this 
age, but be transformed by the renewing of your mind.”206 This renewal 
(anakainōsis or ananeōsis), which literally refers to a transformation into a 
new and not a previously experienced state, finds its completion in what 
Paul calls “weakness” (astheneia). This should not be understood primar-
203 Rom. 7:6.
204 Agamben 2005b: 94ff.
205 2. Cor. 4:16.
206 Rom. 12:2
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ily in a negative sense. Weakness means, first and foremost, a situation in 
which I cannot present myself as the representative of a particular identity 
– ethnic, cultural, or national – or, when my actions are not guaranteed 
with their justification on the basis of a pre-established normative frame-
work or a tradition. This weakness, however, is what makes us ultimately 
“strong”207. When I cannot justify my beliefs, actions or valuations on the 
basis of an established convention – a generative history – I look for the 
grounds of this justification elsewhere: in myself and my relations towards 
my fellow human beings. And it is exactly in this weakness, Paul claims, 
that God’s “power reaches its perfection” (dynamis en asthēneia teleitai).208
  It was perhaps this passage that Nietzsche had in mind as, in The An-
ti-Christ, he described Christianity as the “religion of pity”, which pro-
motes “active sympathy for the ill-constituted and weak”.209 For Nietzsche, 
Christianity followed the negative attitude of Greek philosophy towards 
life by promoting an “ideal out of opposition to the preservative instincts 
of strong life”210, that is, to hunger, sexuality, quest for power, and so on. 
Paul did not deny the existence of these instincts, quite the contrary. What 
he saw was that even our most fundamental instincts and drives are never 
sustained merely by themselves; rather, they emerge against a set of pro-
hibitions that are embodied by the law. Unlike Plato, who understood no-
mos as something which simply restricts the unwanted desires211, for Paul 
these desires are exactly “aroused by the law” (ta dia tou nomou energeitō).212 
This is the idea of “forbidden fruit”, or what Badiou calls the theory of 
subjective unconscious213 – I always want that which I do not have, that 
which is possessed by others.214 
  Nevertheless, if we render inoperative the law or “shared tradition” 
which constitutes our common heritage (our sense of being home), what 
207 2. Cor. 12:10
208 2. Cor. 12:9.
209 “Das Mitleiden der That mit allen Missrathnen und Schwachen – das Christenthum.” 
KSA 6.170.
210 “Das Christenthum hat die Partei alles Schwachen, Niedrigen, Missrathnen genom-
men, es hat ein Ideal aus dem Widerspruch gegen die Erhaltungs-Instinkte des starken 
Lebens gemacht […]” KSA 6.171.
211 Plato, Rep. 571b
212 Rom. 7:5.
213 Badiou 2003: 81.
214 As Foucault puts it the History of Sexuality: “Thus one should not think that desire is 
repressed, for the simple reason that the law is what constitutes both desire and the lack 
on which it is predicated.” (Foucault 1979: 81).
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can bind us together? According to Paul, the answer was to be found in 
the concept love (agapē). According to him, faith operates itself through 
love, which comes to replace law as the binding element of communal life: “Do not 
continue to owe anything, except to love one another. For the one loving 
the other has consummated (peplērōken) the law.” (Rom. 12:8) But what 
is “love”? We should not be absorbed too deeply in the interpretational 
problems that distinguish the notion of agapē from the related notions of 
erōs and filia. Let us note, however, that most of the instances of this notion 
in the New Testament refer to either God’s love towards mankind, or, to 
mankind’s love towards God, i.e., to the asymmetrical relation between 
the finite being and the infinite being. It is thus perhaps understandable 
that when Paul employs the notion of love to describe the reciprocal and 
non-hierarchical relation between individual human beings, he most of-
ten defines the “object” of love in terms of an indefinite “other” (allēlous), 
or, what later became the central notion of the Gospels, the “neighbor” 
(plēsion): “You shall love your neighbor as yourself.” (Gal. 5:14). Although 
the word “neighbor” might evoke the impression of an acquaintance or 
someone living close to you, this is not its meaning in the context of the 
Christian discourse on love. The concept refers to the other exactly as 
removed of all his or her particular characteristics, any other person ir-
respective of nation or religion with whom we live or whom we chance 
to meet.215 To put it in Husserlian terms, the neighbor is the other subject 
as  regardless of her generative background. A genuinely ethical relation to the 
other becomes understandable only through a constant opening up to-
wards the alien, a transgression of home. 
  Thus, what we have in this transition from “law” to “love” is a shift in the 
raison d’être of communal life itself. The ideal form of communal life can 
no longer be described in terms of best possible institutions but in terms 
of best possible interpersonal relations. Love does not undo the existing 
political institutions but brackets them or renders them inoperative: it 
sets a new standard according to which these institutions can be assessed. 
The Pauline “community of love” does not replace polis or the imperium; it 
points towards a wholly new way of comprehending the legitimacy of po-
litical and societal institutions. In other words, rather than offering a new 
idea that would fit the schemata and structure of Greco-Roman political 
215 See e.g. Matt. 5:43ff.
— 399 —
4.4 Rethinking Universalism on the Basis of Husserlian Phenomenology
thought it questions these structures and visions a completely new idea of 
the foundations of human sociality.
  This novel idea of an apolitical community was delineated by Paul 
in his attempts to provide the image of body politic with a new sense. 
Whereas Plato had still used the metaphor of body politic in an essentially 
“functional” sense – in order to validate the division between the differ-
ent classes of society, the division between the ruler and the ruled – Paul 
employed this metaphor to argue for the essential interdependence as well 
as uniqueness of the individual members of community. Through the com-
mon “body of Christ”, Paul was able provide a view of community which 
replaces the matrix of identity differences with the essential intertwined-
ness of individual subjects. “So we, who are many, are one body in Christ, 
and individually members one of another (kath’eis allēlōn melē),”216 Paul 
writes in the letter to Romans – 
For as the body is one, and has many members, and all the mem-
bers of the body, being many, are one body; so also is Christ. For 
in one Spirit we were all baptized into one body, whether Jews or 
Greeks, whether bond or free; and were all given to drink into 
one Spirit. For the body is not one member (melos), but many. […] 
If they were all one member, where would the body be? But now 
they are many members, but one body. The eye can’t tell the hand, 
“I have no need for you,” or again the head to the feet, “I have no 
need for you.” No, much rather, those members of the body which 
seem to be weaker are necessary.217 
Paul presents us with a reservation: “those members which seem to be 
weaker…” In his time as today, we are familiar with people who do not 
find their place in the common life, people who are persecuted, disre-
garded, ostracized or bullied either because they actively refuse all com-
monly accepted “identities” (e.g. ways of life), or, because they uninten-
tionally fall outside the normative framework of the majority. From the 
perspective of “normality”, these people are indeed “seemingly weaker”. 
At the same time, however, these marginalized groups remind the rest of 
the inherent conventionality of a given set of norms – of their tendency 
to become absolutized so that the community merely lives on its adher-
ence to a particular norm. As we may learn from the example of National 
216 Rom. 12:5.
217 1. Cor. 12:12-22.
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Socialism, even totalitarian ideologies do not do away with differences as 
such (“If they were all one member, where would the body be?” Paul asks), 
quite the contrary. Fascism was not, as it is sometimes claimed, the denial 
of differences (ethnic, cultural, sexual); instead, it elevated these differ-
ences in order to substantiate what was considered to be the norm.
  Two things are important here. First, what Paul avoids with his idea 
of “organic unity” is the apparent misconception according to which the 
universal could be discovered or established simply after the negation of 
all differences. As Badiou puts it, for Paul differences are a fact: “One can 
even maintain that there is nothing else.”218 Instead of a clear-cut separa-
tion between the “empirical” identities and the underlying substance of 
“universal” rationality, Paul wanted to understand the universal beginning 
with those norms and identities that exist within this world: as a process 
which seeks to relativize, not destroy, the seeming differences between 
people. The genuine subject of universalism is not the (imagined) totality 
of subjects, but a particular subject which takes a reflective stance towards its 
particular historical, cultural and societal situation. Second, what this entails is 
that from the viewpoint of love, the solution is not to overcome differences 
but to promote the idea of self-responsibility in the others: “Let each one 
of us please his neighbor with a view to what is good, to edification”.219 
Love means, above all, the sense of being at home with oneself. 
  These insights give us resources for a new constructive interpretation 
of Husserl’s social ethics and its universalistic ideal, the community of 
love. As I argued in the second part of the work, the organic metaphors 
of bodies, organs, and tissues were a central part of Husserl’s social on-
tology, which relied on the idea of a specific “intertwining” at the heart 
of human subjectivity. We discover the dependency on other streams of 
consciousness already at the very fundamental levels of our existence – an 
intertwining which makes possible the constitution of a common world. 
It was exactly this intertwining that Husserl wanted to articulate also in 
its ethical consequences. As Husserl put it in his lectures on ethics, as 
we think of the human individual within the community, we discover a 
“wonderful intertwining” (wunderbare Verflehtung), which binds all of the 
218 Badiou 2003: 98.
219 Rom. 15:2
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self-determinations of the individual human beings together.220 This is, yet 
again, another example of Husserl’s “anti-liberalistic” and “anti-atomic” 
view of human being: I cannot assess the ethical character of my life apart 
from the life of the others, but my life must also be measured by my capa-
bility to make others free and responsible. I must understand my actions as 
a part of a chain of actions (of others), which permeates my life and gives 
it a more concrete form: 
We do not live merely next to each other, but in one another. We 
define ourselves from person to person, from I to I, and our wills 
do not merely work on others as the components of our surround-
ing but in the others: our wills extend themselves to the will of the 
other, into the will of the other which is at the same time ours, so 
that the actions of the other can become ours, even if in a modified 
manner.221
For Husserl, this “living common” has its basis in the experience of love. 
Not only does love entail an intimate affection to the other but it builds up 
the basic experience through which life acquires a value for itself. “There 
is no life without love”, as Husserl put it – simply because the very value 
of life is realized first through a “loving” relationship, for instance, that of 
a parent and a child.222 This simply means that the value of life can only be 
acknowledged within a social context: it is only through other conscious 
subjects that my life can be treated not as means but as an end in itself. 
Here, Husserl ends up affirming the basic insight of Aristotle and Fichte 
according to which “self-love” is the essential condition for the love of 
the other. In order to value others, I must be acknowledged as valuable 
myself:
My life is nothing for itself; it is one with the life of the others; it 
is a piece in the unity of the life of the community and reaches be
220 HuaXXXVII: 240.
221 “Wir leben nicht nur nebeneinander, sondern ineinander. Wir bestimmen einander 
personal von Person zu Person, von Ich zu Ich, und unser Wille geht nicht nur auf die 
anderen als umweltliche Sachen, sondern in die anderen, er erstreckt sich in das fremde 
Wollen hinein, das Wollen des anderen und zugleich unser Wollen ist, so dass seine Tat, 
wenn auch in verschieden abgewandelter Weise, zu unserer Tat werden kann.“ Husserl, 
WL 217. Hart 1992a: 248. Translation modified.
222 “Kein Leben ohne Liebe, und jedes Leben wird erst bewusst in eins mit einem Liebes-
bewusstsein, einer Liebesdeckung.“ WL: 210. See also HuaXIV: 165–166.
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yond this into the life of humanity. I cannot evaluate my life with-
out evaluating the interwoven life of others.223
This is not to say, however, that the value of the individual would be com-
pletely determined by other subjects. “For itself ” is not the same as “in 
itself ”. Rather, this idea points towards the essential intertwinement of 
my ethical comportment in regard to the life of others, which gives this 
comportment its proper form. As we saw in the second part of this work, 
Husserl conceived the individuality of the transcendental subjectivity as 
the abstraction of the concrete monadic totality. In ethical terms, this would 
mean that my freedom and my responsibility, which are the necessary fac-
tors of my ethical stance, achieve their concrete form only with the free-
dom and responsibility of others. Therefore, as Husserl puts it, love must 
include within itself “an interest in assisting the other”224 – love expresses 
the ethical imperative to help the other to enhance and preserve the value 
of his or her own life. Love aims at helping the others to attain their true 
self in practice (dem Anderen zu seinem wahren Selbst praktisch zu helfen).225 
As a lover in the community of love (friendship) […] I observe the 
beloved not merely as someone who lives so-and-so […] he is not 
there in my field of being, but I live in his life, I live with it, and the 
same goes the other way round.226
It is exactly here that Husserl’s and Paul’s ideals of body politic meet. As in 
the case of the body of an individual, physical pain is never merely in a par-
ticular limb or section but is felt in the whole body, a suffering that takes 
place in a “healthy community” never affects only its particular members. 
Joy, happiness, pain, or social injustices are all of course experienced by 
individual subjects, but they can be lived as common.227 
  The unity of communal person, however, should not be taken for 
granted; it can be broken. This happens when a body politic experiences 
223 “Mein Leben ist aber nichts für sich; es ist einig mit dem Leben der anderen, es ist 
Stück in der Einheit des Gemeinschaft lebens und reicht darfiber hinaus ins Leben der 
Menschheit. Ich kann nicht mein Leben werten, ohne das mitverflochtene Leben der an-
deren zu werten“. WL 209–210 Translation in Hart 1992a, 294.
224 “Die Liebe bestimmt ein Interesse der Fremdförderung […].“ HuaXIV: 166.
225 HuaXXXVII: 241.
226 “Als Liebender in der Liebesgemeinschaft (Freundschaft) […] betrachte ich […] ihn 
nicht nur als so und so Lebenden, er ist nicht nur als das in meinem Seinsfeld, sondern ich 
lebe in seinem Leben, ich lebe es mit, und auch ich bin für ihn evtl.“ HuaXV: 512.
227 Cf. Paul: “If one part suffers, every part suffers with it” (1. Cor. 12:26).
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a certain paralysation by which we lose the ability to empathize with the 
pain (or joy) of others. This is the moment when culture turns “barbaric”: 
when a society experiences an inner dispersion by which the ability to 
mirror oneself through others, to feel for others, is lost. The loss of em-
pathy can take place through growing class divisions or ethnic conflicts, 
but it can also be fostered through such intellectual practices that present 
the other as somehow fundamentally alien, differentiated by an alleged 
cultural-historical abyss – an absolute “axiological asymmetry”. For this 
reason, we need to constantly remind ourselves of the fundamental bond 
that binds us together.
  Husserl was well aware of the counterargument according to which 
this “living in the other” might entail the loss of individual self-responsi-
bility.228 Against this suspicion, Husserl argued that instead of doing away 
with the inextricable difference that prevails between I and the other, love 
denoted a specific elevation of the individual and her responsibility: “The 
one who loves does not lose himself in love, but lives, in an especially el-
evated way, as I in the beloved.”229 Here, Husserl comes remarkably close 
to Hegel’s definition of love as a peculiar self-alienation, by which subject 
returns to himself in order to find his true identity. “Love means in general 
terms the consciousness of my unity with another,” writes Hegel in the 
Philosophy of Right, “so that I am not in selfish isolation but win my self-
consciousness only as the renunciation of my independence and through 
knowing myself as the unity of myself with another and of the other with 
me.”230 As Hegel put it in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, the essen-
tial insight of Christianity was that even God discovers himself by alienat-
228 According to Buckley’s suggestive criticism, Husserl’s notion of Liebesgemeinschaft 
might still leave room for an idea of “authentic domination” (1992: 139), which founds 
itself on the perfectly uniform, universally functioning reason. While I believe this criti-
cism is partially justified, I believe the Liebesgemeinschaft ought to be treated in terms of 
a moral discourse which does not delineate the any political institutions (or relations of 
domination) as such. Reason, in its most general, ethical sense, entailed merely the idea of 
rational self-responsibility – as such, it presented itself as a counterstrategy to the very idea 
of political domination through power.
229 “Der Liebende verliert sich nicht in der Liebe, sondern in besonders erhöhter Weise lebt 
er als Ich im Geliebten.“ Ms. F I 24 29a: Quoted in Roth 1960: 117. Translation in Hart 
1992a: 243.
230 “Liebe heißt überhaupt das Bewußtsein meiner Einheit mit einem anderen, so daß ich 
für mich nicht isoliert bin, sondern mein Selbstbewußtsein nur als Aufgebung meines Für-
sichseins gewinne und durch das Mich-Wissen, als der Einheit meiner mit dem anderen 
und des anderen mit mir.“ Hegel, GW 14.1: §158.
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ing himself in this world (in the figure of Christ); even God finds his true 
essence through the other. “For love is a distinguishing of two, who never-
theless are absolutely not distinguished for each other,” Hegel writes:
The consciousness or feeling of the identity of the two – to be 
outside of myself and in the other – this is love. I have my self-con-
sciousness not in me but in the other. I am satisfied and have peace 
with myself only in this other – and I am only because I have peace 
with myself; if I did not have it, then I would be a contradiction 
that falls to pieces. This other, because it likewise exists outside 
itself, has its self-consciousness only in me, and both the other and 
the I are only this consciousness of being-outside-ourselves and of 
our identity; we are only this intuition, feeling, and knowledge 
of our unity. This is love, and without knowing that love is both a 
distinguishing and the sublation of the distinction, one speaks emptily 
of it. 231
As I would like to see it, for Hegel as well as for Husserl, love is the title 
for the identity-in-difference that constitutes the compassionate unity of 
the ideal community. As Hegel accentuates, love is not assimilation: in 
love, I do not simply want to become like the beloved nor do I wish to 
make the beloved like me. On the contrary, in the act of love it is exactly 
the indispensable alienness of the other that I wish to sustain and cherish. But 
at the same time, by helping the other to sustain her particularity and 
personality, I am also becoming more aware of my own uniqueness – in 
this regard, love is indeed “co-generative”. Take, for instance, a parent who 
encourages her children to pursue a completely different vocation than 
her own: while this encouragement implies that the child must be treated 
as someone who makes her own choices, it also implies that the parent is, 
in a way, irreplaceable. Alienating one’s dreams, wishes, or inclinations 
into another person would also imply that this person can simply replace 
231 “Denn die Liebe ist ein Unterscheiden zweier, die doch füreinander schlechthin nicht 
unterschieden sind. Das Bewußtsein, Gefühl dieser Identität dieser beiden – dieses, außer 
mir und in dem Anderen zu sein – ist die Liebe: Ich habe mein Selbstbewußtsein nicht in 
mir, sondern im Anderen, aber dieses Andere, in dem nur ich befriedigt bin, meinen Frie-
den mit mir habe – und ich bin nur, indem ich Frieden mit mir habe; habe ich den nicht, 
so bin ich der Wiederspruch, der auseinanderfällt – dies Andere, indem es ebenso außer 
sich ist, hat sein Selbstbewußtsein nur in mir, und beide sind nur dieses Bewußtsein ihres 
Außersichseins und ihrer Identität, dies Anschauen, dies Fühlen, dies Wissen der Einheit. 
Das ist die Liebe, und es ist ein leeres Reden, das Reden von Liebe, ohne zu wissen, daß 
sie das Unterscheiden und das Aufheben des Unterschieds ist.“ Hegel 1984: 201–202. My 
italics. 
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me – that I was only a contingent agent of my actions. For this reason, 
love must be seen as the inclination to sustain one’s personality through an 
encounter with the other.
  We are now able to amplify the argument presented at the end of part 
4.2, namely, the idea according to which self-responsibility finds its genu-
ine realization only within the infinite horizon of community. To define 
this continuity in terms of love would entail that I do not simply imagine 
that the others would take up my beliefs, values, or inclinations as such; 
again, this would mean that my agency could be treated as a mere contin-
gency. Rather, the personality of my accomplishments is best confirmed 
not by blind adoration but through a critical relation towards them. The 
value of my labor is essentially dependent on its capability to make others 
free. For this reason, love, as a movement that takes place within the gen-
erative context, implies essentially the movement of renewal.
  As Laura Werner points out in her work The Restless Love of Thinking, 
one of the reasons why Alexander Kojève, in his interpretation of the dia-
lectics of history, neglected Hegel’s notion of love was that it was unable 
to explain the essentially conflictual character of historical development. 
History, according to this reading, was to be understood as a struggle for 
freedom and recognition whose basic blueprint was to be defined through 
the dialectics of Master and Slave.232 As Hegel himself put it in the Phe-
nomenology of Spirit, what the “play of love” (Spiel der Liebe) – characteristic 
solely to the unfolding of divine intelligence – lacked was “the serious-
ness, the suffering, the patience, and the labor of the negative.”233 In other 
words, what the idea of love lacked was the inherent “cunning of reason”, 
which realizes itself in the seemingly irrational and violent outbursts of 
human history.
  As I would like to claim, however, Husserl’s reflections on the teleo-
logical development of philosophy provide us with a possibility of articu-
lating an idea of love as a category of historical development. While it is 
true – as I have emphasized in several occasions – that Husserl’s own view 
of the development of European history was essentially that of one-sided 
expansionism, it is also possible to point towards another aspect of this 
232 Werner 2007: 91.
233 “[…] wenn der Ernst, der Schmerz, die Geduld und Arbeit des Negativen darin fehlt.” 
GW 9: §19.
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development. As I argued in the beginning of this part, Husserl’s emphasis 
on the teleological development of philosophy had pointed towards a need 
to articulate a more positive account on the idea of historical presupposi-
tions (Voraussetzungen) as the necessary point of departure for a genuine 
philosophical reflection. What this idea entailed was that philosophical 
self-responsibility, although it necessarily unfolds in the life of the individ-
ual, pertains an essential “debt” to past philosophers: we are able to know 
more because of them. And although our relation towards them entails an 
element of negativity – we do not simply accept the choices made by past 
philosophers – this negativity is by no means destructive (as Hegel took 
it to be). On the contrary, we arrive at a genuinely unique philosophical 
position only by recognizing our situatedness within the overall generative 
development of history. This was, of course, the medieval idea of “stand-
ing on the shoulders of giants”, attributed first to Bernard of Chartres by 
John of Salisbury in his Metalogicon. “We frequently know more,” writes 
John, “not because we have moved ahead by our own natural ability, but 
because we are supported by the [mental] strength of others, and possess 
riches that we have inherited from our forefathers.”234 Is this not exactly 
how love – finding one’s own personal existence through others – appears 
in the course of history?
  Is it, however, possible to locate the motive of love also in the political 
domain? We have seen that according to the classical Hegelian thesis, the 
teleological development of human sociality that begins with the one-sid-
ed recognition reached its complete form in the state institutions, which 
endowed the individual members with their basic autonomy. Beginning 
with the “abstract individuality” of the market-place, where individuals 
recognize themselves as two parts of a reciprocal exchange with their in-
dividual wills (e.g. I want to exchange certain goods with another person, 
but this entails that we want different things), it was through the state in-
stitutions that this will could be articulated as genuinely shared. A political 
community, which prescribes the general laws and principles of common 
life, relies essentially on a reciprocal relation in which individual subjects 
recognize each other as the representatives of the same will; although I 
might not be happy with each individual decisions within the political do-
main, I still want the state to exist. Especially in the discourse entertained 
234 Bertrand of Chartes 1967: 167.
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in the Philosophy of Right, the state represented the ultimate telos of hu-
man communality, the “absolute unmoved end in itself, in which freedom 
comes into its supreme right.”235 This end, argues Hegel, materializes itself 
in political institutions (i.e., the law), and as such, it is able to overcome 
the naturality of human love:
Love, however, is feeling, i.e., ethical life in the form of something 
natural. In the state, feeling disappears; there we are conscious 
of unity as law; there the content must be rational and known to 
us.236
It is perhaps evident why Husserl, in search for an interpersonal relation 
that would correspond with the infinite horizon of philosophy, could not 
abide within the statist framework of recognition. Unlike the telos of Hege-
lian recognition that can be attained through political institutions – I can 
recognize the other as equal and free, and thus put an end to the relation of 
master and slave – in the case of Husserl’s Liebesgemeinschaft, no such end 
can be directly delineated. On the contrary, the telos of love – the good 
of the other, his or her becoming responsible – can be infinitely cherished 
and ameliorated. Like personal renewal, this relation relies on an infinite 
striving, which does not satisfy itself in any “objective” state of affairs:
The beautiful is loved. But love is without an end. It is only love in 
the infinity of love and it carries thereby as its correlate the infinity 
of pure value itself. As love of the creative I, love is infinite longing 
for the beautiful.237
Understood this way, the relation of “community of love” to political in-
stitutions could be described in terms of a Kantian “regulative idea”. With 
regard to the domain of politics, the community of love would represent 
an essentially “transcendent” ideal, which cannot be attained within this 
world. However, it also functions as a critical device of political thinking 
which constantly has the tendency to settle for those institutions that we 
235 GW 14.1: 201 (§258).
236 “Die Liebe ist aber Empfindung, das heißt die Sittlichkeit in Form des Natürlichen; im 
Staate ist sie nicht mehr: da ist man sich der Einheit als des Gesetzes bewußt, da muß der 
Inhalt vernünftig sein, und ich muß ihn wissen.“ GW 14.1: §158
237 “Das Schöne wird geliebt. Die Liebe ist aber ohne Ende. Sie ist nur Liebe in der Un-
endlichkeit des Liebens, und sie trägt dabei ständig als Korrelat in sich die Unendlichkeit 
des reinen Wertes selbst. Sie ist als Liebe des schöpferischen Ich ins Unendliche Sehn-
sucht nach dem Schönen […].“ HuaVIII: 14–15. See Hart 1992a: 226; Schuhmann 1988: 
171ff.
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have acquired: it would, for instance, seek to overcome those political, 
cultural, and ethnic divisions which hinder us from empathizing with one 
another. This stance, however, would go against the basic perception ac-
cording to which there is love in the world. 
  How could these two stances be reconciled? How can the commu-
nity of love be an infinite telos – yet something which reveals itself in this 
world? The first answer concerns the quantitative definition. While it is 
evident that my experience is intertwined with those of the other, this in-
tertwining is not lived primarily as universal, but as an exclusive bond (for 
instance, between a parent and a child, a circle of friends and so on). As I 
become a part of a generative framework which binds me into a particu-
lar homeworld, I (most often) develop affection towards those persons 
with whom I share a common heritage, and, consequently, with whom I 
can empathize without concrete hindrances. As for instance Jeremy Rifkin 
has shown in his The Emphatic Civilization (2010), different mediums of 
communication play a crucial role in our ability to empathize with the 
joy or suffering of others. The Ancient world of script and codex was able 
to nurture the belonging-together of tribes and relatively small religious 
communities; the emergence of national consciousness was tightly con-
nected to modern printing techniques, which made it possible to broaden 
one’s daily field of interest to a relatively broad domain. We know that in 
many respects, the 20th century audiovisual means of communication have 
brought the famine and suffering of distant peoples closer to us – although 
these means do not guarantee the realization of intercultural empathy. In-
stead, to follow Husserl’s recurring emphasis, the universal distention of 
empathy must be lived as the inner demand of reason, which finds its true 
essence through the social domain: “I can be completely happy (glücklich) 
only when the humankind as a whole can also be happy.”238 
  In this regard, the idea of Liebesgemeinschaft is best understood in con-
nection to the idea of “infinite task”. Understood this way, this idea would 
recognize that love, like reason, does exist in the world as a possibility of 
human action, however, as constantly dissociated from its infinite ideal, 
its universal realization. Like the philosophical “community of theory”, 
which constantly has before itself the open horizon of future develop-
238 “Ich kann nur ganz glücklich sein, wenn die Menschheit als Ganzes es sein kann, und sie 
kann es eben nur in diesem Sinne sein.“ WL: 233.
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ment, the “community of love” would also abstain from entrenching itself 
into particular political institutions. Instead, it would become understand-
able only as a responsibility for the Pauline “neighbor”, for that infinite 
alienness of this world. (As Husserl put it in a letter, he understood himself 
“as a free Christian […] in the sense of an infinite task”239.)
  In a way, Husserl’s idea of a universal community of love points to-
wards a completely new type of logic which transcends both contempo-
rary globalization as well as today’s political universalism. By globalization 
we understand the process of intercultural commerce in which cultural 
differences are not only tolerated but effectively employed in order to 
identify certain goods as authentic, original, personal, and so on. This is 
what Hegel meant by the abstract individuality of the market place. We 
know that multinational corporations, for instance, adapt their products 
to suit the different global and local environments. Food markets are a 
good example of this.240 Against the often-presented concern, globaliza-
tion does not simply do away with differences of identity, but instead, it 
corroborates and even intensifies these differences in order to sustain the 
element of transgression. This is what Paul meant by arguing that desire 
is “aroused by law”: I want that which I do not have; that which falls out 
of the categories of familiar, customary, permissible and so on. It could 
be argued that the model of global consumer rests on the endless varia-
tion of mystified “others”, who function as the raisons d’être for cultural 
transgressions, which are easily commercialized: I can easily “try” Indian 
or Thai food; I can burn incenses to get the genuine bazaar experience; I 
can travel to Lapland in order to witness “real Christmas” etc. While these 
experiences give us information on foreign cultures, they most often do 
not transform this encounter into the form of shared will; instead, their 
appeal rests essentially on their enigmatic character.241 
  By universalism, however, we understand those processes of trans-
national co-operation which aim at creating institutions and norms that 
could be seen as genuine products of a common will. Take, for instance, 
239 HuaDokVII: 207.
240 For instance, through the so-called Protected Geographical Status (PGS) the European 
Union alone has guaranteed a protected status for more than 1000 types or brands of 
regional foods.
241 Thus globalization – as I would maintain – is essentially the movement of nomos, delimi-
tation: it employs generative distances in order to sustain the structure of desire towards 
the unseen, mysterious.
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the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, the International 
Criminal Court, or the Kyoto protocol – these are all examples of uni-
versal political resolutions or institutions, which are often seen as prime 
examples of a transnational co-operation. As such, they can be treated as 
good examples of a development towards shared global responsibility. The 
problem of these forms of co-operation, however, is that they often seem 
to legitimate all too easily the underlying political institutions, that is, the 
nation-states. As we know of the aforementioned examples, without the 
support of nation-states international law is basically inoperative. While 
this kind of universal co-operation produces good results in some areas of 
global interaction, it also strengthens national sovereignty, which makes it 
harder to interfere with injustices inside particular nations. 
  For this reason, I believe, we ought to take the political implications of 
phenomenology beyond mere institutional transformations. Philosophical 
universalism, understood in this Husserlian sense, is a process which takes 
its point of departure from the co-operation of individual subjects, and by 
doing so it targets its critique towards the existing institutions that regu-
late our relations towards other human beings. As such, it is a critical rela-
tion towards all constituted borders, frontiers and limits that prevent the 
realization of the common task of philosophy: with regard to the political 
domain, philosophy is essentially a negative attitude. However, it is exactly this 
negativity which makes possible the emergence of a genuine ethical stance 
within the generative context. This is what Merleau-Ponty meant when he 
described Husserl’s vision of a conscious historical development in terms 
of “permanent revolution”: philosophy is constantly critical towards the 
concrete, the empirical and the institutional; however, it understands that 
these instituted accomplishments hide within themselves latent horizons 
of sense and meaning, which can only be activated or discovered in ret-
rospect.242 Philosophy, in this Husserlian sense, seeks to materialize itself 
in cultural accomplishments, but it also refuses to take any concrete for-
mation of “objective spirit” as the ultimate telos of human communality. 
Instead, the universal is discovered only as the movement or process, in 
242 “Reactivation is not only the making explicit of what was implicit, but awakening of the 
total, originary intention of which it was only a partial expression. [...] Husserl rediscovers 
here one of the senses of permanent revolution: the anticipation of the future in the total 
past and its non-clarified horizons. Each epoch anticipates and is late for itself.” Merleau-
Ponty 2010: 81.
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which humankind both creates and sublates culture – in which individual 
subjects become more conscious of their genuine essence. This is what, I 
believe, Husserl implies in his late manuscript Monadologie:
The universe of monads, a monadic universal unity, is in process 
of enhancement in infinitum. And this process is necessarily one of 
constant development of sleeping monads to patent monads and 
development to a world which constitutes itself always against 
through monads […] And this world-constitution is a constitution 
of an ever higher humanity and supra-humanity (Übermenschentums) 
in which everything grows conscious of its true being and takes on 
the form of perfection or of a free self-constituting reason.243
As Husserl cryptically remarks, this movement is what he understands 
with God. God, according to his phenomenological position, ought to 
be understood not as the perfectly rational substance or the totality of 
monads itself but as “the entelechy residing in the universe of monads as 
the idea of the infinite telos of the development of absolute.”244 If we were 
to subscribe to the concepts of God and absolute, which, as I believe, 
are highly controversial in connection to phenomenology, it is necessary 
to reinterpret them in post-eschatological (or post-metaphysical) terms: 
although history does not completely lack progress and perfection, they 
should not be taken as pre-given categories of historical development. If 
there is a divine element in the life of humanity, it can be discovered in the 
generative development of humankind, in its horizon of infinite develop-
ment. This horizon, however, is possible only on the basis of a perpetual 
critical reflexivity that is targeted towards those beliefs, practices, and 
habitualities according to which we live by. In human history, freedom 
and renewal belong together; and together they nurture the utopian con-
sciousness which is the greatest capacity of the political animal. 
243 “Das Monadenall, eine monadische All-Einheit, ist im Prozess einer Steigerung in infi-
nitum, und dieser Prozess ist notwendig ein beständiger der Entwicklung von schlafenden 
Monaden zu patenten Monaden und Entwicklung zu einer sich in Monaden immer wieder 
konstituierenden Welt, wobei diese Welt konstituierenden Monaden als patent konstituie-
rende nicht alle sind […]. Und diese Weltkonstitution ist Konstitution eines immer höhe-
ren Menschen- und Übermenschentums, in dem das All seines eigenen wahren Seins be-
wusst wird und die Gestalt eines frei sich selbst zur Vernunft oder Vollkommenheitsgestalt 
konstituierenden annimmt.“ HuaXV: 610. Translation in Hart 1992a: 336.
244 HuaXV: 610
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  Is this not what Paul seems to imply in the first letter to the Corinthi-
ans, when he says that “The kingdom of God is not in word (en logō) but in 
power (dynamis)”?245
***
It was indeed a sign of intellectual chauvinism that Europe, especially 
through the historical consciousness of modern age, saw itself as fulfilling 
what Hegel called the “march of God” – the inevitable triumph of uni-
versal reason through the societal and political institutions of modernity. 
However, at the same time, it would be an indolence of thought to give up 
on this connection between historical teleology and universalism. Teleol-
ogy, as I have shown in this last part of the work, not only functions as an 
inalienable tool of self-understanding but it also animates our societal and 
political imagination by providing it with a horizon of possible develop-
ment; it is only through a teleological understanding that philosophy – in 
its search for a shared world – can execute its genuine task. 
245 1. Cor. 4:20. Cf. also Luke 17:20–21: “Once Jesus was asked by the Pharisees when 
the kingdom of God would come. He answered them, “The kingdom of God is not coming 
with a visible display. People won’t say, ‘Look! Here it is!’ or “There it is!” For the kingdom 
of God is among you.”
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his work began as a reflection of a specific paradox. As I ar-
gued in the beginning, Husserl’s reflections on Europe took 
their point of departure from the recognition of a particu-
lar cultural sickness, the “crisis” of Europe. On the basis of 
Husserl’s characterizations, I defined the basic sense of this 
crisis as a peculiar “loss of meaning”, as the inability to justify the basic 
beliefs, values and practices of a culture – the ineptitude to bring its aims 
into lively intuition. As a cultural phenomenon, the crisis became painstak-
ingly manifest after the First World War, which uncovered the unfounded 
nature of the 19th century progressive beliefs relating to techno-scientific 
development as well as to the political institutions of the European nation-
states. However, in his attempt to comprehend the genuine origin of this 
distress, Husserl set himself to uncover the teleological development of 
modern scientific rationality, which, through the Galilean matrix of exact 
mathematical ideality, had dismissed the questions of normativity, of pur-
pose, aim and teleology. As a result of the Galilean step, Husserl argued, 
the ideas of self-responsibility and autonomy could no longer be articulat-
ed in the context of scientific rationality, and Europe – what was still the 
name for the idea of progress in the philosophy of the nineteenth century 
– could only be interpreted in terms of organic or mechanistic unity of 
peoples and nations. Thus, it may seem surprising that alongside with this 
state of confusion and disintegration, Husserl argued that the world was 
still witnessing the “spectacle of Europeanization”, simply, the world be-
coming all more European. This process – for which the term “globaliza-
tion” might be more suitable today – was not a mere recent phenomenon: 
Husserl was well aware that the expansion of Europe (or the West) and 




torical process whose leading thrust may be traced back to the colonialist 
motives of the Roman Empire.1 Still, despite the various crises of Europe 
that Husserl was referring to as well as the frenzy nationalism of the early 
twentieth century, this spectacle had not suffered any major setbacks.
  Hence the basic paradox: How can something that is deeply in crisis 
be expanding to all over the world?
  As I have argued in this work, according to Husserl’s account it was not 
so much the entity Europe that was in crisis, but the principle of universal 
reason that had accompanied its development since the Antiquity. In any 
of its historical phases had Europe realized this principle in an unrestricted 
pure form; rather, its history was a series of attempts to interpret the idea 
in a worldly context and by worldy limitations, i.e., to give it a concrete 
form through cultural practices, territorial rearrangements and political 
institutions. From Plato’s political idealism to Hellenic and Kantian cos-
mopolitanism, from the Christian idea of universal congregation to mod-
ern theories of universal natural law, the history of European universalism 
was to be understood as a series of struggles for a greater clarity on uni-
versalism and its conditions of possibility, but also as a series of monstrous 
articulations that served as a justification for different forms of European 
imperialism. In this sense, the history of European universalism was noth-
ing less than a “history of crises”: a history of one-sided interpretations 
that announced themselves in what Husserl called the “apparent failure of 
rationalism”.2 However, as the explicitly non-universalistic movement of 
Fascism was to show, the simple renouncement of this principle entailed 
only the emergence of new monsters – what Husserl, still in the beginning 
of the 1920s, called the “juggernauts of power-ideas in arms”, or, the “false 
gods of nationalism”.3 
  Husserl, accordingly, began to see the task of phenomenology in a 
new cultural-societal light: its task was to provide not only the sciences 
with an evident foundation but more generally, to articulate a new idea of 







  Let us recapitulate the basic argument of this work. In the first part 
of the work, I approached the topic of Europe by focusing on the idea of 
the European crisis as a peculiarly modern phenomenon. I argued that 
although Husserl’s late reflections on Europe were basically inseparable 
from the phenomenon of crisis, his position was primarily reactive rather 
than assertive: Husserl did not invent the crisis discourse but he inherited 
it. By doing so, he aimed at reformulating the basic presuppositions of 
this discourse and these concepts anew. Through my reading of the ideas 
of modern political community and historical teleology, I showed that it 
was not as much the particular form of culture “Europe” that was in crisis 
but the general principle of rational life that had become effective since 
the birth of Greek philosophy. This principle, or what Husserl often called 
“the idea of Europe”, was to be distinguished from its historically real-
ized form: Europe as a particular cultural lifeworld. During the modern 
times, this crisis announced itself, first of all, in the loss of natural human 
sociality; however, it was also made possible by the novel framework of 
historical teleology, which gave birth to the new ideas of cultural transfor-
mation and periodization. Whereas for the philosophers of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth century, the crisis was still discussed in connection to the 
basic framework of progressive historicity – it was coined, for instance, 
with ideas of social and political revolution – for the academic debates of 
the early twentieth century this faith began to appear as a mere illusion. 
As a concept, the crisis seemed to lose its connotations of openness and 
active resoluteness, and it was now attached to the novel eschatological vi-
sions of inevitable decline that were implied in the Christian connotations 
of this notion. Despite the occasional apocalyptic undertone of Husserl’s 
remarks, I argued that his position was best understood in terms of active 
resoluteness. Through his reflections on the structure of human rationality, 
there emerged a novel possibility of discussing the crisis as a phenomenon 
inextricably bound to the habitual and sedimented character of subjectiv-
ity and meaning and resolvable by a renewal of the community.
  In the second part of the work, I first discussed the basic conditions of 
this habituation and sedimentation in the new understanding of phenom-
enology as a genetic notion that also investigates the generative processes of 
meaning formation. By contrasting Husserl’s account of transcendentality 
with that of Kant’s, I argued that the phenomenological idea of subjectiv-
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ity was to be understood as fundamentally temporal, finite and singular – 
but also essentially tied to the nexus of intersubjective relations that reach 
beyond the life of the individual. Thus, the sphere of sociality turned out 
to be not just a domain among others but the most essential topic in re-
gard to the constitution of a common world. With the help of his concept 
of lifeworld, I argued, Husserl aimed at capturing this constitution both 
in its essential universality – lifeworld as an a priori structure of experi-
ence – as well as in its normative (e.g., cultural and historical) specifica-
tion. By doing so, I moved on to the analysis on the territorial aspects of 
this specification in the constitution of domesticity and alienness through 
the transcendental structure of homeworld and alienworld. Although this 
structure implied a certain idea of intransitivity (i.e., I cannot simply put 
myself into the position of the alien due to the generative depth of her 
tradition), unlike empathy, which founds itself on the essential interstice 
of the streams of consciousness, the structural difference of home and 
alien had its common foundation in the lifeworld as a universally shared 
horizon of experience. By showing how the constitution of a particular 
community is always tied to a certain set of cultural accomplishments – 
and how their relation can actually be read in terms of a specific paradox 
of subjectivity – I argued for the relevance of Husserl’s idea of “personali-
ties of a higher order”.
  In the third part of this work, I turned my focus on the birth of Greek 
philosophy and its revolutionary effect on the ideas of communality and 
historicity. This event, I showed, was to be understood not only in terms 
of an individual attitude but as a a geo-historical-social movement, which 
had its foundation in the specific relativization of individual homeworlds 
and their traditionalities. Philosophy itself, I argued, was to be understood 
as a specific generative transformation that resulted in a novel awareness of 
cultural particularity and a critique of limits. For Husserl, this was the 
founding motive of the idea of Europe – it was the first world-historical 
culture that was able to confront its typicality and to understand its own 
particularity not as a given but as a question to be asked. As I showed, Hus-
serl’s understanding of the effect of Greek philosophy was not restricted 
merely to the scope of scientific endeavor, for instance, to its novel dialec-
tical method or the systematic accumulation of knowledge. Instead, the 
breakthrough of Greek philosophy entailed a more profound transition 
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in the very notion of culture itself – a new idea of communal existence 
striving towards goals and accomplishments of a new kind, i.e., ideas that 
are only partially achievable in concrete action. Following Husserl’s own 
concurrent use of the term, I referred to this idea under the heading of 
universal culture, and respectively, I employed the term “universalism” 
to denote its realization in different domains of cultural co-operation. I 
argued that this transition had its most powerful effects in the spheres of 
communality and historicity that were now rearticulated in the light of 
a twofold liminal transformation. The idea of Europe, as understood by 
Husserl, was born out of the will to overcome the limits of one’s own 
homeworld in two regards, spatial and temporal. First, philosophy en-
tailed a specific relativization of all territorial frontiers, and secondly, 
it aimed at transcending the pre-philosophical framework of teleology 
through a novel idea of “unlimited task”. These transformations, I argued, 
could also be regarded from a more concrete standpoint, motivating a 
novel understanding of political universalism. Instead of a merely person-
alistic or solely interpersonal account of ethical life, the Platonic influence 
of Husserl’s position was best understood as a specific intertwining of the 
two – for Plato, individual and social ethics belonged essentially together. 
Thus, the political function of philosophy was not to be understood in 
terms of simple leadership or authoritarian implementation of a particular 
model but as the critical observance of inherited institutions and practices 
and the motivation of a universal self-responsibility.
  In the fourth and last part of the work, I articulated this idea of com-
munality and historicity with the concepts of Husserlian phenomenology. 
By arguing for the indispensability of the historical-critical approach in 
this context, I emphasized the necessity of rearticulating the ideas of his-
torical teleology and progress on the basis of Husserlian epoché. The idea of 
teleology, I showed, was to be understood as a category of critical reflec-
tion that is executed on the basis of the present moment; as such, it was to 
be conceived as essentially critical towards all pre-given narratives on the 
course of history. Moreover, the teleological reflections were entertained 
not merely in regard to past development but for the sake of an open 
horizon of future development. By showing how Husserl’s reflections on 
ethics took their point of departure from the division between absolute 
and relative ideals, I argued for the essential inexhaustibility of histori-
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cal development on the basis of critical renewal. Thus phenomenology, 
besides opposing all forms of historical determinism, was to be conceived 
as fundamentally critical towards all ideas on “the end of history”, i.e., the 
realization of the normative ideals of humanity in the course of worldly 
time. By redefining the field of phenomenology in regard to the radical-
ly open horizon of historical development, I argued for the indispens-
ability of rearticulating phenomenological philosophy as an essentially 
communal-critical undertaking. On the basis of these reflections, I turned 
my gaze to the political implications of Husserl’s theory of communality 
and historicity. By discussing the temporal and generative implications of 
Husserl’s social ethics, I argued for a novel understanding of the motive 
and sense of political idealism in Husserlian phenomenology. Instead of 
a ready-made static model of communal co-operation and its respective 
cultural-political institutions, this idealism was to be understood in terms 
of dynamic “utopianism”, which, unlike the tradition of European-Oc-
cidental utopian thought, could accept and make sense of the necessary 
transformation of its ideals. Finally, by discussing the idea of universalism 
on the basis of the aforementioned considerations, I argued for the indis-
pensability of rearticulating the normative ideal of transcendental inter-
subjectivity on the basis of Husserl’s ambiguous notion of “community of 
love” (Liebesgemeinschaft). By discussing this notion in regard to the context 
of Pauline discourse of apolitical communality, I argued for the necessity 
of understanding the motive of universalism in regard to the fundamental 
intertwinedness of human subjectivity – an intertwinedness of feeling and 
willing that is constantly obliterated through particular identity-positions 
that separate human beings from one another. Through the concept of 
love, I maintained, Husserl was able to account for a specific idea of inter-
subjective relatedness that does not resign itself to a particular set of social 
or political institutions, but is able to project for itself an infinite horizon 
of future development. 
  These reflections made possible a set of further questions. If, indeed, 
we ought to consider Europe not as a mere continent but as an idea of 
rational life and universal culture in general, how should we understand 
this relation between the name and the idea? Should we interpret their 
relation, as Husserl did, in terms of a specific “entelechy […] which holds 
sway throughout all the changing shapes of Europe and accords to them 
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the sense of a development toward an ideal shape of life and being as an 
eternal pole”?5 Were this the case, it would be hard to account for the 
different alienations or breaks from this tradition, for instance, the vio-
lent and expansionist history of the Roman Empire or Western Christian-
ity, or, the imperialist tradition of the modern nation-states of Europe. 
It would indeed be naïve to consider the emergence of Fascism or Euro-
pean anti-Semitism as mere aberrations of this tradition, as contingent 
realities merely accompanying the entelechy of the universal ideal. Against 
Husserl’s understanding of the European history as “a battle between the 
awakened reason and the powers of historical reality”6, we should account 
for the one-sided, suppressive, and even totalitarian tendencies of this 
“awakened reason”. The fact that Plato’s reflections of the best possible 
republic were accompanied by a set of “totalitarian” practices concerning 
eugenics, the division of classes and the freedom of artistic creation should 
not be interpreted as mere historical prejudices of the time – they were, 
at least partially, consistent consequences of his static ideal of the polis. 
A similar critique can be entertained, for instance, in regard to Hegel’s 
historical reflections on the peoples of Africa: by simply equating the Afri-
can character with the pre-universalistic and pre-cultural stage of spirit’s 
development, he could coherently conclude that their Europeanization 
would be not only necessary but inevitable.
  In this regard, however, I believe that Husserl’s reflections on the phe-
nomenology of progress provide important insights concerning this kind 
of reasoning. What Husserl envisaged with his insistence of treating the 
progress as a category of the will was the critical idea later articulated by 
Adorno and Horkheimer in their Dialectic of Enlightenment (1947) accord-
ing to which progress, insofar as it is proclaimed as a category of being or 
history, is always accompanied by a myth or a mythological dimension that 
can never be absolutely verified. Historical narratives that point towards 
the inevitable triumph or decline of a culture are necessarily one-sided 
and partial. As we can observe from our contemporary perspective, Kant’s 
5 “[…] daß unserem europäischen Menschentum eine Entelechie eingeboren ist, die den 
europäischen Gestaltenwandel durchherrscht und ihm den Sinn einer Entwicklung auf 
eine ideale Lebens- und Seinsgestalt als einen ewigen Pol verleiht.“ HuaVI: 320. 
6 “Es geht durch die ganze „europäische” Geschichte von ihrem Anfangen an dieser 




optimistic history of cosmopolitanism was based on the pacific aspects of 
global trade-relations – as he proclaimed, “the spirit of commerce, which 
is incompatible with war, sooner or later gains the upper hand in every 
state”. What he dismissed, however, were the novel motives for conflicts 
between the imperial powers resulting from the rivalry for material re-
sources, or, the inherent instability of the global financial system, already 
quite apparent in the early 18th-century economic bubbles of John Law’s 
Mississippi and the South Sea Company but also in the more recent crises 
of the European economic constitution.
  Spengler was indeed right to prophesy a European decline at the be-
ginning of the 1910s; what he failed to acknowledge, however, was the 
latent reformatory potential of the Faustian spirit of the Western world 
– the colossal destructivity of the two world wars was followed by a sig-
nificant advancement in the development of transnational political orga-
nizations, which, at least in the mainland of Europe, were able to foster 
a successful period of peace. Following Adorno and Horkheimer, it is in-
deed possible to characterize these historical narratives – the particular 
historical interpretations on the teleological development of history – in 
terms of a “myth”; however, even myths contain within themselves an ele-
ment of truth. What we need to acknowledge is the general structure of 
contamination with the mythological that accompanies all forms of historical 
teleology, a contamination whose essential one-sidedness can only be ac-
knowledged in retrospect.
  Hence, in regard to the history of European universalism, I believe it 
is possible to point towards several competing “narratives” that concern 
its historical development. These narratives ought to serve neither the be-
lief in European supremacy nor the renouncement of this ideal, but our 
critical thinking that aims at articulating its conditions of possibility anew. 
Universalism, as I have argued, can only be accounted for in the overall 
teleological development of reason, which articulates itself always on the 
basis of a specific generative history: it can – and it must – understand it-
self always on the basis of a particular cultural and historical situation, in 
relation to the overall matrix of individual traditions. It is thus possible to 
account for Husserl’s own idea of the “historical nonsense” of the “spec-
tacle of Europeanization”, i.e., the violent and unilateral history of this 
development. But we can also point towards another historical narrative 
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of European universalism based on self-criticism or even self-negation, 
and not solely on mythical constructions. We are only to think of Plato’s 
critique of pre-Socratic philosophers in The Sophist, presented by the El-
eatic Stranger – “Every one of them seems to tell us a story, as if we were 
children”7 – referring to the attainment of autonomity through a specific 
transcending of the past. We can think of the beginning of Descartes’ Medi-
tations and his will to “to demolish everything completely and start again 
from the foundations”, Nietzsche’s account of the history of European 
philosophy, or, the last paragraph of Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach: “All previ-
ous philosophers have interpreted the world in various ways, but the point 
is…”. Besides the history of propagation, there is also another tradition of 
European universalism, and it is that of negativity, of contesting the whole of 
previous tradition. In our own times, as our whole political and intercultural 
framework relies on a positive definition of culture – a culture must mean 
a collection of practices and institutions which can be rendered into an 
account on the clash of civilizations – this tradition is, naturally, in danger. 
However, I believe that it is still the only way to resist what Ágnes Heller 
has vividly interpreted as the root of the contemporary malaise of cul-
tural cynicism – the loss of historical consciousness. “Europe is on a crash 
course in relativizing its own culture,” Heller writes, 
so much so that it arrived at a stage of advanced cultural masoch-
ism. Therefore, it lacks any future-oriented social fantasy apart 
from its technological forms of governance, having become a the-
atre without performers, a place where grand narratives of an-
other, better future in politics, social questions, or anything else, 
are no longer forged.8
I believe Heller is right in pointing out that our contemporary distrust in 
political utopias does not result merely from the growing role of techno-
cratic administration – what Max Weber called the “iron cage” (stahlhartes 
Gehäuse) of the modern social order – but perhaps even more vigorously, 
from the overarching sense of disappointment in the grand narratives of 
the past. Because our history is one of serious failures in political idealism 
– and because the contemporary hegemony of technocratic governance 
constantly reasserts its authority in regard to these ideas – we have lost 
7 Plato, Soph. 242c.
8 Heller 1988: 154.
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our faith in the redeeming potential of historical consciousness. While it is 
true that our political imagination cannot do without criticism, it is like-
wise true that without any idea of a historical teleology, this criticism is in 
constant danger of turning into mere skepticism, cynicism and nihilism. 
Thus teleology, in the phenomenological sense described in this work, 
should liberate us from the yoke of the present moment and serve the 
purpose of renewal.
* * *
We are living, I believe, in a time in which cultural environments and 
political cultures are shaped, perhaps more than ever, by the questions 
of territoriality and alienness, of historical narratives and the future of 
humanity at large. Moreover, we have become acquainted with powerful 
mediums of communication and interaction, which, by emerging on the 
basis of virtual geography, are making possible new forms of internation-
ality and cosmopolitanism. Nevertheless, despite the justified concerns on 
the dissolution of national and ethnic traditions, of the disappearance of 
indigenous cultures, we are also experiencing a new phase of territorial 
demarcation on cultural, ethnic, and socio-economic grounds. In my view, 
the only reasonable conclusion, though very modest and general one, that 
can be drawn from this situation is the conviction according to which the 
mere universality of the medium – of capital, of mass communication, of 
the internet – is not yet enough. Genuine universality, as I have argued, 
must be accompanied by a radical reflection concerning the foundation of 
this idea in the notions of subjectivity and generativity. This reflection must 
be targeted to those intellectual and material capacities and conditions 
that make possible the genuinely self-reflexive and self-critical attitude; 
moreover, it must realize itself through the demythologization of social, 
political, and cultural identities. There is an essential abyss that separates 
“I” from the “other” – I have no access to the experience of the other – but 
this discrepancy is essentially different from those particular forms of gen-
erativity that have their common foundation in the shared world.
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  In this regard, I would like to follow Husserl’s insight according to 
which Europe is perhaps more than a name. Europe, the philosophical 
idea, continues to serve as a title for the intersection of the particular and 
the universal. 
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